Marium Akhtar
Once the largest country in Northeast Africa, unified Sudan was one of the most strategically important countries due to its geographic location, resources, and regional connectivity. However, it was divided in 2011, resulting in the creation of the Republic of South Sudan and the Republic of the Sudan (Sudan). South Sudan, with a population of approximately 12 million, ranks 38th in global oil production. Sudan, with a population of 51 million, ranks 16th in gold reserves and 46th in oil production. The River Nile tributaries flowing through it make it vital for regional water control and strategic influence; however, internal power struggles, economic decline, and foreign intervention fuel instability. The insight argues that foreign involvement under the pretext of support and reform has exacerbated the worsening internal conflict in Sudan.
Unified Sudan was divided due to geopolitical rivalries compounded by ethno-religious conflicts and continuous power struggles. Two major civil wars, the First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972) and the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), were fought between the central government in Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). In 2005, the Central Government and the SPLA signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) brokered by the US, UK, and Norway, which ended the second Sudanese civil war. This led to a referendum in South Sudan, resulting in its independence in 2011, with Salva Kiir Mayardit becoming its President and remaining in power to this day.
In 1989, General Omar al-Bashir seized power in Sudan through a military coup by ousting Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, who had been in office since 1986. His rule focused on restoring stability amid internal divisions, external pressures, and isolation. For this, his government turned to local alliances in response to rebellion and instability, such as the Janjaweed militia, which was later restructured and formalised as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
Economically, GDP growth increased at the start of Bashir’s era (1991-1992), primarily due to the early reforms. Later, due to US-led sanctions and isolation, it dropped to 1% in 1994 before reaching a peak of 18.3% in 1997, driven by Chinese investment.
This was followed by a decline in 1998-99, due to the initial phase of oil exports after infrastructural completion, followed by a steady growth observed from 2000 to 2007 as Sudan aligned with China and Iran. Thereafter, a downward trend has persisted to this day.
The 2011 split left unresolved border demarcation, oil transit, and revenue sharing issues, as 75% of the oil reserves remained in South Sudan, and most pipelines and refineries were in Sudan. The map in Figure 3 highlights the oil infrastructure in Sudan and South Sudan, including oil fields, pipelines, and border lines.
China had adopted a pragmatic, non-interventionist approach since the 1990s. After 1995, it heavily invested in Sudan’s oil industry, with over 130 companies investing US$13 billion across various sectors. Chinese crude oil import patterns underwent significant changes before and after 2011 due to conflicts and instability in the region. A sharp decline occurred after 2011, mainly due to the loss of oil-rich South Sudan, political repression, and internal unrest.
The recent instability in Sudan finds its roots in the ouster of Omar Al-Bashir. In 2018, Public and civil society protests started over economic grievances inspired by the Arab Spring and US-led Western pressure, enabling the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) to oust Bashir in a coup in 2019. A Joint Civil-Military Sovereignty Council was established, which was dissolved by SAF leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in 2021, returning Sudan to military rule.
The post-Bashir Sudan re-engaged with the West, normalised ties with Israel in 2020, and was removed from the US terrorism list, boosting aid. In the same year, the United Nations established the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) to support the country’s democratic transition. The mission ended in 2024 at Sudan’s request, due to ineffectiveness and bias. Meanwhile, US aid through USAID rose from $134 million in 2018 to $773 million in 2021.
During the transitional period, the RSF, under the leadership of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), expanded both financially and militarily, mainly due to illicit trade and its control over gold mines.
Tensions escalated as the RSF’s integration into the army failed, making the SAF view it as a threat to its power. Resultantly, in April 2023, violent clashes erupted between the SAF and RSF, starting a civil war that devastated major cities, displaced 8 million people, and caused Sudan’s GDP to contract by nearly 12% by the end of the year. In April 2025, the RSF announced the formation of a parallel government to manage areas under its control. However, this move has been firmly rejected by Sudan’s internationally recognised government.
Sudan’s internal politics are deeply entangled with global power rivalries, particularly between the US and China. Since the 1990s, China has remained a dominant economic actor, especially in the oil sector. After 2011, despite a decline in crude imports due to the loss of oil sources in South Sudan, it continued to invest in both states.
Conversely, the US has maintained a more interventionist approach. Critics argue that Washington’s policy has often destabilised regimes under the banner of counterterrorism and democracy, as seen in Iraq, Libya, and Syria. The US-backed CPA and the 2011 referendum, though aimed at peace, ultimately created two fragile states.
Later in 2019, the US pushed for Bashir’s ouster without establishing an alternative institutional framework, fueling a power struggle. More recently, it seeks to influence the Red Sea, while countering China’s Belt and Road initiative and Russia’s presence through strategic containment, diplomatic pressure, and targeted sanctions.
The SAF is supported by Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. Their strategic interests include safeguarding Nile water access, countering Gulf rivals, influencing Africa, securing the Red Sea near the NEOM project, and pursuing a naval base in Port Sudan. On the other hand, the RSF is backed by the UAE, Chad, and the Libyan National Army, with interests in gold resources and the Red Sea routes. These alignments show how regional states exploit Sudan’s conflict for strategic and economic gain.
Sudan’s prolonged instability reflects the convergence of internal fractures and external rivalries, making it a proxy battleground for African, Arab, and global interests. While the SAF and RSF compete for control and foreign actors influence, shaping its political future, people suffer the worst crisis. The country reflects a complex, multipolar world in which the sovereignty of fragile states weakens as they become entangled in the power plays of external actors.