The collapse on Friday of a high-profile terrorist prosecution could have been avoided if Scotland Yard had not put off a charging decision until what it believed was the last possible moment.
Liam Óg Ó hAnnaidh, also known as Liam O’Hanna, was accused of displaying a flag in a public place showing support for the banned terrorist organisation Hezbollah. An offence under section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000 was said to have been committed on 21 November 2024 at a concert venue in London where the defendant was performing as part of a group called Kneecap.
The charge, which carries a maximum sentence of six months’ imprisonment, is “summary only” — meaning that it can be tried only in the magistrates’ court. Ó hAnnaidh was ordered to attend court in June after a Metropolitan Police officer issued a written “postal” charge against him on 21 May 2025.
The police are well aware that, by statute, a summary-only offence cannot be tried unless a charge is instituted within six months of the alleged offence. So 21 May would have been the last possible day to institute the charge.
However, the Terrorism Act says that proceedings under section 13 cannot be instituted without the consent of the of the director of public prosecutions. And because the terror charge against Ó hAnnaidh related to a country other than the United Kingdom, the prosecutor’s consent could not be given without the permission of the attorney general.
That was spotted immediately after the charge was issued. Approvals were promptly given on behalf of the director of public prosecutions and the attorney general on 22 May and a new written charge was issued later the same day. But that was too late, according to the chief magistrate for England and Wales.
Giving judgment on Friday, Senior District Judge Goldspring said:
I am satisfied that proceedings against this defendant were instituted on 21 May 2025 when the written charge was issued. At that time, the necessary consent and permission required by law had not been obtained. As such, the proceedings were instituted unlawfully and are null.
I therefore hold that the Crown has failed to establish jurisdiction. The proceedings instituted in this case are invalid and the court has no jurisdiction to hear them.
The judge stressed that he was not ruling on the defendant’s innocence or guilt. “Nothing in this ruling should be read or interpreted as expressing any view, endorsement or rejection of the allegations themselves,” he said. “The sole and discrete issue with which the court is concerned is whether it has jurisdiction to deal with the prosecution.”
Goldspring drew attention in his judgment to the last-minute nature of the police investigation. He said charging advice had been sought by the police on 19 May. A decision was communicated to the police a day later and the Crown Prosecution Service instructed the police to issue a postal charge on 21 May.
I understand that this was the full timeline:
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5 May police seek “early advice” from the CPS.
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19 May police seek charging decision.
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20 May CPS make charging decision and share it with police.
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21 May defendant is charged when police issue postal requisition.
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22 May a decision is made by the CPS to seek retrospective consent from the attorney general’s office. It is granted on the same day and a new postal requisition is issued.
It’s clear from the timings that the police were aware of the six-month deadline. That being the case, there can be no excuse for waiting almost five-and-a-half months before seeking “early” advice, still less for requesting a charging decision with just two days left.
In mitigation, the police could claim they were not told by prosecutors that consents would be needed before a written charge could be issued. Current CPS guidance says that
the point at which proceedings are said to be instituted, and therefore the point before which consent must be obtained if required by statute, [for] summary-only offences [is] when a plea is taken.
That guidance is clearly wrong, according to the chief magistrate. Previous court rulings, said Goldspring, “reinforce the central proposition that proceedings are instituted at the moment a written charge and requisition is issued, not when a defendant first appears before a court or enters a plea”.
If the police had requested a charging decision even a day earlier, a valid replacement could no doubt have been issued in time. It’s not surprising that some observers have speculated that this failure goes beyond mere incompetence.
The Metropolitan Police said:
We will work with the CPS to understand the potential implications of this ruling for us and how that might impact on the processing of such cases in the future.
The director of public prosecutions, who heads the Crown Prosecution Service, works under the “superintendence” of the attorney general, Lord Hermer KC. But this cannot mean that Hermer has to check whether all police forces act promptly when seeking charging decisions that might require his consent or that of his deputy.
And yet the shadow justice secretary immediately held Hermer personally responsible:
Although Goldspring had explained on Friday morning that the police had not requested a charging decision until two days before the deadline, Robert Jenrick subsequently blamed the prosecution service, rather than the police, for leaving the charging decision “to the very last minute”.
A Labour Party source said at the weekend:
This is absolutely classic Jenrick. He has waded into an issue without understanding the basic facts, as usual, and has now had to change his public comments based on what he should have known before seeking the limelight.
For the hearing at Westminster Magistrates Court, the CPS briefed an experienced barrister to argue that the attorney general’s consent was not needed until a defendant answered the charges in court. However, the defendant was represented by no fewer than three KCs and a junior counsel, who persuaded the senior district judge otherwise.
It would now be possible for the director of public prosecutions to bring what’s called an appeal by way of case stated, challenging the senior district judge’s ruling in the High Court. A successful example of this was referred to by Goldspring.
I understand that an appeal is now being considered. But we can infer from the fact that prosecutors took immediate steps to obtain the necessary consents and then tried to reissue the charge that they are less than confident in their published interpretation of the law. It seems unlikely that the prosecution service will successfully challenge the ruling now, which means the charge against Ó hAnnaidh will not be reinstated.
Instead, the prosecution service can be expected to amend its guidance for future cases. And perhaps it will also have a quiet word with Scotland Yard.