Category: 1. Pakistan

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan’s security forces carried out an intelligence-based operation in the country’s northwest, the military said on Saturday, killing 17 Pakistani Taliban who had established a presence in the area.

The country’s tribal districts in northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province have been prone to militant violence by members of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella group of insurgent factions.

The TTP, which the Pakistani state refers to as “Fitna al Khwaraj,” a term from Islamic history denoting a violent rebel group, has been blamed for hundreds of attacks in the region.

Islamabad accuses the group’s leadership of operating from Afghanistan with support from India, charges both Kabul and New Delhi deny.

“On night 26/27 September 2025, Security Forces conducted an intelligence based operation in Lakki Marwat District, on reported presence of khwarij belonging to Indian Proxy, Fitna al Khwarij,” the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) said in a statement. “During the conduct of operation, own troops effectively engaged the khwarij location and resultantly, seventeen Indian sponsored khwarij were sent to hell.”

The military said weapons and ammunition were recovered from the fighters, who it added were involved in numerous attacks against security forces, law enforcement agencies and civilians.

A “sanitization operation” was continuing in the area to deal with any of their accomplices, it continued.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif praised the security forces, according to a statement circulated by his office, saying the militants’ “nefarious designs were foiled due to the professionalism and timely action of our forces.”

“The government and security forces are determined to eradicate terrorism completely … the scourge of terrorism will soon be uprooted,” he was quoted as saying.

Lakki Marwat has suffered attacks ranging from drive-by shootings at police checkpoints to major bombings in the past.

While the district does not directly border Afghanistan, it lies within reach of the porous frontier belt where militant groups often operate.

The area is also close to Bannu, where earlier this month militants attacked a paramilitary base with a suicide car bomb, triggering a 12-hour clash that killed six security personnel, six militants, and left 19 others wounded.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur, who is a senior PTI leader, asserted on Saturday that his provincial government did not support any operation — a reference to military action in various parts of the province against militants.

Addressing a PTI rally in Peshawar, he said, “We will not allow any operation and do not support it … Federal government, listen. The KP government does not support operation or displacement.”

Gandapur called on the “federal institutions” to talk to Afghanistan and resolve the issue of terrorism in the country.

“We don’t want war and we will raise our voice against it,” he added.

Gandapur has been shifting positions on the matter.

In July, he said in a heavily-edited video message that the armed for­ces were in the province at the request of the KP government and should be treated as “guests” and with respect.

This came in complete contrast to another video statement issued by him following a PTI parliamentary meeting a day ago, in which he said that innocent civilians were martyred in a military offensive launched against militants in Bajaur district. He added that such operations had a negative impact and eroded trust between people and the forces.

Meanwhile, the PTI remained opposed to military action.

More recently on Tuesday, he said that mortar shelling, drone strikes and using fighter jets against terrorists was the constitutional right of the military and that the provincial government could not stop it.

Gandapur calls for justice

At the rally today, the KP CM also urged the judiciary to serve justice in line with the Constitution. “Deliver justice to Imran Khan, his wife and the people,” Gandapur said.

The CM further stated that PTI’s struggle for ‘Haqeeqi Azadi’ would continue until it achieved success.

Addressing army chief Field Marshal Asim Munir, he said, “It is obligatory on you to play your role and sort out Imran’s issue” just as the PTI founder had played his role during the May conflict with India asked the people to stand with the armed forces.

Earlier the rally, PTI leader Faisal Javed announced that “video messages” from Imran would be played at the rally.

“In a while, Imran Khan will speak to you on this screen, Peshawar,” he said.

Later, a video of an address by Imran was played, but it seemed to be from a previous public gathering.

Party leader Azam Swati also addressed the gathering and vowed to stand tall and “continue to bear cruelty and barbarity” until Imran’s release from jail. He expressed the hope that Imran would soon come out of jail and lead the country towards development, prosperity and peace.

PTI Chairman Barrister Gohar Ali Khan lauded the party’s followers for standing together during the brief war with India in May.

“This is the eighth rally since the elections and Pakistan has changed greatly since February 8,” he said. “In May, despite (Imran) Khan sahib being wrongfully imprisoned and not allowed to see his family, you stood with the rest of Pakistan and defeated our thuggish enemies.”

Gohar added that the PTI lost its mandate in these elections, but said that Imran was confident the courts would restore it. However, he continued that “the 26th Constitutional Amendment killed that hope”.

“Our rally is not a power show. The world is saying that 90 per cent of people are in favour of Khan sahib — 200 million people rise at his call,” the PTI chairman said. “They want to demand one thing: this rally is for us to raise our voices and show our concerns. Injustice in one place means injustice will be everywhere.”

Quoting Imran, Gohar demanded free courts, a strong parliament and democracy.
“It is your duty to hear our voice,” he emphasised, addressing the government. “Do not silence the voice of 90pc of our people; end injustice, end military operations; end these wrongful convictions. We want justice. We have approached the courts for it and will continue to fight for it.”

He closed out his speech with a message from the PTI founder: “I will not compromise or make deals, I will not bend and I will remain in this country. But as long as I am here, I will stand up and live my life and will not let my country bend the knee.”

PTI Information Secretary Sheikh Waqas Akram delivered a fiery speech branding the federal government “thieves and killers” and slamming the Punjab government’s flood relief efforts.

“Today, [Imran] Khan has called you all here … it is his rally. This is a rally for a man who has been stripped of his rights and locked in prison for standing for the right thing and sacrificing for future generations,” Akram said, addressing the crowd.

“He endures every problem, mistreatment and 22-hour isolation, but remains standing in the face of it all.”

The party spokesperson said that if there were true freedom, PTI figures including Shibli Faraz, Omar Ayub, Ahmed Bachar, Aliya Hamza, Ayesha Bhutta, Khadija Shah, Zartaj Gul, Dr Yasmin Rashid and Sanam Javed would not have been “jailed for 10 years”.

“Why did this happen? Because there is no true freedom. This is a government of slaves, thieves and mandate stealers,” Akram declared. “If there were true freedom, what happened to the flood victims at the hands of this shameless government would not have happened.

“Look at what the KP government — Imran Khan’s government — has done: we disbursed billions to flood victims and rehabilitation has started. In Punjab, [Punjab Chief Minister] Maryam Nawaz has not even completed the initial survey. She is a liar, chasing photo-ops.”

Akram impressed on the crowd that “these people are not your leaders”.

“They are thieves and killers; they murdered your vote. Will you endorse these murderers? Will you condemn them?”

PTI Secretary General Salman Akram Raja took to the stage, emphasising that his party will not end its struggle until the “system of oppression” is brought down.

“I was sitting with Imran Khan in Adiala Jail. I asked him what message he has for you all. He said: ‘Tell my nation that I will never bend before hardship. I am in jail because I value every drop of blood my nation sheds’,” Raja said.

“Today, KP is drenched in blood: ours, the innocents and that of our martyrs. Balochistan, Punjab, Sindh, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan are all drenched in blood. Oppression is everywhere.”

Raja paid tribute to martyrs, stating that “their mothers’ tears are our tears”.

“The martyrs of Tirah ask when this system of oppression will end,” he declared, referring to those affected by a recent airstrike in KP’s Tirah area. “I bring a message from Imran Khan: our struggle, our movement, will only end when the oppression does.”

Raja then demanded the release of the PTI founder, as well as other party leaders and activists, who he said were “imprisoned without rights” and given “false punishments by military tribunals”.

PTI stalwart Asad Qaiser said that the people of KP demand only one thing and that is peace.

“We will not allow military operations in our province under any circumstances,” he emphasised. “We are tired of wars; we will not be a part of one.”

Qaiser also demanded that the federal government settle matters with Afghanistan through diplomatic channels and jirgas.

“We in KP and Afghanistan share deep relations, so we want trade and relations so that there is peace and jobs in our province,” he stated. “I am hopeful that Ali Amin Gandapur will convince this ‘Form 47’ federal government to do so.”

The PTI leader and ex-national assembly speaker noted that there needs to be peace in this region.

“We appreciate the Saudi pact, but if this country is going to progress, then it needs to establish trade relations with regional nations.”

Rally arrangements

According to information shared by the PTI on social media, party workers and supporters have reached Peshawar from across the country to participate in the rally.

While television channels did not air it, the PTI employed social media to broadcast the event online.

Earlier, a statement issued by the office Peshawar Chief Capital Police Officer Mian Saeed Ahmed detailed the security and traffic plan ahead of the rally.

The statement read that 1,451 police personnel would be deployed as part of security arrangements and sniper shooters would be stationed on the roofs of the buildings round the rally’s venue.

Meanwhile, 508 traffic personnel would be deployed at different spots under the traffic plan, the statement said.

Several PTI leaders visited the rally’s venue and examined arrangements before the event. They included Imran Khan’s sister Aleema Khan and PTI provincial president Junaid Akbar.

Ahead of the gathering, PTI General Secretary Salman Akram Raja said on Friday that the party’s rally in Peshawar would raise a strong voice across the country against lawlessness, constitutional violations and restrictions on freedom of speech.

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More to follow

Additional input from Zahid Imdad

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan, China, Russia and Iran have urged Afghanistan to take “effective, concrete, and verifiable actions” to dismantle militants groups operating on its soil, according to a joint statement issued after a quadripartite meeting in New York.

Officials of the four countries met on the sidelines of the 80th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) session and reaffirmed their support for Afghanistan as an independent and peaceful state “free from terrorism, war and narcotics,” but underlined the need to prevent militants from using its territory.

Pakistan, China, Russia and Iran have been holding quadripartite consultations on Afghanistan since 2017, which aim to promote reg­ional stability and coordinate efforts to counter militancy, narcotics and extremism. The grouping seeks to facilitate political dialogue and regional economic integration in Afghanistan.

“The four sides expressed deep concern over the security situation related to terrorism in Afghanistan, noting that terrorist groups such as ISIL, Al-Qaeda, the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Jaish Al-Adl, Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and other similar groups in the region including Majeed Brigade, as well as others, based in Afghanistan, continue to pose a serious threat to regional and global security,” the statement said.

“They emphasized that strengthening peace and stability in Afghanistan and countering the threats of terrorism, radicalism, and drug crime emanating from its territory are in line with their common interests in the region.”

There was no immediate response to the statement by Kabul.

The development comes amid a surge in militancy in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan provinces, which border Afghanistan, with a majority of attacks claimed by the TTP and Baloch separatist groups like the BLA. Islamabad has frequently accused Afghanistan of allowing the use of its soil for militant attacks against Pakistan, Kabul denies it.

Meanwhile, the Jaish Al-Adl (Arabic for ‘Army of Justice’), a Baloch militant group operating from the borderlands between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, mainly the Sistan-Baluchestan triangle, has claimed several attacks on Iranian security forces this year.

“The four sides urged the Afghan authorities to take effective, concrete and verifiable actions in fulfilling the international obligations and commitments made by Afghanistan to fight terrorism, and dismantle, and eliminate all terrorist groups, and to prevent recruitment, fundraising and their access to weapons, as well as their collaboration with foreign terrorist fighters,” the quadripartite statement said.

“The four sides further urged the Afghan authorities to dismantle any terrorist training camps or any other terrorist infrastructure on their soil.”

Pakistan, China, Russia and Iran also urged Afghan authorities to create conditions that facilitate the return of Afghan refugees to their homeland, prevent further migration, and take serious measures to ensure returnees’ livelihoods and reintegration into political and social processes to achieve a lasting solution. 

“The four sides expressed appreciation for the regional countries, especially the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan, for hosting millions of Afghan refugees. They urged the international community and donors to provide, adequate, predictable, regular, and sustainable financial support and other necessary assistance, in line with the principle of international responsibility and burden sharing, for time-bound and well-resourced repatriation of refugees back to Afghanistan,” it added.

The new mutual defence treaty inked by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia astounded many. It came just days after the Gulf region was shell-shocked by Israeli strikes on a Hamas compound in Qatar.

The pact comes at an especially volatile time in the wake of both Iranian and Israeli strikes on Doha, uncertainty over the future of Tehran’s nuclear programme, and clashes between India and Pakistan in May.

“Even those accustomed to dramatic developments in the Middle East and South Asia were caught off guard by the announcement,” said Joshua White from the Brookings Institution.

While the agreement follows decades of close military ties between the countries, questions remain unanswered regarding its exact parameters, particularly any potential nuclear dimensions.

“The pact clearly formalises and deepens decades of Saudi-Pakistani security and defence cooperation, building on a landmark 1982 protocol agreement,” said White, which saw a significant deployment of Pakistani troops to Saudi Arabia.

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“There are a large number of Saudi military personnel who have been trained by Pakistanis, and there are Pakistani officers seconded within the Saudi Ministry of Defence,” added Camille Lons, a Gulf expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

According to Lons, the pact likely resulted from lengthy negotiations.

“We must be cautious in linking it directly to recent developments in the region, although the broader analysis that sees it as a response to growing Israeli power in the region and Saudi doubts about American security guarantees remains valid,” she told AFP.

For Syed Ali Zia Jaffery from the Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research at the University of Lahore, “Pakistan will find this agreement as a way to show its growing importance in the security architecture of the Middle East,” while Saudi Arabia, which has long relied on US muscle, “is looking to diversify its sources of security”.

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What About Nukes?

Pakistan is believed to have around 170 nuclear warheads, according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, but how they factor into the deal remains ambiguous.

There has been no official statement from either side about the establishment of a nuclear umbrella.

To date, only two such agreements exist: the US nuclear umbrella covering its European allies and Russia’s protection of Belarus.

Several Saudi and Pakistani voices have hinted at this possibility.

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Saudi Arabia included “conventional and non-conventional means in the treaty text,” a retired Saudi general told AFP, speaking anonymously due to the sensitivity of the topic.

“We made it very clear and written that it includes the Pakistani nuclear weapons,” he added.

Saudi analyst Ali Shihabi, known to be close to the royal court, also told AFP that “nuclear is an integral part of this agreement”.

Regional experts, however, have asserted that the situation is far from clear.

“Pakistan does not have any nuclear umbrella and there is just no evidence to suggest that Pakistan plans on providing one to Saudi Arabia,” said Jaffery.

“Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, policy, posture, strategy, and capabilities are only India-centric.”

Others suggested a lack of clarity on the issue may be intentional.

“It’s impossible to know the details of any potential arrangement in this area,” added Bruno Tertrais from the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris, “because that’s part of deterrence: what’s often referred to as strategic ambiguity.”

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And India?

Saudi Arabia maintains good relations with Delhi, Pakistan’s main rival.

India’s rapidly developing economy relies heavily on petroleum imports, with Saudi Arabia being its third-largest supplier, according to the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

“Would Saudi Arabia get involved in an escalation between Pakistan and India? I don’t think so. That would go completely against the kind of diplomacy Saudi Arabia is trying to pursue — which, like India, is one of multi-alignment,” explained Lons.

The signing of the pact comes just months after Pakistan and India fought an intense four-day conflict — one of the worst crises between the arch rivals in decades.

So how would Saudi Arabia react to renewed hostilities?

“Riyadh’s instinct would be to stay passive, preserving hard-won trade equities with India while honouring its security obligations to Pakistan,” said White.

“That balance will now be harder to sustain.”

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Saudi–Pakistan Strategic Agreement: Indian Expert Imran Khurshid Decodes

The Saudi–Pakistan strategic defence pact signals a high-stakes gamble, intertwining regional rivalries with nuclear risks. Its implications extend beyond Pakistan, demanding careful vigilance and analysis from India and the wider region.

The recent signing of a strategic mutual defence agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on 17 September 2025 marks a significant geopolitical development. While some in India attempt to downplay its importance—viewing it merely as the formalisation of longstanding defence cooperation—such a reading risks underestimating its wider implications.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have indeed shared deep military ties since the Cold War era. Pakistan has historically provided military assistance to Saudi Arabia, often in exchange for financial aid, training, advisory support, and even stationing troops in the kingdom. The new agreement formalises this relationship as a binding commitment, stating that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.”

Notably, Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif confirmed that Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities “will be made available” to Saudi Arabia under the terms of the agreement, heightening both regional security concerns and the risk of undermining the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

At the same time, the agreement introduces uncertainty into Pakistan’s defence posture. Unlike earlier informal arrangements, this pact transforms bilateral cooperation into an institutionalized framework with binding commitments.

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This shift means that in the event of a crisis involving Saudi Arabia—whether with Iran, Yemen’s Houthis, or in broader regional rivalries—Pakistan would be compelled to respond militarily. This is very dangerous for Islamabad, as it has now entered turbulent and risky geopolitical waters, potentially being drawn into conflicts where its own national interests are marginal, while New Delhi must remain alert to the implications for regional stability.

Strategic Diversion and Blood for Dollars

These ties also play into Pakistan’s ideological identity, since the state has consistently justified its existence on religious grounds. By projecting itself as the guardian of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina, the Pakistani establishment strengthens its claim to legitimacy—especially at a time when it faces internal discontent, public anger over the imprisonment of Imran Khan, and a crisis of legitimacy.

Yet, beneath the optics of religious solidarity lies a dangerous reality. Many rational voices in Pakistan already fear the agreement could drag the country into Middle Eastern conflicts, such as Yemen and other areas. Given Pakistan’s proximity to Iran and the region’s volatility, this agreement could destabilize Islamabad more than it strengthens it.

The agreement also shifts Pakistan’s strategic focus away from domestic challenges and its border with India. By diverting resources and attention to foreign theatres, Islamabad risks weakening its internal security, leaving it vulnerable to both insurgency and economic instability.

Pakistan often laments that it lost nearly 90,000 lives during the so-called “War on Terror” because of its alignment with U.S. policies. Yet, once again, it risks entanglement in conflicts not of its making, shedding more blood of its people for others’ wars.

Moreover, if Pakistan becomes militarily involved in Yemen or elsewhere under this pact, it may find itself a direct target of Iran and other geopolitical actors with stakes in the region. It may also expose itself as a more direct target for actors such as Israel, which has both the capability and precedent of projecting influence across the region through intelligence and covert operations.

The Middle East is a highly volatile region and a chessboard of great power and regional rivalries, making it easy for states to become entangled in conflict and difficult for them to extricate themselves. Even greater powers find it challenging to navigate and balance relationships there; for Pakistan, this is especially difficult because it is economically vulnerable, geostrategically dependent on both China and the U.S., and lacks independent agency. Additionally, Pakistan shares a long border with Iran, further complicating its geostrategic calculations.

The security dilemma in international politics illustrates that every defence pact inevitably provokes counter-alliances. These reactions and counter-reactions intensify challenges, elevate expectations, and create new vulnerabilities.

History—from the World Wars to the Cold War—shows that alliances seldom ensure stability; they often exacerbate insecurity. For Pakistan, already struggling with internal insurgency, diverting resources and attention to Middle Eastern conflicts risks leaving domestic challenges unaddressed and further increasing its strategic vulnerabilities.

Moreover, Pakistan’s military hardware—particularly U.S.-supplied F-16s and other key platforms—cannot realistically be deployed against Israel or other U.S. allies without American consent, which Washington would never grant given its close relationship with Israel. One should also remember that Pakistan’s Noor Khan Airbase remains under U.S. surveillance and de facto control.

While Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons and delivery platforms, operational deployment in sensitive scenarios may still face indirect constraints due to geopolitical pressures and existing military agreements. While some might suggest the use of Chinese systems, they are of lower quality, as exposed during Operation Sindoor.

Even China does not fully trust its air defence systems; it primarily seeks to sell them to other countries for profit. For example, China uses Russian-made S-400 air defence systems itself while supplying less capable platforms to other states.

This limits Pakistan’s options and its ability to act independently, as it may also have to seek Chinese permission before utilizing its military platforms—and it remains uncertain whether China would grant such permission.

Even Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, historically justified as a deterrent against India, cannot credibly be extended to Saudi Arabia without violating the global non-proliferation regime and inviting international backlash. Pakistan’s past record—particularly the A.Q. Khan network that transferred sensitive nuclear technology and centrifuge designs to states such as North Korea, Iran, and Libya—already underscores global concerns about its role as a proliferator.

If Islamabad appears to make its nuclear umbrella available to Riyadh, it would revive those anxieties and set a dangerous precedent, encouraging Iran and others to seek similar capabilities, potentially turning again to suppliers such as North Korea or even Russia. Such a development could fuel further proliferation risks, escalate regional rivalries, and inject greater instability into an already volatile Middle East.

There is also a moral cost. Pakistan risks reducing its soldiers to mercenaries—shedding blood in foreign deserts for Saudi dollars. While the elite’s children remain safe in London or Dubai, the common Pakistani soldier and citizen will pay the price, whether in terms of lives, security, or economic hardship.

Saudi Arabia may provide Islamabad with financial, diplomatic, and moral support, including symbolic gestures on Kashmir. However, Riyadh will never put its own troops on the ground against India. The burden of blood will remain Pakistan’s alone.

Historically, Pakistan has acted as a “paid mercenary,” providing military services for money, destroying its relationships with countries, and later complaining about terrorism and its consequences. This pattern risks repeating itself under the new agreement.

No Room for Complacency

For India, this agreement cannot be dismissed as “just formalization.” The language of “mutual defence” and “strategic” carries deep meaning and must be studied carefully in today’s geopolitical context, not merely through the lens of past ties.

India enjoys strong geoeconomic and geostrategic relations with Saudi Arabia. Millions of Indians live and work there, and New Delhi and Riyadh have institutionalised cooperation across multiple domains. Recently, Saudi Arabia has also moderated its stance on Kashmir, especially after India abrogated Article 370; there was no significant hue and cry from these Gulf countries as used to be the case earlier.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia issued a statement clarifying that the pact is “purely defensive and not aimed at any third country.” Nevertheless, India must remain vigilant, as the agreement’s mutual defence commitments could still have implications for India’s strategic environment.

At a minimum, New Delhi should seek clarity from Riyadh on the terms of this agreement and ensure that Saudi commitments to Pakistan do not undermine Indian security. Trusting historic patterns, assuming that Saudi Arabia’s closeness with the U.S. will neutralize the risks, or relying on repeated assurances from Riyadh, is dangerous. In geopolitics, determinism and historicism are illusions; consequences, not intentions, define outcomes.

Conclusion

The Saudi–Pakistani defence agreement reflects Islamabad’s old habit of trading military services for financial relief. Yet, the consequences today are far more dangerous than in the past. By stepping into Middle Eastern rivalries, Pakistan risks antagonising Iran, Israel, and other geopolitical actors. Worse, the implicit nuclear dimension threatens the fragile global non-proliferation order.

For Pakistan, the pact may provide short-term benefits but will likely lead to long-term insecurity. Beyond financial gain, Pakistan may now face long-term consequences from direct involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts, increased internal instability, and reputational risks in the nuclear domain.

The agreement benefits Saudi Arabia more than Pakistan, while exposing Islamabad to immediate and future strategic vulnerabilities. For India, it is not an event to downplay but a development to watch with open eyes, measured analysis, and proactive diplomacy.

Ultimately, this agreement is more a strategic gamble than a stabilizing alliance—one that risks drawing Pakistan into conflicts beyond its capabilities, while further complicating the already turbulent landscape of South Asia and the Middle East.

• Dr. Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Peace Studies (ICPS), New Delhi. He specializes in India-US relations, Indo-Pacific studies, and South Asian security issues.
• VIEWS PERSONAL OF THE AUTHOR
• With Inputs from AFP

At Sost, the last town before you hit Pakistan’s border with China, no containers had passed through the gates for months. Negotiations repeatedly broke down between the government and traders who don’t want to pay taxes to Islamabad. After stopping and starting, their sit-in finally ended on Saturday after the two sides struck a deal, ending paralysis that was costing millions of dollars. Commercial traffic on the Karakoram Highway would return to normal.

I am from Sost, which is why I have been following these updates from Karachi where I now live. The trouble started in July but it seemed as if no television channel was interested in bringing the news to the rest of Pakistan. That is why I am writing this today. As Shabbir Mir, our correspondent, gave the update of the successful negotiations, I was still bothered by the nagging feeling that no one would really care to read that story. This feeling has defined me for a long time.

Residents sitting at KKH near customs terminal Afiyatabad Sost, Gilgit. Sept 21, 2025. Credit: Saleem Rumi

It is hard to introduce myself as someone from Sost because it barely exists in most people’s imagination. When gornament wallay education officials visited my school in the village, it was said they came from shehr or Pakistan. Even villagers downstream, a ten-minute drive away, laugh about my village. “Acha, Sost netta, ooo!” they scoff. Eww, you are from Sost.

Sost felt like a bastard village.

This unsettling sense of my home’s identity started to colour my own. Whenever I look at my CNIC, I feel slightly deranged, as if it is an unreal document, even though I got it from NADRA in 2017.

By that extension, there was always the gravitational pull of Pakistan proper, signalling to us all that leaving the Village, or getting as far away from it, was the only way to be taken seriously. Validation. Becoming. Proper citizenship. A seat at the table. Anything downstream was progress. And so after primary school, my family sent me out of my village to attend secondary school in Gulmit when I was 11. The next stop was Gilgit City or Gílṭh, as we call it.

By the A’ Levels I found myself further downstream in Islamabad. When a shehr wallah there asked where I was from, I said Sost a few times but got blank looks. It was the same with saying Hunza. Gilgit would get some recognition but then it would be commonly followed up with: “Gilgit wallay bohat phadday baaz hotay hain.” The people from Gilgit just like picking fights. There was more luck when I said I came from Northern Areas, but that came at a price. It was taken as pahari ilaqa or the mountains where people were ‘backward’ and ‘uneducated’. Some would call me Khan and others asked, “Gilgiti Pathan hotay hain?” Are people from Gilgit Pathans?

The map shows Sost Dry Port and villages nearby in Tehsil Gojal, District Hunza, as an entry point from China ending at Gwadar Port, Pakistan. Sept 27, 2025

I have always wanted to belong. I don’t want to be an unwanted child.

I moved further downstream to Karachi in 2016 for the aala taleem my parents wanted me to have. In my early semesters at Habib University it felt as if imperialism contained the answers given our history.

Sost was never under British rule, let alone a part of Kashmir. It was a part of Gilgit Agency that the Mirs ruled. Bhutto set my grandparents free of the Miri nizam or system in the early 1970s. This act of liberation instilled a profound debt of patriotism in my generation. As a child I wanted to grow up to protect Siachen, go to Kargil and fight till death. (Who does not know Lalik Jan of the Northern Light Infantry!) Two generations of my family served: one of my forefathers died during service. My grandfather worked as one of the first sets of hawaldars from Sost near the Pakistan-China border.

The feeling of unbelonging finally found its resolution when I came across Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities and Nosheen Ali’s Delusional States: Feeling Rule and Development in Pakistan’s Northern Frontier. Her argument that the Northern Areas did matter, but its people did not, helped explain my feeling lost. I understood why people around me, in Karachi, did not seem to clock that people from all around Gílṭh had been protesting for 68 days in Sost.

A dry port, an open door

Sost Dry Port is the door for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor trade between the two countries. Cargo via Kashgar in China heads through Sost to make its way to Pakistani cities. These containers are mostly filled with toys, PCs, TVs, kettles, solar panels, medicines, crockery.

Having a dry port makes processing easier, especially since the Customs formalities are all digital. Additionally, cross-border trade benefits the locals because there are no factories here and few large private employers. Trading with China meant grocery stories were stocked and people had livelihood.

Archival image of Sost Dry Port in early days, Hussainabad Sost, Gilgit 2007. Credit: Pamir Times

At the dry port, once a China consignment’s documents are electronically processed, a Customs inspector checks the shipment. Duties are paid and the goods are transferred onto Pakistani trucks so they can be transported to Rawalpindi, from where they fan out nationwide.

I spoke to a trader on the Pakistan-China route, Farhat Ullah Baig, who once worked with the FBR. He said that the Sost dry port has done well, earning nearly Rs9.5 billion in 2024’s financial year.

Work on Sost Dry Port started in 1999 by setting up the community-owned Silk Route Dry Port Trust whose shareholders were local landowners. The Trust secured a 99-year lease on 201 kanal of land, and Sost was declared a legal customs station in 2001. The operational company, Sost Dry Port Pvt. Ltd., was formed in 2002, leading to a joint venture with the Chinese SinoTrans.

For us, 2005 was a year of promise as the port opened and changed the perception of my village. Overnight, in the eyes of other villagers, “Sostic” were now businessmen. I could finally brag about my village as it had given land so we could trade with China.

Evolution of Sost Dry Port over years. Sept 27, 2025

The trouble started in July as the Federal Bureau of Revenue was continuing to ignore a GB court ruling to insist local traders pay sales tax on goods they imported from China.

A trade union formed two years ago called the Tajir Ittehad Action Committee has been organising the protests after attempts to talk to the state, federal, and GB governments failed. The union then reached out to influential groups across the region leading to the creation of the GB Supreme Council. It brings together the Hunza, Nagar, and Gilgit-Ghizer chambers of commerce, religious groups such as the Ahle Sunnat, Anjuman-e-Imamiya, and Ismaili institutions. Thus, the businessmen are supported by religious groups, political parties, and business chambers across Gilgit-Baltistan.

Shipments at Sost Dry Port from China. Sept 25, 2025. Credit: Ibrar Khan

The heart of the fight is our unusual constitutional status which dictates people’s daily lives and trade in upper Gojal, Hunza, Gilgit.

The traders argue that since GB is not part of Pakistan constitutionally, Islamabad or the federal government has no right to tax them. Gilgit-Baltistan’s ambiguous constitutional status dates back to its independence from the Dogra Raj on November 1, 1947.

“Gilgit-Baltistan is not mentioned in Article 1 of the Constitution, and its relationship with Pakistan is governed by Article 257, which links its status to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute,” explained local political leader, Rehan Shah of the PML-N. “Until that is settled, imposing federal taxes here is unlawful.”

The Karachi Agreement of 1949 transferred administrative control to Pakistan but did not integrate the region into the Pakistani state. The Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order of 2009 granted limited autonomy but kept financial control under the federal Ministry of Kashmir Affairs.

This history fuels the argument that federal taxation lacks legal legitimacy here. “If we are not part of Pakistan constitutionally, how can Pakistan tax us?” Asif Sakhi, the vice chairman of the Awami Workers Party, told me over the phone.

Chinese Traders seen among locals at Sost sit-ins. Sept 21, 2025. Credit: Saleem Rumi

The deadlock reached Islamabad’s ears, with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif even acknowledging there was a problem. It didn’t help that the sit-in at the CPEC gate started to affect even military containers at the Khunjerab border. In August they were teargassed by law-enforcement.

The protesters had wanted all containers released. About 1,200 of them were stuck at the dry port because of the tax hikes from the FBR. Nine hundred were subsequently cleared but 300 filled with essential goods such as food, clothing, and construction materials were stuck until the talks worked out, according to a local political leader, Rehan Shah of the PML-N.

Chinese Containers stuck at Sost Customs Interchange carrying heavy macheneries and supplies. Sept 21, 2025. Credit: Saleem Rumi

The men want all of GB to be declared a tax-free zone and SRO 1193 to be implemented to declare Babusar, Shandur, and Thakot as custom entry check posts. The GB Ministry of Trade and Industry should regulate trade, and not the FBR, they add. “Items from Xinjiang province of China, which is only 80km away, are cheaper in Lahore than they are here,” said Shah. “This is because of the taxes. Our traders are being crushed, and our people are suffering.”

A reasonable portion of the Sost revenue should be spent on border communities who need roads, electricity, hospitals, and schools in the Gojal subdivision. And finally, and most crucially, for long-term protection, an autonomous assembly and judiciary, and protection under the State Subject Rule should prevent non-locals from taking control of local lands and businesses.

Tear gas shells collected by protesters used by law enforcement agencies, Sost Dry Port. August 2025. Credit: Saleem Rumi

For now, the talks have seemed successful and these demands will be met. Ishfaq Ahmed, the president of the GB chambers of commerce and industries, called today, a “historic day”.

According to the deal, Sales Tax, Income Tax, and Federal Excise Duty will not be collected on imported goods if they are for use within GB. These importing companies must be owned by GB residents.

The FBR has a month to draw up the paperwork, put the details on its website and the GB government will appoint a focal body to manage all this. The traders said that if the FBR drags its feet, they will not hesitate to protest again.

And so, one of the longest running protests in GB’s recent history, finally was heard. And I could publish this news, so you could read it. My hope is to continue reporting on Gilgit Baltistan in the days to come and to come bearing good news each time.

Read more: The ruling Mir of G-B’s Nagar district