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Category: 3. Business
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Directors’ Deals: Plus500 trio ships £67.2mn in shares to Goldman Sachs – Financial Times
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From late-night shots to sipping with soda: how tequila took over | Life and style
Cracking open the tequila at the end of a long night rarely leads to good decisions. But for Tom Bishop, reaching for a bottle that had been gathering dust on his shelf proved life-changing. Having run out of beers while drinking with friends in 2017, Bishop dug out a bottle of premium Añejo tequila that his brother had given him after a business trip to Mexico. His expectations were low, informed by the throat-burning experiences of his youth. “But it completely blew me away,” Bishop remembers. “I just hadn’t associated tequila with that level of quality or flavour.”
Having stumbled upon the spirit as it was meant to be enjoyed “by accident”, Bishop saw an opportunity. Two years later, he and Jack Vereker, a friend with whom he had been drinking in south-east London that night, sold their first bottle of their brand El Rayo, now stocked across the UK and part of tequila’s new wave.
For decades, tequila was known as a party drink: something you did shots of to kick off or ramp up a big night, or enjoyed in cocktails on holiday. In recent years, however, tequila has shaken off its youthful, hedonistic image to become the fastest-growing spirit in the world.
According to the global alcohol analyst IWSR, UK sales of tequila have grown by about 14% a year between 2019 and 2024. Though growth has slowed lately, the US has seen a similar explosion (it’s now the country’s second biggest spirit after vodka).
Today tequila is not only driving innovation in cocktails with endless twists on the ever-popular margarita, but increasingly sought out and savoured for its own merits, sipped as an aperitif and even paired with food.
“What we’re seeing in the UK isn’t just a tequila boom, it’s a complete reframing of the spirit,” says Nick Ward, a co-founder of Ark Drinks, a specialist marketing agency in London.
The growth is being driven by at-home drinking, premium brands and aged styles of the spirit, showing that consumers are drinking better quality tequila, not just more.
Behind the boom is the pandemic-era rise in cocktail culture, a trend towards drinking “less but better”, and a fatigue with gin. There’s also the influence of increased tourism to Mexico and growing global appreciation for its culture and cuisine. “Tequila was the right spirit, in the right place, at the right time,” says Ward.
El Rayo benefited from that momentum and also helped accelerate it. In 2023, it became the first premium tequila brand costing more than £30 to be stocked by Sainsbury’s. The retailer has since added the premium brands Patrón and the George Clooney-founded Casamigos.
A decade ago, UK consumers had little concept of tequila as a spirit you would reach for over vodka or gin – or even in the sober light of day. “I don’t think people really understood how to drink it, particularly at home,” Bishop says. “It wasn’t part of that moment when you shut your laptop at the end of the day, put on some music and reach for a drink.”
It wasn’t pitched at the premium consumer either. Researching the UK market in 2017, Bishop found it to be geared towards hard-drinking male consumers and littered with lazy stereotypes. “It wasn’t a fair reflection on Mexico as a country today.”
Sierra Tequila, the brand you could probably buy at your local corner shop and get change from £20, has a stylised guitar-toting, moustachioed hombre on its label and is capped off with a little plastic sombrero. Though the hat does have a function (serving as a measure, lime-squeezer and salt receptacle), the branding speaks loudest of Mexican theme nights and students looking to maximise drunkenness from minimum spend.
In fact, tequila can be as refined and complex as rum or any other aged spirit. Tequila blanco (or silver tequila) is consistently the most popular type in the UK, accounting for roughly two-thirds of the market by volume in 2024, according to IWSR. It is the purest form, bottled immediately or within 60 days of distillation – and the most common culprit for that burning sensation. Experienced as intended, however, there should be distinct notes of agave, citrus and pepper against a grassy, vegetal backdrop.
Illustration: Lisa Sheehan/The Guardian The recent “premiumisation” of tequila has driven interest in other types of the spirit, notably reposado and añejo. Both are aged in wooden barrels, reposado for between two and 12 months, and añejo for between one and three years, resulting in golden to amber hues and notes of oak, vanilla, caramel and spices.
In their richness and complexity, they have more in common with whisky than the harsh, clear, rubbing-type alcohol you might associate with tequila. Throw in mezcal – made from the roasted hearts of agave plants, resulting in a smoky flavour – and the category of “tequila” encompasses a diversity of flavours and expressions, which many consumers are now waking up to.
From a bartender’s perspective, very few spirits are as versatile, says Lucia Montanelli, the manager of the Vesper Bar at the Dorchester Hotel in London. Tequila pairs well with a range of flavours – fruity, herby, umami, earthy, smoky, sweet – while holding its own against them. “Rather than disappearing in the mix, it elevates it,” says Montanelli.
That distinct identity – characterful without being overpowering – is why people are increasingly plumping for tequila-based drinks over gin or vodka, she adds. “Vodka is often selected for its neutrality, while gin is driven by botanicals that can sometimes dominate a drink – tequila sits comfortably in between.”
Indeed, tequila and tonic with a grapefruit slice has long been favoured by bartenders and others in the know as a more lively order than G&T or vodka-soda, which is just as straightforward to make.
Pritesh Mody, a cocktail consultant and the creative director of Think Drinks, says tequila’s reputation began to shift with growing celebrity endorsements through the 2010s, notably Casamigos, co-founded by George Clooney in 2013. When it was sold four years later to Diageo, the British giant behind Guinness, Johnnie Walker and Smirnoff, for $700m (£510m), the global drinks industry sat up and took note.
That deal opened the floodgates for “every celebrity and their dog” to jump on the tequila bandwagon. Now Dwayne “the Rock” Johnson, Matthew McConaughey, Arnold Schwarzenegger, LeBron James, Nick Jonas, Eva Longoria and Rita Ora all have their own brands.
Not all of them has raised the bar for the category, or even met it, Mody says. Founded in 2020, Kendall Jenner’s 818 Tequila has become one of the fastest growing brands in the US thanks to Insta-friendly partnerships with Coachella and Nascar, and its celebrity founder’s following among young women. But Jenner has faced accusations of cultural appropriation for online promotions showing her traipsing through agave fields, her hair in braids, and playing cowboy with a horse. Though those 2021 Instagram posts have since been deleted, a class action lawsuit was lodged against 818 Tequila’s parent company last September, alleging its products were falsely marketed as “100% agave”; the brand filed to dismiss it in January and denies the allegation.
Mody used to have a bottle, but it has vanished from his shelf. “I probably gave it away,” he says. He shudders when he recalls the “sweet, orangey” taste. “It’s almost like a cocktail in a bottle.”
It speaks to the challenge to protect tequila’s integrity and authenticity through the global gold rush. As a legally defined and protected spirit in Mexico, it is even more heavily regulated than Scotch whisky and French cognac.
In order to be sold as tequila, a beverage must contain between 35% and 55% alcohol content, be made from the blue weber agave and produced in the Tequila region to exacting standards set by Mexico’s Tequila Regulatory Council. (Mezcal, made from a range of agave species, mostly in the Oaxaca region, has a more permissive definition, and has also seen rising sales.)
“It’s not like someone can just go down to their garden shed and make some tequila if they feel like it,” says Bishop, recalling his own experience of getting El Rayo approved. “It can be a bit onerous at times, but it does a great job for quality control.”
Indeed, that heritage has been more of a selling point in the UK than all the famous faces, with premium brands like El Rayo’s emphasis on provenance and production helping to shift the conversation. “You can tell a real story with tequila: it’s been aged in a barrel, it was grown with this type of agave, it’s been hand-cut,” says Mody.
Premium premixed cocktail brands such as Moth and Whitebox have helped to connect the dots between familiar orders like the margarita and their base spirit, while popularising up-and-comers like the paloma (made with grapefruit soda). Founded in 2021, Moth trumpets its use of craft Tequila Enemigo and sells tequila-specific packs, while El Rayo sells its Plata tequila in cans premixed with tonic. Beverage giants such as Schweppes have followed suit.
There is a danger that the craze for tequila everything will dilute its heritage and craft. Already, through the global boom, some producers have been making use of artificial sweeteners and other additives, potentially compromising the spirit’s flavour and authenticity.
Under the Tequila Regulatory Council’s rules, even bottles labelled “100% agave” – widely taken as a marker of quality – may comprise up to 1% additives, prompting some producers (including El Rayo) to market themselves as “additive-free”.
The drive to capitalise on the thirst for tequila and push the category forward risks distracting from the fundamentals, says Bishop. “The big thing to watch out for is that it doesn’t innovate too fast … There will come a time for flavours.” In the meantime, he says, consumers are still waking up to tequila’s transformation. “We’re trying to turn tequila into the first drink of the night, not the last.”
Mexican wave: five ways to drink tequila now
Tommy’s margarita
A stripped-back take on the classic margarita, omitting the orange liqueur. Combine 50ml blanco tequila, 25ml freshly squeezed lime juice and 15ml agave syrup in a shaker, shake vigorously, then serve straight in a martini glass or on the rocks in a tumbler.
Picante
Photograph: Soho House To create Soho House’s signature cocktail, put 60ml tequila, half a red chilli and some coriander leaves into a cocktail shaker and gently crush or “muddle” it. Add 25ml agave syrup or honey, 30ml lime juice and some ice, then shake. Strain into a tumbler, and garnish with a chilli slice and a sprig of coriander.
Swicy margarita
If you’ve got hot (chilli-infused) honey to use up, put 1tbsp into a cocktail shaker with ice, 60ml blanco tequila, 1tbsp orange liqueur and 2tbsp lime juice. Shake vigorously, then serve in a tumbler. For the rim, mix chilli powder into the salt.
Tequila old-fashioned
Photograph: Getty Images An easy way to branch out from blanco. Put 2-3tsp agave syrup, a dash of Angostura bitters and an orange peel (or a dash of orange bitters) in a tumbler, and stir to combine. Fill the glass with ice, pour over 50ml añejo tequila and stir. Garnish with a maraschino cherry.
Paloma champagne cocktail
A straightforward tequila cocktail perfect for brunch. Combine 25ml blanco tequila, 50ml pink grapefruit juice and 12.5ml lime juice in a cocktail shaker with ice. Shake well, then strain into a champagne flute and top up with champagne.
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Navigating inflation and employment in an era of supply shocks and AI
Speech by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the 2026 US Monetary Policy Forum
New York, 6 March 2026
The post-pandemic inflation surge placed severe strain on our societies, fuelled political frustration and amplified institutional distrust. It also hit the most vulnerable hardest – those with low incomes and without real assets.
But although the scars of this episode are still visible, pressure is building on central banks around the world to shift their focus away from inflation and towards growth. These calls are emerging at a time when central bank independence is under mounting pressure and fiscal consolidation is being constrained by deep political polarisation.[1]
In the euro area, these arguments are sometimes framed as a push for a dual mandate, urging the ECB to place greater weight on employment alongside price stability, often drawing explicit comparisons with the Federal Reserve’s statutory objectives.
In my remarks today, I will argue that a dual mandate rarely leads to fundamentally different policy prescriptions. In a world marked by more frequent supply-side shocks, the main challenge of central banks, regardless of their mandate, is to preserve a credible commitment to price stability.
I will also draw lessons for monetary policy today and discuss the implications of the rise of artificial intelligence (AI), which could boost productivity and help ease the supply-side constraints arising from reduced immigration and demographic ageing.
From stagflation to central bank independence
Calls for central banks to prioritise growth often appear intuitively reasonable. Growth creates jobs, raises incomes and strengthens the fabric of society.
During the 1960s and 1970s, many central banks responded to exactly this logic. They often subordinated monetary policy to fiscal and political objectives, adopting policies explicitly aimed at sustaining growth and keeping unemployment low.
History has shown that such policies can come at a high cost. Across countries, inflation rose sharply in the 1970s, forcing central banks to aggressively tighten monetary policy, resulting in a surge in unemployment (Slide 2). Stagflation severely eroded trust in economic institutions.
This experience gave rise to the institutional framework we rely on today: independent central banks with clear mandates to anchor inflation expectations through credibility. This framework is built on the modern consensus of a vertical long-run Phillips curve, which invalidates the pre-1960s view of a stable, exploitable inflation-unemployment trade-off.[2]
Yet, different economies drew lessons in different ways. Some, like the euro area, chose a single central bank mandate focused squarely on price stability, with growth and employment treated as secondary objectives. Others, like the United States, opted for a dual mandate, explicitly balancing price stability with maximum employment.
Although policy paths have not always been fully aligned across these frameworks, both have ultimately succeeded in delivering price stability and anchoring inflation expectations.
This shared success raises two deeper questions relevant to today’s debates.
First, how does the conduct of monetary policy under a single mandate differ in practice from that under a dual mandate? Do these mandates produce materially different policy responses, or does the inflation process impose constraints that are more similar than the institutional language would suggest?
Second, if the institutional framework was built to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, what risks arise today when central banks are asked to place greater weight on employment? Have changes in labour markets, central bank credibility and the nature of inflation made these risks more manageable than before?
Single and dual mandates often lead to similar policies
The answer to the first question is that the distinction between a single and a dual mandate is often largely inconsequential. In practice, stabilising inflation and stabilising employment often lead to the same policy response.
For demand-driven fluctuations, this is self-evident.
When demand weakens, inflation tends to fall and unemployment rises. In this case, both a price stability mandate and an employment mandate point towards monetary policy easing. Conversely, when demand overheats, inflation rises and labour markets tighten. Then both mandates point towards monetary policy tightening.
This insight closely resembles what economists call the “divine coincidence”: in a typical business cycle, monetary policy stabilises demand in a way that keeps both inflation and employment close to their desired levels.
The dual mandate only truly “bites” when stabilising inflation requires accepting weaker employment outcomes. But even if such a trade-off arises, both mandates often lead to similar policies.
The pandemic provides a recent illustration.
When inflation surged, central banks around the world – whether operating under a single mandate or pursuing explicit employment objectives – responded with comparable vigour, even if doing so meant tolerating higher unemployment (Slide 3).
The reason is straightforward: once the combination of excess savings, rising energy prices and disrupted global supply chains began to feed into inflation expectations and second-round effects, restoring price stability to limit the broader economic fallout became the overriding task.
As a result, the scope for divergence was limited. Monetary policy had to ensure that supply-side shocks did not translate into persistently higher inflation.
The same logic also works in reverse.
In the euro area, once the disinflation process was firmly under way and medium-term inflation expectations remained anchored, the ECB began to remove policy restriction, even though domestic inflation was still elevated.
This decision reflected a forward-looking assessment: maintaining an overly restrictive stance for too long would have risked imposing unnecessary economic costs in terms of weaker growth and higher unemployment.
The experience during the pandemic thus illustrates an important point: a central bank with a single mandate is not indifferent to employment outcomes. It recognises that price stability must be secured in a manner that minimises avoidable volatility in output and labour markets.
This is closely mirrored in the ECB’s mandate: price stability is the primary objective, while support for employment is conditional on it – that is, “without prejudice to the objective of price stability”.[3]
For a central bank with a dual mandate, monetary policy is better understood as a balancing exercise rather than a lexicographic ordering.[4] Still, inflation imposes a constraint: employment can be supported only insofar as inflation remains consistent with price stability; once inflation deviates sustainably, the scope for employment support narrows sharply.
In practice, many central banks therefore operate in remarkably similar ways, regardless of the formal structure of their mandates. The broad consensus, built over decades, is that without price stability, maximum employment cannot be sustained.
The real distinction between mandates may therefore lie less in day-to-day policy decisions and more in communication, accountability and the political economy of central banking.
Pandemic revealed limits of supporting employment
This brings me to the second question: if the institutional framework of inflation targeting and central bank independence emerged because attempts to foster employment proved destabilising, then why would one think that asking central banks to pay more attention to employment today would lead to better outcomes?
The pandemic offers three lessons suggesting this confidence may be misplaced.
More frequent supply shocks make monetary policy more challenging
The first is that monetary policy becomes more of an art than a science when supply shocks become more prevalent.[5]
In the years before the pandemic, policymakers increasingly came to believe that the Phillips curve was flat, as inflation proved remarkably unresponsive to tightening labour markets (Slide 4).[6]
This experience helped explain why major central banks, including the ECB, entered the pandemic with policy settings that were historically accommodative, designed to tighten labour markets, strengthen wage growth and ultimately lift inflation back to target on a sustained basis.
This growing conviction, however, fostered a misconception: namely that inflation could not re-emerge rapidly under certain conditions.
In reality, the slope of the Phillips curve only tells us how inflation responds to changes in slack, holding other shocks constant. But a very flat curve does not imply immunity from inflation.
That is what we saw during the pandemic.
While strong demand played a role, the inflation episode was not simply a movement along a stable Phillips curve. Instead, we saw a steepening of the curve and large upward shifts, driven by supply bottlenecks, energy shocks and changes in price-setting behaviour and inflation expectations.[7]
Looking ahead, the global economy is likely to be exposed more frequently to such supply-side disturbances – from energy price spikes and trade fragmentation to climate-related shocks. The recent escalation of the conflict in Iran, which has heavily affected energy markets and shipping routes, serves as a stark reminder of this vulnerability.
As a result, managing inflation – regardless of whether central banks have single or dual mandates – is not about fine-tuning unemployment along a stable Phillips curve; it is about credibly committing to the inflation target.
In today’s more volatile world, policy cannot rely on established empirical relationships. It must operate under uncertainty about the type, size, persistence and transmission of shocks. Judgement then becomes as important as models, and credibility becomes the central policy asset.
In response to these insights, major central banks have adjusted their policy frameworks.
The Federal Reserve has moved away from its flexible average inflation targeting approach, which had emphasised making up for past shortfalls by allowing inflation to run above target for some time. In the same vein, the ECB in its latest strategy statement no longer highlights a willingness to allow inflation to overshoot.[8]
Running the economy hot can fuel second-round effects
The second lesson is closely related: putting too much emphasis on employment can make it more difficult to control inflation.
A key lesson from the pandemic is that when labour markets are tight, supply shocks transmit more forcefully into prices and wages.
Second-round effects play an important role in understanding this mechanism.
When unemployment is low and vacancies are high, workers have more bargaining power to recover real wages after an inflation shock. At the same time, firms are more likely to pass higher input costs into output prices to protect their margins when demand is strong enough to tolerate price increases.
These processes can take place even when longer-term inflation expectations remain anchored.
This is essentially what we observed during the pandemic inflation surge.
In 2021 and 2022, the wage drift – reflecting firm-level adjustments, bonuses and labour market pressures beyond negotiated agreements – was a dominant driver of growth in compensation per employee in the euro area (Slide 5, left-hand side).
In a tight labour market, employers typically offer newly hired or incumbent employees higher wages than those set out in prevailing collective agreements.[9]
At the same time, firms were quick to pass on rising input costs to consumers. Many firms began to adjust prices far more frequently than they had done previously, reflecting demand conditions that were sufficiently robust to accommodate this pass-through (Slide 5, right-hand side).[10]
In that sense, running the economy hot may make second-round effects more likely – and once these take hold, monetary policy would need to tighten more aggressively to prevent a wage-price spiral, eroding earlier employment benefits.
Supply-side constraints make expansionary policy less effective
The third lesson is that expansionary policies become less effective in stimulating employment once the economy is close to its potential.
In the years following the sovereign debt crisis, the euro area economy operated below capacity. Unemployment was high, labour force participation was depressed and large parts of the workforce were either underemployed or discouraged.
In this environment, an accommodative monetary policy stance delivered tangible gains. Existing slack was gradually reabsorbed, participation increased and unemployment fell (Slide 6, left-hand side). Monetary policy helped bring idle resources back into productive use.
But once slack was absorbed, policy began to run into diminishing marginal returns.[11] Matching frictions became more and more important, slowing the pace at which unemployment could fall and driving up the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio (Slide 6, right-hand side).
In such an environment, additional demand stimulus cannot sustainably increase employment. In fact, a large part of the improvement in euro area labour markets observed in recent years reflected supply‑side responses rather than demand stimulus.[12]
In particular, rising participation and a significant influx of foreign workers helped expand the labour force and alleviate shortages. Foreign‑born workers accounted for around half of labour force growth in recent years, helping firms meet demand and significantly contributing to GDP growth (Slide 7).
In that sense, over the past 15 years, the euro area economy has transitioned from a primarily demand-constrained regime to one in which supply constraints have become more prevalent.
And in a supply-constrained environment, expansionary demand policies become a less effective tool for increasing employment or growth.[13]
Implications for monetary policy today
What do these lessons imply for monetary policy today?
Euro area inflation is projected to be at our 2% target over the medium term.
In the near term, the recent spike in energy prices following the tensions in Iran makes the inflation path more uncertain. However, as long as deviations from our target – in either direction – remain temporary and small with well-anchored inflation expectations, they are of limited relevance for policy decisions, as they naturally occur when an economy is exposed to volatile energy prices (Slide 8).
What matters for monetary policy is the medium-term outlook – that is, whether underlying price dynamics and wage developments are consistent with the target over the policy-relevant horizon. Judged on this basis, the lessons from the pandemic suggest that policymakers must tread carefully.
Inflation could re-emerge with tight labour markets and strong domestic demand
Although vacancy rates have declined from historical peaks, labour markets across the euro area remain tight by most conventional metrics. Unemployment is low by historical standards and is below estimates of the natural rate of unemployment (Slide 9, left-hand side). Firms in many sectors continue to report difficulties in filling positions (Slide 9, right-hand side).
This tightness directly feeds into wages.
While negotiated wage growth is expected to moderate, overall compensation per employee remains elevated relative to levels consistent with stable inflation (Slide 10). Wage drift continues to add to total labour costs in an environment where labour is becoming structurally scarcer owing to rapid demographic ageing, moderating immigration and rising skill mismatches.
This constellation of factors poses upside risks to the future trajectory of domestic inflation, particularly in labour-intensive services where wages account for a large share of total costs and the pass‑through tends to be gradual but persistent.
At the same time, expansionary fiscal policy is increasingly underpinning aggregate demand, pushing the economy towards its potential or even beyond it (Slide 11, left-hand side). In the manufacturing sector, new orders and expectations for future output have risen markedly and are now at their highest levels since the Russian invasion of Ukraine four years ago (Slide 11, right-hand side).
In parallel, governments are actively responding to shifts in the global trade and security order. New trade agreements are opening alternative markets that should help offset part of the slowdown in trade with the United States.
Efforts are also intensifying to better leverage the EU’s Single Market. Governments are reducing internal barriers to further strengthen both domestic demand and resilience.[14]
Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that the ongoing adjustment in global trade patterns is unlikely to have a material impact on the euro area inflation outlook.
ECB staff analysis finds that the estimated impact of trade diversion from China on the euro area is modest and statistically insignificant (Slide 12, left-hand side).[15] Even under extreme counterfactual scenarios in which imports from China rise markedly and import prices fall noticeably, the estimated impact on core inflation would remain small.[16]
The exchange rate does not materially alter this picture. Since last summer, the euro has remained broadly stable in both nominal and real effective terms, including against the Chinese renminbi (Slide 12, right-hand side).
Most of the appreciation observed in the first half of last year can be interpreted as a sign of confidence in the euro and in Europe’s economic potential at a time of elevated geopolitical uncertainty.
The upshot is that, with tight labour markets and strengthening domestic demand, price pressures could re-emerge if demand outpaces supply. The lessons from the pandemic suggest that, in this environment, central banks should focus on anchoring expectations rather than trying to fine-tune economic activity.
Higher productivity driven by AI may ease monetary policy stance endogenously
Central to understanding the evolving balance between supply and demand, and its implications for price stability, is whether technological progress driven by AI can meaningfully relax supply-side constraints arising from declining immigration and demographic ageing.
A critical but unresolved question is whether AI will be labour-augmenting or labour-substituting. History suggests that, at least over the medium to long run, most general-purpose technologies, including digital technologies, enhance labour rather than replace it (Slide 13).[17]
Recent firm-level evidence points in a similar direction: AI adoption appears to be associated more with task reallocation and productivity gains than with broad-based employment losses.[18]
The challenge for central banks lies in identifying the effects of AI in real time. As with digital technologies in the 1990s, the adoption and widespread use of AI technology may take time to unfold, and early signals of productivity gains may be fragmented and slow to appear in macroeconomic data.
This was essentially Alan Greenspan’s wager at the time: he recognised that potential output was rising even before it was visible in headline statistics, and he was ultimately proven right when productivity growth surged.
Also today, central banks need to consider the possibility that accelerating investment expenditure could be foreshadowing a rise in the economy’s supply potential.
In this case, the monetary policy stance would ease endogenously, as higher productivity growth raises the marginal product of capital, which in turn increases the equilibrium real interest rate.[19] And if the equilibrium real rate rises, leaving policy rates unchanged would automatically imply a more accommodative stance, unless inflation fell at the same pace.[20]
In that sense, central banks would already be accommodating the AI shock simply by not tightening, allowing the economy to expand without generating undue inflationary pressures.[21]
In the euro area, expectations of stronger underlying growth, bolstered by the German fiscal package and a growing European reform momentum, have already led to a measurable and persistent rise in real distant forward rates – a widely-used market-based measure of the natural rate of interest (Slide 14, left-hand side). This trend could be reinforced by rising investment in and adoption of AI.
However, today’s conditions call for greater prudence than in the late 1990s for two main reasons.
The first is that, at the time, productivity data already showed signs of acceleration by the mid-1990s. The Federal Reserve did not bet on purely hypothetical gains.
Today, by contrast, productivity growth remains subdued, at least in the euro area, and there is considerable uncertainty around the timing, scale and distribution of the productivity effects of AI. The transmission into measurable aggregate productivity may be gradual, uneven across sectors and accompanied by transitional frictions.[22]
In fact, in the short run AI is more likely to be inflationary than disinflationary.[23] It requires large investments in energy-intensive data centres and may create new bottlenecks in specialised chips and skilled labour.
The second reason for greater prudence today is that the stakes are arguably higher.
The long period of elevated inflation, and the marked rise in the frequency of supply shocks, has left inflation expectations more fragile than in the past, as shown by the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey.[24]
Despite the significant progress we have made in bringing inflation down, median inflation expectations remain elevated across horizons, while mean inflation expectations have been creeping up even before the recent energy price shock (Slide 14, right-hand side).
In this context, the costs of misjudging the balance between supply and demand are higher.
If central banks were to accommodate aggregate demand based on AI optimism and inflation were to resurge, the loss of credibility would be severe. It could also fuel financial stability risks at a time when market participants are already concerned about potential overvaluations.
A prudent approach, therefore, is to let the data guide policy rather than relying on a still speculative narrative.
Conclusion
All in all, and with this I would like to conclude, the ECB’s price stability mandate is well-equipped and robust to deal with the challenges central banks face today. It provides a firm anchor in a world marked by more frequent supply-side shocks, and it is flexible enough to accommodate temporary deviations from target while keeping policy firmly focused on the medium term.
In this volatile world, the lessons from the pandemic suggest that central banks should resist the temptation to fine-tune the economy, accommodate fiscal policy or deliberately run the economy hot in pursuit of marginal short-term gains. The costs of misjudgement can be significant: credibility, once eroded, is difficult to rebuild.
Current monetary policy in the euro area is firmly grounded in these lessons. With inflation projected to be at our target over the medium term and inflation expectations anchored, monetary policy remains in a good place.
But we cannot be complacent. We need to be vigilant as the current geopolitical and macroeconomic environment creates upside risks to inflation over the policy-relevant horizon. In particular, we must carefully monitor the persistence of the energy price shock, its impact on inflation expectations and any indication that firms start passing through higher input costs to their customers.
Over time, the adoption and widespread use of new technologies like AI could expand supply, raise the natural rate of interest and relieve some of these structural constraints. The task of monetary policy will be to identify these forces and calibrate policy appropriately.
Thank you.
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Middle East escalation could push aluminium above $4,000/t | articles
While the evolution of the Middle East conflict remains highly uncertain, we outline three scenarios assessing how disruptions to Gulf aluminium supply could affect the global market, in line with our energy flows scenarios. Based on these scenarios, we revise our aluminium price outlook higher and assess the resulting market balances and price outcomes under varying degrees of disruption.
In Scenario 1, which we consider our base case, we assume a relatively short disruption to regional shipping lasting around four weeks. Exports from Gulf producers are temporarily delayed and some metal accumulates on site, particularly at Alba where deliveries have already been affected. At the same time, the disruption at Qatalum represents a genuine supply shock as production recovers only gradually following a controlled shutdown.
In Scenario 2, disruptions persist for longer, with shipping constraints lasting several months. This would further tighten the seaborne aluminium market as export flows from the Gulf remain constrained. In this scenario, we also assume the risk of minor production curtailments across Gulf smelters if logistics disruptions persist and raw material deliveries begin to tighten.
Scenario 3 represents a more severe disruption to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz lasting around three months. In this case, a combination of lost production, stranded metal and broader logistics disruptions could significantly tighten global aluminium availability. At these levels of tightening, prices could briefly move above $4,000/t before demand destruction begins to limit further upside. Prices therefore retrace from peak levels later in the year, although the underlying deficit keeps aluminium well above pre-conflict baseline levels.
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ZTE Reports 2025 Revenue of RMB 133.90 Billion, Advancing Full-Stack AI Capabilities – ZTE
- ZTE Reports 2025 Revenue of RMB 133.90 Billion, Advancing Full-Stack AI Capabilities ZTE
- ZTE Board Clears 2025 Reports and Seeks Mandate for RMB8 Billion Bond Issue TipRanks
- ZTE Posts Audited 2025 Results and Proposes Cash Dividend TipRanks
- ZTE Proposes Final 2025 Cash Dividend, Key Details Pending TipRanks
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HONEYWELL ANNOUNCES COMMENCEMENT OF CASH TENDER OFFERS TO PURCHASE UP TO $3,750,000,000 AGGREGATE PURCHASE PRICE OF DOLLAR-DENOMINATED SECURITIES AND UP TO €1,250,000,000 AGGREGATE PURCHASE PRICE OF EURO-DENOMINATED SECURITIES
CHARLOTTE, N.C., March 6, 2026 /PRNewswire/ — Honeywell (NASDAQ: HON) today announced offers to purchase for cash the securities listed in Table 1 below (collectively, the “Dollar Securities”) and the securities listed in Table 2 below (collectively, the “Euro Securities” and, together with the Dollar Securities, the “Securities”) issued by Honeywell (i) for up to a maximum aggregate purchase price to be paid for the Dollar Securities validly tendered (excluding the accrued and unpaid interest on the Dollar Securities) of up to $3,750,000,000 (the “Dollar Total Maximum Amount” and, such offer to purchase, the “Dollar Tender Offer”) and (ii) for up to a maximum aggregate purchase price to be paid for the Euro Securities validly tendered (excluding the accrued and unpaid interest on the Euro Securities) of up to €1,250,000,000 (the “Euro Total Maximum Amount” and, such offer to purchase, the “Euro Tender Offer” and, together with the Dollar Tender Offer, the “Tender Offers” and each, a “Tender Offer”).
Table 1: Dollar Securities Subject To The Dollar Tender Offer
Title of Security
Security Identifier(s)
Maturity Date
Par Call Date
Principal Amount Outstanding
Acceptance Priority Level
Early Participation Amount(1)(2)
Reference Treasury Security
Bloomberg Reference Page/Screen
Fixed Spread (basis points)(2)
9.065% Senior Notes due 2033
CUSIP: 019512AM4
ISIN: US019512AM47June 1, 2033
N/A
$51,207,000
1
$50
4.125% UST due February 15, 2036
FIT 1
55
6.625% Senior Notes due 2028
CUSIP: 438506AS6
ISIN: US438506AS66June 15, 2028
N/A
$200,549,000
2
$50
3.375% UST due February 29, 2028
FIT 1
20
5.700% Senior Notes due 2036
CUSIP: 438516AR7
ISIN: US438516AR73March 15, 2036
N/A
$441,050,000
3
$50
4.125% UST due February 15, 2036
FIT 1
40
5.700% Senior Notes due 2037
CUSIP: 438516AT3
ISIN: US438516AT30March 15, 2037
N/A
$462,569,000
4
$50
4.125% UST due February 15, 2036
FIT 1
50
5.375% Senior Notes due 2041
CUSIP: 438516BB1
ISIN: US438516BB13March 1, 2041
N/A
$416,688,000
5
$50
4.125% UST due February 15, 2036
FIT 1
70
5.350% Senior Notes due 2064
CUSIP: 438516CU8
ISIN: US438516CU84March 1, 2064
September 1, 2063
$650,000,000
6
$50
4.625% UST due November 15, 2055
FIT 1
70
5.250% Senior Notes due 2054
CUSIP: 438516CT1
ISIN: US438516CT12March 1, 2054
September 1, 2053
$1,750,000,000
7
$50
4.625% UST due November 15, 2055
FIT 1
65
5.000% Senior Notes due 2033
CUSIP: 438516CK0
ISIN: US438516CK03February 15, 2033
November 15, 2032
$1,100,000,000
8
$50
4.125% UST due February 15, 2036
FIT 1
5
5.000% Senior Notes due 2035
CUSIP: 438516CS3
ISIN: US438516CS39March 1, 2035
December 1, 2034
$1,450,000,000
9
$50
4.125% UST due February 15, 2036
FIT 1
35
4.950% Senior Notes due 2031
CUSIP: 438516CR5
ISIN: US438516CR55September 1, 2031
July 1, 2031
$500,000,000
10
$50
3.500% UST due February 28, 2031
FIT 1
25
4.750% Senior Notes due 2032
CUSIP: 438516CZ7
ISIN: US438516CZ71February 1, 2032
December 1, 2031
$650,000,000
11
$50
3.500% UST due February 28, 2031
FIT 1
35
4.500% Senior Notes due 2034
CUSIP: 438516CM6
ISIN: US438516CM68January 15, 2034
October 15, 2033
$1,000,000,000
12
$50
4.125% UST due February 15, 2036
FIT 1
20
3.812% Senior Notes due 2047
CUSIP: 438516BS4
ISIN: US438516BS48November 21, 2047
May 21, 2047
$442,373,000
13
$50
4.625% UST due February 15, 2046
FIT 1
55
2.800% Senior Notes due 2050
CUSIP: 438516CA2
ISIN: US438516CA21June 1, 2050
December 1, 2049
$700,983,000
14
$50
4.625% UST due November 15, 2055
FIT 1
30
2.700% Senior Notes due 2029
CUSIP: 438516BU9
ISIN: US438516BU93August 15, 2029
May 15, 2029
$750,000,000
15
$50
3.500% UST due February 15, 2029
FIT 1
15
1.950% Senior Notes due 2030
CUSIP: 438516BZ8
ISIN: US438516BZ80June 1, 2030
March 1, 2030
$948,845,000
16
$50
3.500% UST due February 28, 2031
FIT 1
15
1.750% Senior Notes due 2031
CUSIP: 438516CF1
ISIN: US438516CF18September 1, 2031
June 1, 2031
$1,496,188,000
17
$50
3.500% UST due February 28, 2031
FIT 1
30
Total
$13,010,452,000
Table 2: Euro Securities Subject to The Euro Tender Offer
Title of Security
Security Identifier(s)
Maturity Date
Par Call Date
Principal
Amount OutstandingAcceptance Priority
LevelEarly Participation Amount(1)(2)
Reference Treasury Security / Interpolated Rate
Bloomberg Reference Page/Screen
Fixed Spread (basis points)(2)
3.500% Senior Notes due 2027*†
Common Code: 262493865
ISIN: XS2624938655May 17, 2027
April 17, 2027
€650,000,000
1
€50
OBL 0.000% due April 16, 2027
FIT GE1-3
20
2.250% Senior Notes due 2028†
Common Code: 136602691
ISIN: XS1366026919February 22, 2028
N/A
€750,000,000
2
€50
DBR 0.500% due February 15, 2028
FIT GE1-3
30
4.125% Senior Notes due 2034
Common Code: 255190342
ISIN: XS2551903425November 2, 2034
August 2, 2034
€1,000,000,000
3
€50
Interpolated Mid Swap Rate
IRSB EU
(3) 70
3.750% Senior Notes due 2032
Common Code: 262493873
ISIN: XS2624938739May 17, 2032
February 17, 2032
€500,000,000
4
€50
Interpolated Mid Swap Rate
IRSB EU
(3) 65
3.750% Senior Notes due 2036
Common Code: 277689006
ISIN: XS2776890068March 1, 2036
December 1, 2035
€750,000,000
5
€50
Interpolated Mid Swap Rate
IRSB EU
(3) 75
3.375% Senior Notes due 2030
Common Code: 277688999
ISIN: XS2776889995March 1, 2030
January 1, 2030
€750,000,000
6
€50
Interpolated Mid Swap Rate
IRSB EU
(3) 35
0.750% Senior Notes due 2032
Common Code: 212609404
ISIN: XS2126094049March 10, 2032
December 10, 2031
€500,000,000
7
€50
Interpolated Mid Swap Rate
IRSB EU
(3) 45
Total
€ 4,900,000,000
(1)
Per $1,000 or €1,000 principal amount, as applicable.
(2)
The Total Consideration payable for each series of Securities will be at a price per $1,000 or €1,000 principal amount, as applicable, of such series of Securities validly tendered on or prior to the applicable Early Participation Date and accepted for purchase by us, which is calculated using the applicable Fixed Spread, and when calculated in such a manner already includes the applicable Early Participation Amount. In addition, holders whose Securities are accepted for purchase will also receive any Accrued Interest on such Securities. Holders of Securities that are validly tendered after the Early Participation Date and at or before the Expiration Date and accepted for purchase will receive only the applicable Late Tender Offer Consideration, which does not include the applicable Early Participation Amount, together with any Accrued Interest on such Securities. For the avoidance of doubt, the Early Participation Amount is already included within the Total Consideration, and is not in addition to the Total Consideration.
(3)
Pricing Source: BGN.
† On March 6, 2026, Honeywell announced that it had issued a conditional notice of full redemption to redeem all €650,000,000 in outstanding principal amount of its 3.500% Senior Notes Due 2027 (the “3.500% Notes”). Promptly following the pricing of a proposed notes offering by Honeywell Aerospace, Inc. (“Aerospace”), the Company also currently expects to issue a notice of full redemption to redeem all €750,000,000 in outstanding principal amount of its 2.250% Senior Notes due 2028 (the “2.250% Notes”). If (i) the Redemption Condition (as defined in the Offer to Purchase) for the conditional redemption of the 3.500% Notes is satisfied prior the applicable redemption date and (ii) the Company issues a notice of full redemption of the 2.250% Notes, to the extent such Securities have not previously been validly tendered and accepted for purchase in the Euro Tender Offer (as defined below), such Securities will be redeemed on the applicable redemption date at the applicable redemption price. This press release does not constitute a notice of redemption of the 3.500% Notes or the 2.250% Notes. The conditional redemption of the 3.500% Notes is being made, and any redemption of the 2.250% Notes will be made, solely pursuant to separately issued notices of redemption delivered pursuant to the indenture governing such Securities. The statement of expectation relating to the redemption of the 2.250% Notes does not constitute an obligation to issue a notice of redemption, and the decision to issue any such notice of redemption and the selection of any particular redemption date is in the Company’s discretion. This press release is not an offer of any Aerospace notes. The Aerospace notes offering is being made solely pursuant to a private offering memorandum.The Tender Offers are made upon the terms and subject to certain conditions set forth in the offer to purchase, dated March 6, 2026 (as it may be amended or supplemented from time to time, the “Offer to Purchase”). Capitalized terms used but not defined in this announcement have the meanings given to them in the Offer to Purchase.
Copies of the Offer to Purchase are available from the Information and Tender Agent as set out below. All documentation relating to the Offer to Purchase, together with any updates will be available via the Offer Website: www.dfking.com/honeywell.
Timetable for the Tender Offers
Event
Date
Commencement of the Tender Offers
March 6, 2026
Early Participation Date
5:00 p.m., New York City time, on March 19, 2026, unless
extended or earlier terminated by Honeywell in respect of a
Tender Offer in its sole and absolute discretion.Withdrawal Date
5:00 p.m., New York City time, on March 19, 2026, unless
extended by Honeywell in respect of a Tender Offer in its sole
and absolute discretion.Reference Yield Determination Date
10:00 a.m., New York City time, on March 20, 2026, unless
extended by Honeywell in respect of a Tender Offer in its sole
and absolute discretion.Early Payment Date
The Early Payment Date may occur, at Honeywell’s sole and
absolute discretion, following the applicable Early
Participation Date and prior to the applicable Final Payment
Date, which is currently expected to be March 24, 2026.Expiration Date
5:00 p.m., New York City time, on April 7, 2026, unless
extended by Honeywell or earlier terminated by Honeywell in
respect of a Tender Offer, in each case, in its sole and
absolute discretion.Final Payment Date
The Final Payment Date will be promptly following the
applicable Expiration Date and is expected to be on or about
April 9, 2026.Purpose of the Tender Offers
We are making the Tender Offers to purchase certain outstanding debt issued by Honeywell, and, together with the redemption of certain outstanding series of Honeywell debt securities, as further described in the Offer to Purchase, to reduce our leverage in anticipation of the proposed distribution by Honeywell to its shareowners of 100% of the outstanding shares of Honeywell Aerospace Inc.’s common stock (the “Spin-Off”). Securities that are accepted in a Tender Offer will be purchased, retired and cancelled and will no longer remain outstanding obligations of Honeywell.
Details of the Tender Offers
The Tender Offers will expire at 5:00 p.m., New York City time, on April 7, 2026, unless extended or earlier terminated by Honeywell in respect of a Tender Offer in its sole and absolute discretion (such date and time, as the same may be extended, the “Expiration Date”). Securities tendered may be withdrawn at any time on or prior to 5:00 p.m., New York City time, on March 19, 2026, unless extended by Honeywell, in respect of a Tender Offer in its sole and absolute discretion (such date and time, as the same may be extended, the “Withdrawal Date”), but not thereafter. In this press release, we refer to Securities that have been validly tendered and not validly withdrawn as having been “validly tendered.”
Securities validly tendered pursuant to the Tender Offers and accepted for purchase by Honeywell will be accepted for purchase based on the applicable acceptance priority levels set forth in the tables above (the “Acceptance Priority Levels”), subject to the limitation that the maximum aggregate purchase price to be paid for the Dollar Securities in the Dollar Tender Offer (excluding the accrued and unpaid interest on such Dollar Securities) will not exceed the Dollar Total Maximum Amount and the maximum aggregate purchase price to be paid for the Euro Securities in the Euro Tender Offer (excluding the accrued and unpaid interest on such Euro Securities) will not exceed the Euro Total Maximum Amount, and may be subject to proration, all as more fully described herein and in the Offer to Purchase.
A separate instruction must be submitted for each beneficial owner of Securities due to possible proration.
Holders (the “Holders”) of Securities that are validly tendered at or before 5:00 p.m., New York City time, on March 19, 2026, unless extended by Honeywell in respect of a Tender Offer (such date and time, as the same may be extended, the “Early Participation Date”), and accepted for purchase will receive the applicable Total Consideration (as defined below) for their Securities, which includes the applicable early participation amount for the applicable series of Securities set forth in the tables above (the applicable “Early Participation Amount”), together with any accrued and unpaid interest on the Securities from, and including, the most recent interest payment date prior to the applicable Payment Date (as defined in the Offer to Purchase) up to, but not including, the applicable Payment Date (“Accrued Interest”). Subject to the terms and conditions described in herein and in the Offer to Purchase, including the Dollar Total Maximum Amount or the Euro Total Maximum Amount, as applicable, the applicable Acceptance Priority Levels and the proration procedures, Holders of Securities that are validly tendered after the applicable Early Participation Date and at or before the applicable Expiration Date and are accepted for purchase will receive only the applicable “Late Tender Offer Consideration,” which consists of the applicable Total Consideration minus the applicable Early Participation Amount, for each $1,000 or €1,000 principal amount, as applicable, of such tendered Securities, plus any Accrued Interest. The applicable Total Consideration and the Late Tender Offer Consideration will be payable in cash.
Each Tender Offer is subject to certain conditions, including the Financing Condition (as defined in the Offer to Purchase). The Tender Offers are not conditioned on any minimum amount of Securities being tendered. Neither Tender Offer is conditioned on completion of the other, and each Tender Offer otherwise operates independently of the other Tender Offer. Subject to Honeywell’s right to terminate one or both of the Tender Offers, and subject to the Dollar Total Maximum Amount or the Euro Total Maximum Amount, as applicable, the applicable Acceptance Priority Levels and proration, Honeywell will purchase the Securities that have been validly tendered at or before the applicable Expiration Date, subject to all conditions to such Tender Offer having been satisfied or waived by Honeywell promptly following the applicable Expiration Date (the date of such purchase, which is expected to be the second business day following the applicable Expiration Date, the “Final Payment Date”). Honeywell reserves the right, but is not obligated, in its sole and absolute discretion, to purchase the Securities that have been validly tendered at or before the applicable Early Participation Date or following the applicable Early Participation Date but prior to the applicable Expiration Date, subject to all conditions to such Tender Offer having been satisfied or waived by Honeywell (the date of such purchase, the “Early Payment Date” and together with the Final Payment Date, each a “Payment Date”).
Honeywell also reserves the right, in its sole and absolute discretion, subject to applicable law, to terminate one or both of the Tender Offers at any time prior to the applicable Expiration Date. Securities that are accepted in the Tender Offers will be purchased, retired and cancelled and will no longer remain outstanding obligations of Honeywell.
The Securities accepted for purchase will be accepted in accordance with their Acceptance Priority Levels (with 1 being the highest Acceptance Priority Level in each Tender Offer, 17 being the lowest Acceptance Priority Level with respect to the Dollar Tender Offer and 7 being the lowest Acceptance Priority Level with respect to the Euro Tender Offer), subject to the limitation that the overall aggregate purchase price to be paid for the Securities in each of the Tender Offers (excluding the accrued and unpaid interest on the Securities) will not exceed the Dollar Total Maximum Amount or the Euro Total Maximum Amount, as applicable.
Securities validly tendered on or before the applicable Early Participation Date having a higher Acceptance Priority Level will be accepted before any Securities validly tendered on or before the Early Participation Date having a lower Acceptance Priority Level are accepted in each of the Tender Offers, and all Securities validly tendered after the applicable Early Participation Date having a higher Acceptance Priority Level will be accepted before any Securities tendered after the applicable Early Participation Date having a lower Acceptance Priority Level are accepted in the applicable Tender Offer, in each case subject to the Dollar Total Maximum Amount or the Euro Total Maximum Amount, as applicable. Securities validly tendered on or before the Early Participation Date will be accepted for purchase in priority to other Securities tendered after the Early Participation Date, even if such Securities tendered after the Early Participation Date have a higher Acceptance Priority Level than Securities tendered on or before the Early Participation Date. Furthermore, if the amount of Securities validly tendered prior to or at the Early Participation Date exceeds the Dollar Total Maximum Amount or the Euro Total Maximum Amount, as applicable, Holders who validly tender Securities in a Tender Offer after the Early Participation Date will not have any of their Securities accepted for purchase regardless of the Acceptance Priority Level of such Securities unless Honeywell increases the Dollar Total Maximum Amount or the Euro Total Maximum Amount, as applicable.
Subject to applicable law, Honeywell reserves the right, in its sole and absolute discretion, to waive or modify any one or more of the conditions to the Tender Offers in whole or in part at any time on or prior to the date that any Securities are first accepted for purchase or to (i) increase the Dollar Total Maximum Amount or the Euro Total Maximum Amount or (ii) decrease the Dollar Total Maximum Amount or the Euro Total Maximum Amount. Any such increase or decrease may be made on the basis of Securities validly tendered through the applicable Early Participation Date and promptly announced on the business day immediately following the applicable Early Participation Date. Any such increase or decrease may be made without extending the Withdrawal Date or otherwise reinstating withdrawal rights, except as required by applicable law.
If Honeywell exercises its right, in its sole and absolute discretion, to purchase the Securities on an Early Payment Date and, on such Early Payment Date, or on the Final Payment Date, there are sufficient remaining funds to purchase some, but not all, of the remaining tendered Securities in any Acceptance Priority Level without exceeding the Dollar Total Maximum Amount or the Euro Total Maximum Amount, as applicable, Honeywell will accept for payment such tendered Securities on a prorated basis, with the proration factor for such Acceptance Priority Level depending on the aggregate principal amount of Securities of such Acceptance Priority Level validly tendered.
The “Total Consideration” payable for each series of Securities will be a price per $1,000 or €1,000 principal amount of such series of Securities validly tendered pursuant to the applicable Tender Offer on or prior to the applicable Early Participation Date, and accepted for purchase by us (subject to the applicable Acceptance Priority Levels, the Dollar Total Maximum Amount or the Euro Total Maximum Amount, as applicable, and proration, if any), equal to an amount in the currency in which the applicable Securities are denominated, calculated in accordance with Schedule C-1 or C-2 to the Offer to Purchase, as applicable, that would reflect, as of the applicable Early Payment Date or, to the extent Honeywell does not exercise its right to purchase the Securities on such Early Payment Date, as of the applicable Final Payment Date: (i) for each series of Dollar Securities , a yield to the applicable maturity date or par call date, as the case may be, in accordance with standard market practice, of such series of Securities equal to the sum of (a) the Reference Yield (as defined in the Offer to Purchase) of the applicable reference security set forth in Table 1 above, determined at 10:00 a.m., New York City time, on the first business day following the applicable Early Participation Date (the “Reference Yield Determination Date”), plus (b) the fixed spread applicable to such series, set forth in the Table 1 above, (ii) for the series of Euro Securities constituting the 3.500% Notes and the 2.250% Notes, a yield to the applicable maturity date in accordance with standard market practice, of such series of Securities equal to the sum of (a) the Reference Yield (as defined in the Offer to Purchase) of the applicable reference security set forth in Table 2 above, determined at the Reference Yield Determination Date, plus (b) the fixed spread applicable to such series, set forth in Table 2 above, provided that if such Total Consideration is below €1,000, the Total Consideration will be €1,000, and (iii) for each of the other series of Euro Securities, a yield to the applicable maturity date or par call date, as the case may be, in accordance with standard market practice, of such series of Securities equal to the sum of (a) the reference yield (corresponding to the applicable Interpolated Rate (as defined in the Offer to Purchase) determined at the Reference Yield Determination Date, plus (b) the fixed spread applicable to such series set forth in Table 2 above, in each case, minus accrued and unpaid interest on such Securities from, and including, the most recent interest payment date prior to the applicable Payment Date up to, but not including, such Payment Date. The applicable Total Consideration already includes the Early Participation Amount for the applicable series of Securities set forth in the tables above. For the avoidance of doubt, the Early Participation Amount is already included within the Total Consideration, and is not in addition to the Total Consideration.
For further details on the procedures for tendering the Securities, please refer to the Offer to Purchase, including the procedures set out under the heading “The Tender Offers—Procedures for Tendering Securities” of the Offer to Purchase.
Honeywell has retained BofA Securities, Inc., Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC and Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC and to act as the Dealer Managers in connection with the Tender Offers (collectively, the “Dealer Managers”). Questions regarding terms and conditions of the Tender Offers should be directed to BofA Securities at +1 (888) 292-0070 (toll free), Merrill Lynch International at +44 20-7997-5420 (London) or via email at [email protected], Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC. at +1 (800) 828-3182 (toll free) and Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC at +1 (800) 624-1808 (toll free) or +1 (212) 761-1057 (collect).
D.F. King has been appointed the information and tender agent with respect to the Tender Offers (the “Information and Tender Agent”). The Offer to Purchase can be accessed at the Tender Offers website: http://www.dfking.com/honeywell. Questions or requests for assistance in connection with the tendering procedures for the Securities in the Tender Offers or for additional copies of the Offer to Purchase may be directed to the Information and Tender Agent at +1 (800) 967-5074 (toll free), +1 (212) 784-6885 (collect), +44 (0)20 7920 9700 (London) or via e-mail at [email protected]. You may also contact your broker, dealer, commercial bank or trust company or other nominee for assistance concerning the Tender Offers.
Honeywell reserves the right, in its sole discretion, not to purchase any Securities or to extend, re-open, withdraw or terminate one or both of the Tender Offers and to amend or waive any of the terms and conditions of one or both of the Tender Offers in any manner, subject to applicable laws and regulations.
Holders are advised to read carefully the Offer to Purchase for full details of and information on the procedures for participating in the Tender Offers.
Holders are advised to check with any custodian or nominee, or other intermediary through which they hold Securities, whether such entity would require the receipt of instructions to participate in, or notice of a revocation of their instruction to participate in, the Tender Offers before the deadlines specified above. The deadlines set by any custodian or nominee, or by the relevant Clearing System, for the submission and revocation of valid electronic tender and blocking instructions, in the form required by the relevant Clearing System, may be earlier than the relevant deadlines specified above.
Unless stated otherwise, announcements in connection with the Tender Offers will be made available on Honeywell’s website at https://investor.honeywell.com/news. Such announcements may also be made by (i) the issue of a press release and (ii) the delivery of notices to the Clearing Systems for communication to Direct Participants. Copies of all such announcements, press releases and notices can also be obtained from the Information and Tender Agent, the corresponding contact details for whom are set out above. Significant delays may be experienced where notices are delivered to the Clearing Systems and Holders are urged to contact the Information and Tender Agent for the relevant announcements relating to the Tender Offers. In addition, all documentation relating to the Tender Offers, together with any updates, will be available via the Offer Website: http://www.dfking.com/honeywell.
DISCLAIMER This announcement must be read in conjunction with the Offer to Purchase. This announcement and the Offer to Purchase contain important information that should be read carefully before any decision is made with respect to the Tender Offers. If you are in any doubt as to the contents of this announcement or the Offer to Purchase or the action you should take, you are recommended to seek your own financial, legal and tax advice, including as to any tax consequences, immediately from your broker, bank manager, solicitor, accountant or other independent financial or legal adviser. Any individual or company whose Securities are held on its behalf by a broker, dealer, bank, custodian, trust company or other nominee or intermediary must contact such entity if it wishes to participate in the Tender Offers. None of Honeywell, the Dealer Managers, the Information and Tender Agent or any of their respective directors, officers, employees, agents or affiliates makes any recommendation as to whether or not Holders should tender their Securities in the Tender Offers.
None of Honeywell, the Dealer Managers, the Information and Tender Agent or any of their respective directors, officers, employees, agents or affiliates assumes any responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the information concerning Honeywell, the Securities or the Tender Offers contained in this announcement or in the Offer to Purchase. None of Honeywell, the Dealer Managers, the Information and Tender Agent or any of their respective directors, officers, employees, agents or affiliates is acting for any Holder, or will be responsible to any Holder for providing any protections which would be afforded to its clients or for providing advice in relation to the Tender Offers, and accordingly none of Honeywell, the Dealer Managers, the Information and Tender Agent or any of their respective directors, officers, employees, agents or affiliates assumes any responsibility for any failure by Honeywell to disclose information with regard to Honeywell or the Securities which is material in the context of the Tender Offers and which is not otherwise publicly available.
General
This announcement is for informational purposes only. Each Tender Offer is being made solely pursuant to the Offer to Purchase. Neither this announcement nor the Offer to Purchase, or the electronic transmission thereof, constitutes an offer to sell or buy Securities, as applicable, in any jurisdiction in which, or to or from any person to or from whom, it is unlawful to make such offer or solicitation under applicable securities laws or otherwise. The distribution of this announcement in certain jurisdictions may be restricted by law. In those jurisdictions where the securities, blue sky or other laws require the Tender Offers to be made by a licensed broker or dealer and the Dealer Managers or any of their respective affiliates is such a licensed broker or dealer in any such jurisdiction, the Tender Offers shall be deemed to be made by the Dealer Managers or such affiliate (as the case may be) on behalf of Honeywell in such jurisdiction.
No action has been or will be taken in any jurisdiction that would permit the possession, circulation or distribution of either this announcement, the Offer to Purchase or any material relating to Honeywell, any subsidiary of Honeywell or the Securities in any jurisdiction where action for that purpose is required. Accordingly, none of this announcement, the Offer to Purchase or any other offering material or advertisements in connection with the Tender Offers may be distributed or published, in or from any such country or jurisdiction, except in compliance with any applicable rules or regulations of any such country or jurisdiction.
The distribution of this announcement and the Offer to Purchase in certain jurisdictions may be restricted by law. Persons into whose possession this announcement or the Offer to Purchase comes are required by Honeywell, the Dealer Managers and the Information and Tender Agent to inform themselves about, and to observe, any such restrictions.
This communication has not been approved by an authorized person for the purposes of Section 21 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as amended (the “FSMA”). Accordingly, this communication is not being directed at persons within the United Kingdom save in circumstances where section 21(1) of the FSMA does not apply.
This announcement does not constitute an offer of securities to the public in any Member State of the European Economic Area (a “Relevant State”). In any Relevant State, this communication is only addressed to and is only directed at qualified investors within the meaning of Article 2(e) of the Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 (as amended or superseded) (the “Prospectus Regulation”) in that Relevant State. This announcement and information contained herein must not be acted on or relied upon by persons who are not qualified investors within the meaning of Article 2(e) of the Prospectus Regulation.
The communication of this announcement, the Offer to Purchase and any other documents or materials relating to the Tender Offers is not being made, and such documents and/or materials have not been approved, by an authorized person for the purposes of section 21 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as amended. Accordingly, such documents and/or materials are not being distributed to, and must not be passed on to, the general public in the United Kingdom. The communication of such documents and/or materials as a financial promotion is only being made to those persons in the United Kingdom falling within the definition of investment professionals (as defined in Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005, as amended (the “Financial Promotion Order”)) or persons who are within Article 43(2) of the Financial Promotion Order or any other persons to whom it may otherwise lawfully be made under the Financial Promotion Order.
Each Holder participating in a Tender Offer will give certain representations in respect of the jurisdictions referred to above and generally as set out in the Offer to Purchase. Any tender of Securities pursuant to the Tender Offers from a Holder that is unable to make these representations will not be accepted. Each of Honeywell, the Dealer Managers and the Information and Tender Agent reserves the right, in its absolute discretion, to investigate, in relation to any tender of Securities pursuant to the Tender Offers, whether any such representation given by a Holder is correct and, if such investigation is undertaken and as a result Honeywell determines (for any reason) that such representation is not correct, such tender shall not be accepted.
About Honeywell
Honeywell is an integrated operating company serving a broad range of industries and geographies around the world, with a portfolio that is underpinned by our Honeywell Accelerator operating system and Honeywell Forge platform. As a trusted partner, we help organizations solve the world’s toughest, most complex challenges, providing actionable solutions and innovations for aerospace, building automation, industrial automation, process automation, and process technology that help make the world smarter and safer as well as more sustainable.
Forward-Looking Statements and Other Disclaimers
We describe many of the trends and other factors that drive our business and future results in this release. Such discussions contain forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. Forward-looking statements are those that address activities, events, or developments that management intends, expects, projects, believes, or anticipates will or may occur in the future. They are based on management’s assumptions and assessments in light of past experience and trends, current economic and industry conditions, expected future developments, and other relevant factors, many of which are difficult to predict and outside of our control. They are not guarantees of future performance, and actual results, developments and business decisions may differ significantly from those envisaged by our forward-looking statements, including with respect to any changes in or abandonment of the proposed Spin-Off, the Tender Offers, any notes offering by Aerospace or the redemption of certain outstanding series of Honeywell debt securities. We do not undertake to update or revise any of our forward-looking statements, except as required by applicable securities law. Our forward-looking statements are also subject to material risks and uncertainties, including ongoing macroeconomic and geopolitical risks, such as changes in or application of trade and tax laws and policies, including the impacts of tariffs and other trade barriers and restrictions, lower GDP growth or recession in the U.S. or globally, supply chain disruptions, capital markets volatility, inflation, and certain regional conflicts, that can affect our performance in both the near- and long-term. In addition, no assurance can be given that any plan, initiative, projection, goal, commitment, expectation, or prospect set forth in this release can or will be achieved. Some of the important factors that could cause Honeywell’s or Aerospace’s actual results to differ materially from those projected in any such forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to: (i) the ability of Honeywell to effect the Spin-Off described above and to meet the conditions related thereto; (ii) the possibility that the Spin-Off will not be completed within the anticipated time period or at all; (iii) the possibility that the Spin-Off will not achieve its intended benefits; (iv) the impact of the Spin-Off on Honeywell’s and Aerospace’s businesses and the risk that the Spin-Off may be more difficult, time-consuming or costly than expected, including the impact on their resources, systems, procedures and controls, diversion of management’s attention and the impact and possible disruption of existing relationships with regulators, customers, suppliers, employees and other business counterparties; (v) the possibility of disruption, including disputes, litigation or unanticipated costs, in connection with the Spin-Off; (vi) the uncertainty of the expected financial performance of Honeywell or Aerospace following completion of the Spin-Off; (vii) negative effects of the announcement or pendency of the Spin-Off on the market price of Honeywell’s securities and/or on the financial performance of Honeywell or Aerospace; (viii) the ability to achieve anticipated capital structures in connection with the Spin-Off, including the future availability of credit and factors that may affect such availability; (ix) the ability to achieve anticipated credit ratings in connection with the Spin-Off; (x) the ability to achieve anticipated tax treatments in connection with the Spin-Off and future, if any, divestitures, mergers, acquisitions and other portfolio changes and the impact of changes in relevant tax and other laws; and (xi) the failure to realize expected benefits and effectively manage and achieve anticipated synergies and operational efficiencies in connection with the Spin-Off and completed and future, if any, divestitures, mergers, acquisitions, and other portfolio management, productivity and infrastructure actions. These forward-looking statements should be considered in light of the information included in this release, our Form 10-K and other filings with the SEC. Any forward-looking plans described herein are not final and may be modified or abandoned at any time.
SOURCE Honeywell
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Catalysts of change: the strategic impact of women in finance
Women in finance have long reshaped industries from the inside out, often operating in environments that were not originally designed with them in mind. The Women’s Affinity Network at Marex is pleased to highlight this International Women’s Day episode of Suite Talk, in which Dominique Highfield, CFO of Bloom & Wild, and Lorna Davies, CFO of GHO Capital, join Birchstone’s Head of Sales, Devonshi Mody, to move beyond the usual IWD talking points.
Instead of revisiting the familiar themes at face value, they unpack why certain topics are still directed overwhelmingly at women, such as confidence, balance, returning to work and the emotional load, and they explore what equality actually looks like when you strip back the assumptions. Drawing on careers across private equity, financial services and high growth consumer brands, they reflect on authenticity, confidence, gendered expectations and how the CFO role has changed since they first entered the industry.
Being authentic as your strongest strategic advantage
For both Dominique and Lorna, authenticity is not a leadership style, it is a strategic advantage. Dominique shares that early in her career she took herself far too seriously, even hosting a work themed 21st birthday party, before realising that leadership became more effective when she let go of performing and brought her whole self to work. Lorna echoes this, explaining that staying true to who she is has been the foundation of her influence, especially in rooms where she was often the only woman. Together, they make the case that authenticity builds connection, credibility and trust, which in turn shape how effectively you lead.
Confidence shaped by hard chapters
Both leaders point out that confidence rarely arrives fully formed. It is shaped by the pressure points in a career.
Dominique recalls returning to work with a five-month-old baby and stepping straight into a high stakes turnaround. The pace was relentless, but those experiences became a deep well of resilience she still draws on.
For Lorna, confidence grew from consciously documenting her achievements over time. She keeps a metaphorical trophy cabinet she turns to when doubt creeps in, a catalogue of things she’s achieved that grounds her by reminding her she’s already done hard things. As your catalogue builds, it becomes something you can refer to in difficult moments to ground yourself and to remember what you have already overcome.
Unpacking the weight of gendered expectations
Dominique and Lorna approach imposter syndrome from the perspective of growth rather than inadequacy. They talk about the importance of recognising whether you are uncomfortable because you are stretching into something new, or because you genuinely feel you do not belong. Learning to tell the difference is key. Discomfort is often the sign that you are learning, and as Dominique puts it, it can also be the reminder that you are “exactly where you are meant to be.”
They also point out that many conversations often framed as women’s issues, such as returning to work, balance and having it all, remain gendered by default. Both argue that real progress requires shifting these topics, so they apply to everyone, not only women, and broadening the conversation to include men in discussions around parental leave, emotional load and flexibility.
How the CFO role has evolved in their eyes
The CFO landscape today looks very different from when both leaders started their careers. Dominique and Lorna describe a clear shift from the traditional numbers only archetype to a role that is far more strategic, commercial and people focused. Technical reporting is only one part of the job. The real work now lies in interpreting data, connecting insights across the business and creating a story around the numbers that teams can act on.
With AI and automation able to surface information instantly, the differentiator is no longer who knows the technical details. It is who can communicate what the numbers mean, shape the direction of the business and influence people to move with them. Both leaders note that today’s CFO is expected to be a storyteller, a strategist and a connector, not just a financial expert.
Find cultures that fit you
Dominique and Lorna emphasise the importance of choosing workplaces where you feel heard, supported and able to be yourself. For Dominique, returning to work after children highlighted the stark differences between cultures that enable women to thrive and those that make it unnecessarily difficult. Lorna reflects on the importance of balanced teams and leaders who intentionally create space for new voices. Both highlight the value of invested female networks and being in environments where personal identity does not have to be muted in order to succeed.
Key takeaways
- Authenticity is a strategic asset – It builds trust, clarity and influence, and shapes how effectively you lead
- Confidence grows through difficult experiences – The moments that stretch you become the foundation you rely on later
- The modern CFO is more than the numbers – Judgment, communication and the ability to create a story around the numbers now matter as much as technical skill
- Gendered expectations need to be challenged – Topics like balance, returning to work and ambition should apply to everyone, not only women
- Choose environments that support your voice – Cultures, teams and leaders who make space for you are essential for long term growth
- Build the right network – Invest in peers and mentors who challenge you and open doors you cannot on your own
About the companies
Bloom & Wild is Europe’s largest direct-to-consumer flower company and the inventor of letterbox flowers. Known for customer-led innovation and the Thoughtful Marketing Movement, the group operates across eight markets following the acquisitions of Bloomon and Bergamotte.
GHO Capital is a specialist healthcare investment adviser based in London, backing high-growth companies across outsourced services, PharmaBio, MedTech and patient services, combining deep sector expertise with a global healthcare network.
Marex is an equal opportunity employer. The Women’s Affinity Network mission is to empower women to thrive at Marex, with and alongside their male colleagues. Members can share experiences, engage in learning and development opportunities, brainstorm ideas, and strengthen connections. The Network is fully inclusive; we encourage men to join as allies.
Read our disclaimers
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International Women’s Day 2026: Building Trust and Equity Through Pay Transparency – SAP News Center
- International Women’s Day 2026: Building Trust and Equity Through Pay Transparency SAP News Center
- 40% of women say they aren’t satisfied with employer’s benefits plan: survey Benefits Canada.com
- Gender gaps in group benefits leave women underserved, says RBC Insurance Benefits and Pensions Monitor
- Canadian women want less fanfare, more support this Women’s Day: survey Canadian HR Reporter
- Nearly Two-Thirds of Canadian Women Believe Employers Treat International Women’s Day as More Celebration Than Accountability – That Needs to Change Yahoo Finance
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Hong Kong SFC warns sponsors in booming IPO market
This surge, however, exposed cracks in the foundations. On 30 January 2026, the SFC issued a strongly worded circular1 putting sponsors firmly on notice. The message is clear: quality over volume. SFC warned that sponsors’ gatekeeping role “may have been eroded in their eager pursuit of deal volume” and urged all to “avoid overcommitment”. Sponsors should take heed since enforcement action may follow.
SFC core concerns
The SFC identified serious deficiencies in some sponsor work: poor listing document preparation, over-reliance on external experts and third parties without proper competency checks, insufficient capacity of sponsor principals to supervise deal teams and participate in the listing engagements, attempts to appoint unqualified sponsor principals, and staff lacking requisite knowledge and experience. The SFC’s concern is that some sponsors may be adopting a “process-driven approach” over substantive due diligence. Specific case examples and details of their potential non-compliance are set out in the Appendix to the circular.2
Reporting requirements and on-site inspections
All sponsors were required to report to the SFC on the number of their principals and active engagements, plus staff who have not passed relevant licensing examinations within the prescribed timeframe.The SFC also identified a critical category: “Sponsors with Strained Principals” i.e. any sponsor that has designated any principals to simultaneously supervise or participate in six or more active IPO engagements. The SFC generally regards Sponsors with Strained Principals as lacking adequate resources, unless under very exceptional circumstances with valid justifications to the SFC’s satisfaction. Sponsors must monitor this threshold carefully.In addition 13 sponsors that received a December 2025 joint letter from the SFC and SEHK (Concerned Sponsors), plus Sponsors with Strained Principals, should expect on-site inspections “in the near future”.
Mandatory internal reviews
The following sponsors must complete comprehensive internal reviews within three months:
- Concerned Sponsors, and additional sponsors who receive written communication from the regulators about specific cases of concern in the future: Reviews must focus on the concerns cited, any material non-compliance issues related to internal control and corresponding remedial actions.
- Sponsors with Strained Principals: Reviews must focus on resources available to the sponsor for conducting sponsor work as well as the listing engagements that it is currently handling. The sponsor must submit a rectification and resource plan to the SFC.
These internal reviews should be signed off by the Managers-In-Charge of the Overall Management Oversight (OMOs) of the sponsors.
Tightened examination requirements
All individuals engaging in IPO sponsor work must now pass HKSI LE Papers 1 and 16 before starting IPO sponsor work. An individual who is currently engaged in sponsor work, but who has not passed the requisite examination even after the six-month period, should be removed from transaction teams immediately.
Consequences for non-compliance with sponsor obligations
The SFC has said that it will not hesitate to act. It has warned that overly lengthy listing documents (expected not to exceed 300 pages for the main body), poor drafting, or incomplete responses to regulators’ comments may result in suspension of the vetting process (as at 31 December 2025, vetting of 16 listing applications remain suspended). In addition, listing applications may be returned where they are not substantially complete.
For persistent underperformers, the SFC may also restrict business scope and the number of permitted active listing engagements. Serious cases will attract SFC investigation and/or disciplinary action against sponsors, principals, as well as management (including directors and key group personnel) who are accountable for the sponsor’s failures.
Key takeaways for sponsors
- Listing documents must be drafted with concision, precision and a clear understanding of the business.
- Ensure adequate resources and controls before taking on new IPO mandates. Assess both applicant readiness and sponsor’s own capacity before accepting engagements.
- Principals and other management personnel must actively oversee sponsor work. This mirrors trends elsewhere – senior individuals have been held personally liable for ignoring warning signs.
- Keep detailed records: team appointments, due diligence plans and results, and management involvement in key matters.
Footnotes:
[1] https://apps.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/circular/doc?refNo=26EC4
[2] https://apps.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/api/circular/openAppendix?lang=EN&refNo=26EC4&appendix=0
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Hydrogen Europe
A major milestone has been reached in the construction of one of Europe’s largest green hydrogen facilities, after the final electrolysers for a 200MW order were shipped to a large industrial hydrogen project in Germany. The equipment delivery marks the completion of manufacturing and dispatch for the electrolyser systems that will form the backbone of the project’s hydrogen production capacity.
Hydrogen technology company ITM Power confirmed that the last batch of its TRIDENT electrolyser stacks has left its UK factory and is now en route to the project site in Lingen, where energy major RWE is developing the GET H2 Nukleus green hydrogen project. The company said: “Yesterday saw our last batch of TRIDENT stacks leaving our factory, heading for RWE’s electrolyser plant in Lingen, Germany. The shipment marks a major milestone for us and our industry. 200 MW delivered on time.”
The Lingen plant will be built in two 100MW production lines, with the first already installed and certified. Installation of the second line is currently under way as the final stacks arrive on site. Once the full facility is operational, it will rank among the largest electrolysis plants currently under construction worldwide.
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