The number of electric passenger cars in the EU reached 4.4 million in 2023, accounting for 1.73% of all passenger cars. Compared with 2022, the total number of electric cars went up by 1.4 million.
In 121 (56.28%) out of the 215 regions at level 2 of the nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS 2) with available data, the share of electric cars in the total passenger cars was below the EU average. For most EU countries, this share was relatively homogeneous across regions, suggesting that factors such as national subsidies and incentives or other national factors likely played an important role in the adoption of these vehicles.
A total of 17 regions reported that electric cars made up at least 4.00% of all passenger cars (darkest shade of blue on the map):
with all its 5 regions, Denmark led the distribution along with Sweden (5 out of 8 regions), including the capital regions of Hovedstaden and Stockholm
3 regions in the Netherlands, among them the capital region of Noord-Holland
2 regions in Belgium, including the capital region of Région de Bruxelles-Capitale / Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest
the Finnish capital region of Helsinki-Uusimaa
and Luxembourg
Source dataset: tran_r_elvehst and tran_r_vehst
At the top end of the distribution, the central Dutch region of Flevoland recorded by far the highest share of electric cars in 2023, at 17.07%. This unusually high figure may reflect the presence of vehicle leasing companies based in the region, which register large fleets of electric vehicles and thereby inflate the number of electric cars relative to the size of the regional car population. The Swedish capital region of Stockholm (10.74%) was the only other region in the EU to record a double-digit share. It was followed by Hovedstaden in Denmark (8.64%) and Prov. Vlaams-Brabant in Belgium (7.60%).
At the lower end of the distribution, 46 regions reported that electric cars accounted for fewer than 0.25% (lightest shade of yellow on the map) of all passenger cars in 2023. This group was largely concentrated in Czechia (5 out of 8 regions), Greece (11 of 13), Poland (14 of 17) and Slovakia (3 of 4). There was also a cluster in southern Italy (6 regions). The remainder of the group consisted of 4 regions from Spain, 2 regions from Romania, as well as a single region from Croatia.
The use of electric passenger cars reflects income levels, price differences between electric and other vehicles, subsidies and incentives, infrastructure investment, battery technology, fuel prices, urban policies, the availability and cost of public transport, and environmental consciousness.
Would you like to know more about transport statistics at the regional level?
You can read more about transport statistics in the Eurostat regional yearbook – 2025 edition, also available as a set of Statistics Explained articles, as well as in the transport section of the interactive publication Regions in Europe and the Statistical Atlas.
The development process for offshore wind projects in the Philippines begins by the developer obtaining a Certificate of Endorsement with the DOE. This is accompanied by other registrations and approvals, such as business registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission and tax registration with the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The developer is also required to post a performance bond, being 2% (or 1% if not using a port administered by the Philippine Ports Authority) of the project cost per MW, multiplied by the offered capacity in MW according to the GEA-5 Terms of Reference.¹⁶
The next stage of the development process is pre-development. The developer must obtain an OWESC from the DOE as well as endorsements or permits from other agencies (including the DENR and National Commission on Indigenous Peoples) to ensure the project is environmentally sound, socially accepted, and technically feasible. Upon receipt of a Certificate of Confirmation of Commerciality from the DOE, the project commences its construction and commissioning phase. At this point, the Wind Energy Operating Contract (“WEOC”) is issued granting legal authority to generate and sell electricity.
The project must receive a further Certificate of Endorsement from the DOE and may enter several other agreements. For example, a Connection Agreement with the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines is required to connect to the grid. The project may also register with WESM via the Philippine Electricity Market Corporation, obtain a Certificate of Compliance and Feed-in Tariff eligibility from the Energy Regulatory Commission (“ERC”), and enter a REPA with the payment agent National Transmission Corporation (“TransCo”) if supplying under a Green Energy Auction Program.
GEA-5 Auction
On 11 June 2025, the DOE officially launched GEA-5 focussed exclusively on fixed-bottom OSW technology with an installation target of 3300MW between 2028-2030.¹⁷ Prior Green Energy Auction rounds did not include OSW, so this marks a major shift signalling the country’s intent to tap into its vast OSW potential. Fixed-bottom offshore wind was chosen due to its established global track record, cost-effectiveness and scalability.
Whilst the DOE acknowledges the future potential of floating offshore wind, the decision to prioritise fixed-bottom technology reflects a strategic effort to build early momentum. Current technical capabilities, regulatory frameworks, and infrastructure readiness make it the most viable pathway for successful deployment at this stage. If successful, GEA-5 is expected to attract significant foreign investment and position the Philippines as a regional leader in OSW.
The allocation framework methodology for GEA-5 incorporates price and non-price criteria, including price competitiveness, project readiness and capacity.¹⁸ In terms of the auction timeline, the DOE is yet to publish the Notice of Auction and the green energy auction reserve price is pending finalisation, so further delays are expected.
Figure 2: Prescribed timeline for GEA-5 (D = Day).¹⁹
Activity
Tentative Timeline
DOE Issuance/Posting of List of Winning Bidders/Notice of Award
D99 + 1 working day
Auction Proper
D68 + 1 working day
Pre-Bid Conference
D49 + 2 working days
Notification to Qualified Bidders on successful registration and to Qualified Suppliers who failed the evaluation
D38 + 1 working day
Last day of Registration
D32 + 3 working days
Start of Registration of Qualified Suppliers
D31 + 1 working day
Publication of Notice of Auction and Terms of Reference
“This recognition highlights Arkema’s ability to leverage material chemistry for sustainability, in partnership with leaders in boating, composites, and recycling. Together, we are building a viable circular model for a more responsible future,” says Pierre Gérard, R&D Expert in Composite Materials at Arkema, who was deeply involved in establishing this alliance.
The alliance will also be a central feature of the 2025 Paris Boat Show from November 26 to December 1 at the Parc des Expositions du Bourget. On Beneteau’s stand in Hall 3, visitors will discover an educational pathway dedicated to circular boatbuilding, in partnership with the five other major players in the alliance. This initiative reflects Beneteau’s commitment, as a global leader in boating, to innovate toward more recyclable boats with a lower environmental footprint.
International stock markets tracked Wall Street gains and U.S. stock futures pointed to a higher open ahead of the Thanksgiving holiday. The higher close in the prior session was broad-based, even as AI chip giant Nvidia’s shares fell amid potential competition in AI semiconductors from Google.
Also in investors’ focus, delayed U.S. economic data that again boosted expectations for a Federal Reserve rate cut next month.
In light of recent media coverage about the resumption of Gemini sailings through Suez / the Red Sea and the timing of such, the Gemini partners Hapag-Lloyd and A.P. Moller – Maersk share the following update:
At the launch of the Gemini Cooperation in February 2025, A.P. Moller – Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd introduced a Cape of Good Hope network due to the on-going disruptions in the Red Sea.
Gemini’s ambition has always been to return to a Suez-based East-West network once security conditions in the region permit. However, as the safety of crew, vessels and cargo remains our top priority, we currently have no specific timing to change the Gemini East-West network to sailing through the Red Sea.
Considering the Gaza ceasefire progress, we closely monitor developments in the region, and we are continuously conducting detailed security assessments. When security conditions warrant it, and in keeping with the Gemini trademark of industry-leading schedule reliability, Hapag-Lloyd and A.P. Moller – Maersk will carefully coordinate with our respective customers and important stakeholders to ensure an orderly transfer to a Suez-based network with minimal disruption to our customer´s supply chains.
We will keep you updated on the Gemini network should any changes occur.
What’s a conversation we’re not having enough when it comes to AI and the future of work?
There is no shortage of headlines and articles on AI and the future of work. But too often, this discourse focuses solely on job losses, coupled with sensational headlines. While technologies continue to evolve rapidly, meaning that we can’t yet drew firm conclusions, it is also true that we need to look at the labour market effects much more carefully. This entails understanding how AI impacts not only the quantity of jobs but also the quality of them and the nature of work, in terms of wages, working conditions and rights more broadly. The larger issue of inequality is also crucial.
2. In your view, what are the current and potential future impacts of automation on developing economies?
Currently, the impact of digitalization and AI in developing economies is less than in advanced economies, primarily due to the digital divide and differences in the structure of economies. While the possible negative effects on jobs are less (but not zero), we also know, as shown by ILO research, that the digital divide prevents developing countries from taking advantage of the benefits from new technologies, such as AI.
But there are two caveats to this view that developing countries are not being affected by AI. First, digital tools and platforms are growing rapidly, even if the use of generative AI is more confined to small part of the population – see the rise of digital payment systems, such as M-PESA in Eastern Africa, and the rapid emergence of digital labour platforms, both location-based and online, which are creating opportunities and challenges in all countries. Second, emerging technologies, such as AI, continue to evolve so we cannot assume that the situation today will hold in the coming months and years. We need to continue to monitor the situation.
Residents use M-pesa services at a local kiosk in Kibera slum, Nairobi, Kenya
3. How do these impacts influence groups in vulnerable situations, such as women, youth, and migrants?
A key lesson from centuries of technological change is that there are both winners and losers as economies and labour markets adjust. ILO research has shown that women are more susceptible to the automation effects of AI due to their overrepresentation in occupations that are most exposed, such as administrative jobs. Recent data on actual labour market trends (as opposed to potential effects) is telling us that we should be worried about how generative AI is impacting young people – evidence is emerging to suggest that there is a more negative effect of AI on young labour market entrants in such countries as the US. At the same time, there are range of use cases that can help certain groups access new learning and employment opportunities. For example, under the PROSPECTS programme, the ILO is supporting young people in remote areas of Kenya through digital skills training and mentoring programmes to access online job opportunities.
4. While we talk about the quantity of jobs impacted by AI, what would you say about the quality of jobs impacted?
As already mentioned, we need to focus on not only implications of AI for job quantity but quality as well, which is where the largest effects are likely to emerge. AI impacts tasks and won’t eliminate most jobs entirely. But these changes can lead to effects on wages, depending on how demand for the occupation shifts, and working conditions due to the impact of AI in the workplace.
We already see the use of algorithmic management tools, which are getting supercharged by AI, for recruitment, allocating tasks, monitoring and evaluating workers. While this has the potential to improve productivity, it poses challenges in terms of workers’ agency and the nature of their jobs. Key is transparency on the use of these tools, matched by dialogue to ensure that new technologies can be beneficial to both the enterprise and their workers.
5. There’s often a regional divide in how AI is deployed and its benefits are distributed. How can we bridge that gap—both nationally and globally?
A digital divide exists both within and between countries due to differences in access to digital infrastructure and skills. The share of the population using the Internet in 2024 reached 93 per cent in high-income countries compared with just 27 per cent of the population in low-income economies. Even in advanced economies, such as in the European Union, access to AI is uneven with higher rates of adoption in richer countries and larger firms. Within countries, access to broadband (optic fibre) Internet and training programmes is more limited in rural areas. In response, greater investments are needed in infrastructure and skilling to ensure that these gaps are reduced. Support is also needed to ensure that there are opportunities for developing economies to build their own AI ecosystems in terms of both development and deployment of new technologies in different languages and adapted to country-specific contexts.
The share of the population using the Internet in 2024 reached 93 per cent in high-income countries compared with just 27 per cent of the population in low-income economies.
6. What kind of policy frameworks do we need to ensure that AI benefits all workers?
From an ILO perspective, the Decent Work Agenda remains key for assessing both the benefits and challenges arising from the development and deployment of AI. In practice, responding to the opportunities and challenges posed by AI will involve applying existing policies and regulations, while adapting and developing new strategies and governance frameworks where needed, in line with international labour standards and through social dialogue (e.g., to address the platform economy).
There are three areas we need to look at: first, address the negative impact of AI through redeployment, social protection and active labour market policies (e.g., employment services); second, enhance digital skilling and upskilling to support access to new technologies, along with measures to assist small businesses to overcome the digital divide and take advantage of opportunities; and third, strengthen governance mechanisms to ensure rights are protected in the workplace (e.g., safeguarding against discriminatory algorithms).
7. If you could deliver just one message to global policymakers about AI and employment, what would it be?
AI is creating both new opportunities and challenges in the world of work and to ensure that the benefits are broadly shared, we need to assess the impact of AI on both the quality and quantity of jobs, and respond through employment policies and other measures, backed by the latest evidence and social dialogue.
Prepared by Maciej Grodzicki, Urtė Kalinauskaitė, Benjamin Klaus, Chloe Larkou, Francesca Lenoci and Allegra Pietsch
Published as part of the Financial Stability Review, November 2025.
The US dollar assets and liabilities of euro area banks arise mainly from their capital market activities. Capital market activities are often characterised by short maturities and require daily marking to market and margining. These features may pose a liquidity risk to banks in the event of abrupt market movements. US dollar funding and hedging instruments provided by banks are also important for euro area corporates and non-bank financial institutions, especially when exchange rates move rapidly. This box presents the business rationale for euro area banks’ US dollar activities and aims to assess the associated financial stability risks.
US dollar activities are concentrated among euro area global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), which intermediate US dollars to other European parties. In contrast to other major currencies, US dollar activities relate almost exclusively to wholesale business.[1] The breakdown of euro area banks’ US dollar assets and liabilities reveals the high weight of capital market activities relative to loans and deposits from the non-financial sector (Chart A, panel a). Other financial assets and liabilities, which include primarily the positive fair value of derivatives, are the largest balance sheet position denominated in US dollars. They are followed by repo borrowing, debt securities funding, holdings of debt securities and deposits taken from banks and other financial institutions.
Banks’ dollar-denominated credit exposures are largely limited to holding high-quality debt securities and lending to the non-financial corporate sector. Euro area banks’ debt securities holdings denominated in US dollars consist mainly of US Treasuries and agency mortgage-backed securities, followed by debt issued by non-US governments and financial institutions. These securities qualify as high-quality liquid assets. Euro area banks’ dollar-denominated lending is estimated to be close to €700 billion at the least (9.2% of the total loan book), with most of this going to non-euro area corporate and non-bank financial clients (Chart A, panel b).[2]
Chart A
Capital markets business dominates in euro area banks’ US dollar activities
a) Dollar-denominated assets and liabilities of 48 euro area significant institutions, by bank type
b) Dollar-denominated securities holdings and bank lending of euro area banks
(Q4 2024, € trillions)
(Q4 2024, percentages)
Source: ECB (supervisory data, SHS, AnaCredit) and ECB calculations. Notes: Panel a: based on annual funding plan reports by 48 banks, including five global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), for which US dollar-denominated liabilities account for over 5% of their total liabilities. The share of these banks in the total assets of significant institutions supervised by the ECB amounts to 56%. The data on repos use the liquidity coverage ratio template and capture only transactions with a residual maturity up to 30 days, while the data on reverse repo lending to financials use the net stable funding ratio template. “Other financial assets/liabilities” mainly includes trading assets and liabilities such as derivatives, equity and fund shares, and repo borrowing with a residual maturity of more than 30 days. “Other banks” includes, among others, euro area subsidiaries of US banking groups. Panel b: covers all euro area significant institutions, meaning numbers are larger than in panel a. Data exclude subsidiaries of non-euro area banks in the euro area and loans held in the foreign subsidiaries of euro area banking groups. The debt of supranational issuers is included in non-US non-euro area sovereign debt. Lending data are based on the AnaCredit dataset and exclude retail loans to households, loans to banks, reverse repo transactions and intragroup exposures. EA stands for euro area. “Non-banks” refers to non-bank financial intermediation entities.
The US dollar activities of euro area banks in capital markets represent a diverse set of financial services to the economy. Euro area banks, especially some of the G-SIBs, are present in US money markets, where they act as intermediaries by sourcing funding from money market funds and lending the proceeds to hedge funds on a secured basis.[3] Euro area investment funds, life insurers and pension funds invest in dollar-denominated assets, despite their euro-denominated obligations to fund-shareholders or policyholders. Euro area banks facilitate these counterparties’ needs to mitigate the resulting currency risk by engaging in FX swaps, effectively receiving US dollars and paying euro to investment funds, insurance corporations and pension funds. Euro area banks partially hedge this currency risk by taking opposite positions with global banks (Chart B, panel a). These US dollar liabilities are not visible on bank balance sheets.[4] Euro area banks also provide currency hedges to euro area exporters and importers, although such hedging trades are on a smaller scale than those associated with euro area financial investors. For instance, as of July 2025, banks are facilitating US dollar payments to non-financial corporations via currency swaps, primarily to stabilise such corporations’ import costs rather than to manage dollar-denominated revenue flows.
While asset-liability mismatch appears to be limited in extent, banks are nonetheless taking liquidity risk due to mismatches between counterparties providing and receiving funding. Some banks mitigate liquidity risks further by running maturity-matched repo books and do not use volatile short-term repos to fund illiquid long-term assets. However, these strategies do not fully eliminate liquidity risk. While banks hold sizeable quantities of high-quality liquid assets, dollar outflows in an extreme scenario could exhaust their capacity to raise cash through repos, FX swaps and the sale of such assets.[5] The value of liquid assets may also decline in these circumstances, exacerbating liquidity pressures.[6] Although net outflows of US dollars could be covered by US dollar liquid assets in the long term, the net outflows are concentrated in the short term. Some banks may require additional funding in US dollars or rely on inflows of US dollars from maturing short-term assets to remain liquid during financial stress (Chart B, panel b). However, collecting these cash inflows would imply that they reduce US dollar funding to counterparties.
Chart B
Euro area banks’ US dollar intermediation activities
a) Euro area banks’ net dollar-denominated FX swap and CIRS positions
b) Cumulative contractual gap between US dollar inflows and outflows to/from euro area banks
(Q2 2025, € billions)
(Q4 2024, percentages of US dollar HQLA)
Source: ECB (EMIR, sector enrichment based on Lenoci and Letizia*, supervisory data) and ECB calculations. Notes: Panel a: foreign exchange (FX) swap and cross-currency interest rate swap (CIRS) positions of euro area banks with other counterparties, netted within maturity bucket. Within the same maturity bucket, euro area banks’ derivatives positions with the same counterparty sector are netted against each other. A positive net position indicates that the euro area banks are committed to receiving US dollars and paying euro with a specific time bucket. “Banks” includes net derivatives positions with banks that are not supervised by the ECB. NFCs stands for non-financial corporations; IFs stands for investment funds, including money market mutual funds; ICPFs stands for insurance corporations and pension funds; OFIs stands for other financial intermediaries. Panel b: the periods denote the residual maturity of the contractual inflows and outflows. The net contractual gap is calculated as the sum of the net contractual outflows (gross inflows less gross outflows) scheduled over a given horizon and presented as a share of dollar-denominated HQLA. G-SIBs stands for global systemically important banks; IWBs stands for investment and wholesale banks; UDIs stands for universal and diversified institutions, which include universal banks and diversified lenders; HQLA stands for high-quality liquid assets. *) See Lenoci, F.D. and Letizia, E., “Classifying Counterparty Sector in EMIR Data”, in Consoli, S., Reforgiato Recupero, D. and Saisana, M. (eds.), Data Science for Economics and Finance, Springer, Cham, 2021.
Maintaining adequate balance sheet capacity is necessary to enable banks to act as shock absorbers. If euro area banks reduce their dollar intermediation, their counterparties could face difficulties funding or hedging dollar-denominated investments and may need to sell such assets. Capital and US dollar liquidity buffers provide the balance sheet space required by banks to offer financial services in US dollars to their counterparties in times of financial stress. Capital headroom could be needed to absorb the increase in capital requirements associated with higher currency volatility and counterparty credit risk. Although liquidity risk may not materialise in banks’ own balance sheets and there is no regulatory requirement for banks to match the currencies of liquid assets to the currencies of liabilities, banks should hold liquid US dollar assets to counterbalance outflows and act as a stabilising intermediary.
Prepared by Paolo Alberto Baudino, Oscar Schwartz Blicke and Maurizio Michael Habib
Published as part of the Financial Stability Review, November 2025.
Hedge funds represent a relatively small segment of the euro area investment fund sector and comprise both AIF and UCITS hedge funds. The total assets of euro area hedge funds stood at around €660 billion in the third quarter of 2025, equivalent to roughly 3% of the investment fund sector’s total assets. In the EU, hedge funds may fall either under the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD)[1] or the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) Directive.[2] AIF hedge funds are usually marketed to wealthy investors and are predominantly held by euro area investment funds. They offer limited liquidity, by allowing redemptions only quarterly or even annually (often with advance notice), for example, and by imposing lock-up periods on initial investments. By contrast, UCITS hedge funds are more accessible to retail investors and other non-bank sectors – with euro area households and insurance corporations each holding around 15% of the shares in such funds. As these funds often allow investors to redeem shares on a high-frequency basis, the sector is more exposed to fund share redemptions during market turmoil. UCITS hedge funds account for about 30% of the overall hedge fund sector in terms of shares issued (Chart A, panel a) as well as total assets.
Chart A
UCITS hedge funds exhibit higher retail participation and use derivatives more intensively than do AIF hedge funds
a) Investor base and shares issued by euro area hedge funds, by fund type
b) Euro area hedge funds’ financial leverage and gross derivatives exposure, by fund type
c) Gross derivatives exposures of euro area UCITS hedge funds and derivative type distribution
(Q3 2025; percentages, € billions)
(Q3 2025; total assets divided by shares issued, derivative gross notional divided by shares issued)
(Q3 2025, derivative gross notional divided by shares issued)
Sources: ECB (EMIR, IVF, SHS), Morningstar Direct[3] and ECB calculations. Notes: the sample of euro area UCITS and AIF hedge funds is derived from the ECB’s investment fund list classification. AIF stands for alternative investment fund. Panel a: the investor base is proxied by information available for traded securities. The latest available information on the investor base refers to Q2 2025. For a discussion of different measures of leverage for hedge funds, see the article entitled “Leveraged investment funds: A framework for assessing risks and designing policies”, Macroprudential Bulletin, Issue 26, ECB, 2025. Panel c: hedge fund strategies follow the Morningstar Direct classification. HFs stands for hedge funds.
As UCITS hedge funds have relatively high derivatives exposure and leverage, they warrant attention from a financial stability perspective. Both UCITS and AIF hedge funds employ a wide range of investment strategies, including leveraged trades, to achieve positive absolute returns. Because of regulatory constraints on borrowings,[4] UCITS hedge funds make less use of financial leverage than AIF hedge funds do, with a total assets/equity ratio of 1.3 for UCITS hedge funds versus 1.7 for AIF hedge funds. However, synthetic leverage through derivatives is more pronounced in UCITS hedge funds, with gross notional derivatives exposure reaching up to 12 times equity for fund categories such as global macro strategies (Chart A, panels b and c).[5] In addition, UCITS hedge funds hold a lower proportion of highly liquid assets (e.g. cash and sovereign bonds) than AIF hedge funds do.[6] This leaves them more vulnerable to liquidity risk from redemption shocks or margin calls. Although some research has been carried out on the performance of UCITS hedge funds, this box sheds light on their liquidity and leverage-related risks, given their importance for financial stability.[7]
Procyclical flows and larger redemptions from leveraged funds in times of stress can lead to asset sales and mounting liquidity pressures during periods of high market volatility. Evidence from a panel of 457 UCITS hedge funds shows that their flows are procyclical, positively correlated with past returns (Chart B, panel a) and in line with the findings for other fund categories.[8] Although the analysis does not indicate that leverage generally amplifies the flow procyclicality of UCITS hedge funds, it does show larger outflows from leveraged UCITS hedge funds in periods of market stress (Chart B, panel b). Since fund share redemptions may force funds to sell assets when markets are under pressure, leveraged funds could be required to close larger positions, thereby amplifying stress.
The use of derivatives by UCITS hedge funds can intensify liquidity pressures via margin calls. Derivatives positions, which can be used for hedging or for leverage, are subject to margin requirements. During periods of elevated price volatility and significantly negative returns, margin calls on these derivatives positions tend to increase (Chart B, panel c), further straining a fund’s liquidity.[9] This exacerbates the challenges faced by leveraged UCITS hedge funds, as they have to manage liquidity to meet both margin calls and redemption requests simultaneously. Interaction between these factors can heighten liquidity strains and contribute to broader market stress underadverse market conditions.[10]
Chart B
Flows into UCITS hedge funds tend to be procyclical, while margin calls may intensify liquidity risk
a) Average fund-level flows into euro area UCITS hedge funds, by lagged return level
b) Average fund-level flows into euro area UCITS hedge funds, by synthetic gross leverage level
c) Average fund-level daily posted variation margin of euro area UCITS hedge funds, by negative return level
(Jan. 2019-Oct. 2025; standardised values, log of derivative gross notional as a percentage of TNA)
(Jan. 2020-Oct. 2025; percentages of TNA, percentages)
Sources: ECB (EMIR), EPFR Global, Morningstar Direct[11] and ECB calculations. Notes: Panel a: the sample is based on funds that have been classified as UCITS hedge funds in the ECB’s investment fund list since 2009, to limit survivorship bias. The analysis is restricted to funds pursuing major hedge fund-like strategies, as classified by Morningstar Direct, and which have substantial representation in the sample. These strategies include global macro, systematic trend, options trading, market neutral and long/short strategies. Fund-level returns are calculated by aggregating the returns for each fund’s share classes, weighted by the total net assets (TNA) of each share class. Fund-level flows and TNA are obtained by aggregating the corresponding values across all the share classes within each fund. Flows are expressed as percentages of TNA and standardised to remove trends from the data. Panel b: stress episodes are defined as months in which the VIX exceeds the 90th percentile of our sample. Synthetic leverage is proxied by the gross notional value of derivatives excluding interest rate and FX contracts, which are extensively used for hedging, as a share of fund-level TNA. Panel c: average posted variation margin (VM) is calculated as the mean of fund-level daily margin amounts posted as percentages of fund TNA.
A robust stress-testing framework for leveraged UCITS hedge funds is essential to ensure their resilience and limit the risks to financial stability in turbulent market conditions. The combination of outflows and margin calls on derivatives positions can intensify liquidity pressures for UCITS hedge funds during periods of stress. This raises concerns about the ability of such funds to manage the challenges and contributes to broader financial instability. These dynamics highlight the need for strengthened risk management and comprehensive stress-testing practices to safeguard financial stability during episodes of market turmoil.
Finally, authorities should be equipped with suitable tools to limit excessive leverage in UCITS hedge funds and mitigate the build-up of risks during periods of market stress. While authorities have tools that enable them to contain excessive leverage in AIFMD-compliant funds, they do not have such tools for UCITS hedgefunds. The Eurosystem suggests introducing discretionary powers that would allow authorities to impose stricter leverage limits on these funds when they pose risks to financial stability.[12] It also recommends that all UCITS hedge funds should be required to report their leverage using the commitment approach.
Young professionals under 35 years are invited to submit essays on innovations in the nuclear fuel supply chain, with winners presenting at an IAEA conference in Vienna in October 2026.
The IAEA is inviting young professionals to submit innovative essays on nuclear fuel supply issues and prospects covering topics from uranium exploration to recycling of spent fuel. Winners will be invited to present their essays at the IAEA International Conference on Fuel Supply Chain for Sustainable Nuclear Power Development in Vienna on 13 to 15 October 2026.
Professionals can submit an essay on one of the following themes:
Meeting growing global demand for uranium resources.
Advancing fuel engineering and production for innovative reactor technologies.
Expanding spent fuel recycling to support a circular economy in the nuclear sector.
The deadline for submission is 10 January 2025. Shortlisted authors must submit a three-minute recorded presentation or video by 1 March 2026.
“We wish to encourage creative thinking about the fuel supply in the context of expanding nuclear power generation, including with advanced and innovative reactor concepts,” said Olena Mykolaichuk, Director of the IAEA Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology Division. We are eager to see participation from women and professionals from developing countries, as well as experts in disciplines such as engineering, law, natural or social sciences who have a focus on the nuclear sector.”
The prospect of significantly increasing nuclear power generation by mid-century poses challenges across the nuclear fuel supply chain. This competition aims to highlight the career opportunities for young professionals in these fields.
Winners will have the opportunity to present their essays and participate in the conference which provides a global forum for fuel supply professionals to explore current topics and innovations. All essay applicants will also be considered for roles in other segments of the Conference programme.
For more details about the competition please click here.
