Shifting geopolitics of South Asia – Opinion

The recent visit of China’s Foreign Minister to New Delhi marks more than a routine diplomatic exchange. It hints at a subtle but consequential reordering of South Asian geopolitics. China’s engagement with India goes beyond tariffs; it signals a bid to reshape South Asia’s rivalries and regional alignments. After brokering peace in the Middle East, China eyes South Asia—where India and Pakistan remain locked in old disputes.

As Beijing reaches out to New Delhi, the regional chessboard shifts, raising questions about America’s role and Pakistan’s strategic space. Beijing’s balancing act with India has deep implications for Pakistan’s security, economy, and foreign policy flexibility. The US still provides hard power, but China is emerging as the region’s indispensable broker. Where does this leave Pakistan?

India and China, despite border disputes and decades of rivalry, appear willing to reopen channels at a time when both face economic and strategic pressures. For India, the outreach is about hedging. Washington has positioned New Delhi as a central pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy against China. Yet India has never been fully comfortable as a junior partner. Its refusal to sanction Russia, its oil purchases from Moscow, and now its gestures toward Beijing reflect a familiar instinct: preserve strategic autonomy.

US is not likely to abandon India — the strategic logic is too strong — but it will view this hedging with concern. If India waters down its role in the Indo-Pacific coalition, Washington may respond by tightening expectations or recalibrating its own engagement with South Asia.

For China, re-engagement with India is about stabilising its periphery and blunting the US containment drive. With tariff conflicts straining trade, Beijing wants to avoid open hostility with South Asia’s largest state, even if relations remain fragile.

The shift raises many valid questions — which has short term and long-term consequences for South Asian geopolitics, notably:

1. What this shift means for South Asia?

2. Can China nudge India and Pakistan toward dialogue amidst developing scenarios?

3. Will this shift dilute terrorism in Balochistan?

4. Is China growing influence in the region signal a new world order diluting America’s historic grip on South Asia?

5. What does the shift means for Pakistan?

The answer to these questions much depends on the sustainability and sincerity of China-India developing alignment – to be put to test once India and USA trade war reach a settlement and their relations swing back to that of strategic partners – notwithstanding the fact that India’s confidence and reliance on USA has shaken.

Assuming India takes a midway of balancing the relationship between the two, which is the most likely scenario, the implications of the shift extend beyond India–China ties. Smaller states such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh are already recipients of Chinese loans and infrastructure. If Beijing can simultaneously keep channels open with both India and Pakistan, it elevates itself as South Asia’s chief mediator—filling a role once associated with Washington.

For Pakistan, the stakes are particularly high. China’s model of quiet diplomacy has already borne fruit in the Middle East, where Beijing facilitated the Iran–Saudi reconciliation and now the Iran – Pakistan – Afghanistan dialogue. If China applies the same template to South Asia, Pakistan could benefit from reduced hostility with India and expanded trade through a “CPEC Plus” framework.

Under this scenario, China could nudge India and Pakistan toward dialogue. Both countries are under economic strain, and connectivity across the region is impossible without some easing of tensions. Even modest steps—such as trade resumption—would signal progress. If China’s mediation helps restrain Indian hostility and reopens trade channels, Islamabad gains strategic breathing space to focus on domestic recovery. China’s growing stature as a regional stabilizer also enhances Pakistan’s own relevance as Beijing’s closest partner.

The obstacles, however, are formidable. Domestic politics in India, dominated by Hindutva nationalism, leaves little space for rapprochement with Pakistan. Kashmir remains a frozen conflict, and electoral cycles often reward confrontation rather than conciliation. Still, China’s rising leverage makes it harder for India to ignore Pakistan’s relevance, particularly where Chinese interests in CPEC and Gwadar are concerned.

For Islamabad, one immediate concern is Indian interference in Balochistan. Here, China’s role could prove decisive. Since Gwadar and CPEC depend on stability in the province, Beijing has every reason to discourage Indian destabilization efforts. While it cannot compel New Delhi to change course, China’s growing economic influence gives it tools.

China growing influence in the region is still far from diluting America’s historic grip on South Asia. The struggling economies of South Asian states are in perpetual need of funding from IMF & World Bank and American lucrative markets to sustain their economies – the concessions which China’s model of funding and market does not provide.

The US still maintains unmatched military power in the Indian Ocean and remains India’s partner in defense and technology. But diplomatically, Beijing has become the region’s problem-solver, filling a vacuum left by Washington’s absence from the region.

For South Asia, this means living in a dual order: the US as the financial and security anchor and China as the economic and diplomatic broker.

For Pakistan, the opportunity lies in using China’s rise to ease tensions with India while maintaining diversified external ties.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2025