Uncertainty, and no little trepidation, surrounds the upcoming Trump-Putin meeting on Friday 15 August in Alaska.
While Trump has (for now) ruled out attendance at the meeting by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, it’s still not clear what is on the negotiating table.
There is a lot at stake – most immediately for Ukraine but also for broader European security – and the auguries aren’t encouraging.
Trump says his objective is to end the fighting, and evidently sees his face-to-face meeting with Putin on Friday as key to this. While talk of possible “land-swaps” and recovering “prime oceanfront land” for Ukraine suggests the US President is in deal-making mode, Trump has also described Friday’s encounter with Putin as just a “feel-out” meeting, suggesting more a preliminary encounter.
Trump’s sudden and unexpected decision late last week to meet with Putin – on the very day his self-imposed deadline to Putin to agree to a ceasefire or face more sanctions was due to expire – was at once characteristic of his mercurial operating style, but also his conviction that only the two leaders themselves could resolve the matter.
For its part, Europe, caught off balance by the announcement of the summit, has been scrambling, fearful of being presented with a done deal.
Perhaps the best outcome that can realistically be expected is for a ceasefire along the current line of contact to end the fighting, at least for now.
European leaders have reiterated their strong support for Ukraine, insisting that Kyiv must be involved in any negotiations concerning Ukraine’s security. Together with Zelenskyy, they plan to hold a “virtual” meeting with Trump on Wednesday this week, 13 August, seeking to shape the outcomes of the summit. Zelenskyy has declared that any agreement reached at the summit without input from Kyiv would amount to “dead decisions”. Kyiv sees no evidence on the battlefield that Russia is ready to end the fighting – indeed warning that any concessions to Putin would only encourage Russia to continue the war.
Yet Kyiv (and its European backers) face a dilemma: while wary of being presented with an unpalatable deal, they don’t want to risk angering Washington by appearing to be the obstacle to a negotiated agreement.
For Putin, Washington’s agreement to hold the summit is itself a gift – an unrequited concession. Such meetings, echoing past US-Soviet high-level encounters, give the Russian leader the status and respect as an equal partner he craves, and accords with Putin’s view of how great powers should dispose of world affairs between themselves, deciding spheres of influence.
Moreover, Washington’s comments to media, suggesting possible “territorial swaps” before the summit has even occurred, and absent any credible signs of Russia’s willingness to stop the fighting, fuels unfortunate speculation that the talks will be held on Moscow’s terms.
To be sure, Kyiv may indeed have to accept Russian de facto control of parts of eastern Ukraine as part of any eventual settlement to end the fighting. But to concede this likelihood up front is a puzzling negotiating tactic. It will alarm those who suspect that Ukraine, and Washington’s European allies, will be presented with a fait accompli, and fuel speculation that the administration’s main objective is to reach a quick deal, and promote normalisation of relations with Russia.
More details may emerge over coming days that provide greater reassurance about how the United States will be approaching Friday’s summit. But perhaps the best outcome that can realistically be expected is for a ceasefire along the current line of contact to end the fighting, at least for now. Such a ceasefire would certainly offer a welcome respite for Ukraine from the constant barrage of damaging missile and drone attacks on its troops, its civilian population and infrastructure.
But the hard work of converting any ceasefire into some kind of longer-term settlement would remain. And there should be no illusions about how challenging this will prove.
Bear in mind that Russia too would benefit from a ceasefire, allowing it to reconstitute its forces and relieve pressure on its overheating economy – especially if it were accompanied by a relaxation of Western sanctions. And given the Kremlin’s near-complete control of the information space within Russia, underpinned by its formidable internal security apparatus, Moscow can spin any outcome to the conflict in Ukraine as a victory for Russia.
Moreover, there are no grounds to suppose that Putin has resiled from his core objective of bringing Ukraine to heel, installing a more pliable government in Kyiv and bringing Ukraine back firmly within Russia’s sphere of influence. This was underscored in May during Russia’s latest (abortive) talks with Ukraine in Istanbul, where Moscow reiterated its maximalist demands: full control of the four territories it has annexed in eastern Ukraine (plus Crimea), Ukrainian neutrality and repudiation of NATO membership aspirations, demilitarisation, and “denazification”.
More broadly, Russia remains intent on revising the post-Cold War European security framework as set out in Moscow’s draft treaties in December 2021 – including the drawdown of forward-deployed NATO forces in its eastern member states.
At best, then, the upcoming summit in Alaska might offer an end to the fighting in Ukraine – at least for now. But this will only be the start of a long and arduous process, the outcome of which will remain crucial, not only for the future of Ukraine but also for wider European and global security.