Between August 31 and September 1, national leaders gathered in Tianjin, China, for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit. The grouping — founded in 2001 by China, Russia, and four Central Asian states as a regional organization — has grown to include India, Pakistan, Iran, and Belarus. In total, SCO has 10 members, 2 observers, and 14 dialogue partners. China continued its high-profile week of diplomacy two days later when Beijing hosted a massive military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII, highlighting the sacrifices that China made in that conflict and showcasing its military and economic development over the subsequent decades.
Experts at Stimson assess these developments and their implications.
What had China hoped to achieve from this summit week, and did it deliver on those expectations?
Yun Sun: Beijing had defined the SCO Summit as its signature foreign policy event of the year, and China almost certainly achieved its main diplomatic and strategic aims. This summit was noteworthy for being the largest SCO meeting yet, with more than 20 state leaders and heads of 10 international organizations in attendance. The week included Putin’s unprecedented 4-day visit and Modi’s participation, which was not assured until the recent deterioration of India-US relations. SCO members passed the organization’s development strategy for the next decade, including the start of a process to found a SCO Development Bank. The summit also announced plans to establish four centers for countering security threats, securing information, combating organized crime, and countering illicit narcotics. Participants agreed to pursue cooperation in other areas, including energy.
The debate in the policy community on SCO has always been focused on whether it is more than merely a talk shop. The question is well-justified, as the SCO’s concrete cooperation mechanisms and deliverables have so far remained limited. However, from the Chinese perspective, the SCO has served as an effective mechanism to manage Russia, its close neighbor with a complex history. The international isolation Russia has faced since the Ukraine war has given China an opportunity to push the SCO to expand cooperation beyond the narrow security focus that had long been Moscow’s preference.
The four security centers and the political process to found a SCO Development Bank are important additions to the current existing structures to beef up SCO’s substantive mechanisms. In addition, the group’s agreement to promote cooperation in capacity building, training, green economy, and digital economy are signs of the organization’s future potential.
How does the SCO summit fit in the context of Russia’s foreign policy agenda, and what lessons should the Trump administration learn from the gathering?
Peter Slezkine: For Putin, the SCO summit in China was a second act on center stage. After his red-carpet handshake with Trump in Anchorage, Putin stood at Xi’s right side throughout the SCO meeting in Tianjin and the Victory Day celebration in Beijing. He also followed up his recent ride in Trump’s Cadillac by inviting first Modi and then Kim to take a spin in his Russian-made Aurus limousine. In the most iconic moment of the summit, Putin and Modi walked hand in hand to have a conversation with Xi. The three leaders’ display of solidarity served as a public rebuff of Trump’s attempt to pressure China and India to cut purchases of Russian energy. A subsequent announcement that Putin and Xi had signed a legally binding memorandum to build the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline only reinforced the message that Europe’s (partial) refusal to buy Russian energy would simply result in greater exports to Asia.
For the United States, the display in China should be more instructive than concerning. The SCO hardly amounts to an anti-American conspiracy (as Trump suggested in a recent “truth”), and the Russia-India-China troika will never be free of tension. There is no need for geopoliticians in Washington to worry about a Eurasian “heartland” uniting against the West. Yet the Trump administration would do well to remember that there is a world beyond the West, and that what works within the American empire might backfire when attempted beyond its bounds. The United States’ “allies and partners” are, in effect, subordinate entities in a single structure, and they have had little choice but to accept Trump’s trade terms. Russia, India, and China exist outside of this system, and while Washington can inflict pain, it cannot dictate decision-making.
Did India and China really resolve their differences at the summit?
Elizabeth Threlkeld: While policymakers in Washington and beyond are right to note the warming ties between India and China, India’s careful balancing act, coupled with the slow pace of tangible progress, suggests that underlying structural tensions and deep-seated distrust still impede a genuine reset.
The visit was Modi’s first to China since 2018, and notably his first since the 2020 border clash between Indian and Chinese troops, in which 20 Indian soldiers were killed. In Modi’s meeting with Chinese President Xi, the two leaders termed their countries “development partners and not rivals,” adding that “their differences should not turn into disputes.” They expressed a desire for progress towards a boundary resolution along with the resumption of mechanisms to strengthen economic and people-to-people ties. Xi called for “the dragon and the elephant [to] dance together.”
Despite this warmth, caution is warranted in assessing both the potential of the India-China thaw and the extent to which it is being driven by a summer of unanticipated India-US tension. Modi emphasized the latter point in his meeting with Xi, noting that China-India ties “should not be seen through a third country lens.” Indeed, the India-China rapprochement predates US-India troubles, with both sides having laid the groundwork in their October 2024 border disengagement deal. India was also careful to balance Modi’s visit to China with a prior stop in Quad partner Japan, where the two sides outlined extensive cooperation and expressed concern over Chinese coercion, albeit without naming Beijing. The Indian Army also conducted a high-altitude warfare exercise in Arunachal Pradesh as the SCO summit unfolded, a clear show of strength in a territory Beijing claims as its own. And while Modi appears to have confined his remarks on the May India-Pakistan crisis to criticizing support for cross-border terrorism, Beijing’s continued military backing of Islamabad remains a significant obstacle to deeper India-China rapprochement.
How did Pakistan use the summit to advance its own aims with China, India, Iran, and Russia?
Asfandyar Mir: While India set the tone at this year’s SCO leaders’ summit — with Prime Minister Modi’s full-court presence and a media narrative portraying the gathering as strategically weighty, even a counter to U.S. influence — Pakistan adopted a steadier, more workmanlike posture. It maintained top-level attendance and leveraged the SCO as a forum where it appears alongside major powers. Islamabad is not a prime mover in the putative multipolar order, but it generally prizes clubs of global powers like the SCO that don’t marginalize Pakistan or singularly elevate India.
On substance, Islamabad will count the joint declaration’s language as a win: SCO leaders “strongly condemned” the March 11 Jaffar Express hijacking and May 21 Khuzdar bombing in Pakistan, in addition to the April 22 Pahalgam terrorist attack. The condemnation of violence on Pakistani soil drew attention to Pakistan’s security concerns, complicating efforts by India to portray Pakistan solely as a perpetrator of regional instability. It also contributed to a broader international consensus against the violence of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), which was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States in August.
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir held a trio of high-level meetings on the sidelines of SCO. The most consequential was with President Xi Jinping. Beijing’s official readout situated the relationship within “once-in-a-century transformations” and pledged Chinese support for enhancing Pakistan’s “national strength” — suggesting Beijing’s continued commitment to building Pakistan’s military capabilities, particularly relevant after the May India–Pakistan clash.
Sharif and Munir also met Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian. Against the backdrop of U.S. Secretary of State Rubio’s mention of Pakistan’s willingness at “mediating conversations” between the U.S. and Iran, this engagement can have broader implications. A further meeting with Russian President Putin saw Sharif emphasize that Pakistan respects Moscow’s close partnership with India while nonetheless seeking to deepen ties with Russia.
Together, the summit likely advanced Pakistan’s commitment to the SCO as well as its bilateral relations with China, Iran, and Russia. Yet domestically, the impact was still modest compared to the exhilaration that followed Army Chief Munir’s lunch meeting with President Trump, which is viewed as strategically the most consequential diplomatic event for Pakistan in 2025.
How was Beijing’s high-profile week of diplomacy received in Washington, and what are its implications for the United States?
Daniel Markey: Not surprisingly, the SCO summit, bilateral meetings, and subsequent WWII commemorative parade went down poorly with President Trump. Initially, the president’s focus — and that of other top administration officials — was fixed on India. Trump, Peter Navarro, and Scott Bessent took India to task, especially for its continued purchase of Russian oil. Soon, however, Trump’s gaze shifted to the WWII celebrations, which he critiqued both for being a venue for anti-U.S. conspiracy and for inadequately crediting U.S. wartime contributions against the Nazis and Imperial Japan.
By the end of the week, Trump circled back to observe: “Looks like we’ve lost India and Russia to deepest, darkest, China. May they have a long and prosperous future together!” Trump’s words were presumably intended to mock or taunt India and Russia for sliding closer to a dangerous China, not to accept U.S. responsibility for pushing major world powers into Beijing’s willing embrace. Still, the Trump administration’s critics will be correct to wonder whether Trump is committing a major strategic blunder, at least with respect to India.
Generally, the SCO summit week touched a nerve in Washington. For years, the U.S. news media has characterized Chinese-led groupings like the SCO and BRICS as reflections of an alternate global order, raising American concerns that they could one day supplant gatherings like the NATO and G-7 summits. This week’s ubiquitous photo spreads featuring Chinese, Russian, and Indian leaders in warm conversation, followed by Beijing’s massive military parade that showcased weapons systems obviously intended to rival those of the United States, played into existing American anxieties far more than the limited tangible achievements of the SCO would necessarily suggest. At a moment of profound partisan division at home and when U.S. alliances and partnerships are being tested abroad, this week may long be perceived as an important, if mainly symbolic, milestone along the path to diminished U.S. leadership on the world stage.