Author: admin

Islamabad, Pakistan – Seven decades ago, one of South Asia’s greatest fiction writers, Saadat Hasan Manto, published a short story set in a village in Pakistan’s Punjab province. The plot revolved around rumours of an Indian plan to “shut down” water to Pakistan by closing off rivers that irrigated the province’s crops.

A character in the 1951 story titled Yazid responds to that chatter by saying, “…who can close a river; it’s a river, not a drain.”

That theory is now on test, 74 years later — with implications for two of the world’s most populous nations that are also nuclear-armed neighbours.

In April 2025, after gunmen killed 26 civilians, almost all tourists, in an attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, New Delhi blamed armed groups that it said were backed by Pakistan for the violence.

India announced it was walking out of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), a six-decade-old transboundary water agreement that governs the division of water from the Indus Basin’s six rivers. The treaty is a lifeline for more than 270 million people, most of whom live in Pakistan.

A day after India’s announcement, Pakistan’s National Security Committee (NSC), the country’s top security body, rejected the “unilateral” move, warning that “any diversion of Pakistan’s water is to be treated as an act of war”.

In the weeks that followed, India and Pakistan engaged in an intense four-day conflict in May, during which both countries exchanged missile and drone strikes, before US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire between them.

But though the guns have fallen silent, for now, the neighbours have both launched diplomatic campaigns aimed at convincing the world about their narratives.

And India has refused to reconsider its decision to set aside the IWT. On June 21, Amit Shah, India’s home minister and the man widely considered as the second-in-command to Prime Minister Narendra Modi, declared the treaty would remain suspended permanently.

“It will never be restored. International treaties cannot be annulled unilaterally, but we had the right to put it in abeyance, which we have done,” Shah told The Times of India, the country’s leading newspaper, in an interview.

“The treaty preamble mentions that it was for peace and progress of the two countries, but once that has been violated, there is nothing left to protect,” he said.

For Pakistan, a lower riparian country, even the possibility of water disruption is an existential threat.

Blocking river flows threatens agriculture, food security, and the livelihoods of millions. It could also, warn experts, set the stage for a full-fledged war between India and Pakistan.

So can India really stop Pakistan’s water? And can Pakistan do anything to mitigate that risk?

The short answer: India cannot completely stop the flow of rivers into Pakistan, given the current infrastructure that it has. But experts caution that even a small diversion or blockage could hurt Pakistan, particularly during the winter season. And at the moment, Pakistan does not have the reservoirs it needs to store enough water to deal with the crisis it would face if India were to manage to stop the flow of the Indus Basin rivers.

A river that defines the region

The mighty Indus River, the 12th longest in the world, originates from Mount Kailash in Tibet at an elevation of 5,490 metres (18,000 feet).

It flows northwest, cutting through the scenic yet disputed Kashmir region, before entering Pakistan and travelling some 3,000 kilometres (1,864 miles) south to the Arabian Sea.

In Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the Indus is joined by its western tributaries – the Swat and Kabul Rivers – as it carves through mountainous terrain.

Entering the fertile plains of Punjab, the river’s five eastern tributaries — the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas and Sutlej — meet the Indus.

These rivers flow through Indian-administered Kashmir and other Indian states before entering Pakistan.

This geographic dynamic, with India as the upper riparian state and Pakistan the lower state, has fed into long-standing distrust between the neighbours.

To be clear, transboundary water conflicts are not exclusive to Pakistan and India, and historians have recorded wars over water since ancient times.

In the last half a century alone, Turkiye, Syria and Iraq have had disputes over water sharing due to the construction of dams on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers.

More recently, there is an ongoing water conflict between Egypt and Sudan against Ethiopia, an upper riparian state constructing a dam on the Nile, causing insecurity among the two lower riparian nations.

In South Asia itself, Bangladesh, India and Nepal have water-sharing disputes over the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna rivers system.

Partition’s lingering legacy

As with most India-Pakistan disputes, the two countries’ tensions over water are rooted in the partition of the subcontinent in August 1947, when both nations gained independence from British colonial rule.

The region of Jammu and Kashmir, where the Jhelum originates and the Chenab flows, became a central point of conflict.

But another critical issue was the division of Punjab’s irrigation system, which had operated as a unified network under British rule. Canals, rivers and headworks were all intertwined, complicating water sharing.

A short-lived agreement held until March 1948, when India suspended water flow through two canals into Pakistan. The stoppage left nearly eight percent of cultivable land in Pakistani Punjab without water for five weeks.

That early crisis inspired Manto’s Yazid and served as the catalyst for the Indus Waters Treaty.

With World Bank mediation and financial support, the treaty [PDF] was signed in September 1960, after nine years of negotiations between India and Pakistan.

According to Majed Akhter, senior lecturer in geography at King’s College London, the treaty was a “hydraulic partition” that followed political partition. “It was needed to resolve issues of the operation of an integrated irrigation system in Punjab, a province which the British invested heavily in and that was partitioned in 1947,” he told Al Jazeera.

But Akhter pointed out that water sharing between the neighbours is also linked to their dispute over Kashmir. Both India and Pakistan control parts of the region, with China also administering two slices of Kashmir. India, however, claims all of Kashmir, and Pakistan claims all of the region other than the parts controlled by China, its ally.

“Territorial control of Kashmir means control of the waters of the Indus, which is the main source of water for the heavily agrarian economies” of Pakistan and India, Akhter said.

India and Pakistan have fought three of their four wars over Kashmir, before the latest conflict in May.

Treaty that divided the rivers

The 85-page treaty is unusually structured. Unlike most global water treaties that share water according to their total volume of flows, the IWT divides the rivers.

The three eastern rivers – Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas – were allocated entirely to India, while the three western rivers – Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab – were reserved for Pakistan’s exclusive use.

India, however, was permitted to build “run-of-the-river” hydroelectric projects on the western rivers, provided they adhered to design limitations meant to ensure uninterrupted water flow to Pakistan.

The treaty also has a three-tiered dispute resolution mechanism.

Any technical questions are brought before the Permanent Indus Commission, a standing bilateral body composed of one commissioner from each country, which is set up under the IWT clauses.

If the commission can’t resolve any differences, the matter is then referred to a neutral expert under the supervision of the World Bank. If the dispute still remains unresolved, it can then be taken to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). The Hague-based PCA is not a United Nations agency but an intergovernmental organisation to which countries go to “facilitate arbitration and other forms of dispute resolution between states”.

Though the treaty has been in place for over six decades, this formal dispute resolution path has only been invoked in three cases, all involving Indian hydroelectric power projects on western rivers: Baglihar, Kishenganga and Ratle.

India was able to win its case regarding Baglihar, a dam built on the Chenab, before a neutral expert in 2007, following which the project started operating a year later.

The Kishenganga project, built on the Jhelum, again faced resistance from Pakistan, which claimed the construction would impact water flow into Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

The matter was taken to the PCA, where a 2013 decision allowed India to divert water for power generation purposes, while ensuring that water flow towards Pakistan continued. The project was inaugurated in 2018 by Indian PM Modi.

The Ratle hydroelectric plant, also being constructed on the Chenab, is the latest flashpoint between the two neighbours.

Pakistan has sought the PCA’s involvement over the dispute, but India has argued that under the IWT, the countries need to first go before a neutral expert. However, with India now no longer adhering to the water-sharing treaty, a cloud hovers over the arbitration process, while construction on the project continues.

‘Blood and water’

Over its 65-year history, the IWT has withstood major pressures: Wars, a secessionist movement in Indian-administered Kashmir, recurring military skirmishes, deadly attacks in India that New Delhi has blamed on Pakistan-backed armed groups, and even nuclear tests by India and Pakistan.

The April 2025 Pahalgam attack marked a breaking point. But signs of the treaty’s fragility had emerged long before that.

In September 2016, following an attack on an Indian Army base in Uri, a town in Indian-administered Kashmir, that killed at least 18 Indian soldiers, India accused the Jaish-e-Muhammad, a Pakistan-based armed group that has carried out multiple attacks on Indian soil, of being behind the Uri strike.

Pakistan swiftly denied any involvement of its government, but India’s then-Home Minister Rajnath Singh branded Pakistan a “terrorist state” that supported “terrorists and terrorism groups”.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, then in his first term leading the Hindu majoritarian Bharatiya Janata Party, declared, “Blood and water cannot flow at the same time”, amid growing calls within India to stop the flow of water in Pakistan.

Nine years later, after India actually walked out of the treaty, former Pakistani Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari issued a warning even more chilling than Modi’s original comment.

“The Indus is ours and will remain ours, either our water will flow through it, or their blood,” he thundered at an April rally in Sindh, a province named after the Indus River (Sindhu in Sanskrit).

Symbolism or substance?

Several water experts argue that India’s suspension of the IWT is more symbolic than immediately harmful to Pakistan.

Naseer Memon, an Islamabad-based environmental and water expert, called it a “political gimmick” designed to generate anxiety in Pakistan rather than alter water flows.

First, there’s international law, which Pakistan believes is on its side. “Modi is trying to portray that he would stop Pakistan’s water immediately. But legally, he cannot decide anything about the IWT unilaterally,” Memon told Al Jazeera.

Three weeks after India’s suspension of the treaty, Ajay Banga, the Indian-American president of the World Bank, also said that there is no provision in the IWT that allows a party to unilaterally suspend the treaty.

“There is no provision in the treaty to allow to be suspended. The way it was drawn up, it either needs to be gone or it needs to be replaced by another one. That requires the two countries to want to agree,” he said during a visit to New Delhi in May.

Geography and infrastructure also limit what India can do. Daanish Mustafa, professor of critical geography at King’s College London, argued that these factors protect Pakistan more than its policymakers on either side acknowledge. “The fanatic attachment to hydro-control in India and hydro-vulnerability in Pakistan is almost comical,” he told Al Jazeera.

Of the six rivers in the Indus Basin, the waters of three — the Sutlej, Beas and Ravi — are in any case only for India’s use, under the IWT.

Of the three rivers whose waters belong to Pakistan, the Indus passes briefly through Indian-administered Kashmir and Ladakh. But Memon, the Islamabad-based expert, said that topography in the region means that the river passes through areas that are snowy, with little space for any canal diversion or agricultural projects. “Plus, there is not enough quantum of water in the Indus in that area which would make it feasible for India to build any project,” he said.

Indian hydroelectric projects on the remaining two rivers — the Kishenganga dam on the Jhelum, and Baglihar dam and the under-construction Ratle dam on the Chenab — have sparked concerns in Pakistan, which has protested against them under the IWT.

Islamabad alleges that the projects could allow India to lower water levels into Pakistan, and that the Kishenganga dam could also change the course of the Jhelum. New Delhi rejects these allegations.

In reality, experts say that as with the Indus, India lacks the ability to divert water from the Jhelum, too. The river passes through populated areas of Indian-administered Kashmir such as Baramulla and Jammu, Memon said. Any plans to construct a dam there could put the population at risk of inundation.

The case of the Chenab is different. Its waters “could be disturbed” by India, Memon said, though not in all seasons.

The expert says that the river has several potential sites where dams could be built. But even if India built a dam, Memon said, it would not be able to store much water during the summer season, when the flow of water is at its peak, as that could risk flooding India’s own population living near the project. To avoid that, India would need to allow water to flow downstream — into Pakistan.

Anuttama Banerji, a New Delhi-based political analyst and water specialist, agreed that India cannot “stop” the river flow, only regulate its release.

“The flow of the Chenab River can be regulated through dams and storage facilities, but India would need serious capital investment [for that]”, she said. “The threat won’t materialise for Pakistan in the immediate term.”

Still, warn many experts, just because India cannot at the moment stop water flow into Pakistan does not reduce either the value of the IWT as a weapon for New Delhi, or Islamabad’s vulnerability in the future.

‘Real pressure point’

Dan Haines, environmental historian at University College London and author of the book Rivers Divided: Indus Basin Waters in the Making of India and Pakistan, warned that even symbolic disruptions of water flows by India could undermine Pakistan’s agriculture.

Agriculture accounts for almost 25 percent of Pakistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) and employs more than 40 percent of the workforce.

“The Indian government announced the abeyance very quickly after the Pahalgam terrorist attack because it knows that water is a real pressure point for Pakistan. Water is very politically sensitive,” Haines said.

In many ways, the recent fracture over river-sharing is precisely what the IWT had tried to insulate India-Pakistan relations from, say analysts.

“What India is attempting to do is to drag the issue of water squarely back into the domain of politics, which the treaty explicitly sought to separate,” Erum Sattar, lecturer in sustainable water management at Tufts University, told Al Jazeera.

“Given Pakistan’s reliance on the waters of the Indus, it is absolutely the case that having the treaty hold in its present form is critical and vital to Pakistan.”

And Pakistan needs to prepare for a future where India might have the ability to hurt it more than it currently can, using water, said Ahmed Irfan Aslam, a lawyer by practice, and a former federal minister who oversaw portfolios including law, justice, water, climate change, and investment. Aslam has also represented Pakistan in international water arbitration cases, including under the IWT.

“India does not have the capacity to stop rivers from flowing today. But that does not mean that they cannot acquire or develop that strategy over time,” he said.

Memon, too, agreed that while India can’t block the Chenab’s flow into Pakistan in the summer, the dynamic changes when the weather does.

“The real concern, however, arises during winter when water flow reduces. And in case India builds storage or diversion projects, they could cause harm to Pakistan’s winter crops, such as wheat,” he said. “Additionally, if there is a lean water flow in the summer season, the dams can also store water during that time as well, which could hurt Pakistan’s agriculture.”

Shiraz Memon (no relation to Naseer), a former Pakistani representative on the Permanent Indus Commission for Pakistan, also said that he feared that future Indian projects on the Chenab could eventually hurt Pakistan.

These projects — including the Ratle dam — “could hold water between 50 to 60 days during winter, which could be very damaging to Pakistan’s Punjab, which is entirely reliant on the Chenab River for its agricultural needs,” he told Al Jazeera.

How prepared is Pakistan for an India block on water flows?

At the moment, Pakistan has limited water storage capabilities. The country has three major multipurpose reservoirs – Mangla, Tarbela, and Chashma – as well as 19 barrages and 12 inter-river link canals.

Together, these allow for the storage of just under 15 million acre-feet (MAF) of water, enough for approximately four weeks. International standards recommend storage equivalent to at least 120 days.

To address the shortfall, Pakistan is building two major dams on the Indus River – Mohmand and Diamer-Bhasha – which are expected to increase capacity by another nine MAF upon their completion in 2028 and 2029, respectively.

Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif recently acknowledged the need for expanded storage and pledged to act. “The enemy has certain evil designs against Pakistan and wants to take steps against the water treaty. For that, the government has decided that we will build our water storage,” Sharif said on July 1.

In effect, that sets up a race between India potentially developing the capability to actually block the flow of water into Pakistan if it wants to, and Pakistan building storage facilities big enough to reduce the risk of a forced water shortage.

Still, no matter how much storage capacity Pakistan builds, it won’t be enough to survive more than short-term disruptions to water flow, if India were to try to block rivers from entering into its neighbour’s territory.

Khurram Dastgir Khan, a former federal minister for foreign affairs and defence in Pakistan, said that India acquiring the capability to divert or store water in the medium to long term could push the region into war.

“India’s threat is a genuine, existential concern,” Khan, a senior leader of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, told Al Jazeera. “The Indus Basin is a civilisation. Flow of these waters has braced our environment and sustained development of Pakistan’s culture, arts, agriculture, and industry. But PM Modi and his ministers have threatened repeatedly to stop every drop of water flowing into Pakistan.”

What makes that threat particularly worrying for Pakistan, said Aslam, the other former minister, is the breakdown in any trust between the neighbours.

“What you have right now is a situation in which we as Pakistanis feel that good faith is no longer there on the other side of the border,” Aslam told Al Jazeera during an interview at his residence in Islamabad.

But Aslam acknowledged that the sentiment might be shared across the border. “Indians may have a similar view on this about Pakistan,” he conceded.

A new Indus Waters Treaty?

For now, both sides have adopted hard-line positions. New Delhi has rejected any reversal of the IWT suspension, while Pakistani officials have termed it an “act of war” and accused India of weaponising water.

But analysts — and some Pakistani politicians — still hold out hope for diplomacy, or international legal intervention.

“India, we hope, and we expect, will act like a responsible state,” said Aslam. “And eventually, whatever issues there are, two neighbours will have to sit down to talk to each other and resolve.”

Al Jazeera reached out to several Pakistani government officials – including the ministers for defence, information, and water – but received no responses about the government’s plan of action for a scenario when India actually is able to — and does — block the flow of water.

However, a senior military official, speaking on condition of anonymity, pointed out that Pakistan was already invoking international legal channels to make its case.

Since 2016, Pakistan has been protesting India’s hydroelectric projects on the Jhelum and Chenab at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague. Last week, the PCA ruled that India’s decision to hold the IWT in abeyance did not impact its authority to adjudicate the case.

However, India has consistently refused to recognise the PCA’s authority in the case, so it is unclear whether New Delhi will accept any verdict that emerges from that court.

That effectively leaves Pakistan with two options: a military response, or a diplomatic solution.

The senior military official said that for Pakistan, the Indus waters were a “lifeline for the 250 million people of the country”.

“We see this as an act of war, and if there is any action taken by the Indians which we deem harmful to our interest, we will respond,” the official told Al Jazeera. “Any act of war authorises us to deliver an appropriate, legitimate and befitting response at a time and place of our choosing.”

Banerji, also a former fellow at the Washington-based Stimson Center, said any military response would be unwise given that the recent conflict has already reduced space for dialogue.

“I believe Pakistan should also reassess the treaty and see where it can derive benefits from a modified treaty, as that can enable the treaty to acquire a new form that is mutually beneficial to both sides,” she said.

Mustafa, the King’s College London geography professor, said Pakistan could use India’s decision to walk away from the IWT to also seek a renegotiated agreement — including by staking a claim to some of the water from the eastern rivers that New Delhi currently controls fully.

Aslam said that although direct negotiations between India and Pakistan remain the most effective way forward, the current climate makes dialogue unlikely.

“As a measure of last resort, I think the [Pakistan] government has made its position very clear on this,” he said.

“If Pakistan is deprived of water, all options are there on the table, including the consideration to use military solutions.”