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As the United States and Israel’s war on Iran unfolds over the coming days and weeks, the scale of the fallout for the global economy will be measured at the petrol pump.
The biggest threat the conflict poses to global economic health lies in rising energy prices.
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Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian attacks on key energy production facilities in Qatar and Saudi Arabia have paralysed a substantial chunk of the world’s energy supply.
For a global economy already rattled by US President Donald Trump’s tariffs and what many see as his unravelling of the post-World War II order, much now depends on how long the disruption lasts.
A sustained surge in energy prices would drive up the cost of everyday goods.
Central banks would then likely raise borrowing costs to curb inflation, dampening consumer spending and dragging down economic growth.
“It’s really a question on how long the disruption of flows through the Strait of Hormuz lasts and whether there will be destruction of physical assets,” said Anne-Sophie Corbeau, an analyst at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.
“For the moment, the market is pricing a short disruption and no destruction. But that may change in the future. We simply do not know right now how this whole crisis ends.”
While Iran’s threats to shipping have halted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, the conduit for one-fifth of the world’s oil, crude prices have seen relatively modest gains so far.
Brent crude hovered about $84 a barrel on Friday morning, US time, up about 15 percent compared with pre-conflict prices.
That gain pales in comparison with past crises.
During the 1973-74 oil embargo led by OPEC’s Arab members, prices quadrupled in just three months.
Since then, the world’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil has declined substantially.
Today, the US is the biggest producer globally, producing some 13 million barrels a day, more than Iran, Iraq and the UAE combined, according to the US Energy Information Administration.
But if supply disruptions extend beyond a few weeks, oil prices could rise precipitously.
The seven oil-producing Gulf nations – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE – are likely to run out of crude oil storage capacity in less than a month if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, according to an analysis by JPMorgan Chase.
With storage capacity depleted, producers would be forced to cut production.
“While there will be some capacities elsewhere, and some options to use pipelines rather than shipping, it is incredibly difficult to replace the sheer volume as we are talking about an average of 20 million barrels of oil per day that usually cross the Strait of Hormuz,” said Sarah Schiffling, a supply chains expert at the Hanken School of Economics in Helsinki.
“This important maritime chokepoint provides very significant leverage in the global economy.”
This week, Goldman Sachs analysts estimated that global oil prices will likely hit $100 a barrel – a threshold not seen since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine – if shipping through the waterway stays at the current reduced levels for five weeks.
In an interview published by The Financial Times on Friday, Qatar’s energy minister Saad al-Kaabi warned that producers in the region could halt production within days and that oil could soar as high as $150 a barrel.
Such increases would reverberate through the global economy.
The International Monetary Fund has estimated that global economic growth is reduced by 0.15 percent for every 10 percent rise in oil prices.
The pain would not be spread evenly.
About 80 percent of the oil shipped through the strait goes to Asia.
India, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, which are all highly dependent on foreign energy imports, would be among the economies most vulnerable to spikes in the cost of necessities such as food and fuel.
“The effect would be felt in Asia and Europe in particular,” said Lutz Kilian, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
“Some countries, such as China, have ample oil reserves to help weather a temporary outage, while others do not.”
Liquefied natural gas (LNG), which is also shipped through the strait and has fewer alternative suppliers outside the region than crude oil, has already seen much steeper price rises.
European prices of LNG surged by as much as 50 percent on Monday after state-run QatarEnergy, which ships about one-fifth of global supply through the waterway, announced a halt to production following drone attacks blamed on Iran.
“Gas will be more impacted because the market was still relatively tight and stocks are low in Europe as we are at the end of winter; also, there is no replacement for the LNG lost,” Corbeau said.
With US President Donald Trump signalling that he intends to continue the assault on Iran for at least several more weeks, the extent to which Tehran is willing – or able – to keep the strait closed will be critical to the global economy.
At least nine commercial vessels have been targeted in attacks in or near the strait since the start of the conflict, prompting multiple insurance firms to cancel coverage for vessels in the Gulf.
While traffic through the strait has not halted, it is down about 90 percent compared with normal levels, according to ship tracker MarineTraffic.
“The uncertainty itself is probably the most dangerous part. Supply chains hate uncertainty,” Schiffling said.
“It is possible to plan for almost anything, but not knowing what will happen makes it really challenging to adapt operations.”
On Wednesday, Trump said he had ordered the US International Development Finance Corporation to start insuring shipping lines in the region in order to keep trade flowing.
Trump also said the US Navy could begin escorting vessels through the strait if necessary.
“As long as Israel and the US are able to suppress Iranian drone and missile attacks in the strait to the point that the bulk of the oil tankers gets through, and as long as the United States provides back-up insurance for shippers and their cargo, the global economy may make it through this war without a recession,” Kilian said.
“On the other hand, if there is a severe disruption of oil traffic, the economic costs will grow the longer the disruption lasts.”
ISLAMABAD: Short-term inflation, measured through the Sensitive Price Index (SPI), increased by 4.70 per cent year-on-year in the week ending 5 March, reflecting higher retail prices for petroleum products.
Short-term inflation has persistently risen for the 31st consecutive week, indicating ongoing pressure on household budgets. The continuous increase is mainly caused by sharp rises in the prices of vegetables and other perishable foods, along with higher electricity tariffs and petrol prices.
On a week-on-week basis, the SPI recorded a marginal increase of 0.37pc compared with the previous week, mainly due to higher prices of petrol, diesel, and liquefied petroleum gas, according to official data released on Friday.
Short-term inflation is expected to increase further due to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, which is disrupting the supply of essential commodities, especially petroleum products. The uncertainty in global energy markets has raised concerns about higher import costs and supply limitations, which could put additional pressure on domestic prices.
Petroleum, food drive price hike for 31st week
The government has already indicated that an increase in petroleum product prices is likely, warning that supply shortages may also emerge in the country if the situation persists. According to officials, a prolonged conflict in the region could intensify inflationary pressures by pushing up energy costs and affecting the availability of key imported commodities.
A sharp rise in the retail prices of sugar and meat has also significantly contributed to the recent upward trend. Meat prices, in particular, have been increasing gradually, placing additional pressure on household budgets already strained by high food and energy costs.
Weekly inflation earlier hit a record high of 48.35pc YoY in early May 2023. It then eased in the following years. The recent fluctuations in sugar, edible oil, pulses, and meat prices indicate that instability in essential food commodities continues to influence short-term inflation patterns, with consumers experiencing repeated cycles of price increases.
The items, whose prices increased the most over the previous week included chicken (10.46pc), LPG (5.61pc), bananas (3.85pc), petrol (3.06pc), diesel (1.84pc), garlic (1.23pc), beef (0.66pc), mutton (0.65pc), pulse mash (0.51pc), lawn printed (0.43pc), gur (0.30pc) and mustard oil (0.24pc).
The items whose prices declined week-on-week included tomatoes (10.04pc), eggs (8.13pc), onions (6.08pc), potatoes (5.09pc), wheat flour (2.40pc), pulse gram (0.50pc), pulse moong (0.43pc) and 5-litre cooking oil (0.37pc).
However, on an annual basis, the items with the highest price increases included gas charges for Q1 (29.85pc), wheat flour (26.13pc), electricity charges for Q1 (17.33pc), LPG (16.89pc), chilli powder (15.20pc), beef (12.36pc), firewood (11.40pc), powdered milk (10.16pc), mutton (9.32pc), tomatoes (9.02pc), gur (8.51pc), and rice basmati broken (6.18pc).
In contrast, the prices of potatoes fell by 53.76pc, followed by onions (26.10pc), eggs (24.93pc), garlic (22.25pc), chicken (21.70pc), pulse gram (21.37pc), salt powder (12.52pc), and pulse masoor (10.71pc).
The index, comprising 51 items collected from 50 markets in 17 cities, is computed weekly to assess the prices of essential commodities and services more frequently. Data showed that the prices of 13 items increased, 11 decreased, and 27 remained stable compared to the previous week.
Published in Dawn, March 7th, 2026
The international agenda of the second Trump administration has far-reaching economic consequences. Sweeping tariffs have disrupted longstanding trade norms and raised import prices, affecting consumers and firms in the US and abroad (Clausing 2025, Kawasaki 2025, Amiti et al. 2026), while sharp breaks in global alliances have cooled economic relationships between the US and its closest allies (Gensler et al. 2025). But beyond these well-documented effects on goods trade and supply chains, geopolitical tensions also deter foreign visitors; and when visitors stop coming, the consequences for employment in tourism-dependent communities can be swift and concentrated.
As a case in point, President Trump’s rhetoric about a possible acquisition of America’s northern neighbour, combined with escalating trade tensions, led to a 25% decline in Canadian visits to the US over the course of 2025 (Figure 1). This decline is economically meaningful. Tourism supports around 10 million US jobs and accounts for about 3% of GDP (US Department of Commerce 2026), while Canadians represented approximately 28% of the 72 million international visitors to the US in 2024. The episode echoes earlier instances in which geopolitical conflicts deterred foreign visitors with measurable consequences for host economies (Ahn et al. 2022, Greaney and Kiyota 2025).
Figure 1 Canadian resident visitors to the US
In recent work (Kurmann et al. 2026), we present the first systematic evidence on how this negative demand shock affected US local labour markets. The shock is geographically concentrated in tourist-dependent destinations, sectorally confined to consumer-facing industries like leisure and hospitality and retail, and still actively developing. Accurately capturing its economic consequences therefore requires granular, high-frequency data not readily available from statistical agencies. To address this, we leverage two novel private-sector datasets.
Our first dataset is smartphone foot-traffic data from Advan, covering more than 8 million points of interest across the US. Because Canada and the US share a highly integrated mobile device ecosystem, the data provider can identify devices with home locations in Canada that visit US businesses. This allows us to construct a precise measure of Canadian visitor exposure, at the level of individual ZIP codes and industries, before the tourism decline began. Our second dataset is real-time establishment-level records on weekly employment, hours worked, and hourly wage rates from Homebase, a scheduling and payroll administration platform used by over 150,000 small and medium businesses in the US, primarily in food services, retail, and leisure.
Figure 2 illustrates the geographic distribution of our exposure measure, the share of foot traffic attributable to Canadian visitors in 2024, across US ZIP codes and service-sector industries. Canadian visitor shares are highest in border regions from Washington state to Maine, as well as major tourist hubs in California, Florida, and Nevada. While in most places, this share is small relative to the total number of visitors (which includes residents), some border communities derive a substantial fraction of their customer base from Canadian visitors – in some cases exceeding 10%.
Figure 2 Exposure to Canadian tourism
To infer the causal effect of the tourism decline on local labour markets, we compare employment, hours, and wages at establishments in highly exposed local markets, those where Canadian visitors account for roughly 1% or more of total foot traffic, to outcomes at less exposed establishments, before and after the tourism decline began in 2025. Our approach controls for local economic conditions, industry-wide shocks, and time-invariant establishment characteristics, so that differences in outcomes can be attributed to differential exposure to Canadian visitors.
We find significant employment losses in highly exposed local markets, as shown in Figure 3. Employment at highly exposed and less exposed establishments tracked each other almost perfectly through 2024. Beginning in spring 2025, a sharp divergence opens up: employment in the most exposed markets starts falling relative to less exposed ones in March-April, deepens through the summer, and then persists through the end of 2025. By mid-2025, establishments in the most exposed markets employed roughly 6% fewer workers relative to comparable establishments in less exposed markets.
Interestingly, we find no significant effects on average hours and hourly wages, indicating that the adjustment occurred almost entirely along the extensive margin, consistent with evidence from other demand shocks affecting service industries (Goolsbee et al. 2025, Kurmann et al. 2025).
Figure 3 Canadian tourism decline and US local business employment
Scaling up from establishment-level estimates to national totals requires assumptions about the broader population of affected businesses. Under conservative assumptions – focusing on the small and medium establishments covered by Homebase and assuming no demand spillovers onto non-exposed local businesses – we estimate that the Canadian tourism decline cost between 14,000 and 42,000 jobs in exposed US markets. The wide range reflects different choices about which markets to count as exposed and whether to focus on the average effect for 2025 or on the period after the full effects were realised.
While these numbers may be modest relative to total US employment, their geographic concentration is striking. The most exposed markets span only about 1,500 to 3,300 ZIP codes, home to between 9 and 26 million residents. In those communities, our estimates imply a persistent contraction of around 4% to 6% in retail and leisure-sector employment at small establishments, a substantial local shock.
Several factors suggest the true employment losses are larger. As mentioned, we abstract from demand spillover effects onto neighbouring businesses, we do not track large establishments that are important in the hotel industry, and we cannot fully capture establishment closures. A growing literature shows that tourism generates significant local economic gains through demand spillovers onto non-tourism sectors (Faber and Gaubert 2019, Allen et al. 2020), suggesting that the indirect effects of the Canadian tourism decline may be non-negligible.
The political geography of the shock is also noteworthy. ZIP codes most exposed to Canadian tourism are disproportionately likely to have voted Democratic in the 2024 presidential election and tend to have somewhat lower household incomes. This contrasts with the pattern documented for tariff retaliation in the US-China trade war, which primarily affected Republican-leaning counties (Fetzer and Schwarz 2019).
The US-Canada case illustrates a channel of harm that trade policy debates often overlook. Beyond goods trade and supply-chain disruptions, geopolitical tensions can deter foreign visitors and hit the economy fast. Such shocks strike specific places and non-tradable sectors that may find it difficult to absorb the blow. Whereas major tourist destinations like Las Vegas or Miami may be able to offset the shock by attracting more domestic visitors, less prominent places such as communities along the US-Canada border may have less capacity to do so.
More broadly, our analysis demonstrates that combining smartphone-based visitor origin data with high-frequency payroll records can deliver rapid, granular assessments of tourism disruptions as they unfold – well before traditional government statistics become available. This methodology provides a template applicable to future shocks, whether arising from geopolitical tensions, public health crises, or macroeconomic downturns.
Ahn, J, T M Greaney, and K Kiyota (2022), “Political conflict and angry consumers: Evaluating the regional impacts of a consumer boycott on travel services trade”, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 65: 101216.
Allen, T, S Fuchs, S Ganapati, A Graziano, R Madera, and J Montoriol-Garriga (2020), “Is tourism good for locals? Evidence from Barcelona”, Dartmouth College, mimeograph.
Amiti, M, C Flanagan, S Heise, and D E Weinstein (2026), “Who is paying for the 2025 US tariffs?”, Liberty Street Economics, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 12 February.
Clausing, K (2025), “The aftermath of tariffs”, VoxEU.org, 29 August.
Faber, B, and C Gaubert (2019), “Tourism and economic development: Evidence from Mexico’s coastline”, American Economic Review 109(6): 2245–93.
Fetzer, T, and C Schwarz (2025), “Tariffs and politics: Evidence from Trump’s trade wars”, VoxEU.org, 23 April.
Gensler, G, S Johnson, U Panizza, and B Weder di Mauro (2025), “The second Trump administration: Consequences for the ‘rest of us’”, VoxEU.org, 8 December.
Goolsbee, A, C Syverson, R Goldgof, and J Tatarka (2025), “The curious surge of productivity in US restaurants”, NBER Working Paper 33555.
Greaney, T M, and K Kiyota (2025), “Regional impacts of international tourism boycott: A China – Japan conflict”, Economic Inquiry, first published 3 December.
Kawasaki, K (2025), “Economic impact of US tariff hikes: Significance of trade diversion effects”, VoxEU.org, 15 September.
Kurmann, A, E Lalé, and L Ta (2025), “Measuring small business dynamics and employment with private-sector real-time data”, Journal of Public Economics 250: 105477.
Kurmann, A, E Lalé, and J Martin (2026), “When neighbors stop knocking: The impact of Canada’s 2025 tourism decline on US local businesses”, CEPR Discussion Paper 21187.
Moder, I, and T Spital (2026), “The risk of tariffs as a tool to attract manufacturing investment”, VoxEU.org, 8 January.
US Department of Commerce (2026), “US travel and tourism fast facts”, International Trade Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office.
HAMILTON, Bermuda, March 6, 2026 /PRNewswire/ — Ardmore Shipping Corporation (NYSE: ASC) (“Ardmore” or the “Company”) announced today that it has filed its Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2025 (the “Form 20-F”) with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”).
In compliance with the New York Stock Exchange rules, a copy of the Form 20-F can be found in the Investor Relations section of the Company’s website, www.ardmoreshipping.com, under SEC Filings.
About Ardmore Shipping Corporation
Ardmore owns and operates a fleet of MR product and chemical tankers ranging from 25,000 to 50,000 deadweight tonnes. Ardmore provides, through its modern, fuel-efficient fleet of mid-size tankers, seaborne transportation of petroleum products and chemicals worldwide to oil majors, national oil companies, oil and chemical traders, and chemical companies.
Ardmore’s core strategy is to continue to develop a modern, high-quality fleet of product and chemical tankers, build key long-term commercial relationships and maintain its cost advantage in assets, operations and overhead, while creating synergies and economies of scale as the company grows. Ardmore provides its services to customers through voyage charters, commercial pools, and time charters, and enjoys close working relationships with key commercial and technical management partners.
Forward-Looking Statements
The statements in this press release that are not historical facts may be forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties that could cause the outcome to be materially different. These risks and uncertainties include, among others, those discussed in Ardmore’s public filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Ardmore undertakes no obligation to revise or update any forward-looking statements unless required to do so under the securities laws.
Investor Relations Enquiries:
Mr. Leon Berman
IGB Group
32 Broadway, Suite 1314
New York, NY 10004
Tel: 212-477-8438
Fax: 212-477-8636
Email: [email protected]
Or
Mr. Bryan Degnan
IGB Group
Tel: 646-673-9701
Email: [email protected]
SOURCE Ardmore Shipping Corporation
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Cracking open the tequila at the end of a long night rarely leads to good decisions. But for Tom Bishop, reaching for a bottle that had been gathering dust on his shelf proved life-changing. Having run out of beers while drinking with friends in 2017, Bishop dug out a bottle of premium Añejo tequila that his brother had given him after a business trip to Mexico. His expectations were low, informed by the throat-burning experiences of his youth. “But it completely blew me away,” Bishop remembers. “I just hadn’t associated tequila with that level of quality or flavour.”
Having stumbled upon the spirit as it was meant to be enjoyed “by accident”, Bishop saw an opportunity. Two years later, he and Jack Vereker, a friend with whom he had been drinking in south-east London that night, sold their first bottle of their brand El Rayo, now stocked across the UK and part of tequila’s new wave.
For decades, tequila was known as a party drink: something you did shots of to kick off or ramp up a big night, or enjoyed in cocktails on holiday. In recent years, however, tequila has shaken off its youthful, hedonistic image to become the fastest-growing spirit in the world.
According to the global alcohol analyst IWSR, UK sales of tequila have grown by about 14% a year between 2019 and 2024. Though growth has slowed lately, the US has seen a similar explosion (it’s now the country’s second biggest spirit after vodka).
Today tequila is not only driving innovation in cocktails with endless twists on the ever-popular margarita, but increasingly sought out and savoured for its own merits, sipped as an aperitif and even paired with food.
“What we’re seeing in the UK isn’t just a tequila boom, it’s a complete reframing of the spirit,” says Nick Ward, a co-founder of Ark Drinks, a specialist marketing agency in London.
The growth is being driven by at-home drinking, premium brands and aged styles of the spirit, showing that consumers are drinking better quality tequila, not just more.
Behind the boom is the pandemic-era rise in cocktail culture, a trend towards drinking “less but better”, and a fatigue with gin. There’s also the influence of increased tourism to Mexico and growing global appreciation for its culture and cuisine. “Tequila was the right spirit, in the right place, at the right time,” says Ward.
El Rayo benefited from that momentum and also helped accelerate it. In 2023, it became the first premium tequila brand costing more than £30 to be stocked by Sainsbury’s. The retailer has since added the premium brands Patrón and the George Clooney-founded Casamigos.
A decade ago, UK consumers had little concept of tequila as a spirit you would reach for over vodka or gin – or even in the sober light of day. “I don’t think people really understood how to drink it, particularly at home,” Bishop says. “It wasn’t part of that moment when you shut your laptop at the end of the day, put on some music and reach for a drink.”
It wasn’t pitched at the premium consumer either. Researching the UK market in 2017, Bishop found it to be geared towards hard-drinking male consumers and littered with lazy stereotypes. “It wasn’t a fair reflection on Mexico as a country today.”
Sierra Tequila, the brand you could probably buy at your local corner shop and get change from £20, has a stylised guitar-toting, moustachioed hombre on its label and is capped off with a little plastic sombrero. Though the hat does have a function (serving as a measure, lime-squeezer and salt receptacle), the branding speaks loudest of Mexican theme nights and students looking to maximise drunkenness from minimum spend.
In fact, tequila can be as refined and complex as rum or any other aged spirit. Tequila blanco (or silver tequila) is consistently the most popular type in the UK, accounting for roughly two-thirds of the market by volume in 2024, according to IWSR. It is the purest form, bottled immediately or within 60 days of distillation – and the most common culprit for that burning sensation. Experienced as intended, however, there should be distinct notes of agave, citrus and pepper against a grassy, vegetal backdrop.
The recent “premiumisation” of tequila has driven interest in other types of the spirit, notably reposado and añejo. Both are aged in wooden barrels, reposado for between two and 12 months, and añejo for between one and three years, resulting in golden to amber hues and notes of oak, vanilla, caramel and spices.
In their richness and complexity, they have more in common with whisky than the harsh, clear, rubbing-type alcohol you might associate with tequila. Throw in mezcal – made from the roasted hearts of agave plants, resulting in a smoky flavour – and the category of “tequila” encompasses a diversity of flavours and expressions, which many consumers are now waking up to.
From a bartender’s perspective, very few spirits are as versatile, says Lucia Montanelli, the manager of the Vesper Bar at the Dorchester Hotel in London. Tequila pairs well with a range of flavours – fruity, herby, umami, earthy, smoky, sweet – while holding its own against them. “Rather than disappearing in the mix, it elevates it,” says Montanelli.
That distinct identity – characterful without being overpowering – is why people are increasingly plumping for tequila-based drinks over gin or vodka, she adds. “Vodka is often selected for its neutrality, while gin is driven by botanicals that can sometimes dominate a drink – tequila sits comfortably in between.”
Indeed, tequila and tonic with a grapefruit slice has long been favoured by bartenders and others in the know as a more lively order than G&T or vodka-soda, which is just as straightforward to make.
Pritesh Mody, a cocktail consultant and the creative director of Think Drinks, says tequila’s reputation began to shift with growing celebrity endorsements through the 2010s, notably Casamigos, co-founded by George Clooney in 2013. When it was sold four years later to Diageo, the British giant behind Guinness, Johnnie Walker and Smirnoff, for $700m (£510m), the global drinks industry sat up and took note.
That deal opened the floodgates for “every celebrity and their dog” to jump on the tequila bandwagon. Now Dwayne “the Rock” Johnson, Matthew McConaughey, Arnold Schwarzenegger, LeBron James, Nick Jonas, Eva Longoria and Rita Ora all have their own brands.
Not all of them has raised the bar for the category, or even met it, Mody says. Founded in 2020, Kendall Jenner’s 818 Tequila has become one of the fastest growing brands in the US thanks to Insta-friendly partnerships with Coachella and Nascar, and its celebrity founder’s following among young women. But Jenner has faced accusations of cultural appropriation for online promotions showing her traipsing through agave fields, her hair in braids, and playing cowboy with a horse. Though those 2021 Instagram posts have since been deleted, a class action lawsuit was lodged against 818 Tequila’s parent company last September, alleging its products were falsely marketed as “100% agave”; the brand filed to dismiss it in January and denies the allegation.
Mody used to have a bottle, but it has vanished from his shelf. “I probably gave it away,” he says. He shudders when he recalls the “sweet, orangey” taste. “It’s almost like a cocktail in a bottle.”
It speaks to the challenge to protect tequila’s integrity and authenticity through the global gold rush. As a legally defined and protected spirit in Mexico, it is even more heavily regulated than Scotch whisky and French cognac.
In order to be sold as tequila, a beverage must contain between 35% and 55% alcohol content, be made from the blue weber agave and produced in the Tequila region to exacting standards set by Mexico’s Tequila Regulatory Council. (Mezcal, made from a range of agave species, mostly in the Oaxaca region, has a more permissive definition, and has also seen rising sales.)
“It’s not like someone can just go down to their garden shed and make some tequila if they feel like it,” says Bishop, recalling his own experience of getting El Rayo approved. “It can be a bit onerous at times, but it does a great job for quality control.”
Indeed, that heritage has been more of a selling point in the UK than all the famous faces, with premium brands like El Rayo’s emphasis on provenance and production helping to shift the conversation. “You can tell a real story with tequila: it’s been aged in a barrel, it was grown with this type of agave, it’s been hand-cut,” says Mody.
Premium premixed cocktail brands such as Moth and Whitebox have helped to connect the dots between familiar orders like the margarita and their base spirit, while popularising up-and-comers like the paloma (made with grapefruit soda). Founded in 2021, Moth trumpets its use of craft Tequila Enemigo and sells tequila-specific packs, while El Rayo sells its Plata tequila in cans premixed with tonic. Beverage giants such as Schweppes have followed suit.
There is a danger that the craze for tequila everything will dilute its heritage and craft. Already, through the global boom, some producers have been making use of artificial sweeteners and other additives, potentially compromising the spirit’s flavour and authenticity.
Under the Tequila Regulatory Council’s rules, even bottles labelled “100% agave” – widely taken as a marker of quality – may comprise up to 1% additives, prompting some producers (including El Rayo) to market themselves as “additive-free”.
The drive to capitalise on the thirst for tequila and push the category forward risks distracting from the fundamentals, says Bishop. “The big thing to watch out for is that it doesn’t innovate too fast … There will come a time for flavours.” In the meantime, he says, consumers are still waking up to tequila’s transformation. “We’re trying to turn tequila into the first drink of the night, not the last.”
Tommy’s margarita
A stripped-back take on the classic margarita, omitting the orange liqueur. Combine 50ml blanco tequila, 25ml freshly squeezed lime juice and 15ml agave syrup in a shaker, shake vigorously, then serve straight in a martini glass or on the rocks in a tumbler.
Picante
To create Soho House’s signature cocktail, put 60ml tequila, half a red chilli and some coriander leaves into a cocktail shaker and gently crush or “muddle” it. Add 25ml agave syrup or honey, 30ml lime juice and some ice, then shake. Strain into a tumbler, and garnish with a chilli slice and a sprig of coriander.
Swicy margarita
If you’ve got hot (chilli-infused) honey to use up, put 1tbsp into a cocktail shaker with ice, 60ml blanco tequila, 1tbsp orange liqueur and 2tbsp lime juice. Shake vigorously, then serve in a tumbler. For the rim, mix chilli powder into the salt.
Tequila old-fashioned
An easy way to branch out from blanco. Put 2-3tsp agave syrup, a dash of Angostura bitters and an orange peel (or a dash of orange bitters) in a tumbler, and stir to combine. Fill the glass with ice, pour over 50ml añejo tequila and stir. Garnish with a maraschino cherry.
Paloma champagne cocktail
A straightforward tequila cocktail perfect for brunch. Combine 25ml blanco tequila, 50ml pink grapefruit juice and 12.5ml lime juice in a cocktail shaker with ice. Shake well, then strain into a champagne flute and top up with champagne.