Editor’s Note: Mohammad Salami, a Pakistani academic, has written for Stimson in the past on Iran’s energy woes, its efforts to control Internet access, and the role of sanctions in limiting its ability to function as a hub for trade.
By Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East Perspectives Project
China has adopted a pragmatic approach to the Houthis in Yemen, balancing economic and security interests with minimal direct involvement to maintain a controlled level of instability that protects its shipping interests in the Red Sea at the expense of the U.S. and its allies.
“Why would China help us address the Houthis problem when it obviously distracts and depletes us?” Elbridge Colby, then the incoming administration’s nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, asked in October 2024 while analyzing Chinese policy toward the Yemeni group.
China has not given formal recognition to the Houthis, a militant faction that has taken control of much of Yemen since 2014. But by providing the Houthis with dual-use technologies such as satellite imagery and drone components, Beijing complicates U.S. maritime security efforts.
To manage this delicate position, China employs indirect diplomacy and dual messaging: avoiding direct criticism of the Houthis while emphasizing civilian ship protection. For instance, in January 2024, China refrained from blaming the Houthis for Red Sea instability but called for maritime safety. In February of that year, it deployed its 46th Navy Fleet to the region, yet abstained from a UN resolution condemning the Houthis just a month earlier.
Overall, China’s strategy is built on three pillars: securing commercial interests in the Red Sea, countering U.S. influence, and coordinating with regional powers such as Saudi Arabia.
China views economy and trade as central to its national interests, and any threat to commercial routes is treated with strategic urgency. With over 60 percent of European Union-China trade passing through the Suez Canal, the Red Sea’s security is critical for Beijing. While many countries have rerouted ships via the Cape of Good Hope — incurring two-week delays, nearly $1 million in added fuel costs per trip, and a 30 percent increase in overhead — China has adopted a different strategy to secure safe passage for its vessels.
Reports, including documents from the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), suggest Chinese coordination with Iran, which backs the Houthis, or directly with senior Houthi figures such as Mohamed Ali Al-Houthi to ensure that Chinese ships are not targeted. This quiet understanding has paid off for Beijing. Despite an 85 percent drop in general Red Sea shipping and a 66 percent decline in Suez Canal traffic, Chinese shipping tonnage has significantly increased, according to Lloyd’s List data as of January 2024.
The collapse in March 2025 of a brief Gaza ceasefire has not deterred owners and operators from returning to the Red Sea. Total volumes, measured by gross tonnage, almost doubled in the first quarter of this year as steeply discounted Russian and Iranian oil competed to supply the Chinese market.
By leveraging its ties with the Houthis, China has transformed the Red Sea crisis into an opportunity, gaining a competitive economic edge over global rivals. As noted as early as late 2023 by the South China Morning Post, China’s reluctance to join US-led maritime patrols stems from this strategic advantage: Why participate in securing a route that currently serves as a benefit? Ultimately, Beijing has used the Red Sea disruption to outmaneuver competitors and expand its influence in global trade without direct military involvement.
Challenging the US
China views the Middle East — particularly Yemen, Gaza, and the Red Sea — as a key arena in which to test and challenge the US-led global order. Beijing sees Yemen not only as a place to assert solidarity with the Palestinians, on whose behalf the Houthis say they are conducting their maritime attacks, but also as a strategic zone for advancing geopolitical competition with the United States. Its policy toward the U.S. is guided by three “no’s”: no cooperation, no support, and no direct confrontation. This helps China maintain plausible neutrality while still undermining the Western rules-based system.
In China’s view, the global order — especially amid an ongoing US-China trade war — is no longer fair. Beijing believes a shift toward a more multipolar international structure is both necessary and inevitable. In this context, China sees the Houthis and Yemen’s capital city of Sana’a as important strategic pieces in reshaping regional alignments. The instability caused by Houthi actions is not necessarily viewed negatively by China, especially if it weakens the perceived credibility and control of the United States.
While avoiding open defiance of U.S. sanctions, China has been linked to material support for the Houthis: In April 2025, the U.S. sanctioned Chang Guang Satellite Technology Company for providing satellite imagery to the Houthis, threatening U.S. interests in the Red Sea. In August, Yemeni authorities in Aden found drone kits on a commercial ship that originated in China.
At the same time, China benefits from continued U.S. military entanglement in the Middle East, which prevents Washington from fully pivoting to Asia. U.S. involvement in Middle East conflicts, China believes, weakens U.S. focus on more critical fronts for Beijing, such as the South China Sea and Taiwan. Meanwhile, China’s stance on the Red Sea mirrors its approach to Gaza: discredit U.S. policies, emphasize neutrality, and appeal to Arab and Global South audiences.
China’s stance toward the Houthis has also shifted in response to changing regional dynamics, particularly the recent de-escalation between Arab states and Iran. Previously aligned with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — its key economic partners — Beijing has adopted a more pragmatic approach now that those states have distanced themselves from direct conflict with the Houthis. This shift reflects a strategy of moving from a passive “wait and see” stance to actively exploring potential gains from the new regional balance.
The Houthis, meanwhile, view China favorably, seeing it as a powerful, anti-imperialist force aligned against U.S. dominance. This perception enhances China’s political leverage and provides an opening for greater involvement in Yemen’s economy. The Houthis hope China will invest in their territories and incorporate them into Beijing’s broader regional economic initiatives. Houthi political bureau member Ali al-Qahoum has voiced support for deeper cooperation with China, Russia, and the BRICS nations as a way to undermine U.S. power and help dismantle the unipolar world order.
China’s policy has evolved from one of neutrality to a form of “silent support” — quietly backing the Houthis while avoiding overt confrontation with international norms. This shift is grounded in China’s economic interests, alignment with regional de-escalation efforts, and opposition to U.S. influence in the Middle East. However, Beijing faces a delicate balancing act if the Houthis grow increasingly destabilizing and regional tensions, especially between Iran and Israel, continue to rise.
Dr. Mohammad Salami is a research associate at the International Institute for Global Strategic Analysis (IIGSA). His areas of expertise include politics and governance, security, and counterterrorism in the Middle East, especially the Persian Gulf region. @moh_salami