AFGHANISTAN is not a victim of any global power play, nor is there any conspiracy being hatched against it. The sole responsibility for the current state of affairs lies with the Afghan Taliban’s interim regime. Their policies are not aligned with their initial commitments, and they have disappointed experts and statesmen who once labelled them as ‘Taliban 2.0’, projecting them as different from the Taliban of the 1990s.
When the Taliban seized Kabul in August 2021, they promised a break from their 1990s image by announcing a roadmap centred on general amnesty, an inclusive Islamic government, respect for women’s rights within the Sharia, freedom of the press and assurances that Afghan soil would not be used against other countries. They also pledged to maintain constructive relations with the international community and to support education and reconstruction. However, these commitments quickly unravelled: the interim government became an exclusive Taliban-dominated setup, women and girls were barred from education and most work, the press was muzzled, extremist groups regained space and Afghanistan remained diplomatically isolated, with engagement limited to humanitarian aid and migration control.
Even so, the world remains divided, engaging with the Taliban only for humanitarian purposes and to curb the outflow of migrants from Afghanistan, with much of this focus directed towards the West. This is why several European countries are engaging with the Taliban.
The Taliban have ruled Afghanistan for four years but have failed to earn international goodwill.
Those who were jubilant after Russia’s recognition of the Taliban regime would have been disappointed that Afghanistan was not invited to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit scheduled for Aug 31 to Sept 1 in Tianjin, China. Afghanistan holds observer status in the SCO, and it is up to the host to decide whether to extend invitations to observer states.
It was up to China to invite the Afghan interim foreign minister, Amir Khan Muttaqi. After the Chinese foreign minister’s recent visit to Kabul to attend a trilateral meeting, which included Pakistan, it was hoped that his Afghan counterpart would be invited to participate in the summit, and Russia, which had recognised the Taliban regime, was expected to put its weight behind the bid.
The US has become vindictive, since Moscow has recognised the Taliban regime and has a strict travel ban on the Taliban leadership, which were imposed on the Taliban leadership under UN Security Council Resolution 1988 (2011). Amir Muttaqi was not even allowed to visit Islamabad, where he had been several times on an official visit. One understands that he also has a scheduled visit to Delhi, which both Washington and Islamabad are not in favour of, but more surprising is that he will miss the SCO summit.
Several interpretations are circulating in the media, ranging from references to the UN Security Council resolutions to suggestions that the move was a punitive action against the Taliban for failing to fulfil their promises to China and Pakistan to act against terrorists operating from Afghan soil. Others believe that the Taliban’s arrogance was the real trigger. In this context, Afghanistan’s government recently terminated a 25-year oil exploration and extraction contract in the Amu Darya basin, previously awarded to the Chinese firm Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company (CAPEIC), locally known as ‘Afchin’. Signed in early 2023, the $540 million agreement required an initial investment of $150m in the first year.
Interestingly, on one hand, the Taliban have revoked the agreement with the Chinese firm, while on the other, they are offering incentives to Central Asian companies for the same contract. But how can these firms realistically invest in a project that has already become controversial, one from which a significant economic power has been pushed out?
The Taliban have ruled Afghanistan for four years, yet they have failed to build goodwill with the international community. Even neighbouring states from Central Asia to China and Pakistan are reluctant to deepen cooperation, despite their interests in sustaining Afghanistan’s fragile economy and ensuring regional order. The Taliban have attempted to leverage Afghanistan’s natural resources, minerals, agriculture and water for diplomatic and geopolitical influence. However, to exploit these assets, Afghanistan must demonstrate compatibility with international norms and fulfil its commitments. Instead, the Taliban’s domestic order remains as draconian as it was in the 1990s, and their approach to neighbours remains unchanged. How then can they expect the world to treat them differently this time?
Many countries, especially in Europe, are engaging with the Taliban largely out of fear of uncontrolled migration and to prevent a collapse that could trigger another civil war. Yet uncertainty persists: in the event of renewed internal conflict, where will the Taliban stand? Will they revert to being the same militia they were before the Doha Agreement, aligned with Al Qaeda, the TTP, and other regional and global terrorist networks?
Pressure on the Taliban is mounting not only from the US but also its close ally China. Beijing remains uncertain about whether the Taliban can be trusted to engage in long-term mineral extraction and transnational infrastructure projects, as its initial experiences with the regime have been far from reassuring. The recent trilateral meeting in Kabul, involving Afghanistan, Pakistan and China, was significant in this regard. While China has excluded Afghanistan from CPEC, it is still exploring new bilateral geo-economic avenues, attempting to simplify its regional ambitions. Yet, for such cooperation to materialise, the Taliban must first prove themselves trustworthy to both their neighbours and the wider world.
Some Taliban leaders may realise that meaningful engagement with the international community cannot come solely through economic and trade partnerships; it also requires social and political transformation. But the central question is whether the Taliban leadership, especially Mullah Hibatullah, has the capacity or even the will to grasp this reality. Unless they learn to adapt, Afghanistan will remain trapped in isolation and continued suffering.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, August 31st, 2025