A Preview of UNGA 2025
By Lisa Sharland, Senior Fellow and Director
Protecting Civilians & Human Security Program
Close to 150 heads of state or government are anticipated to converge on New York next week for the opening of the UN General Assembly. The elephant in the room will be the role of U.S. leadership (or lack thereof) in driving the future of the UN system. The first eight months of the Trump administration have reinitiated a U.S. withdrawal from the multilateral system.
This includes cuts to humanitarian aid and assistance, shrinking advocacy for human rights, and opposition to efforts to address climate change.
U.S. officials have made clear that the U.S. wants the UN to get “back to basics,” focusing on peace and security. There is sadly no shortage of conflicts for the UN to focus on. Commitments by several countries to recognize Palestinian statehood in the week ahead will draw attention to the war in Gaza. Conflicts in Ukraine, Sudan, Haiti, and Myanmar, to name only a few, are also likely to feature throughout the week.
Trump’s speech to the General Assembly could offer an opportunity to lay out areas of congruence with U.S. priorities. For instance, the U.S. has interests in seeing the peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda succeed, an effort that could be bolstered through further support to the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC. Similarly, addressing the insecurity in Haiti remains a regional priority, with the U.S. seeking the political support of the Security Council to mobilize a new coalition “Gang Suppression Force” backstopped by a UN logistics mission. However, those efforts will require more funding, and the U.S. has proposed further cuts to existing UN peacekeeping missions through the pocket recissions package.
The question overshadowing ministerial statements and high-level side events in New York next week will be how much the UN can do with less, and whether it will remain relevant in this moment of global disruption.
One Year On: The Pact for the Future
By Richard Ponzio and Rebecca Snyder
Global Governance, Justice, and Security Program
In the wake of the socioeconomic fallout from the COVID-19 crisis and attendant “crisis of global governance,” last year’s Summit of the Future galvanized attention worldwide, through its chief outcome, the Pact for the Future, on rebuilding trust and gaps in global governance; reaffirming the UN Charter, 2030 Agenda, and other existing commitments; and renewing the multilateral system to prepare for over-the-horizon challenges and opportunities.
At a minimum, this year’s UNGA High-Level Week will underscore further progress in taking forward three major elements of the Pact (with overall progress elaborated in section two of this recent Stimson publication).
First, all day on Wednesday, September 24, the Secretary-General will gather the heads of international financial institutions and many leading (G20) economic powers, alongside small and medium-sized countries, for the inaugural Biennial Summit for a sustainable, inclusive, and resilient global economy (Pact Action 48). That same afternoon, the UN’s Climate Summit 2025 aspires to accelerate momentum on climate finance and related priorities in the run-up to COP30 this November in Belém (Pact Actions 9, 10, and 52). Finally, on Thursday, September 25, Member States will launch the Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance to advance international governance of AI (the Pact’s Global Digital Compact – Objective #5). These efforts to modernize global governance coincide with waning political and financial support for global cooperation among some influential countries (see next point below).
The UN’s Extreme Liquidity Crisis & the UN80 Initiative Response
By Richard Ponzio, Senior Fellow and Director
Global Governance, Justice, and Security Program
Another major issue to watch at High-Level Week is how the world body’s long-standing financial crisis has suddenly morphed into an extreme liquidity crisis, thanks largely to sudden and severe U.S. cuts this year to both its assessed (legally-bound) and voluntary contributions across the UN system.
Ongoing deliberations suggest that major humanitarian agencies, including the World Food Program, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and International Organization for Migration, could see severe annual budget shortfalls as high as 30% to 40%, and the UN Secretariat may need to let go at least 20% of its staff in the coming few months, in addition to other immediate cost-saving measures through the Secretary-General’s new “UN80 Initiative.”
As elaborated in this recent policy memo, it is critical that Member States work closely with the Secretariat to fully leverage this multi-pronged effort to help advance, rather than detract from, the Pact for the Future, by creating a more agile, cost-effective, and impactful UN system. Though the Secretary-General and his leadership team are in an unenviable position, if well executed by a motivated and mission-driven international civil service and backed by a cross-regional group of champion governments and partners in civil society, the combined UN80 Initiative and Pact for the Future follow-through agendas hold out the promise that the United Nations can navigate the turbulent waters ahead and come out a more nimble, tech-savvy, and outcome-oriented, rather than process-driven, international organization on the other side.
Finding Peace
By Andrew Hyde, Senior Fellow
Strategic Foresight Hub
As leaders gather in New York, there are a number of calls for the UN to get “back to basics,” a demand that often centers on achieving better results on peace and security. Conflicts across the globe have multiplied, but the UN has often found itself sidelined and marginalized.
Many see the UN as falling far short of its promise as embodied in its founding documents. UN structures are no longer fit-for-purpose — ranging from the waning legitimacy of an unrepresentative Security Council, where vetoes become weapons for great-power competition, to a UN peacekeeping framework that seems mired in legacy approaches that are not responsive to the shifting aspects of 21st century conflicts.
Global leaders are often dismissive of what the UN can offer, rarely invoking it as part of proposed solutions. Instead, they see the institution as a last resort, like in Haiti, completely absent, as in Ukraine, or as a diminished presence in regions such as the Middle East. A looming financial reckoning at the UN — largely triggered by a U.S. policy shift away from meeting its treaty obligations to pay its share into the UN budget — adds an element of urgency to reconsidering the goals and purpose of the UN and its toolkit. The Berlin Peacekeeping Ministerial in May and an ongoing review of the UN’s Peacebuilding architecture offer some possibilities for direction, reform, and evolution, but that is only if resulting proposals are truly responsive to the need and can attract widespread Member State support. Tinkering and technical fixes won’t be enough and will only add to the narrative of decline.
Technology on the Agenda
By Allison Pytlak, Senior Fellow and Director
Cyber Program
The impact of digital and other technologies on international peace and security, development, and human rights is increasingly at the fore of UN discussions. These issues dominated the UNGA High-level Debate in 2024, with the adoption of the Pact for the Future and its accompanying Global Digital Compact (GDC).
This year, as the UN marks 80 years since its founding, the organization’s ability to navigate complex contemporary issues like cybersecurity and AI governance will be crucial for the UN to remain a primary forum for global cooperation and diplomacy, amid a governance landscape that is less state-centric and increasingly skeptical of global organizations. Nonetheless, digital security, cyber attacks against critical infrastructures, digital civilian protection, surveillance, and disinformation are some of the topics that states may raise during their statements to the General Debate, in line with a growing number of references to these topics in recent years. One major event to look out for is a high-level informal meeting on September 25 to launch the Global Dialogue on Artificial Intelligence Governance. The Global Dialogue was established by the UNGA in August, in line with commitments made by Member States as part of the GDC. Importantly, this is a multi-stakeholder meeting and dialogue, meaning that it is intentionally open to the participation of non-governmental organizations and experts — access that is not taken for granted in UN settings, especially on technological issues. Indeed, the UN’s ability for meaningful and non-tokenistic multi-stakeholderism will also be a determinant of how effective its tech and digital governance efforts will be in the future.
Meanwhile, and as the UNGA High-level opening is in full swing next week, the Republic of Korea (ROK) will host a High-level Open Debate on Artificial Intelligence in the UN Security Council on September 24 as part of its Council presidency this month. This builds on ROK’s leadership in the Council on raising the profile of how technological issues like cybersecurity and AI are affecting international peace and security. Stimson’s Cyber Program has been tracking the Council’s interest in these topics. A growing number of Arria-formula meetings, briefings, and debates have been slowly but steadily identifying the points of connection between the UNSC’s mandates and technologies, pointing to a need for greater engagement from the Council on such topics.
North Korea’s Approach to UNGA
By Jenny Town, Senior Fellow and Director
Korea Program and 38 North
North Korea, for the first time in seven years, is planning to send a high-ranking foreign ministry official from Pyongyang to address this year’s UN General Assembly (UNGA). The last few times North Korea took advantage of this global stage were during the first Trump administration.
In 2017, then DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho’s UNGA speech aimed to justify North Korea’s nuclear pursuits, coming on the heels of U.S. President Donald Trump’s assertion that the U.S. could “totally destroy” North Korea. However, by 2018, Trump and DPRK leader Kim Jong Un had already met in Singapore, where they signed a joint statement pledging to transform US-North Korea relations. Ri’s 2018 UNGA speech, therefore, emphasized trust and peace, and made frequent references to denuclearization and sanctions. But with the failure to reach an agreement at the ill-fated Hanoi Summit in 2019, North Korea has since left UNGA speeches to its UN representatives. This year’s UNGA speech will reportedly be delivered by a Vice Foreign Minister. The message will likely underscore recent North Korean assertions of being a nuclear armed state and denouncing denuclearization, while echoing grievances against the West shared by its close partners, China and Russia. However, whether and how it will address Trump’s repeated overtures for reviving diplomacy remain unclear.
Prospects for the High-Level Conference on Rohingya
By Steve Ross, Senior Fellow
Crisis in Myanmar’s Rakhine State project
Last month marked eight years since hundreds of thousands of Rohingya were forcibly displaced from Myanmar’s Rakhine State to Bangladesh by the Myanmar military.
On September 30, the UN General Assembly will convene a High-level Conference on the Situation of Rohingya Muslims and Other Minorities in Myanmar. The idea for the Conference was first floated by Bangladesh’s Chief Advisor, Mohammed Yunus, on the sidelines of last year’s General Assembly and was subsequently codified in December, with modalities adopted in March. The conference aims to “propose a comprehensive, innovative, and concrete plan for a sustainable resolution of the crisis,” particularly through Rohingya returns to Myanmar.
But efforts to realize a political solution will be frustrated by the evolution of events on the ground. The Myanmar military seized power in a coup in 2021, plunging the country into chaos. The collapse in 2023 of a tentative ceasefire between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic Rakhine armed group, led to the AA’s seizure of much of Rakhine State. Rohingya were caught between the conflicting parties and instrumentalized by both, particularly the military; counterintuitively, Rohingya armed groups fought alongside the military and against the AA and continue to clash with the AA along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border.
The humanitarian situation in Rakhine is now dire, with hundreds of thousands of Rakhine and Rohingya internally displaced, regular airstrikes, and a military blockade limiting humanitarian access and contributing to high levels of food insecurity. Moreover, the AA stands accused of committing further atrocities against the Rohingya, charges it denies. Across the border in Bangladesh, Rohingya in the world’s largest refugee camps have been squeezed by 150,000 new arrivals from Rakhine since the beginning of last year and steep declines in humanitarian assistance, which may soon prompt cuts to food assistance and are already impacting access to informal education, health services, and cooking fuel.
The Rohingya Conference will bring necessary attention to the Rakhine crisis, provide a rare platform for some Rohingya voices to be represented at high-level discussions (on the heels of a broader such effort in Bangladesh last month), and may yield some much-needed support from donors, even if it is not intended as a pledging conference. But a sustainable resolution to the crisis for now remains out of reach, particularly without cultivating a more robust, legitimate, and representative Rohingya civil society and deeper engagement with the powers that be in Rakhine.