In July 2025, Saudi Arabia and France jointly convened a high-profile diplomatic conference in New York dedicated to reviving momentum for a negotiated two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The initiative, aimed at mobilizing international recognition for a Palestinian state, brought together representatives from Europe and the Arab world as well as other international actors. The message was twofold: to signal Riyadh’s determination to position itself as a defender of Palestinian rights and a central broker for regional stability, and to convey to Israel that such a state, under the right conditions, could enhance, rather than undermine, its security.
This diplomatic push, however, coincided with a dramatic escalation in Israel’s military posture. In August 7, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israeli forces will occupy Gaza City and will have indefinite Israeli security presence throughout the Gaza Strip. At the same time, Israel continued military operations in Lebanon. These moves were part of a broader post–October 7 security doctrine that emerged in the aftermath of Hamas’s surprise attack on southern Israel. The doctrine rests on the premise that Israel must eliminate any strategic threat in its immediate neighborhood and reshape the regional environment by force if necessary in order to ensure such an attack can never be repeated.
For Saudi Arabia, this policy presents a profound dilemma. While Riyadh shares with Israel a desire to neutralize Islamic armed non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah, the two states’ priorities and methods diverge sharply. Israeli military escalation, particularly in Syria and Gaza, runs counter to key Saudi interests and priorities. Efforts to craft a normalization deal between the two countries have been slowed, if not halted, by these differences. Although there are some points of tactical convergence, there is no shared strategic blueprint for Gaza’s future, no common vision for Syria’s territorial integrity, and only a conditional overlap regarding Lebanon’s political trajectory. With Washington showing little appetite to pressure Israel toward a political settlement, Saudi Arabia’s room for maneuver is constrained.
Divergence on the Two-State Solution
Saudi Arabia and France designed the New York conference explicitly to reinvigorate the diplomatic case for a two-state solution. Riyadh’s framing was deliberate: it offered security reassurances to Israel while affirming Palestinian political rights. The proposal called for the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state, accompanied by an Arab call for disarmament of Hamas and removing it from governing Gaza. The Saudi leadership has increasingly viewed the Palestinian Authority (PA) as the only viable administrative alternative to Hamas, if it can be restructured and revitalized. This would likely involve sidelining the aging President Mahmoud Abbas in favor of a younger, more dynamic figure such as Hussein al-Sheikh, whom Abbas appointed as vice-president of the Palestine Liberation Organization and who could command greater credibility both domestically and internationally.
In this vision, the PA would emerge as the unified governing body for both the occupied West Bank and Gaza, providing a coherent framework for eventual statehood. Such a state, with robust security guarantees and no independent armed forces, would theoretically mollify Israel’s security concerns, placing the diplomatic burden back on Israel to engage with a political roadmap that could open the door to normalization with Riyadh.
However, Israel’s current course rejects this premise outright. By moving to occupy Gaza City and impose an indefinite security presence, which Saudi Arabia condemned, Netanyahu signaled that no external guarantees, Saudi or otherwise, meet Israel’s threshold for security. In Israel’s assessment, only direct Israeli control can prevent the reconstitution of militant capabilities in Gaza. Furthermore, the Israeli government’s rejection of the two-state framework is deeply ideological, and most of the rightist, and dominant, political class in Israel rejects it. For Netanyahu’s coalition, recognition of a Palestinian state, even a demilitarized one, is tantamount to rewarding Hamas for the October 7 attack, as Netanyahu repeated many times. As such, Israeli policy is set on avoiding any political arrangement that might be interpreted as a concession, regardless of international pressure.
This fundamental disagreement erodes the basis for any near-term Saudi Arabian–Israeli normalization. Riyadh’s strategy depends on linking Palestinian political progress to an independent state to regional integration. Israel’s, on the other hand, is to pursue a military-first doctrine that sidelines diplomacy and to force Saudi Arabia and other countries to join the Abraham Accords after abandoning the idea of a Palestinian state and focusing solely on shared interests.
Israeli Work Against a Unified Syria
The Syrian theater provides another window into the Saudi–Israeli divergence. In July, the southern province of al-Suwayda witnessed clashes between Bedouin tribes and segments of the local Druze community. Syrian government forces moved toward al-Suwayda to impose security, then Israel intervened directly to push regime forces out of the area, seeking to weaken Damascus’s hold on the province and foster a more autonomous local order.
From an Israeli perspective, the goal was clear: to prevent Syria from reconstituting itself as a fully sovereign, centrally governed state that could host a unified military threat along Israel’s northern frontier. By promoting localized autonomy in southern Syria, particularly in Druze-majority areas, Israel aims to create buffer zones hostile to both potential allies of Iran and new regime influence.
Saudi Arabia, however, views such fragmentation as destabilizing and counterproductive. Riyadh’s long-term objective in Syria is the emergence of a stable, unified, and centralized state capable of attracting economic investment and integrating into a broader Arab economic and political order. A functioning Syrian state, away from Iranian influence, could become a site for Saudi influence through investments in reconstruction projects and trade. Fragmentation, by contrast, risks entrenching lawlessness, empowering extremist actors, and inviting Iranian penetration to the ungoverned spaces.
The Saudi position is further influenced by its ties to Arab tribes in eastern and southern Syria, some of which have clashed with Druze militias. Riyadh fears that prolonged disorder could allow jihadist groups like the so-called Islamic State (IS) to regain a foothold in southern Syria, and threaten the new government in Damascus. While Israel and Saudi Arabia share an interest in limiting Iran’s influence, Israeli tactics in southern Syria, particularly in al-Suwayda, may inadvertently create the very conditions that facilitate Iran’s return.
Indirect Partial Alignment on Lebanon
Lebanon represents perhaps the clearest case of partial Saudi–Israeli alignment. Both states see Hezbollah as a primary security challenge. Riyadh has been working closely with Washington to push for Hezbollah’s disarmament, seeing it as a prerequisite for political stability and economic recovery. Reports indicate that the Saudis have engaged with Lebanese officials to encourage adoption of the proposal advanced by US envoy Thomas Barrack, which outlined a phased plan for disarming Hezbollah.
From Riyadh’s perspective, Hezbollah’s political and military dominance has been a direct obstacle to Saudi engagement in Lebanon. The group’s regional alignment with Iran and its active opposition to Saudi positions in Yemen and beyond have cemented its place as a strategic adversary. The Saudis require the end of Hezbollah’s role in order to engage in revitalizing the Lebanese economy, and they will not invest in Lebanon as long as the group and its weapons continue to be outside state control.
In this sense, Saudi and Israeli objectives overlap. Yet, their risk calculations differ sharply. Israel’s military campaign against Hezbollah, currently involving near-daily airstrikes, could, if escalated with the aim of carrying out the mission of disarming Hezbollah, spark a large-scale war and further increase the instability of the region. Such an outcome could reinforce instability in neighboring Syria, and create the kind of chaos Riyadh seeks to avoid.
Saudi Arabia prefers a Lebanese solution, supported by a unified Lebanese political front, to the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons, although this solution may not be feasible given the unbalanced power dynamics between the Lebanese army, which is feared to fracture at the moment of confrontation, and Hezbollah’s forces. Israel, on the other hand, appears willing to force the issue militarily if the Lebanese government fails to address the matter. Thus, while both countries share the end goal of curtailing Hezbollah’s power, their methods, and tolerance for the attendant risks, do not necessarily match.
Conclusion
Saudi Arabia’s recent diplomatic push, exemplified by its partnership with France in advocating for a two-state solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, illustrates its intent to position itself as a leading architect of regional stability. However, Israel’s post–October 7 security doctrine is fundamentally at odds with this approach. By prioritizing military dominance over political settlement, Israel has effectively closed the door on the kind of phased, security-guaranteed Palestinian state that Riyadh envisions.
In Gaza, Israel’s position means rejecting any framework that empowers the PA, however reformed, and insisting on direct Israeli control. In Syria, it entails fostering fragmentation that undercuts the Saudi vision of centralized stability. In Lebanon, it risks triggering large-scale conflict in pursuit of Hezbollah’s disarmament, an aim Riyadh shares but fears the consequences of the chaos resulting from the expansion of the war.
Compounding these challenges is Washington’s relative disengagement from meaningful conflict resolution. The United States continues to grant Israel wide latitude to pursue its security agenda and has shown no willingness to pressure Netanyahu toward a political settlement. Even the shifting stance of some European governments, marked by recent recognitions of Palestinian statehood, has not altered the American position. The United States has expressed its displeasure over the intention of some of its European allies to recognize a Palestinian state.
For Saudi Arabia, this leaves limited options. It can continue to pursue incremental diplomatic initiatives, leveraging its partnerships in Europe and the Arab world to keep the two-state solution on the table. However, without a shared vision with the United States, these efforts will remain constrained. Considering Riyadh’s reluctance to put any pressure on Washington in this matter, and to avoid antagonizing President Donald Trump, it is unlikely that efforts to revive the two-state solution will yield tangible results in the near future.