This question exposes a deeper, more systemic issue that has plagued Pakistan’s defence procurement approach: the gap between current operational necessity and the need for a cohesive industrial strategy. The BrahMos threat is not a hardware problem; it is a symptom of a deep-seated procurement philosophy that has prioritized immediate, off-the-shelf tactical fixes over the long-term, arduous work of building a core platform and, in turn, a sovereign industrial base.
The choice of a new SAM system, therefore, is not merely a procurement decision; it is a foundational choice about whether to finally break this cycle.
For years, Pakistan’s approach to air defence has been a patchwork of imported solutions, often pursued in service-specific silos. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) acquired Chinese long-range systems like the HQ-9BE and medium-range platforms like the HQ-16FE to fill its operational gaps. The Pakistan Navy (PN) opted for the European MBDA CAMM-ER for most of its surface vessels. Finally, the Pakistan Army (PA) operates the Chinese HQ-9/P, LY-80EV, and LY-80.
While each decision may have been logical within its own narrow context, the collective result is a fragmented national air defence architecture, reliant on foreign supply chains and devoid of a unifying industrial backbone. This siloed procurement model prevents the economies of scale necessary for domestic industrialization and, instead, scatters resources and expertise across disparate platforms.
This stands in stark contrast to India’s long-term strategic approach. The Barak venture with Israel was not just about acquiring a capable missile; rather, it was a deliberate, multi-decade strategy to develop critical technology and build a domestic ecosystem for SAM development and production. The process was complex, but the outcome was clear: to move from being a buyer to a co-developer and, ultimately, a sovereign producer. The result is an industrial base that can now field thousands of interceptors, iterate on designs, and densify coverages.
However, the outcome of the May 2025 conflict presents a unique strategic opportunity. The short-to-medium-range air defence layer is now an urgent, acknowledged gap for both the Army and the Air Force. This rare moment of aligned, tri-service need offers orientation for a national-level decision to standardize on a single, effective platform. By amalgamating the requirements of its service arms, Pakistan can aggregate its demand, creating the scale necessary to justify a deep and meaningful transfer of technology and the establishment of a robust domestic production line.
Therefore, the selection of the next SAM system is less about the missile itself and more about the industrial and technology partnership it brings. It provides a chance to pivot from fragmented procurement habits to a unified industrial strategy, using a shared operational need to build a national asset in advanced air defence technology. The upcoming decision will determine whether Pakistan remains a perpetual importer of tactical solutions or finally begins the journey toward becoming a sovereign producer of its own strategic security.