Category: 3. Business

The EU has unveiled a €3bn (£2.63bn) strategy to reduce its dependency on China for critical raw materials amid a global scramble triggered by Beijing’s “weaponisation” of supplies of everything from chips to rare earths.

The ReSourceEU programme will seek to de-risk and diversify the bloc’s supply chains for key commodities with a funding initiative to support 25-30 strategic projects in the sector.

The EU said the strategy was designed to reduce the impact of “market shocks” such as the recent disruption to the car industry caused by the recent, now lifted, ban on exports of chips by China in response to the Dutch government taking control of the Chinese-owned chip firm Nexperia.

Senior EU officials said that “while the direction is clear” there was also a need to “accelerate the process” as China continued to “weaponise” its hold on raw materials for “geopolitical purposes”.

These projects cover rare earths – a group of 17 heavy metals that are actually abundant but difficult and costly to extract – as well as the elements gallium, germanium, cobalt and lithium, used in batteries for electric vehicles.

The plan centres on creating a European hub for critical materials that would pool company orders and build joint stockpiles for key projects including urgent defence programmes, an effort driven by the EU industry commissioner, Stéphane Séjourné

The discussion comes as the French president, Emmanuel Macron, visits China, which has threatened to expand its controls on the exports of rare earths, including magnets used in everything from car and fridge doors to MRI scanners.

As part of the new strategy, the EU will redouble efforts to recycle aluminium with fresh restrictions on scrap exports in 2026 of the metal and of scrap copper if necessary.

It will also build a raw materials trading platform that can “aggregate demand” and procurement across the bloc and launch a stockpiling pilot in early 2026.

Brussels has long complained that no matter how many defence measures it puts in place to protect against dependency on China, industry suppliers still buy from the country because it is cheaper than Chile, Brazil, Australia and Canada.

The EU will also look at financial supports to bridge the cost of buying from pricier alternative locations.

The strategy is designed to reboot the 2024 Critical Raw Materials Act that set targets for supplies for 2030 including capacity to extract 10% of the bloc’s needs locally, process 40%, and recycle 25%.

Illustrating the scale of the reliance on Beijing, EU officials revealed that the bloc buys about 20,000 tonnes of permanent magnets a year, used in everything from car and fridge doors to MRI machines.

Of that “17,000 to 18,000” tonnes come from China, 1,000 are produced in the EU with the remainder from other countries.

Up to €3bn in funding will be mobilised within the next 12 months with €2bn a year made available by the European Investment Bank in the form of loans, venture debt and private debt plus financing such as loans already issued to a Finnish lithium mine project Keliber.

This dwarves the £50m announced last month by Keir Starmer for a similar initiative in the UK.

Concerns that Europe could fall behind the US, Japan, Canada and Australia are widespread in industry, with large American car companies already working with mining conglomerates to reduce reliance on Beijing.

Efforts by the US, the EU and the UK to reduce dependency on China for supplies took on a fresh urgency in October when China threatened to introduce sweeping controls on global exports of rare earths from December.

That threat was lifted as part of the tariff deal struck between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump in South Korea six weeks ago, but the reprieve only holds for 12 months, preserving China’s future leverage on supply chains.

The commission has previously estimated that the demand for rare earths and lithium alone is expected to increase five to 12 times and nearly 60 times, respectively, by 2050. In 2020, more than 98% of the EU’s rare earths imports came from China and 78% of its lithium needs were sourced from Chile.

ReSourceEU is part of a wider package being unveiled on Wednesday that the commission calls its economic security doctrine, intended to make European firms more self-sufficient.

Europe’s only lithium hydroxide factory, operated by AMG Lithium in Germany, cost £150m to build, and the company was already in the mining business.

Earlier this year, its chief executive, Stefan Scherer, said that the EU might as well “apply to be a province of China” so little was being done in practice to cut reliance. “Europe has to become independent of China, otherwise it’s just blah blah blah,” he said.

Over the years, the Argentine government has taken significant steps to liberalize its mining sector. Under President Javier Milei (2023-present) and through the newly introduced Incentive Regime for Large Investments, Argentina is aiming to attract large-scale foreign direct investment (FDI) in mining, extraction, and processing of critical minerals such as lithium, gallium, germanium, and rare earths. [1] At the same time, there is a rising global demand for minerals in the technology, energy, and semiconductor industries. For Taiwan, which has an economy that is heavily reliant on advanced manufacturing, securing stable supplies for critical minerals is strategically relevant. In this context, Argentina presents an opportunity for Taiwanese investment and trade.

Argentina: Mineral Resources, Policy, Trade & Investment Framework

Argentina is endowed with a wide range of critical minerals. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), beyond sizable lithium reserves, Argentina holds abundant copper, cobalt, chromium, rare earths, graphite, nickel, platinum-group elements, zinc, and other strategic minerals. In particular, Argentina is part of the “Lithium Triangle” (with Chile and Bolivia) and ranks among the world’s top lithium producers. Copper has also become a rapidly emerging focus, as numerous exploration projects are underway and the metal is considered essential for electrification and renewable energy infrastructure.

Following the election of President Javier Milei in 2023, Argentina has advanced a legal and regulatory framework aimed at attracting large-scale mining investment. Key material factors include:

• The Incentive Regime for Large Investments: Offers tax, customs, and foreign exchange benefits for projects exceeding USD 200 million, with 30 years of regulatory stability.
• Export-Duty Reductions: In August 2025, Argentina eliminated export duties on 225 mining products through the Executive Decree No. 563/2025.
• Transparency Commitments: Since joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in 2019, Argentina has maintained an online platform providing public access to mining, environmental, and cadastre data.
• Institutional Framework: The Argentine Chamber of Mining Firms represents major companies and serves as a key industry interlocutor with the government.

Together, these policies and institutions make Argentina a relatively favourable jurisdiction for mining investment—and one of the more open jurisdictions in the Lithium Triangle. In this regard, Argentina is the only country in the Lithium Triangle that allows private companies to own and commercialize lithium resources, while Chile and Bolivia maintain greater state control.

Furthermore, following the results of Argentina’s October 2025 legislative elections, the current administration is expected to retain stronger control over Congress, reinforcing policy continuity and investor confidence. In this context, characterized by an openness to foreign capital, favorable investment conditions, and a liberalized mining regime, Argentina presents a unique opportunity for Taiwan to strengthen its non-official economic ties while ensuring greater resilience against potential disruptions from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in its semiconductor supply chain. Additionally, President Milei’s alignment with the United States, the European Union, and other like-minded democracies further enhances the political feasibility of deeper Taiwan-Argentina cooperation.

Taiwan: Dependence on Critical Minerals and Supply-chain Risks

Taiwan’s advanced technology, semiconductor, and electronics industries rely heavily on a stable supply of critical minerals such as rare earth elements, lithium, copper, and germanium. However, due to its limited natural endowments and lack of domestic reserves, Taiwan’s supply chain remains highly dependent on external sources. 

Critical minerals are fundamental to advanced technologies. Lithium, nickel, and cobalt underpin battery performance, while rare earth elements are indispensable for components in electric vehicle motors. However, Taiwan remains heavily dependent on external suppliers. In the first half of 2025, imports from the PRC and Hong Kong totaled USD 43.2 billion, with electronic components, information and communication products, and electrical machinery showing particularly strong growth. Taiwan also imported USD 58.1 million worth of mineral raw materials in 2024. Although its dependence on the PRC is significantly lower in the commodities category, accounting for only 1.6 percent of total mineral raw material imports, these figures still underscore Taiwan’s constrained access to the upstream raw materials needed to sustain its high-value manufacturing sectors.

Source: External Trade Report in the First Half of 2025- Taiwanese Ministry of Finance

It is worth noting that the critical minerals supply chain begins with upstream activities, which consist of exploration and extraction. Following extraction, the minerals enter the processing and refining stage, which serves as a bridge between raw mining output and industrial applications. Here, materials are transformed into usable forms. The downstream stages involve the industrialization of refined minerals as they move into manufacturing, where countries have greater opportunities to add value and diversify their production. The chain concludes with end-of-life management, which seeks to close the loop through recycling and reuse, ultimately reducing the demand for virgin materials.

However, the distribution of capabilities across these stages is uneven, and this imbalance creates strategic vulnerabilities. In particular, mineral refining and processing capacity is highly concentrated in the PRC (accounting for almost 70 percent of the market share), posing significant geopolitical risks for Taiwan. Beijing’s imposition of export controls on critical minerals creates vulnerabilities for Taiwan. These factors could potentially lead to an economic blockade, disrupting the upstream of the mining industry and exacerbating supply chain bottlenecks. 

A notable example is tungsten, a strategic metal essential to Taiwan’s industrial infrastructure. Taiwan does not produce its own raw tungsten and relies entirely on imports, with approximately 90 percent of its supply originating from China. In February 2025, China added tungsten to its export control list and eliminated value-added tax rebates for raw exports, effectively discouraging global supply and altering market dynamics. Industry managers have warned that a complete disruption in tungsten supply could force “half of Taiwan’s people” to take unpaid leave, highlighting the metal’s strategic importance.​ Additionally, in October 2025, Beijing introduced sweeping new export restrictions requiring companies worldwide to obtain licenses for any product containing more than 0.1 percent Chinese-origin rare earth elements by value. While Taiwan does not directly rely on China for rare earth elements used in its domestic chipmaking processes, it remains vulnerable through indirect channels—especially via its dependence on semi-finished products and components manufactured in Japan or Southeast Asia that use Chinese-refined rare earth elements.​

Hence, diversification is essential for Taiwan to strengthen its industrial resilience and preserve its global competitiveness in high-tech sectors. Critical minerals are indispensable inputs for semiconductors, smart machines, electronics, battery systems, and green technologies. In particular, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry (anchored by firms such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company [TSMC, 台灣積體電路製造公司]), constitutes the foundation of its export economy and strategic position in the international system, given the large market share they hold. Any disruption in the supply of raw materials could pose systemic economic and security risks for not just Taiwan, but for the whole world.

Although Taiwan and Argentina lack formal diplomatic relations, Taipei maintains commercial and cultural engagement through the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Argentina (駐阿根廷台北商務文化辦事處). Despite persistent pressure from the PRC, Taiwan has succeeded in promoting economic and institutional cooperation through Memoranda of Understandings (MOUs) between firms, chambers of commerce, and academic institutions. Building on these mechanisms, Taiwan can further advance bilateral ties with Argentina and other resource-rich partners to secure access to critical minerals and enhance the resilience of its industrial supply chains.

Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwanese Investment and Trade

For Taiwan, engaging with Argentina’s critical-minerals sector offers a route to diversify supply chains away from heavy reliance on the PRC and a narrow set of sources. By gaining access to minerals such as lithium, copper, rare earths and germanium from Argentina, Taiwanese firms can strengthen their upstream security of supply for semiconductors, electronics, magnets, battery technologies and smart machines. Given the geopolitical risks associated with China’s dominance in mineral processing and refining, diversification into Argentina is both economically prudent and strategically significant.

Furthermore, instead of being purely downstream manufacturers, Taiwanese firms might explore upstream participation through joint ventures, equity shares, or trade partnerships in Argentina. Notable examples include the memorandum of understanding between the Chinese International Economic Cooperation Association (CIECA) and the Argentine Chamber of Commerce and Services (Cámara de Comercio y Servicios de la República Argentina), as well as the cooperation agreement between CIECA and the Chamber of Industry and Commerce of Mercosur and the Americas (Cámara de Industria y Comercio del Mercosur y de las Américas). This would allow Taiwan to evolve from a passive consumer of raw materials to an integrated actor within the Argentine emerging mining sector, improve value-chain capture, secure supply stability, and reinforce the competitiveness of its high-tech industries.

In the absence of formal diplomatic relations between Taiwan and Argentina, cooperation can advance through provincial and regional levels, particularly in mining-rich provinces, such as Jujuy, Catamarca, and San Juan. Through chambers of commerce, investment promotion agencies, and sister-city agreements, access could be facilitated while circumventing federal-level diplomatic constraints. This decentralized approach would complement existing trade promotion mechanisms and foster ground-level partnerships.

In addition, these engagements may also open doors in neighboring countries for Taiwan to build a regional critical minerals network, strengthen its political and economic position in Latin America’s Southern Cone -Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile-, reduce its diplomatic isolation, and increase its presence in a strategically significant region. Participation in the Argentine mining boom could also enhance Taiwan’s leverage in the global competition over supply chains, particularly vis-à-vis the PRC.

However, the critical minerals sector in Argentina also presents notable challenges for Taiwanese businesses and investors. Geopolitically, the influence of the PRC remains substantial, reinforced by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, formerly known as “One Belt, One Road,” 一帶一路)  and extensive commercial presence in the country. As of September 2025, China had become Argentina’s second-largest trading partner, with the bilateral trade balance reflecting a USD 6.5 million deficit for Argentina. Moreover, the PRC maintains significant foreign direct investment in strategic sectors including energy, manufacturing, mining, real estate, ICT, infrastructure, agroindustry, and finance.

At the same time, mining operations in Argentina face strict regulations and community opposition, with legislation that limits and restricts mining activity and investment. These issues are compounded by Argentina’s macroeconomic instability, including high inflation and uncertain investment and economic conditions, which may pose financial risks despite recent reforms. Altogether, these geopolitical, environmental, financial, and diplomatic constraints form a challenging landscape that Taiwan must carefully navigate to participate effectively in Argentina’s emerging critical minerals market.

Recommendations

In order to capitalize on the benefits of closer economic relations, Taiwan should:

1. Sign an MOU between the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Argentina and the Argentine Chamber of Mining Firms [Cámara Argentina de Empresas Mineras]. The MOU should establish a framework for investment and dialogue, including information sharing, high-level reciprocal visits, and matchmaking between Argentine mining firms and Taiwanese investors.
2. Direct the Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA, 中華民國對外貿易發展協會) to organize at least one annual trade mission to the Argentine provinces of Jujuy, Catamarca, and San Juan, focused on identifying trade and investment opportunities in critical mineral sectors. These missions should involve forming a working group among Taiwanese firms interested in diversifying raw material sourcing for semiconductors, as well as relevant Argentine stakeholders (federal, provincial, and regional governments, mining firms, and legislators). Through the Contact Taiwan platform, TAITRA should facilitate linkages between investors and recipients, and specify mining and processing projects suited for Taiwanese participation.
3. Coordinate with like-minded partners, such as the United States, Canada, and the European Union (countries that already have significant investments in Argentina) to establish a multilateral forum on critical minerals. The forum would align investment cooperation frameworks and ensure Taiwan’s inclusion in broader supply chain initiatives.

The main point: For Taiwan, the time is ripe to deepen its presence in Argentina’s mining sector; not merely as a buyer of raw materials, but also as a strategic partner in extraction, processing, and supply-chain integration. Doing so would strengthen Taiwan’s techno-industrial base and enhance its economic diplomacy in Latin America.

[1] Critical minerals are defined as any mineral, element, substance, or material designated as critical by the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the director of the US Geological Survey. The Critical Materials List includes the following: Critical materials for energy: Aluminum, cobalt, copper, dysprosium, electrical steel, fluorine, gallium, iridium, lithium, magnesium, metallurgical coal for steelmaking (inclusive of anthracite), natural graphite, neodymium, nickel, platinum, praseodymium, silicon, silicon carbide and terbium. Critical minerals: Aluminum, antimony, arsenic, barite, beryllium, bismuth, cerium, cesium, chromium, cobalt, dysprosium, erbium, europium, fluorspar, gadolinium, gallium, germanium, graphite, hafnium, holmium, indium, iridium, lanthanum, lithium, lutetium, magnesium, manganese, neodymium, nickel, niobium, palladium, platinum, praseodymium, rhodium, rubidium, ruthenium, samarium, scandium, tantalum, tellurium, terbium, thulium, tin, titanium, tungsten, vanadium, ytterbium, yttrium, zinc, and zirconium.

Mutations in the dynein cargo adaptor BICD2 have been linked to SMALED2 (Koboldt et al., 2020). Mutations in the heavy chain of the dynein motor have also been implicated in a version of this disorder (Chan et al., 2018; Das et al., 2018), suggesting that defects in dynein-mediated transport contribute to its etiology. However, the molecular and cellular mechanisms underlying SMALED2 pathogenesis remain poorly understood. Previous studies have characterized mutations within the first coiled-coil domain of BICD2, a region responsible for interactions with dynein and dynactin. These analyses elegantly demonstrated that mutants such as BICD2_N188T result in dynein hyperactivity (Huynh and Vale, 2017). In addition to these mutants, however, recent studies have identified several SMALED2-associated alleles within the C-terminal cargo-binding domain of BICD2 (Ravenscroft et al., 2016; Synofzik et al., 2014). Given BICD2’s role as a dynein cargo adaptor, these findings raise two important questions: (1) Is dynein hyperactivity a common feature of SMALED2-associated BICD2 mutations? and (2) Do these mutations alter the interactome of BICD2 relative to the wild-type protein? The goal of this study was to address these questions and elucidate potential molecular consequences of SMALED2-associated BICD2 mutations.

BICD2 is one of the best characterized dynein cargo adaptors. However, most studies involving BICD2 have focused on the mechanism by which this adaptor activates dynein for processive motility. Relatively little is known regarding the cargo that is linked to dynein by BICD2. In Drosophila, BicD links the RNA-binding protein Egalitarian (Egl) with dynein for transport of specific mRNAs in the oocyte and embryo (Dienstbier et al., 2009; Goldman et al., 2021; Goldman et al., 2019; Mach and Lehmann, 1997; McClintock et al., 2018). Loss of either BicD or Egl compromises transport of these mRNAs and consequently results in defective oogenesis or embryogenesis. The first definitive cargo identified for mammalian BICD2 was the small GTP-binding protein, RAB6A (Matanis et al., 2002). Despite the ability of BICD2 to directly bind RAB6A, most vesicles containing RAB6A move towards the plus end of microtubules, suggesting that their transport is primarily driven by the Kinesin-1 motor, KIF5B (Grigoriev et al., 2007). Other cargos that have been shown to directly bind BICD2 are RANBP2, a nucleoporin, and Nesprin-2 (SYNE2), a LINC complex component involved in linking dynein and kinesin to the nuclear envelope (Gonçalves et al., 2020; Splinter et al., 2010).

In order to determine whether SMALED2 alleles of BICD2 are associated with interactome changes, it was therefore critical for us to determine the interactome of wild-type BICD2. This was done using the promiscuous biotin ligase miniTurboID (mTrbo). In comparison to an RFP-mTrbo control, BICD2-mTrbo resulted in the biotinylation and purification of numerous known interacting partners including RANBP2, as well as several components of the dynein motor. One interesting group of potentially novel interacting proteins was components of the HOPS complex, a six-subunit complex of proteins involved in endocytic trafficking (Spang, 2016). Four of the six HOPS components were identified in the wild-type BICD2 interactome, with VPS41 being the fifth most enriched protein. However, unlike RANBP2, RAB6A, and NESPRIN-2, all of which are able to bind the isolated BICD2 cargo binding domain (Gonçalves et al., 2020; Matanis et al., 2002; Splinter et al., 2010), the HOPS complex components were only able to bind full-length BICD2. The BICD2 cargo binding domain was therefore necessary but not sufficient for interaction with HOPS components. In addition, contrary to our initial hypothesis that VPS41 was the direct binding partner between BICD2 and the HOPS complex, BICD2 retained its interaction with VPS16 and VPS18 in cells depleted of VPS41. This suggests that BICD2 likely recognizes a domain or motif present in several HOPS proteins. We attempted to use Alphafold2 multimer to predict the relevant domain within HOPS proteins that interact with BICD2. Although Alphafold2 was able to generate a high confidence prediction of the interaction site between BICD2 and RAB6A, consistent with published results (Zhao et al., 2024), it failed to produce a high confidence prediction for the BICD2-HOPS complex interaction (data not shown). Thus, although we were able to validate the in vivo association between BICD2 and VPS41, VPS16, and VPS18, we are not able to conclude whether BICD2 is capable of directly interacting with these proteins. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first example of BICD2 interacting proteins that display this binding characteristic. The ScaC protein from the intracellular pathogen Orientia tsutsugamushi was recently also shown to interact with BICD2, and although the binding site of ScaC was different from that used by RANBP2 or RAB6A, it was still able to interact with the isolated cargo binding domain of BICD2 (Manigrasso et al., 2025).

Another unusual aspect of the BICD2-HOPS complex interaction is that it does not appear to be linked to dynein-mediated trafficking. Depletion of dynein heavy chain resulted in the peripheral distribution of GFP-VPS41 and LAMP1 vesicles, indicative of a reduction in minus end transport, and a net gain in plus end directed transport. By contrast, depletion of BICD2 resulted in the perinuclear accumulation of lysosomal vesicles that were mostly immotile. Interestingly, however, overexpression of BICD2 caused the outward spreading of LAMP1 vesicles, a process that depends on KIF5B (Guardia et al., 2016). Previous studies have shown that BICD2 is also able to interact with KIF5B via a central coiled coil domain (Grigoriev et al., 2007; Hoogenraad and Akhmanova, 2016). A recent report suggests that Drosophila BicD is capable of interacting with and activating the motility of Kinesin-1, the fly homolog of KIF5B (Ali et al., 2025). Consistent with the notion that BICD2 might link late endosomal vesicles with KIF5B, depletion of KIF5B in BICD2 overexpressing cells restored the normal localization of LAMP1 vesicles. Additional studies will be required to determine whether BICD2 is capable of directly interacting with these vesicles and whether these vesicles are directly linked to KIF5B by BICD2.

The motility of LAMP1 vesicles has some similarity to the transport of RAB6A exocytic vesicles. RAB6A vesicles are transported from the area of the Golgi towards the cell periphery in a KIF5B-dependent manner, and loss of either kinesin-1 or dynein results in a sharp reduction in the number of motile particles (Grigoriev et al., 2007). In addition, mutations in BICD2 that compromise binding to RAB6A also result in vesicles that are largely immotile (Zhao et al., 2024). Thus, in the case of LAMP1 and RAB6A vesicles, instead of resulting in an increased rate of minus end transport, loss of BICD2 results in compromised vesicle motility, indicating that coordination between opposite polarity motors is critical for their motility.

As noted earlier, mutations in the CC1 region of BICD2 hyperactivate dynein (Huynh and Vale, 2017). Our findings indicate that this property is also shared by BICD2_R694C and BICD2_R747C, mutations present within the C-terminal cargo binding domain. In the absence of cargo, BICD2 is thought to exist in an inhibited conformation due to intramolecular interactions between the N and C termini of the protein (Figure 1B; Liu et al., 2013; Terawaki et al., 2015; Wharton and Struhl, 1989). Cargo binding to the C-terminus of BICD2 counteracts the intramolecular interaction, enabling N-terminal residues within BICD2 to bind the dynein/dynactin complex (Goldman et al., 2019; Huynh and Vale, 2017; Liu et al., 2013; McClintock et al., 2018; Sladewski et al., 2018). How might mutations in BICD2 result in dynein hyperactivation? One possibility is that these mutations disrupt the autoinhibited state of BICD2, effectively causing BICD2 to be present in a more open and uninhibited conformation that promotes dynein/dynactin binding. Molecular dynamics simulations suggest that the R747C substitution causes a registry shift in the coiled coil, likely destabilizing this domain and thus disrupting the intramolecular interaction between the N and C termini of BICD2 (Cui et al., 2020). Another possibility is that the hyperactivation of dynein results in reduced binding between BICD2 and KIF5B. Our results are consistent with this scenario and suggest that the net effect of dynein hyperactivity results in three molecular changes; reduced intramolecular BICD2 interaction, increased interaction between BICD2 and dynein, and reduced interaction between BICD2 and KIF5B.

In addition to hyperactivating dynein, all three mutations, including BICD2_N188T, alter the BICD2 interactome. This finding was unexpected for BICD2_N188T because this mutation is not within the cargo binding domain. One possible explanation for this phenotype is that BICD2_N188T is present in a more open conformation, and this change affects its binding properties. Another possibility that is not mutually exclusive is that the different binding profile results from the altered localization of BICD2_N188T within the cell. In comparison to wild-type BICD2, we generally observed greater centrosomal enrichment of BICD2_N188T. In comparing the three mutants, the general trend was that more proteins displayed a reduced interaction with the SMALED2 mutants in comparison to wild-type BICD2. Among the three mutants analyzed, BICD2_R747C displayed the most drastically altered interactome. This mutant displayed reduced association with RANBP2, importin beta, and HOPS complex components. Interestingly, this mutant also displayed numerous gain-of-function interactions. For instance, although minimal binding was observed between wild-type BICD2 and GRAMD1A, this protein abundantly interacted with BICD2_R747C. GRAMD1A is involved in non-vesicular transport of accessible cholesterol from the plasma membrane to the ER and is often concentrated at sites of plasma membrane-ER contact (Besprozvannaya et al., 2018; Sandhu et al., 2018). However, in cells expressing BICD2_R747C, this localization pattern was disrupted and GRAMD1A co-localized with BICD2_R747C adjacent to the centrosome.

The GRAMD1 family consists of three isoforms: GRAMD1A, GRAMD1B, and GRAMD1C. Interestingly, our interactome analysis only identified GRAMD1A as a gain-of-function interaction partner with BICD2_R747C. It is unclear whether GRAMD1B and GRAMD1C also interact with BICD2_R747C. However, given that GRAMD1 proteins can form hetero oligomers (Naito et al., 2019), the BICD2_R747C-induced mislocalization of GRAMD1A could potentially affect the distribution of other GRAMD1 isoforms as well. The GRAMD1 proteins function to sense excess accessible cholesterol in the plasma membrane and to mediate the transport of this cholesterol to the ER. This reduces the rate of new cholesterol synthesis by the ER, enabling the cell to maintain cholesterol homeostasis (Sandhu et al., 2018). It will be interesting to determine whether endogenous GRAMD1A is mislocalized in motor neurons of SMALED2 patients with the BICD2_R747C mutation, and if this results in an expanded accessible pool of cholesterol at the plasma membrane.

A recent study by Yi and colleagues examined the effect of the BICD2_R694C mutation on cargo binding (Yi et al., 2023). Using in vitro experiments, they found that this mutation enhanced RANBP2 binding while having no effect on NESPRIN-2 binding (Yi et al., 2023). Our results using full-length BICD2 are consistent with this finding. We also observed slightly higher binding of BICD2_R694C to RANBP2. However, due to experimental variability, the increase was not statistically significant. The authors also examined cargo binding using a BICD2 double mutant (F743I/R747C). Consistent with our results, this mutant displayed greatly reduced binding to RANBP2, but bound NESPRIN-2 at a much higher level than the wild-type protein (Yi et al., 2023). NESPRIN-2 was not identified as an interacting partner in our study for the wild-type protein or the BICD2_R747C mutant, possibly due to its low expression level in HEK293 cells. Nevertheless, these findings, along with our interactome analysis, indicate that mutations in the cargo binding domain of BICD2 can result in loss- and gain-of-function interactions.

In conclusion, our study is the first to comprehensively examine the interactome of wild-type BICD2 and to identify changes that occur in SMALED2 linked mutant alleles of BICD2. We find that not only are mutations within the cargo binding domain associated with interactome changes, but these mutations are also capable of hyperactivating dynein. Some limitations of this study are worth noting. In the current study, we chose to determine the BICD2 interactome in HEK FLP-In cells (embryonic kidney cells). These cells were chosen because they enabled us to precisely integrate wild-type and mutant alleles of BICD2 at a specific locus. It also enabled us to expand cultures of these cells to levels that were sufficient for proteomic analysis. However, the main cell type affected in patients with SMALED2 is motor neurons. Primary motor neurons are harder to culture to scale and to genetically manipulate to express the desired wild-type or mutant BICD2 transgenes. Thus, although motor neurons were not used in our study, the next significant challenge will be to perform these types of experiments using motor neurons. In addition, although our study identified interactome changes between wild-type and mutant alleles of BICD2, we cannot conclude whether these changes are causative for the symptoms associated with SMALED2. Patients diagnosed with this disorder display a range of symptoms, from relatively mild to more severe (Frasquet et al., 2020; Koboldt et al., 2020). Even patients with the same genetic mutation can display a range of phenotypes (Storbeck et al., 2017). Furthermore, disease symptoms can result from one or two interactome changes that are critical for the health of motor neurons. Alternatively, symptoms might also be caused by many small changes in the interactome that cumulatively affect the health of motor neurons. Lastly, because SMALED2 is an autosomal dominant disorder, patients express wild-type and mutant versions of BICD2 in the same cell. Thus, to accurately model this disorder, studies will need to be conducted in motor neurons that are genetically edited to express disease-associated mutations in a heterozygous state.

Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the Hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament

Brussels, 3 December 2025

It is a pleasure to address this Committee for the fourth time this year.

Recent years have witnessed profound technological, geopolitical, and structural changes which continue to redefine our economic landscape. These shifts underscore not just the importance of improving Europe’s resilience and competitiveness, but also the imperative to build lasting internal economic strength.^[1]

In our previous hearings, we examined this shifting global environment and its implications for the European economy. Today, I will focus my remarks on the instruments in our toolkit, in line with the topic you have selected for this hearing.

Before turning to these tools, let me first outline our assessment of the euro area economy and our current monetary policy stance.

Outlook for the euro area and the ECB’s monetary policy

The economy grew by 0.2% in the third quarter of the year, supported by robust domestic demand. The services sector continued to expand, boosted by tourism and a pick-up in digital services, as many firms stepped up efforts to modernise their IT infrastructures and integrate artificial intelligence into their operations. By contrast, manufacturing and exports were held back by higher tariffs, still-heightened uncertainty and a stronger euro.

Looking ahead, growth in economic activity should benefit from increased household spending and a resilient and more inclusive labour market – with the highest labour force participation rate since the start of the euro. Substantial infrastructure and defence spending are also expected to support economic activity. The global environment is likely to remain a headwind, as the impact of higher tariffs on euro area exports and manufacturing investment continues to unfold.

Risks to the outlook have become more balanced thanks to the EU-US trade deal reached over the summer, the ceasefire in the Middle East and progress in the US-China trade negotiations. At the same time, the outlook remains uncertain – owing to a still volatile global trade environment, a potential deterioration in financial market sentiment and geopolitical tensions.

Inflation remains close to our 2% medium-term target. According to Eurostat’s flash estimate, inflation edged up slightly to 2.2% in November, mainly due to higher services and energy inflation. Core inflation – excluding energy and food – was constant at 2.4%. Indicators of underlying inflation remain consistent with our 2% medium-term target.

The reduction in inflation towards our medium-term target has been supported by a gradual moderation in wage growth from its peak of 5.7% in the second quarter of 2023 to 3.9% in the same quarter of this year. Forward-looking indicators, such as the ECB’s wage tracker and surveys on wage expectations, point to slower wage growth over the remainder of the year and the first half of 2026.

We expect inflation to stay around our 2% target in the coming months. Risks to the outlook continue to be two-sided, while uncertainty remains higher than usual owing to volatile global trade policies. The next Eurosystem staff projections, to be published on 18 December, will shed further light on the outlook for growth and inflation.

As our assessment of the inflation outlook was broadly unchanged, we decided at our October monetary policy meeting to keep the key ECB interest rates unchanged. We continue to follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. In particular, our interest rate decisions will be based on our assessment of the inflation outlook and the risks surrounding it, as well as the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. We are not pre-committing to a particular rate path.

The instruments in the ECB’s toolkit

Let me now turn to the ECB’s instruments.

As reconfirmed in our recent strategy assessment, we are committed to setting monetary policy such that inflation stabilises at our 2% target in the medium term.^[2] Our primary monetary policy instrument is the set of three key ECB interest rates. However, we may also employ other instruments, as appropriate, to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission and provide additional accommodation when interest rates approach their lower bound.

Effective transmission of our monetary policy stance across the euro area is critical for delivering on our price stability mandate. We must therefore remain attentive to situations in which cross-country differences in the impact of our policy on key economic variables become excessive or signal that the transmission mechanism is impaired. To address such concerns, we have developed tools to safeguard the smooth transmission of our monetary policy.

I will now briefly outline three key instruments in our monetary policy toolkit: Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs), the technical features of which were announced in August and September 2012;^[3] the Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) announced in July 2022;^[4] and the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) announced in March 2020.^[5]

Outright Monetary Transactions are designed to safeguard the transmission of monetary policy in all euro area countries. OMTs enable us to address severe distortions in government bond markets which originate from, in particular, unfounded fears among investors of the reversibility of the euro. A necessary condition for OMTs is strict and effective conditionality attached to an appropriate European Stability Mechanism programme.^[6]

The Transmission Protection Instrument can be activated to counter unwarranted, disorderly dynamics in the market for securities issued in countries experiencing a deterioration in financing conditions not warranted by country-specific fundamentals. The Governing Council will consider a cumulative list of criteria to assess whether the countries in which the Eurosystem may conduct purchases under TPI are pursuing sound and sustainable fiscal and macroeconomic policies. The criteria include, among others, compliance with the EU’s fiscal framework and an absence of severe macroeconomic imbalances.

The pandemic emergency purchase programme was launched and used in response to the COVID-19 shock, which affected all euro area countries, but to different degrees. The programme was designed with a dual role: on the one hand, it supported market functioning as well as the transmission of monetary policy; on the other hand, it enabled a substantial easing of the monetary policy stance to counter the serious downside risks to price stability posed by the pandemic.

In the face of the extraordinary economic and financial shock, the programme’s flexibility – which allowed the pace and composition of purchases to be adjusted – proved critical in stabilising markets, addressing impediments to transmission, supporting the economic recovery and safeguarding price stability.^[7] As circumstances evolved, the size and pace of the PEPP were recalibrated, and reinvestments of maturing bonds were fully discontinued as of December 2024, contributing to the normalisation of our balance sheet.^[8]

Together, these tools demonstrate that the ECB’s toolkit is adaptable to unprecedented challenges while remaining clearly within the scope of our monetary policy competence. Consistent with our commitment to transparency and accountability, we have engaged extensively with this Committee to explain our assessments and answer questions on these tools. This ongoing dialogue underscores our dedication to ensuring that our actions are thoroughly scrutinised and clearly understood by the public.

Conclusion

To conclude – as also highlighted in our monetary policy strategy statement, the Governing Council will continue to respond flexibly to new challenges as they arise and will consider, as needed, new policy instruments in the pursuit of its price stability objective.

It is essential that other policies take the lead in strengthening Europe’s prospects and reducing vulnerability to future shocks. This means creating the right conditions for Europe’s sources of economic strength to reach their full potential – most notably by making the Single Market truly single.

In this context, I warmly welcome the European Commission’s forthcoming package on capital market integration and supervision. These proposals are key for overcoming fragmentation, enhancing the efficiency of capital markets, and fostering innovation.

There are clear solutions at hand – now is the time to implement them.

In this episode of Workforce WorldView, Janette Lucas from our London Labour & Employment team speaks with Kate Dean, a neurodiversity and disability consultant, about the growing prevalence of diagnoses of neurodiversity – and the opportunities and challenges this presents for employers. They explore the common misconceptions surrounding diagnoses, and provide practical steps that employers can take to move beyond compliance to create inclusive workplace environments. The conversation highlights why proactive strategies and understanding neurodiversity are essential for talent retention and organisational success.

A few key points from the discussion:

Why is neurodiversity a business priority?

We are told that up to 20% of the UK population is neurodivergent, and reportedly it is now the third most common reason for occupational health referrals. Employers need to recognise this trend as a core workforce issue, not a niche concern.

How should employers handle self-identification?

Long waiting lists mean many employees self-identify rather than obtaining a formal diagnosis. The approach to take will vary on a case-by-case basis, but given the increase in self-diagnosis there is certainly an argument for HR focusing on providing supportive conversations and assisting with strategies proactively for employees who have self-diagnosed, rather than waiting for proof of diagnosis.

What is the link between neurodiversity and employee wellbeing?

Neurodiversity and mental health challenges often co-occur; and even physical conditions can be involved. And of course, when employees have caring responsibilities for neurodivergent family members, this may impact their work lives too. Integrating neurodivergent voices into wellbeing strategies can help reduce absenteeism and improve engagement.

How can inclusion strategies reduce risk and conflict?

Kate recommends moving away from an “us and them” mindset – recognising neurodivergence as one of the many ways that all people think and behave differently from each other – and embedding neurodiversity into inclusion policies, as this may assist with preventing misunderstandings and workplace disputes.

Why does embracing neurodivergent talent drive performance?

Employees with different perspectives bring a great richness of problem-solving, creativity and focus to our organisations, and people who think differently are very much part of that richness. Employers that adapt job design and recruitment strategies can unlock innovation and gain a competitive edge.

Listen and Learn More

Hear the full discussion and practical insights by listening to this fascinating podcast – and look out for Part 2 of the Workforce WorldView discussion on neurodiversity, where we dig into the role that line managers can play in creating an inclusive, welcoming environment.

To further explore how we can help your organisation build an inclusive workplace and manage neurodiversity effectively, please get in touch with our Labour & Employment team today.

The Jaguar Land Rover design boss behind the Range Rover and the polarising Jaguar relaunch has abruptly departed the business just four months after its new chief executive took charge.

Gerry McGovern left the role of chief creative officer on Monday after 20 years at the business in which he oversaw the design of some of the company’s most successful cars as well as the launch of a new-look, pink electric Jaguar that drew the ire of Donald Trump.

Britain’s largest carmaker appointed PB Balaji as chief executive in August. Balaji, an Indian national, was previously the chief financial officer of Tata Motors, the Indian owner of JLR.

Balaji was due to take over the reins of a business that was performing well, generating nearly three years of consecutive quarterly profits. However, any chance of a smooth transition was dashed by a crippling cyber-attack in August that stopped all production at JLR’s factories.

JLR declined to comment on the departure and McGovern was still listed on the company’s website on Wednesday. Autocar India, which first reported on McGovern’s departure, said he had been removed with immediate effect.

David Bailey, a professor of business economics at the University of Birmingham, said the abrupt removal “has sent shock waves through the automotive world”. He said it would herald “much more than a routine management reshuffle” but rather “the symbolic end of an era” and was perhaps a sign that Tata was looking to exert more control.

McGovern returned to Land Rover in 2004 after an earlier stint and rose to be in charge of designing its key products, including its flagship Range Rover, its bestselling Range Rover Evoque and several other models.

His stewardship included hiring Victoria Beckham as a creative design executive in 2010. In 2017, tensions emerged after Beckham said at the launch of a special VB Evoque: “I’ve designed a car that I want to drive, a car I think [her husband] David wants to drive.” McGovern later said: “She didn’t design the car … I’ve forgotten more than that woman will ever know about [car] designing – to be a car designer takes years.”

McGovern was elevated to the role of JLR’s chief creative officer in 2021 by the then chief executive, Thierry Bolloré, giving him oversight of the struggling Jaguar brand as well. McGovern retained the role under Bolloré’s successor, Adrian Mardell.

Bolloré had scrapped an advanced plan for an electric Jaguar that followed on from previous models, and McGovern was tasked with completely overhauling the brand in an effort to end years of weak sales.

The product he came up with was a major departure from previous, fairly traditional Jaguars. The Type 00 targeted wealthy, younger, international buyers rather than going head to head with BMW as another executive saloon car. It featured a large, angular design with no rear window, and the initial concept design was shown in pink and electric blue.

The company faced a ferocious and at times hate-filled backlash from some quarters after a teaser campaign featured several androgynous models. Elon Musk and Trump criticised what Trump called a “stupid, and seriously WOKE advertisement”. McGovern, seen as assertive and sometimes combative by people with whom he has worked, said the car displayed “fearless creativity”.

McGovern’s departure raises questions about how much of the concept car will survive into production, although prototype models were at a fairly advanced stage before the hack disrupted production plans. A person who has driven the car said it would wow drivers.

The new electric Range Rover overseen by McGovern will also be a crucial car in JLR’s transition away from petrol and diesel. The design is nearly identical to the petrol version, but sales are expected to be delayed because of the cyber-attack. JLR had initially planned to make the first deliveries by the end of this year.

WPP is set to be relegated from the FTSE 100 after nearly 30 years, as the advertising giant struggles to stem an exodus of clients and match the artificial intelligence and data capabilities of rivals.

WPP, once the world’s largest advertising group, has seen its market valuation plummet from around £24bn in 2017 to just £3.1bn.

The company has also seen its share price plunge two-thirds this year and is expected to be relegated from the blue chip index when the next quarterly reshuffle is officially announced after stock markets close on Wednesday afternoon.

WPP has issued two profit warnings this year and Cindy Rose, who took over as chief executive after Mark Read was ousted in June, has launched a strategic review, admitting that the company has “not gone far enough or fast enough in adapting to the evolving needs of our clients”.

Founded in 1985 by Sir Martin Sorrell, who built a global advertising powerhouse out of a small, Kent-based maker of wire baskets, WPP has been in the FTSE 100 since 1998.

“I was in the room with Sorrell when the business entered the FTSE 100 … the jubilation,” said Alex DeGroote, a media analyst. “This is a moment, the end of an era really. It is sad; advertising … is an industry where Britain had a global leader. To fall out is pretty ignominious and there is no obvious route back.”

WPP is investing heavily in AI tools but has been slow to adapt to a changing market and is being heavily outgunned, principally by France’s Publicis Groupe, which took its crown as the biggest ad group in the world by revenue last year.

Given the parlous state WPP is in, analysts believe that Rose may only have a year to turn the business around, or break up the company, which has become a potential takeover target.

British Land, the most valuable company in the FTSE 250, looks set to be promoted to the FTSE 100 to take the spot vacated by WPP.

In September’s reshuffle, housebuilder Taylor Wimpey – led by Jennie Daly – was relegated from the FTSE 100. Daly’s departure, and the relegation of Rose’s WPP, will leave just seven female chief executives in the blue chip index. GSK boss Emma Walmsley and Severn Trent chief Liv Garfield, both longstanding FTSE CEOs, have recently announced their departures.