For centuries, China regarded itself as the Middle Kingdom – the center of the civilized world, surrounded by natural buffers that made it both secure and inward-looking. Its goods – silk, tea, porcelain – were prized in Europe, and by the late 18th century Britain’s appetite for them was insatiable. Yet the Qing court permitted foreign merchants only limited access through Canton, and had little interest in British products. The imbalance was settled in silver, and Beijing steadily amassed vast reserves.
This “favourable” position, however, created hostility in London. For Britain, hemorrhaging silver while being excluded from China’s market was intolerable. Unable to sell legitimate goods, British merchants turned to opium smuggling from India. Addiction spread, and when Chinese authorities confiscated and destroyed opium stockpiles, Britain retaliated with warships.
The First Opium War (1839–42) ended with the Treaty of Nanjing, which forced China to cede Hong Kong, open new ports, and accept humiliating concessions. The Second Opium War (1856–60) went further: European powers seized Beijing, burned the imperial Summer Palace, forced China to legalize opium, and expanded their privileges under “extraterritoriality” – foreigners in China were no longer subject to Chinese law.
For a state that had for millennia seen itself as the pinnacle of civilization, the humiliation was profound. It was compounded by further defeats, from losing Korea and Taiwan to Japan in 1895, to the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, when an eight-nation force marched into Beijing itself. The lesson for China was stark: economic advantage without military strength invites coercion, disunity invites exploitation, and resisting modernization ensures defeat. This became known as the Century of Humiliation, a phrase still invoked in Chinese political discourse today.
It is here that Xi Jinping stands apart from his predecessors. Mao Zedong secured China’s sovereignty but left its economy and society devastated. Deng Xiaoping initiated modernization and opened the economy, but kept military development modest and the Party’s legitimacy anchored in growth. Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao oversaw steady material progress, but their focus was incremental. Xi, however, has elevated historical trauma into a governing principle. His “China Dream” is not only about prosperity, but about ensuring that the humiliation of the 19th and early 20th centuries can never be repeated.
This outlook explains the three pillars of his governance. First, unity under a single leadership, with Xi consolidating power to prevent factionalism and paralysis reminiscent of the late Qing. Second, a disciplined populace and society, with the Party exercising tight control through surveillance, censorship, and ideological campaigns – tools to ensure cohesion against external manipulation. Third, unrelenting industrial growth, not just in consumer goods but in advanced sectors – artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, aerospace, naval construction – so that China’s economy is never again at the mercy of outsiders.
Thus, the parade was more than a show of weapons. It was a demonstration of how Xi has internalized China’s past defeats and harnessed them to drive policy today. Hypersonics, stealth fighters, and ICBMs are not only instruments of war – they are the visible proof that China will not lose its economic and political sovereignty to foreign coercion again.