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Is the “big, beautiful” India-US trade deal slipping out of reach?

With just days to go before a 9 July deadline set by US President Donald Trump’s administration, hopes of clinching an interim trade pact between Delhi and Washington remain alive but increasingly entangled in hard bargaining.

Despite White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt hinting that the deal was imminent, and Indian Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s upbeat assertion that Delhi would welcome “a big, good, beautiful” agreement – in response to Trump’s claim that a trade deal with Delhi is coming and would “open up” the Indian market – negotiators remain locked in tough discussions.

Key sticking points persist, particularly over agricultural access, auto components and tariffs on Indian steel.

Indian trade officials have extended their stay in Washington for another round of talks, even as Delhi signals “very big red lines” on farm and dairy protections, and the US presses for wider market openings. The tone remains optimistic – but the window to strike a deal appears to be narrowing.

“The next seven days could determine whether India and the US settle for a limited ‘mini-deal’ or walk away from the negotiating table – at least for now,” says Ajay Srivastava, a former Indian trade official who runs Global Trade Research Initiative (GTRI), a Delhi-based think tank.

That uncertainty hinges on a few key flashpoints – none more contentious than agriculture.

“There are two real challenges to concluding an initial agreement. First on the list is US access to the Indian market for basic agriculture products. India will need to protect its basic agriculture sector for economic and political reasons,” Richard Rossow, who tracks India’s economy at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, told the BBC.

For years, Washington has pushed for greater access to India’s farm sector, seeing it as a major untapped market. But India has fiercely protected it, citing food security, livelihoods and interests of millions of small farmers.

Mr Rossow says the “second issue is India’s non-tariff barriers. Issues like India’s growing set of ‘Quality Control Orders’ (QCO) are significant obstacles to US market access and may prove tricky to meaningfully handle in a trade deal”.

The US has raised concerns over what it calls India’s growing and burdensome import-quality rules. Over 700 QCOs – part of the “self-reliant India” push – aim to curb low-quality imports and promote domestic manufacturing. Suman Berry, a senior member of a government think tank Niti Aayog, has also called these rules a “malign intervention” that restrict imports and raise costs for domestic medium and small scale industries.

The elephant in the room is farm exports. India-US farm trade remains modest at $8bn, with India exporting rice, shrimp and spices, and the US sending nuts, apples and lentils. But as trade talks progress, Washington is eyeing bigger farm exports – maize, soya bean, cotton and corn – to help narrow its $45bn trade deficit with India.

Experts fear tariff concessions could pressure India to weaken its minimum support prices (MSP) and public procurement – key protections that shield farmers from price crashes by guaranteeing fair prices and stable crop purchases.

“No tariff cuts are expected for dairy products or key food grains like rice and wheat, where farm livelihoods are at stake. These categories are politically and economically sensitive, affecting over 700 million people in India’s rural economy,” says Mr Srivastava.

Curiously, a recent Niti Aayog paper recommends tariff cuts on US farm imports – including rice, dairy, poultry, corn, apples, almonds and GM soya – under a proposed India-US trade pact. It’s unclear, however, whether the proposal reflects official government thinking or remains a policy suggestion on paper.

“If the US were to say ‘no deal’ if India does not include access on basic agriculture, then clearly American expectations were not set correctly. Any democratically-elected government will have political limits to commercial policy choices,” says Mr Rossow.

So what could happen with the deal now?

Experts like Mr Srivastava believe that the “more likely outcome is a limited trade pact” – styled after the US-UK mini trade deal announced on 8 May.

Under the proposed deal, India may cut tariffs on a range of industrial goods – including automobiles, a long-standing US demand – and offer limited agricultural access via tariff cuts and quotas on select products like ethanol, almonds, walnuts, apples, raisins, avocados, olive oil, spirits and wine.

Beyond tariff cuts, the US is likely to push India for large-scale commercial buys – from oil and LNG to Boeing aircraft, helicopters and nuclear reactors. Washington may also seek FDI easing in multi-brand retail, benefiting firms like Amazon and Walmart, and relaxed rules on re-manufactured goods.

“This ‘mini-deal’, if concluded, would therefore focus on tariff reductions and strategic commitments, leaving broader FTA issues – including services trade, intellectual property (IP) rights and digital regulations – for a future negotiation,” says Mr Srivastava.

At the start, the India-US trade talks appeared to be grounded in a clear and fair vision.

“The two leaders [Trump and Modi] laid out a simple concept in their first summit this year. The US would focus on manufactured goods that are capital-intensive, while India would focus on items that are labour-intensive,” says Mr Rossow. But things appear to have changed since.

If talks fail, Trump is unlikely to reinstate the 26% tariffs on India, experts believe.

While 57 countries faced these levies in April, only the UK has secured a deal so far. Targeting India specifically could seem unfair. “Still, with Trump, surprises can’t be ruled out,” says Mr Srivastava.

The 12-day war of aggression waged principally by Israel against Iran has been fascinating for its starkness on multiple fronts. Much like Israel’s genocide of the Palestinians, on open display yet unstoppable, the falsehood and illegality of both Israeli and American words and actions continued unabated throughout the war.

It was, in every way, a no-holds-barred affair: the facts, the rhetoric, the deceit. And this wasn’t about domestic politics or some marginal policy issue. This was about taking nations to war. It was about planning to tear down a country, deploying weapons and unloading tonnes upon tonnes of missiles. 

It was about flaunting cutting-edge technology, including 30,000-pound GBU-57 bunker buster bombs, to be dropped by the B-2 bombers – the most expensive planes ever built, worth $2.2 billion each. 

The logistics story was made captivating, numbing the mind to more critical questions – such as what these 30,000-pounders could achieve when targeting material located more than a kilometre beneath the earth. 

Reports were sent out dutifully about the unprecedented ‘heroic’ 37-hour-long missions of the B-2 bomber pilots, who would drop fourteen of these bombs, guaranteeing annihilation and destruction at three sites.

The power-wielding architects of this dramatically worded bombing mission spread their ‘faith’ with conviction. The shrill messaging around this unprecedented, colossal task was delivered in fascistic simplicity: that the ‘noble’ objective was to rid the world of the ‘most dangerous threat’ to global security. 

The mission, they claimed, would demolish Iran’s nuclear programme once and for all. Israel had been making the claim for over two decades – and was now seconded by US President Donald Trump – that Iran was just months away from producing nuclear weapons for what they called the world’s most dangerous and dreaded regime.

Thus, the shrill rhetoric proliferated globally. Digital and legacy media buzzed with talk of the mission, of bombers and bombs, of Top Gun-style pilots in Tom Cruise mode who had rehearsed every step of ‘Mission Annihilate’. 

All the rest was drowned out. Questions about the impact on areas and people surrounding the nuclear sites of Isfahan, Fordow and Natanz – and above all, concerns about possible radiation from these bombed sites, where the world had been told Iran held several hundred kilograms of enriched uranium – surfaced only as outlier opinions. 

The dominant mood in the power corridors of the US, most Western nations and India was one of rah-rah, let’s gun for Iran. Questions did emerge regularly, but they evaporated just as quickly. Often, this was because the lead decision-maker, President Donald Trump, would simply brush off all concerns, almost mocking any journalist who dared to raise them.

This was a fantasy being spread, much like the ugly truth that was systematically concealed about a hundred years ago. It was the truth of how today’s aggressor, Israel, was born – and who actively midwifed its then-illegitimate birth. 

That concealed truth was about how Palestinians were robbed of two-thirds of their land, and how Irgun and Haganah, the two terrorist Zionist organisations, killed, maimed and pushed out from Palestine its rightful owners, who were actively resisting the occupation of their land.

Significantly, in the 12-day war of aggression, Israel and the US alone cannot be given credit for the major political, military and psychological setback it represented. Much of the West had politically and diplomatically partnered with the aggressors.

The Israel–US duo’s determination to deny Iran nuclear weapons was shared by most European governments, as well as the EU.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz unabashedly stated that he was happy that “Israel is doing [this] for all of us. We’re also affected by this regime. This Mullah regime has brought death and destruction over the world. The dirty work that Israel did here – I can only say that I have the highest respect that the Israeli army was courageous enough, that the Israeli government was courageous enough to do this. Otherwise, we possibly would have seen this terror made by this regime for months and years, and possibly with a nuclear weapon in their hand”. 

These deeply partisan, hate-ridden words in praise of the aggressor were, of course, spoken somewhat prematurely.

Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte also sent a profusely congratulatory WhatsApp message to Trump, which Trump then posted on social media: “Thank you for your decisive action in Iran. That was truly extraordinary and something no one else dared to do. It makes us safer…” Rutte wrote. Again, prematurely.

Only on Switzerland’s foreign ministry website did a post appear that cautioned against the aggressors’ complete disregard for legality. It read: “Switzerland emphasizes the importance of full respect for international law, including the UN Charter and international humanitarian law.”

However, beyond all the bravado and chest-thumping by the self-declared winners of the 12-day war lay the uncomfortable reality: Not even one of the three objectives that Netanyahu and his team had bragged they were determined to achieve was fulfilled – no regime change, no destruction of Iran’s nuclear capability and no major disabling of Iran’s missile infrastructure. 

Satellite imagery shows only limited irreversible damage to Iran’s storage and launch sites. Iran’s stockpiles of its most advanced ballistic missiles were largely left intact.

The dramatic B-2 bombers and 30,000-pound bombs weren’t able to destroy Iran’s nuclear capability. The core components of Iran’s nuclear facilities were not destroyed – at best, their progress was delayed by only a few months.

The first to report this was the US’s own Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). CNN quoted their report, noting that no irreversible damage had been done and that more information was required from the actual nuclear sites to confirm the extent of the damage. Both the IAEA and DIA conceded that, without access to the sites, all estimates were merely “guesstimates”. Claims of “obliteration” or “significant damage” were baseless.

Trump’s assertions that the 30,000-pound bombs had “obliterated” Iran’s programme at depths of over 800 meters beneath a mountain at the Fordow facility clashed with the IAEA’s conclusion that the programme had only been delayed by a few months, with all of Iran’s enriched uranium safely stashed away – unreachable to everyone but the Iranians. And the majority of the centrifuges had not been damaged.

The IAEA’s own duplicity was unmistakable. Rafael Grossi, head of the UN nuclear watchdog, said on June 23 that the airstrikes had probably caused “very significant” damage to Fordow, a major uranium enrichment facility. Yet the IAEA subsequently veered toward the DIA’s more cautious assessment.

As for what has long been deployed by Washington as a ‘legitimate’ policy tool – the removal of governments in foreign lands through force, sabotage and other means – that too failed. After all, Iran is neither Syria, Iraq, nor Libya, nor even the Iran of 1953. 

This was not a regime that could be brushed aside easily. Iran’s revolution-hardened, four-decade-old government stood its ground. Paradoxically, for a regime already facing multiple domestic challenges, Israeli aggression somewhat boosted its political fortunes. Nationalist sentiment rose.

After the war, despite mounting economic and security problems, Iran’s regime emerged more confident and self-assured, having successfully fought back and survived the much-hyped Israeli-US war machine.

Amid the widespread chatter about what comes next, only two facts appear reliable. First, and fortunately, beyond all the litter of whimsical, flashy and fictional verbosity, there are signs of re-engagement between the two principal players: Iran and the US. 

Trump has publicly criticised some of Israel’s recent actions, while in important circles in Tehran, there is recognition that indirect communication between Iranian and American officials continues. Some Iranians even see in Trump a potential president willing to pursue an ‘America First’, not ‘Israel First’, policy.

The second important development appears to be a ceasefire in Gaza. But does this mean progress toward a definitive two-state solution or merely a deceptive lull, under the cover of which the ‘Greater Israel’ agenda advances? At present, with a disengaged Arab and Muslim world, Donald Trump remains – somewhat paradoxically – central to advancing a lasting and viable solution for Palestine. And that solution, clearly, is a two-state one.

The writer is a senior journalist. She tweets at @nasimzehra and can be reached at: [email protected]

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer’s own and don’t necessarily reflect Geo.tv’s editorial policy.

Originally published in The News