As governments and companies clash over how satellite constellations such as Starlink should be regulated, a paradox is emerging: regulatory efforts designed to constrain unauthorized satellite operations may inadvertently strengthen the market position of the very players they seek to control.
When satellites operate without permission
At the heart of the growing debate in satellite governance is a simple question: Can a satellite system beam signals into a country or provide a service without that country’s explicit consent?
This new struggle is unfolding at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the often-overlooked multilateral UN body responsible for coordinating global telecommunications. At stake are the rules for cross-border satellite operations, and whether global connectivity will be governed through enforceable, equitable frameworks, or left to the priorities of dominant private actors and a handful of vocal states, with questionable human rights records.
International law—particularly the ITU Radio Regulations, which are binding international treaty provisions—affirms national sovereignty over the radio spectrum on which satellite internet relies. Yet, new-generation Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite companies like Starlink complicate its enforcement. Unlike the traditional geostationary systems, LEO satellites orbit the Earth rapidly (in about 92 minutes) and continuously traverse multiple national jurisdictions each day. With no formal enforcement mechanisms at the ITU, this evolving landscape risks disrupting established coordination practices, often referred to as ‘spectrum sovereignty’: the principle that states manage spectrum use within their borders.
These disruptions could in turn lead to dangerous interference across critical infrastructure and essential services, highlighting the persistent tension between global coordination needs and national regulatory authority.
This issue became a concrete flashpoint in September 2022, when Iranian authorities detected that Starlink terminals were operating without authorization inside Iran. The terminals, apparently smuggled into the country, were providing unlicensed service in violation of national rules. Iran’s response was systematic: filing complaints with the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the UN Security Council, and multiple UN bodies, without a concrete solution. Eventually in 2023, Iran escalated the matter to the ITU’s Radio Regulations Board, a specialized body that interprets the ITU radio regulations and mediates disputes regarding harmful interference and procedural violations that cannot be solved between parties. The Board focuses on reviewing this subset of issues, to maintain neutrality in the cases they accept to be discussed and prevent the process from becoming politicized.
Iran’s argument centered on ‘spectrum sovereignty,’ invoking the principle that each country controls radio frequencies within its borders—and they had a point. Under ITU procedures, satellite operators, like any other spectrum user, must coordinate service areas and obtain national approval before transmitting into a country. These sustained diplomatic efforts led Iran, and eventually Russia, to successfully force inclusion of ‘unauthorized satellite operations’ as Agenda Item 1.5 at the 2023 World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC). The WRC is the ITU’s quadrennial global forum where countries define international radio spectrum regulations and future agenda items for discussion. Or put plainly, Starlink’s perceived non-compliance with established rules led a bilateral technical violation to escalate into a multilateral regulatory precedent that will fundamentally shape the future governance of satellite connectivity, and not necessarily to the benefit of the open internet.
While Iran and Russia are hardly champions of the open internet, both countries maintain highly restrictive digital policies, and their technical arguments about regulatory compliance inadvertently highlighted genuine concerns about the importance of upholding international spectrum coordination agreements. Failure to do so risks not only market distortion or internet interference, but also severe disruptions to critical infrastructure systems including aviation communication, rail operations, emergency services, and smart city functions, where precise spectrum usage is essential to public safety and coordination.
The emerging response to Starlink’s disruptive practice of operating without national consent has become the most contentious issue in satellite governance. But as regulators work to address this challenge, they are discovering that the solution may create new problems.
The ironic twist of non-compliance
The ITU’s regulatory response reveals an unexpected problem. Starlink’s non-compliance is enabled by current regulations that assume cooperative behavior and lack strong enforcement mechanisms. Iran’s and other nations’ response—pushing for stronger rules—creates new barriers for operators who were already playing by the rules. This dynamic becomes clear when examining how the two major players in the commercial satellite market approach compliance.
Starlink sells directly to consumers and has repeatedly operated without explicit government authorization, including in Sudan, Namibia, South Africa and Cuba. OneWeb (now owned by Eutelsat, the French satellite operator) operates as a wholesale provider, working through local Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and following traditional authorization processes. OneWeb, like other providers, has demonstrated that compliance with the current ruleset is technically straightforward. In ITU meetings, the European company has shown how easily it can disconnect unauthorized users from its network. Now, it appears Iran is rubbing this fact in everyone’s face to show that compliance is simple.
Starlink does not do what could easily be done, and current regulations do not force it to. As a result, Iran is now pushing for stronger enforcement mechanisms on the entire satellite sector. It is important to note that discussions at the ITU-R (International Telecommunication Union Radiocommunication Sector) do not and cannot target individual companies; the ITU-R operates at the level of service categories and technical standards. In this case, the debate is framed around the broader class of Non-Geostationary Earth Orbit (NGEO) satellite systems—which includes multiple operators and constellations—rather than any single provider. Thus, the unintended consequence is that new rules could create compliance burdens that would make it harder for operators like OneWeb to compete, while doing little to constrain Starlink’s market dominance.
The enforcement challenge and its global stakes
In 2025, the debate over satellite connectivity, sparked in part by Iran’s detection of unauthorized Starlink terminals operating within its borders, has continued to gain momentum at the ITU. What began in 2023 as a country-specific concern has since escalated into a formal agenda item (Agenda Item 1.13) for the upcoming World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-27). This agenda item is meant to study and potentially define global regulatory frameworks for Non-Geostationary Satellite Systems (NGSOs), including how their signals are coordinated, limited, or excluded across national borders.
Under ITU rules, satellite services must already be authorized by each country to operate within its borders. The key distinction in current debates is not whether authorization is needed, but how that authorization is technically enforced and whether stricter, verifiable mechanisms should be required. We saw how many Member States are now calling for stricter controls over how satellite internet operates across borders. Proposals include requiring satellite operators to set up control centers that can shut off terminals in real time, systems to track the physical location of each user terminal, and technologies to prevent satellite signals from reaching countries where the service isn’t authorized. These measures would require satellite constellations, especially those providing near-global coverage, to develop more complex infrastructure, potentially limiting how flexibly and widely they can operate.
The ensuing technical discussions reveal the global stakes of efforts to bolster enforcement and regulation of satellite connectivity, in the ITU and beyond. As we observed during ITU meetings, these new proposals face strong resistance from countries hosting major satellite operators and industry representatives, who argue such measures are impractical and risk ‘stifling innovation.’ Such proposals may indeed not be technically or economically feasible for all operators, depending on their satellite systems and coverage geography. This is likely to lead to a situation in which stricter rules and enforcement mechanisms create significant burdens for operators with limited global coverage or real-time control capabilities, precisely those who were already following authorization processes.
Whereas the phrase ‘stifling innovation’ is often used liberally by tech companies protecting their vested interests, in this particular case the worry seems valid. In this scenario, the focus on constraining one dominant player is leading to interventions that may unintentionally entrench its position. Put differently, regulators are proposing rules that assume all operators have the same massive scale and advanced technical capabilities as Starlink—and this is simply not the case.
By designing rules around the scale and behavior of mega-constellations, these obscure but binding regulatory ITU frameworks risk creating structural challenges for diverse or emerging actors. The rule-breaker, meanwhile, continues to operate largely unaffected. Even more concerning, the regulatory response to rule-breaking may end up consolidating power among the rule-breakers. Industry concerns about the strictest proposals focus on feasibility and cost, particularly affecting smaller operators as opposed to giants like SpaceX and Amazon’s upcoming Kuiper constellation. As other LEO satellite companies approach commercial viability, the rules established now will determine whether satellite connectivity becomes a diverse, competitive market or remains dominated by a handful of mega-players.
Watch this space
What’s emerging from the ITU negotiations is a fundamental question about space-based digital infrastructure. Will satellite connectivity be governed through frameworks that ensure diverse participation and fair access, or will it be determined by the priorities and capabilities of a few dominant private actors? This question sits at the center of a political power struggle over control of orbital infrastructure. The outcome will define whether regulatory accountability and infrastructure diversity can be upheld in an era increasingly shaped by commercial satellite mega-constellations.
What is clear is that global connectivity cannot be left to a handful of political actors with incentives to keep their societies digitally isolated, nor to the vagaries of dominant private actors operating as if only the sky is the limit.
