After U.S. & Russia, Pakistan Is 3rd Country To Offer It “Nuclear Umbrella”; What Lies Ahead Of Saudi-Pak Deal?



The new mutual defence treaty inked by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia astounded many. It came just days after the Gulf region was shell-shocked by Israeli strikes on a Hamas compound in Qatar.

The pact comes at an especially volatile time in the wake of both Iranian and Israeli strikes on Doha, uncertainty over the future of Tehran’s nuclear programme, and clashes between India and Pakistan in May.

“Even those accustomed to dramatic developments in the Middle East and South Asia were caught off guard by the announcement,” said Joshua White from the Brookings Institution.

While the agreement follows decades of close military ties between the countries, questions remain unanswered regarding its exact parameters, particularly any potential nuclear dimensions.

“The pact clearly formalises and deepens decades of Saudi-Pakistani security and defence cooperation, building on a landmark 1982 protocol agreement,” said White, which saw a significant deployment of Pakistani troops to Saudi Arabia.

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“There are a large number of Saudi military personnel who have been trained by Pakistanis, and there are Pakistani officers seconded within the Saudi Ministry of Defence,” added Camille Lons, a Gulf expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

According to Lons, the pact likely resulted from lengthy negotiations.

“We must be cautious in linking it directly to recent developments in the region, although the broader analysis that sees it as a response to growing Israeli power in the region and Saudi doubts about American security guarantees remains valid,” she told AFP.

For Syed Ali Zia Jaffery from the Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research at the University of Lahore, “Pakistan will find this agreement as a way to show its growing importance in the security architecture of the Middle East,” while Saudi Arabia, which has long relied on US muscle, “is looking to diversify its sources of security”.

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What About Nukes?

Pakistan is believed to have around 170 nuclear warheads, according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, but how they factor into the deal remains ambiguous.

There has been no official statement from either side about the establishment of a nuclear umbrella.

To date, only two such agreements exist: the US nuclear umbrella covering its European allies and Russia’s protection of Belarus.

Several Saudi and Pakistani voices have hinted at this possibility.

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Saudi Arabia included “conventional and non-conventional means in the treaty text,” a retired Saudi general told AFP, speaking anonymously due to the sensitivity of the topic.

“We made it very clear and written that it includes the Pakistani nuclear weapons,” he added.

Saudi analyst Ali Shihabi, known to be close to the royal court, also told AFP that “nuclear is an integral part of this agreement”.

Regional experts, however, have asserted that the situation is far from clear.

“Pakistan does not have any nuclear umbrella and there is just no evidence to suggest that Pakistan plans on providing one to Saudi Arabia,” said Jaffery.

“Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, policy, posture, strategy, and capabilities are only India-centric.”

Others suggested a lack of clarity on the issue may be intentional.

“It’s impossible to know the details of any potential arrangement in this area,” added Bruno Tertrais from the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris, “because that’s part of deterrence: what’s often referred to as strategic ambiguity.”

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And India?

Saudi Arabia maintains good relations with Delhi, Pakistan’s main rival.

India’s rapidly developing economy relies heavily on petroleum imports, with Saudi Arabia being its third-largest supplier, according to the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

“Would Saudi Arabia get involved in an escalation between Pakistan and India? I don’t think so. That would go completely against the kind of diplomacy Saudi Arabia is trying to pursue — which, like India, is one of multi-alignment,” explained Lons.

The signing of the pact comes just months after Pakistan and India fought an intense four-day conflict — one of the worst crises between the arch rivals in decades.

So how would Saudi Arabia react to renewed hostilities?

“Riyadh’s instinct would be to stay passive, preserving hard-won trade equities with India while honouring its security obligations to Pakistan,” said White.

“That balance will now be harder to sustain.”

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Saudi–Pakistan Strategic Agreement: Indian Expert Imran Khurshid Decodes

The Saudi–Pakistan strategic defence pact signals a high-stakes gamble, intertwining regional rivalries with nuclear risks. Its implications extend beyond Pakistan, demanding careful vigilance and analysis from India and the wider region.

The recent signing of a strategic mutual defence agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on 17 September 2025 marks a significant geopolitical development. While some in India attempt to downplay its importance—viewing it merely as the formalisation of longstanding defence cooperation—such a reading risks underestimating its wider implications.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have indeed shared deep military ties since the Cold War era. Pakistan has historically provided military assistance to Saudi Arabia, often in exchange for financial aid, training, advisory support, and even stationing troops in the kingdom. The new agreement formalises this relationship as a binding commitment, stating that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.”

Notably, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif confirmed that Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities “will be made available” to Saudi Arabia under the terms of the agreement, heightening both regional security concerns and the risk of undermining the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

At the same time, the agreement introduces uncertainty into Pakistan’s defence posture. Unlike earlier informal arrangements, this pact transforms bilateral cooperation into an institutionalized framework with binding commitments.

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This shift means that in the event of a crisis involving Saudi Arabia—whether with Iran, Yemen’s Houthis, or in broader regional rivalries—Pakistan would be compelled to respond militarily. This is very dangerous for Islamabad, as it has now entered turbulent and risky geopolitical waters, potentially being drawn into conflicts where its own national interests are marginal, while New Delhi must remain alert to the implications for regional stability.

Strategic Diversion and Blood for Dollars

These ties also play into Pakistan’s ideological identity, since the state has consistently justified its existence on religious grounds. By projecting itself as the guardian of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina, the Pakistani establishment strengthens its claim to legitimacy—especially at a time when it faces internal discontent, public anger over the imprisonment of Imran Khan, and a crisis of legitimacy.

Yet, beneath the optics of religious solidarity lies a dangerous reality. Many rational voices in Pakistan already fear the agreement could drag the country into Middle Eastern conflicts, such as Yemen and other areas. Given Pakistan’s proximity to Iran and the region’s volatility, this agreement could destabilize Islamabad more than it strengthens it.

The agreement also shifts Pakistan’s strategic focus away from domestic challenges and its border with India. By diverting resources and attention to foreign theatres, Islamabad risks weakening its internal security, leaving it vulnerable to both insurgency and economic instability.

Pakistan often laments that it lost nearly 90,000 lives during the so-called “War on Terror” because of its alignment with U.S. policies. Yet, once again, it risks entanglement in conflicts not of its making, shedding more blood of its people for others’ wars.

Moreover, if Pakistan becomes militarily involved in Yemen or elsewhere under this pact, it may find itself a direct target of Iran and other geopolitical actors with stakes in the region. It may also expose itself as a more direct target for actors such as Israel, which has both the capability and precedent of projecting influence across the region through intelligence and covert operations.

The Middle East is a highly volatile region and a chessboard of great power and regional rivalries, making it easy for states to become entangled in conflict and difficult for them to extricate themselves. Even greater powers find it challenging to navigate and balance relationships there; for Pakistan, this is especially difficult because it is economically vulnerable, geostrategically dependent on both China and the U.S., and lacks independent agency. Additionally, Pakistan shares a long border with Iran, further complicating its geostrategic calculations.

The security dilemma in international politics illustrates that every defence pact inevitably provokes counter-alliances. These reactions and counter-reactions intensify challenges, elevate expectations, and create new vulnerabilities.

History—from the World Wars to the Cold War—shows that alliances seldom ensure stability; they often exacerbate insecurity. For Pakistan, already struggling with internal insurgency, diverting resources and attention to Middle Eastern conflicts risks leaving domestic challenges unaddressed and further increasing its strategic vulnerabilities.

Moreover, Pakistan’s military hardware—particularly U.S.-supplied F-16s and other key platforms—cannot realistically be deployed against Israel or other U.S. allies without American consent, which Washington would never grant given its close relationship with Israel. One should also remember that Pakistan’s Noor Khan Airbase remains under U.S. surveillance and de facto control.

While Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons and delivery platforms, operational deployment in sensitive scenarios may still face indirect constraints due to geopolitical pressures and existing military agreements. While some might suggest the use of Chinese systems, they are of lower quality, as exposed during Operation Sindoor.

Even China does not fully trust its air defence systems; it primarily seeks to sell them to other countries for profit. For example, China uses Russian-made S-400 air defence systems itself while supplying less capable platforms to other states.

This limits Pakistan’s options and its ability to act independently, as it may also have to seek Chinese permission before utilizing its military platforms—and it remains uncertain whether China would grant such permission.

Even Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, historically justified as a deterrent against India, cannot credibly be extended to Saudi Arabia without violating the global non-proliferation regime and inviting international backlash. Pakistan’s past record—particularly the A.Q. Khan network that transferred sensitive nuclear technology and centrifuge designs to states such as North Korea, Iran, and Libya—already underscores global concerns about its role as a proliferator.

If Islamabad appears to make its nuclear umbrella available to Riyadh, it would revive those anxieties and set a dangerous precedent, encouraging Iran and others to seek similar capabilities, potentially turning again to suppliers such as North Korea or even Russia. Such a development could fuel further proliferation risks, escalate regional rivalries, and inject greater instability into an already volatile Middle East.

There is also a moral cost. Pakistan risks reducing its soldiers to mercenaries—shedding blood in foreign deserts for Saudi dollars. While the elite’s children remain safe in London or Dubai, the common Pakistani soldier and citizen will pay the price, whether in terms of lives, security, or economic hardship.

Saudi Arabia may provide Islamabad with financial, diplomatic, and moral support, including symbolic gestures on Kashmir. However, Riyadh will never put its own troops on the ground against India. The burden of blood will remain Pakistan’s alone.

Historically, Pakistan has acted as a “paid mercenary,” providing military services for money, destroying its relationships with countries, and later complaining about terrorism and its consequences. This pattern risks repeating itself under the new agreement.

No Room for Complacency

For India, this agreement cannot be dismissed as “just formalization.” The language of “mutual defence” and “strategic” carries deep meaning and must be studied carefully in today’s geopolitical context, not merely through the lens of past ties.

India enjoys strong geoeconomic and geostrategic relations with Saudi Arabia. Millions of Indians live and work there, and New Delhi and Riyadh have institutionalised cooperation across multiple domains. Recently, Saudi Arabia has also moderated its stance on Kashmir, especially after India abrogated Article 370; there was no significant hue and cry from these Gulf countries as used to be the case earlier.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia issued a statement clarifying that the pact is “purely defensive and not aimed at any third country.” Nevertheless, India must remain vigilant, as the agreement’s mutual defence commitments could still have implications for India’s strategic environment.

At a minimum, New Delhi should seek clarity from Riyadh on the terms of this agreement and ensure that Saudi commitments to Pakistan do not undermine Indian security. Trusting historic patterns, assuming that Saudi Arabia’s closeness with the U.S. will neutralize the risks, or relying on repeated assurances from Riyadh, is dangerous. In geopolitics, determinism and historicism are illusions; consequences, not intentions, define outcomes.

Conclusion

The Saudi–Pakistani defence agreement reflects Islamabad’s old habit of trading military services for financial relief. Yet, the consequences today are far more dangerous than in the past. By stepping into Middle Eastern rivalries, Pakistan risks antagonising Iran, Israel, and other geopolitical actors. Worse, the implicit nuclear dimension threatens the fragile global non-proliferation order.

For Pakistan, the pact may provide short-term benefits but will likely lead to long-term insecurity. Beyond financial gain, Pakistan may now face long-term consequences from direct involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts, increased internal instability, and reputational risks in the nuclear domain.

The agreement benefits Saudi Arabia more than Pakistan, while exposing Islamabad to immediate and future strategic vulnerabilities. For India, it is not an event to downplay but a development to watch with open eyes, measured analysis, and proactive diplomacy.

Ultimately, this agreement is more a strategic gamble than a stabilizing alliance—one that risks drawing Pakistan into conflicts beyond its capabilities, while further complicating the already turbulent landscape of South Asia and the Middle East.

  • Dr. Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Peace Studies (ICPS), New Delhi. He specializes in India-US relations, Indo-Pacific studies, and South Asian security issues.
  • VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR
  • With Inputs from AFP

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