The U.S. government can work to prevent Chinese telecommunications equipment manufacturers from dominating the global market by promoting Open Radio Access Networking (Open RAN) standards worldwide. Radio access networks are a component of mobile infrastructure that connects user devices to the broader network. Open RAN is a technological standard for building that infrastructure using open, compatible interfaces, allowing hardware and software from different vendors to work together. While China’s mercantilist policies boost its manufacturers, such as Huawei and ZTE, enabling them to take ever-greater global market share, a wider adoption of Open RAN standards would level the playing field and allow the United States to restore its telecommunications equipment industry as a global competitor.
Open RAN standards represent a set of open, non-proprietary technological specifications for the hardware and software used in radio access networks. The standards are set by the O-RAN Alliance, an international group of mobile network operators, vendors, and research institutions.
As a concept, Open RAN allows wireless networks to function as “Lego blocks,” with separate but interoperable components. This feature enables network operators to buy equipment from any vendor and integrate with the rest of an Internet Service Provider’s (ISP’s) existing network’s hardware and software. Thus, it comprises a system that allows competition at all levels of components, enabling innovation among companies. This architecture differs from the status quo, which does not permit third-party vendors to participate in the network buildout. In contrast, China’s strategy of promoting Huawei and ZTE leverages the current RAN equipment market to lock in ISPs to cheap but vulnerable systems.
Open RAN concepts have been around for almost a decade, but adoption has been slow and skewed toward the U.S. market. Open RAN made up 7 to 10 percent of global revenues in 2024, and is expected to reach 20–30 percent by 2028. Several factors are impeding the global adoption of Open RAN systems.
First, for countries that have already deployed wireless infrastructure, converting their networks to Open RAN equipment is costly and does not offer an immediate source of new revenue. However, promoting the use of Open RAN standards in greenfield wireless markets, such as developing countries, presents a profit opportunity for Open RAN hardware and software companies as well as a more economically viable and secure competitor to Chinese offerings.
Second, some critics have voiced concerns that a network comprised of multiple vendors’ components will be less secure, as bad actors would have a wider attack surface. However, this view misjudges the tradeoff. Open RAN allows companies to pick and choose trusted vendors if certain ones are unreliable, unlike the status quo, in which developing countries often incur the full security threats posed by companies such as Huawei and ZTE.
The primary benefit of wider adoption of Open RAN networks for the United States can be to help restore the position of U.S. equipment and software companies, which has been lost to China-backed competitors. But Open RAN also provides technological advantages in and of itself. Despite concerns about a wider threat landscape, competition from a marketplace with more vendors and adequate standards will compel vendors to make their products more secure and reduce costs. Open RAN can also deliver a better quality of service and experience, enable greater automation of network functions, and facilitate faster innovation through the disaggregated network architecture.
Broader adoption of Open RAN systems worldwide is strategically important for the United States, both in terms of “defense” and “offense” perspectives in the techno-economic competition with China. On the “defense” side, Open RAN is crucial for countering China’s highly subsidized and predatory approach in telecommunication networks. While Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE promote full-stack RAN equipment, especially in greenfield markets in the Global South, they do so at the expense of U.S. national security (since Chinese Intelligence Law requires all companies to share information with the Chinese government) and harm Western competitors. Even U.S. allies such as Germany and Spain maintain Huawei within their telecommunication networks, although they have shown signs of phasing out the presence of Chinese equipment.
The U.S. government can take the “offensive” by helping boost America’s technological leadership and increase U.S. companies’ global market share through the adoption of Open RAN standards as part of trade negotiations. U.S. companies are equipped to play a greater role in the global RAN market by driving innovation in the use of virtualized networking components. However, this requires the U.S. government to lead a collective, public-private effort to promote Open RAN standards since adoption from market forces alone has been slow and ineffective.
To create a coherent foreign and trade policy approach that reinforces the already existing efforts to promote Open RAN worldwide, the U.S. government should do the following:
The U.S. Trade Representative’s Office (USTR) should initiate a Section 301 investigation into unfair foreign policies that distort competition or impede the adoption of Open RAN standards. This investigation could include assessing countries that are phasing out Huawei or ZTE, such as Germany, Spain, and other countries that heavily rely on these companies, such as Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, or Serbia.
The U.S. government should fulfill its commitments under the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) by recommitting to a zero-for-zero tariff regime on telecommunication equipment and other goods listed in the ITA. The United States is an exporter of goods relevant to the global adoption of Open RAN, including processors and controllers (over $24 billion of exports in 2023) and power and distribution panels (over $7 billion). Maintaining a zero-for-zero regime for ITA goods means maintaining competitiveness. Fulfilling ITA commitments would enable U.S. manufacturers of telecommunication equipment to access components and intermediate goods at competitive prices and avoid potential retaliation.
The U.S. government should provide more “muscle” to the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) so it can issue loans, equity, and other foreign direct investment (FDI) to ease the adoption of Open RAN-compatible equipment and standards.
The U.S. Department of State should reinforce its “tech-diplomacy” efforts at the multilateral level, such as at the OECD, ITU, and APEC, and at the bilateral level, particularly in Global South countries with low Internet connectivity rates, such as India. While the U.S. government has taken some steps to promote Open RAN, this doesn’t seem to be a priority. The State Department’s Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy (CDP), intended to centralize America’s cyber diplomacy, was downsized and pulled apart into multiple offices. The Technology Gateway Program (TECHGATE) seems to be a continuation of USAID’s “Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership,” a program to build cybersecurity capacity in the Global South. TECHGATE’s funding opportunity does not include explicit metrics to include Open RAN technologies’ adoption as an outcome.
Open RAN standards can be an effective tool for countering Chinese tech dominance, and the United States should leverage that tool to protect its economic and national security.