ASTANA – The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) marked its 25th anniversary with its largest summit to date, signaling its evolution from a regional bloc focused on Central Asia to a platform addressing global issues.
Photo credit: VCG
The summit, held on August 31–September 1 in Tianjin, brought together over 30 world leaders, including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico – two heads of NATO member states. UN Secretary-General António Guterres also attended, underscoring the event’s growing reach.
By the close of the two-day gathering, the SCO adopted 20 documents. They included the SCO Development Strategy through 2035, an agreement to establish an Anti-Drug Center in Dushanbe and a Universal Center for Countering Security Challenges in Tashkent, as well as a joint statement marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II and the founding of the United Nations. The bloc also issued statements on cooperation in the digital economy, energy sustainability, green industry, artificial intelligence, combating drug trafficking, multilateral trade, and science and technology.
Observers said the Tianjin summit carried a distinctly global tone. The question, however, is whether the SCO has always aimed so broadly.
SCO 1.0: Building trust and securing Central Asia
Muhammad Shamsuddinov.
The SCO traces its roots to the “Shanghai Five,” a grouping formed in the late 1990s by Russia, China, Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan to resolve border disputes after the Soviet Union’s collapse. The framework proved effective and laid the groundwork for a permanent organization.
The group formally became the SCO in 2001, when Uzbekistan joined. Its founding declaration pledged to strengthen trust, friendship and good-neighborliness; expand cooperation in politics, trade, science, culture, education, energy, transport and the environment; and safeguard peace and stability in the region.
The SCO Charter and the first declaration of member states in 2002 reaffirmed those priorities. These early documents focused on regional cooperation and relations among members, with “regional security” understood primarily in the context of Central Asia.
SCO 2.0: From regional bloc to global player
The tone shifted in 2007 with the Bishkek Declaration, which began not with regional security but with globalization. It warned that growing interdependence made security and development “indivisible” and argued that unilateral actions could not solve global problems.
In 2008, the Dushanbe Declaration criticized plans for a global missile defense system, saying it undermined strategic balance and arms control.
The 2017 Astana Declaration called for keeping outer space free of weapons and urged a treaty banning arms in orbit. It also addressed conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, notably Syria, and touched on the need for a “political resolution of the Ukraine crisis.”
By 2020, the Moscow Declaration described the SCO as “an influential and responsible participant” in international relations committed to peace and conflict resolution. It lamented the end of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The 2023 New Delhi Declaration highlighted the digital divide, volatile financial markets, declining investment, fragile supply chains, protectionism, climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic as key threats to global stability.
The most recent Tianjin Declaration, adopted Sept. 1, opened by noting that “profound historical changes” are reshaping the world order. It called for a more just and representative multipolar system. The document condemned unilateral sanctions, criticized U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, and cited the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. It said peace in the region is only possible through “a just resolution of the Palestinian issue.” It also rejected bloc-based politics and warned against attempts to distort the history of World War II or rehabilitate Nazism.
Why the shift?
The SCO’s expanding agenda mirrors shifts in the global balance of power and the roles of its two main members, Russia and China.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2007 Munich speech marked a turning point, as he openly rejected a unipolar order and criticized the West. This marked the beginning of Russia’s distancing from the West, which escalated into confrontation by 2014 and reached a critical peak in 2022.
Meanwhile, China’s “fifth generation” of leaders took power in 2012, soon unveiling the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, a sweeping geo-economic project aimed at reshaping global trade and development. By 2017, the Communist Party declared the dawn of “a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics,” signaling global leadership ambitions.
Together, Moscow and Beijing steered the SCO into a broader “non-Western” platform, turning its declarations into vehicles for their diplomatic messaging. Summits increasingly became stages to address the world, as Tianjin demonstrated.
Other members, however, have tried to keep the SCO focused on its original mission. At the 20th summit, Tajikistan succeeded in having Central Asia recognized as the “core of the SCO,” a phrase included in the leaders’ declaration.
The author is Muhammad Shamsuddinov, a Dushanbe-based international relations expert
Translated and edited by Aiman Nakispekova
The article was originally published on Cronos.Asia