Category: 3. Business

9 April 2026

• Households’ financial investment increased at unchanged annual rate of 2.5% in fourth quarter of 2025
• Non-financial corporations’ financing grew at unchanged annual rate of 1.5%
• Non-financial corporations’ gross operating surplus increased at higher annual rate of 4.3%, compared to 3.5% in previous quarter

Data for household financing and financial and non-financial investment

Data for NFC gross-operating surplus, non-financial investment and financing

Households

Household gross disposable income increased at a higher annual rate of 3.3% in the fourth quarter of 2025 (after 2.9% in the previous quarter). Compensation of employees grew at a lower rate of 4.2% (after 4.6%), and gross operating surplus and mixed income of the self-employed increased at a lower rate of 2.1% (after 2.4%). Household consumption expenditure grew at a higher rate of 3.6% (after 3.1%).

The household gross saving rate remained at 14.9% in the fourth quarter of 2025, unchanged from the previous quarter.

Household gross non-financial investment (which refers mainly to housing) increased at a higher rate of 7.1% (after 4.6% in the previous quarter). Loans to households, the main component of household financing, grew at a higher rate of 2.7% (after 2.5%).

Household financial investment increased at an unchanged rate of 2.5% in the fourth quarter of 2025. Among its components, currency and deposits (3.0%, after 3.2%) as well as investment in shares and other equity (2.0%, after 2.3%) grew at lower rates, while investments in debt securities (2.7%, after ‑0.5%) and in life insurance (2.6%, after 2.3%) increased at higher rates. Investment in pension schemes grew at an unchanged rate (2.6%).

Household net worth grew at an unchanged annual rate of 4.7% in the fourth quarter of 2025. The growth in net worth was due to continued valuation gains in financial and non-financial assets in addition to new net investments. Housing wealth, the main component of non-financial assets, grew at a lower rate (4.6%, after 5.1%). The household debt-to-income ratio decreased to 81.3% in the fourth quarter of 2025, from 81.7% in the fourth quarter of 2024.

Non-financial corporations

Net value added by NFCs increased at a broadly unchanged annual rate of 4.4% in the fourth quarter of 2025. Gross operating surplus grew at a higher rate (4.3%, after 3.5% in the previous quarter), and net property income, defined in this context as property income receivable minus interest and rent payable, also increased at a higher rate (0.5%, after 0.1%). As a result, gross entrepreneurial income (broadly equivalent to cash flow) grew at a higher rate (3.7%, after 3.1%).^[1]

NFCs’ gross non-financial investment increased at a lower annual rate of 1.3% (after 6.5%).^[2] Financial investment grew at a broadly unchanged rate of 2.1%. Among its components, loans granted increased at a lower rate of 2.3% (after 2.6%), while investments in currency and deposits (3.7%, after 3.5%) and in shares and other equity (1.1%, after 0.9%) grew at higher rates.

Financing of NFCs increased at an unchanged annual rate of 1.5% in the fourth quarter of 2025. Net issuance of debt securities (3.2%, after 2.4%) and loan financing^[3] (2.4%, after 2.2%) both grew at higher rates, while trade credit financing increased at a lower rate (3.9%, after 4.7%). Equity financing grew at an unchanged rate (0.7%).

NFCs’ debt-to-GDP ratio (consolidated measure) decreased to 65.6% in the fourth quarter of 2025, from 67.0% in the same quarter of the previous year; the non-consolidated, wider debt measure decreased to 135.7%, from 138.0%.

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Notes:

• This statistical release incorporates revisions to the data since the first quarter of 2022.
• The annual growth rate of non-financial transactions and of outstanding assets and liabilities (stocks) is calculated as the percentage change between the value for a given quarter and that value recorded four quarters earlier. The annual growth rates used for financial transactions refer to the total value of transactions during the year in relation to the outstanding stock a year before.
• The euro area and national financial accounts data of NFCs and households are available in an interactive dashboard.
• Hyperlinks in the main body of the statistical release are dynamic. The data they lead to may therefore change with subsequent data releases as a result of revisions. Figures shown in annex tables are a snapshot of the data as at the time of the current release.
• The ECB publishes experimental Distributional Wealth Accounts (DWA) which provide additional breakdowns for the household sector. The release of results for 2025 Q4 will take place on 29 May 2026.

As a result, the debate was less about which technology should win and more about how to build enough of everything. The dominant approach was “all of the above.” Renewables, battery storage, natural gas, nuclear, geothermal, and grid-enhancing technologies all have a role to play. The old idea that the transition would mainly consist of replacing hydrocarbons is giving way to a new reality: the world is entering a phase of energy addition rather than energy substitution. Demand is growing too quickly, and the system is too strained, for any single solution to suffice.

This is especially relevant for renewables. Far from fading, they have gained a broader justification. Solar and wind are no longer seen only as climate solutions, but also as strategic assets that enhance domestic resilience. At the same time, their effectiveness depends on being paired with storage, transmission, and system flexibility. The next phase of the energy transition is not just about adding clean generation, but about integrating it into a more robust system. Batteries are among the clearest examples of a technology that has moved from promise to operational relevance.

Batteries are among the clearest examples of a technology that has moved from promise to operational relevance.

Natural gas also emerged as one of the key winners. Once widely described as a bridge fuel, it is increasingly seen as a long-term pillar of the global energy system. Its role in power generation, industry, system flexibility, and energy security is harder to question. The narrative of an impending LNG glut has weakened, replaced by concerns about tighter supply, geopolitical risk, and a renewed emphasis on long-term contracts. In this environment, U.S. LNG is not only commercially important, but strategically significant. Europe remains dependent on global gas markets, while Asia is highly exposed to disruptions in Persian Gulf supply, and the premium on reliability has increased.

Asia represents the epicenter of vulnerability. Many economies remain heavily reliant on imported energy, particularly from the Middle East, making them especially exposed to prolonged disruptions. At the same time, Asia is where the future of the energy system is being most intensely contested. Some countries are rapidly scaling renewables and batteries; others are doubling down on coal for security reasons. Nuclear remains part of the mix in some markets, while gas continues to play a central role in others. India stood out as a country that could leapfrog traditional pathways by accelerating solar, storage, and electrification. What Asia ultimately shows is that there is no single energy model—different countries are responding to the same pressures in very different ways.

Nuclear is another area where the tone has shifted. What many now call a nuclear renaissance is becoming more credible, driven by rising electricity demand, stronger political support, and growing interest from technology companies seeking firm, low-carbon power. Yet significant constraints remain: cost overruns, supply chains, standardization, and labor availability. Nuclear is part of the solution for the 2030s, but not a quick fix for today’s pressures.

The same realism applies to infrastructure. One of the recurring frustrations is that demand is moving at sprint speed, while energy systems move at marathon pace. This is partly about capital and engineering, but also about bureaucracy, overregulation, permitting, and project execution. Even when capital is available and the strategic need is clear, infrastructure takes too long to approve and build—especially in advanced economies. In a world where energy has become the new bottleneck, these delays matter more than ever.

The deeper meaning of CERAWeek 2026 is the end of a certain innocence in the energy debate. The transition is not over, but it is no longer seen as a smooth, linear process driven primarily by policy ambition and declining clean-tech costs. It is now understood as a more complex, uneven, and geopolitical transformation. The world is not simply choosing between fossil fuels and renewables—it is trying to assemble a system capable of delivering enough energy, at speed, under conditions of rivalry, geopolitical risk, industrial competition, and national security. At the same time, AI and hyperscalers are not only adding pressure on the demand side; they are increasingly part of the solution, bringing capital, long-term offtake agreements, and new tools to optimize grids, improve efficiency, and accelerate innovation across the energy system.

Energy has returned to the center of economic strategy, technological competition, and national security

At times, Houston felt less like an energy conference and more like a discussion of power and statecraft. Energy has returned to the center of national security, economic strategy, and technological competition. The winners in this new era will not necessarily be those with the most ambitious rhetoric, but those able to combine resilience, affordability, and execution. CERAWeek 2026 did not bury the energy transition. But it did bring to an end the illusion that it could happen without trade-offs, without geopolitics, and without a much more uncomfortable conversation about how the world will actually power itself in the decades ahead. In this new landscape, energy security strikes back—and regains center stage.

Expanded certifications further reinforce the eco-friendly value of Samsung’s premium lineup while advancing its sustainability efforts across product categories

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. announced that approximately 34 models across its 2026 TV and soundbar lineup have received Product Carbon Reduction and Product Carbon Footprint certifications from TÜV Rheinland, a globally recognized certification organization based in Germany. The achievement reflects Samsung’s continued efforts to reduce carbon emissions across its premium product lineup.

“As a global leader in premium displays and audio, Samsung sees sustainability as an essential part of innovation,” said Taeyong Son, Executive Vice President of Visual Display (VD) Business at Samsung Electronics. “We remain committed to reducing carbon emissions across our products, so consumers do not have to choose between cutting-edge technology and a more responsible product experience.”

Samsung received Product Carbon Reduction certification for 14 premium display and audio models, including its 2026 OLED TVs, The Frame Pro and its flagship HW-Q990H soundbar.[1] An additional 20 products, including Micro RGB and Mini LED TVs, earned Product Carbon Footprint certification.[2]

TÜV Rheinland grants Product Carbon Footprint certification to products that meet international standards for evaluating greenhouse gas emissions across the full product life cycle, including manufacturing, transportation, use and disposal.

Product Carbon Reduction certification, on the other hand, is granted to products that have already received Product Carbon Footprint certification and further demonstrate a measurable reduction in carbon emissions compared with their predecessors. Notably, the HW-Q990H earned both certifications, extending Samsung’s sustainability efforts beyond TVs.

In 2021, Samsung’s Neo QLED became the first TV with 4K resolution or higher to receive Product Carbon Reduction certification. In the six years since, the company has continued to expand its portfolio of certified products across QLED, OLED, Lifestyle TVs, monitors and signage.

These efforts also reflect Samsung’s broader leadership in premium display and audio categories, where it has led the global TV market for 20 years[3] and remained the No. 1 global soundbar brand for 12 years.[4]

For more information on Samsung’s 2026 TV lineup, please visit: https://www.samsung.com/my/

[1] 14 Product Carbon Reduction-certified models include OLED (S90H, S85H 55’’, 65’’, 77’’, 83’’), The Frame Pro (LS03HW 65”, 75”, 85”) and soundbar (HW-Q990H model).

[2] 20 Product Carbon Footprint-certified models include Micro RGB (R95H 65’’, 75’’, 85’’, R85H 55”, 65”, 75”, 85”, 100’’), OLED (S95H 55’’, 65’’, 77’’, 83’’, S85H 48’’), Mini LED (M70H), and The Frame Pro (LS03HW 55’’).

[3] Omdia Q4 2025 Public Display Report, by unit sales.

[4] FutureSource Consulting, 2025.

Inside a teaching kitchen south-east of Seoul, I coat a whole chicken – cut into eight parts – in batter and dip the pieces carefully into a bowl of powdered mix until covered in a light, fluffy layer.

A chef watches intently. “Don’t rub it,” he says. “Keep it delicate.”

The chicken, already brined in what I’m told is a secret marinade, goes into a fryer filled with an olive oil blend, heated to 170C. I slowly lower the pieces a third of the way, then drop them in away from myself to avoid splashing. I set a timer for 10 minutes.

This is Chicken University,a sprawling campus with a giant chicken statue at the entrance. It exists to train would-be owners of the BBQ Chicken franchise chain through a two-week residential programme. More than 50,000 people have passed through its classrooms.

This humble dish is relatively simple, and is not even traditional Korean cuisine, but it is part of a national obsession that has gone global, both physically and culturally as part of the K-food wave. The country has been only half-jokingly dubbed the Republic of Fried Chicken.

South Korea has around 40,000 fried chicken restaurants – just a few thousand short of the number of McDonald’s branches worldwide. Most are small, family-run operations. But now, Korean chicken brands operate more than 1,800 stores in around 60 countries, nearly double the number of stores a decade ago. From London to Los Angeles, Korean fried chicken appears on the menu.

It is the most popular Korean food among international consumers, according to a South Korean government survey of about 11,000 consumers across 22 cities, spanning Asia, Europe, the Americas and Australia.

From post-war import to K-food export

South Korea’s most successful culinary export is not traditionally Korean. Fried chicken arrived with American soldiers stationed in the country after the Korean war, but the technique that made it distinctly Korean emerged decades later.

About 1980, a chicken shop owner in the southern city of Daegu, Yoon Jong-gye, noticed customers abandoning their chicken once it grew cold, when the meat became dry. So he began experimenting with brining the chicken to keep it juicy and a glaze made from chilli powder. A neighbourhood grandmother suggested adding corn syrup.

The result was yangnyeom chicken – sweet, sticky and spicy – and still appealing at room temperature. Yoon never patented his recipe and died in December 2025 at 74, having watched his invention spread far beyond his tiny shop where it began.

Korean chicken brands had been expanding internationally since the early 2000s, but the cultural breakthrough came in 2014, when the Korean drama My Love from the Star became a sensation across China.

A line from its lead character – that “on the day of the first snow, you should have chicken and beer” – reportedly triggered queues outside Korean chicken restaurants, even during an avian flu outbreak.

Chimaek, the portmanteau meaning “fried chicken and beer” from the Korean words “chikin” and “maekju”, has since become a cultural shorthand, even entering the Oxford English Dictionary.

It describes as much an act of collective pleasure as a meal: friends gathered around a table, with a plate of chicken at the centre and draught beer within reach. Every July, Daegu hosts a chimaek festival that draws more than a million visitors.

One defining feature of Korean fried chicken is how it is served. Kim Ki-deuk, who has run an independent chicken shop near Korea University in Seoul with his wife Baek Hye-kyeong for more than 20 years, puts it simply. “In fast food places, they may sell one or several pieces,” he says. “Korean chicken is one full bird.”

Technique is another factor, though methods vary.

At shops like Kim and Baek’s, chicken is fried twice. “We fry it once first, then when the customer orders, we fry it again,” he says. “Otherwise it gets soggy. That’s what makes it extra crispy.”

The batter, typically made with potato or corn starch, holds up under the sauce – whether a sweet-spicy yangnyeom glaze or a soy-garlic coating – allowing it to stay crisp long after it has been boxed up for delivery.

Prof Joo Young-ha, a cultural anthropologist at the Academy of Korean Studies who specialises in food culture, argues that Korean chicken’s global success stems from its simplicity.

“Unlike pork, chicken crosses religious prohibition boundaries,” he says. “And unlike kimchi, which is treated like a side dish, or bibimbap, which isn’t immediately obvious as a dish, fried chicken is immediately recognisable as a meal.”

Beyond its global appeal, fried chicken’s rise in South Korea reflects something about modern life there. Prof Joo traces its rise to the 1980s and 1990s, when apartment living, dual-income households, and delivery culture were reshaping Korean life. Fried chicken, fast, convenient, and boxed for takeaway, fitted the moment.

The industry has long attracted mid-career Koreans seeking a route back to income after leaving corporate jobs, though the market is fiercely competitive and margins are thin.

Back at their fried chicken shop, Kim Ki-deuk slides another batch of chicken gizzards, another popular menu item, into the crackling oil. “Same as usual,” one customer says.

“It’s great that Korean chicken is known worldwide,” Kim says, wiping down the counter between orders. “Chicken is for everyone, young and old.

“Korea is such a small place. One bird doing all this work, introducing our country, our culture. It’s quite something.”