Executive Summary:
- The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an increasingly important vehicle through which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks to drive changes to the international system. This year’s summit focused on seizing the current moment to shape rules and standards in emerging frontiers, such as artificial intelligence (AI), cyberspace, and outer space.
- CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping used the summit to unveil the Global Governance Initiative—the fourth such initiative he has announced in recent years. While currently short on substance, it is symbolic as a statement of intent for shaping an international order in the Party’s own image.
- The SCO claims that it is not an anti-Western organization that seeks reform, not revision, of the international system. The Tianjin Declaration’s explicit and implicit criticisms of the United States, as well as SCO member states’ ongoing violations of international law in ways that undermine the current system, suggests that such claims are largely rhetorical.
“Profound changes in international relations have taken place.” “In a spirit of partnership, the Parties shall strive to promote the multipolarization of the world and the establishment of a new international order.” These are quotes not from last week, but from 1997. They can be found in the “Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order,” a foundational document of what later became the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (UN Digital Library, May 20, 1997). In the nearly three decades since, the leadership in both countries has remained remarkably consistent on this assessment, and in their commitment to bringing this new order into existence. By the time presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping arrived in the Kazakhstan for last year’s SCO summit, they felt comfortable declaring that the multipolar world “has become a reality” (Kremlin.ru, July 4, 2024).
The SCO, in Xi’s view, is an increasingly important vehicle through which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seeks to drive changes to the international system. It is, in the words of the 2024 Astana Declaration, “one of the key multilateral organizations in a multipolar world” (多极世界中重要的多边组织之一) (SCO, July 4, 2024). Events in northern China over in recent days appear to provide further grist for these narratives, with a successful summit in Tianjin—including a visit, for the first time in seven years, by India’s prime minister Narendra Modi—culminating later in the week with a military parade to commemorate the Second World War (China Brief, August 27). [1]
Concrete outcomes from the summit are difficult to assess, however, despite the triumphal pageantry. While Xi was keen to announce a tranche of smaller-scale goodies for the SCO’s ever-expanding membership, key details regarding the more significant agreements signed are yet to be disclosed. These include approval for an SCO development bank, finally greenlit after the PRC first proposed the idea over a decade ago, as well as an “SCO 10-Year (2026–2035) Development Strategy” (上合组织未来10年 (2026–2035年) 发展战略) (People’s Daily, September 2). An arguably more significant outcome was a symbolic one. Xi used the occasion to unveil a new foreign policy framework, the Global Governance Initiative (GGI; 全球治理倡议), which represents another milestone in the PRC’s attempts to exert normative influence over the international system (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], September 1). In addition, speeches and documents from the summit indicate an ambition to seize the current moment and shape rules and standards in emerging frontiers, such as artificial intelligence (AI), cyberspace, and outer space.
SCO Calls for Global Governance Reform, Targeting the United States
In a speech delivered at the 25th Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the SCO, Xi talked up the original aims of the organization in enhancing security cooperation, announcing four new security centers while declaring that members’ extensive borders had been turned into a “bond of friendship, mutual trust, and cooperation” (MFA; Jiemian, September 1). This optimistic gloss was undermined, however, by the India-Pakistan border war in May, an exchange of fire between Tajik border guards and Taliban fighters near a Chinese gold mining operation in August, and unresolved tensions on the Sino-India border following a deadly clash in 2020—a reminder of persistent distrust among SCO member states (The Times of Central Asia, September 2).
The SCO’s ambitions have expanded considerably over the course of its existence. The Tianjin Declaration (天津宣言) signed at this year’s summit was framed more broadly in terms of building a “more representative, democratic, and just multipolar world” (更具代表性、更加民主公正的多极世界). Careful to avoid accusations that the co-signatories of the declaration reflect revisionist approaches to the international system, these ambitions are articulated as being centered on the United Nations, and specifically in the principles enshrined in the UN Charter. While the declaration assesses that the UN needs reform in order to adapt to “the needs of modern political and economic realities” (当今政治和经济现实需要), the GGI concept paper points out that this “does not mean to overturn the existing international order or to create another framework outside the current international system” (不是对现有国际秩序的推倒重来，也不是在现行国际体系之外的另起炉灶).
Despite SCO members often framing the organization as not anti-American or anti-Western, the declaration explicitly and implicitly singles out the United States (and Israel) for criticism. Its text “strongly condemns the military strikes by Israel and the United States against the Islamic Republic of Iran” (强烈谴责以色列和美国 … 对伊朗发动的军事侵略), while disapproving references are made to countries making unilateral actions and pursuing destabilizing trade and economic policies. New initiatives, such as the SCO Development Bank, are also characterized as necessary to “further reduce dependence on other external financial institutions” (进一步降低对外部其他金融机构的依赖)—in other words, moving away from reliance of U.S.-led ones (China Daily, September 3). Moreover, PRC scholars argue that the SCO might fill governance gaps created by U.S. retrenchment (ChinaAffairs+, September 3).
Xi’s unveiling of the GGI comes as a response to this deficit in global governance; or, as Zhao Xiaozhuo (赵小卓) of the Academy of Military Science describes it, the “irreversible decline” of American hegemony (ChinaAffairs+, September 4). The GGI concept paper articulates three examples of such deficiencies: serious underrepresentation of the Global South in international institutions, an erosion of authoritativeness (i.e. institutions are failing to enforce their rules), and an urgent need for greater effectiveness (multilateral plans and agreements are not being implemented properly). In response to these challenges, it proposes five core concepts (五个坚持) to underpin the reform of global governance. These all follow standard PRC normative pronouncements and include a commitment to sovereign equality, international rule of law, multilateralism, a people-centered approach, and achieving “real results” (力求实效). While this is not substantively groundbreaking, the GGI’s symbolism and the ambitions that lie behind it are representative of an emboldened PRC on the global stage.
PRC Seeks to Shape Rules in Emerging Frontiers
The output from this year’s summit indicates that the SCO might begin its attempts at global governance reform with a focus on influencing norms in emerging areas. This was most notable in the GGI Concept Paper proposed by the PRC, which described “areas with large governance deficits that urgently require attention” (治理紧迫性突出、治理赤字较大的领域). The priority areas listed include international financial institutions, AI, cyberspace, climate change, trade, and outer space.
This focus on alternative approaches to developing and regulating technology- and innovation-heavy domains is apparent in the Tianjin Declaration, which discusses improving coordination and cooperation on science and technology, enhancing future technologies programs and promoting innovation through an international AI center. Other reporting discusses other initiatives in this area, including a China-SCO AI cooperation forum held in Tianjin earlier this year (SCO, May 30; China Diplomacy, September 3). The forum promoted products from leading PRC AI companies, suggesting that the PRC’s primary aim through deepening technological ties with SCO member states is strategic, as much as it is economic or developmental. Rather than “global affairs being decided by all, the governance system built by all, and the fruits of governance shared by all” (全球事务由大家一起商量，治理体系由大家一起建设，治理成果由大家一起分享), as the GGI concept paper claims, alternative mechanisms like the SCO may function instead as channels for establishing the dominance of the PRC’s technology stack throughout the global south (China Brief, July 25, August 7). PRC scholars have pitched this as a reason for prospective members to join the organization, arguing that the SCO is adapting to emerging technologies, and that “participation may be selective, focusing more on economics, technology, and AI” (ChinaAffairs+, September 3).
As a sign of the gap between rhetoric and reality, however, language about cyberspace and outer space across the declaration and concept paper highlights a hypocrisy at the heart of core tenets that the SCO claims to hold dear. As the declaration—and all previous SCO declarations—makes clear, member states are committed to “commonly recognized principles and norms of international law” (公认的国际法原则). These include respect for sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of states, equality, mutual benefit, non-interference in internal affairs, and non-use of force or threat of force. But the actions of member states, in particular those of Russia and the PRC, frequently violate those principles and norms. Putting aside the illegality of ongoing PRC actions in the South China Sea and in Taiwan’s territorial waters, there is growing concern in the West over the aggressive actions of PRC state-sponsored cyber threat actors (China Brief, December 20, 2024, September 2). One joint advisory authored or co-sealed in August by cybersecurity agencies from 13 different countries warns that these actors are “targeting networks globally, including, but not limited to, telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure networks” (U.S. Department of Defense, September 4). Reporting from The New York Times quotes Western officials characterizing the attacks as “unrestrained” and “indiscriminate,” and clearly violating a number of the SCO’s core principles (NYT, September 4). The anti-satellite (ASAT) programs of both the PRC and Russia also appear to violate another commitment in the declaration to keep outer space free of weapons of any kind (Secure World Foundation, June 12).
Conclusion
Already, the GGI is gaining traction, with officials from Russia, Belarus, Iran, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Malaysia, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan all praising Xi’s latest global initiative. In the months and years ahead, it likely will be incorporated into joint statements and used to promote CCP preferences in other multilateral fora. While fissures remain at the heart of the SCO, these have not been a barrier to its expansion over the last quarter century. As the PRC in particular seeks to use the organization as a vehicle for molding the international system in its image, it may well continue to grow in stature in the years to come.