Trade Trends to Watch in 2026

Affordability, Agreements, and Action by Congress

Inu Manak is senior fellow for trade policy.

Despite the flurry of trade policy activity in 2025, President Donald Trump’s on-again, off-again tariff threats left the trade landscape largely intact. Tariffs are not nearly as high as anticipated, and firms took proactive measures to massively front-load the economy, delaying some tariff impacts. The year ahead is likely to be another roller coaster, but there are three trends in trade to keep a close eye on: the erosion of trade agreements, the effects of tariffs on affordability, and the potential limits of executive power in trade.

The United States is charting a new course on trade, but it is casting aside fundamental rules that have underpinned the global trading system in the process. That is pushing some of its closest allies away and could further fragment trade rules. The Trump administration has signed a handful of new trade deals and is likely to increase pressure on trading partners next year to make those deals deliver (or walk away from them if they do not). Closer to home, if Trump rips up the deal with Canada and Mexico that he negotiated in his first term, it will send shock waves throughout the U.S. economy.

That said, Trump was willing to test the limits of what markets would accept on tariffs this year; the effects of tariffs on affordability could continue to nag at him. The administration has exempted a range of household goods from tariffs, including bananas, beef, and coffee. If everyday items feel unaffordable, the administration could be pushed to respond with additional tariff relief.

Throughout U.S. history, every major tariff increase was legislated by Congress. Today, Congress has virtually no role. This is a precarious state of affairs, because it means that trade policy is now beholden to whoever holds the White House—and in this case, trade policy is being made by one person. With the Supreme Court set to rule on Trump’s use of emergency tariffs early this year, we will soon find out if there are any limits to the president’s trade powers.

Following the Money From Oil to Tech

Edward Alden is senior fellow at CFR, specializing in U.S. economic competitiveness, trade, and immigration policy.

Here is a rule for anticipating U.S. trade actions in 2026: follow the money. Despite promising tariff protections to revitalize American manufacturing, the Trump administration has selectively spared the wealthiest industries in the United States, from big tech to big oil.

Tech companies avoided the worst tariffs—semiconductors and smart phones were exempted—and even benefited as the administration eased export controls on China and knocked down Canada’s digital services tax. Europe will be the main target in 2026: the Trump administration wants a rollback of the European Union’s Digital Services Act and artificial intelligence regulations.

Conventional energy has also remained largely tariff-free, and new trade deals have included purchase commitments for U.S. natural gas and oil. More is likely, especially if Venezuelan oil is reopened to U.S. producers.

None of that bodes well for the biggest trade negotiation of 2026: the review of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement. The sectors at stake, especially autos and agriculture, have been the most harmed by the Trump actions to date. This year could be the death knell for three decades of free trade in North America.

Will Trade Policies Drop Drug Prices?

Thomas Bollyky is senior fellow for international economics, law, and development and director of the Global Health Program. Elena Every is research associate for Global Health, Economics, and Development. Chloe Searchinger is former research associate for Global Health, Economics, and Development.

In 2025, President Trump broke new ground by using trade tools in an effort to lower prescription drug prices at home, raise them abroad, and return drug manufacturing to the United States.

The tactic resulted in deals with foreign governments and pledges from drug manufacturers and alike, but the details and text of most of those commitments have not been released. The agreements with manufacturers are voluntary.

In 2026, we will be watching whether those trade deals generate real returns by lowering the sky-high costs that Americans pay for medicines and by reversing the U.S. pharmaceutical trade deficit, which has grown 9 percent annually over the last two decades—hitting record highs in 2025.

It may take a while. In exchange for a three-year reprieve from U.S. tariffs, fourteen drugmakers agreed to lower their Medicaid drug prices, launch future drugs at prices comparable to those in other countries, and invest over $480 billion in U.S. manufacturing. Yet, our analysis of earning statements of companies that produce specialized pharmaceutical manufacturing equipment suggests that those drugmakers have not begun acquiring the means yet to launch new production facilities in the United States.

In December, the United Kingdom agreed in principle to raise by 25 percent its cost-effectiveness threshold for medicines procurement that the UK’s National Health Service uses, although it is unclear whether that will result in the UK spending more and U.S. patients paying less for prescription drugs. The UK government reported that the cost allocations for the change had already been made earlier in 2025 and would not affect “frontline services.”

Is the United States Still Committed to Slowing China’s AI Progress? 

Chris McGuire is senior fellow for China and emerging technologies.

The United States’ approach to export controls on technology to China in 2026 could dictate whether the United States maintains its lead over China in artificial intelligence (AI) or whether China approaches parity.

Until 2025, export controls were the most important and most heavily used policy tool for slowing China’s technological progress in advanced technologies, particularly chip-making and AI. China has achieved real progress in those areas, but substantially less than if U.S. export controls had not been in place. Restrictions on the export of semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) have caused China’s advanced chip-making capabilities to significantly lag those of U.S. allies and partners in both quantity and quality, and restrictions on the export of AI chips have caused China’s AI models to lag U.S. models by at least seven months. Those controls have been imperfect, but effective.

The Trump administration has not effected a single regulation tightening export controls on China, however. It has done nothing to tighten controls on SME exports, which were strengthened annually by the Biden administration, and has substantially loosened restrictions on AI chip exports to China. Meanwhile, China’s circumvention efforts grow by the day.

If the U.S. export control regime on advanced technologies is not actively maintained, it will atrophy. That would risk allowing China to catch up at the worst possible moment: just as those advanced technologies are emerging as major drivers of U.S. economic growth and military modernization.