Category: 2. World

Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, perhaps, agreed to disagree at their summit in Alaska. Their rubbing of shoulders in pursuit of a permanent peace over Ukraine was, however, an arduous task to attain in a given timeframe. But the fact that they exhibited personal chemistry to overcome cynicism and kept the doors open for further talks is a milestone achievement. The subsequent willingness from Kiev to join a trilateral get-together with arch-foe, Russia, and the US indicates that proper tactical signaling has flown down the warzones in the heartland of Europe. This euphoria is, thus, likely to see some sort of an agreement in weeks to come.

The sound-bites of confidence from both the heads of state, after almost three hours of one-on-one parleys, also hinted at a broad-based consensus to reflect on issues of peace and security beyond Ukraine, and to set in a new-normal at times when the world is sliding into a power struggle of multilateralism. The prelude to Alaska also witnessed some bizarreness from Washington as it tried to flag the tariffs issue with India as a conjunction to the outcome of talks. That was quite unbecoming of American leadership, and was nothing but a ploy to air its discomfort over the ongoing trade war with emerging powers in the East.

Trump, nonetheless, was more forthcoming as he ensured his guest that he means business. The red carpet welcome, after months of bickering over the media, simply reflected the essence of being rational; and Putin, likewise, reciprocated by avoiding any hiccups. The summit has sent shivers down the spine for European leaders who are eager to know at what cost a ‘deal’ is going to be stuck. The critical demands from Moscow are neutrality of Ukraine, Kiev’s distancing from NATO and return of Russian-speaking oblast territories. Washington has little to maneuver that reality as the Kremlin sits pretty comfortable in terms of strategic strength, and is winning the duel with Ukraine. Thus, the phrase from the huddle that “there is no deal until there is a deal” will keep everyone on tenterhooks.

WHAT RUSSIa cannot get by fighting it is demanding to be given on a plate through the pressure that Donald Trump can put on Ukraine and on America’s European allies. At the top of Vladimir Putin’s shopping-list is the western part of Donetsk province, which is still firmly in Ukrainian hands. But it is not just the symbolism that is important to him. The real prize is to force Ukraine to abandon its strategically critical “fortress belt”, a 30-mile (50km) line that comprises four cities and several towns, which stands in the way not only of Russia’s goal of gaining the whole of Donbas, but also of its ability to threaten other regions.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Donald Trump have started their talks with European leaders at the White House.

They have met Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer, France’s Emmanuel Macron, Italy’s Giorgia Meloni, Germany’s Friedrich Merz, Finland’s Alexander Stubb, as well as NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, for a multilateral talk in the State Dining Room.

Mr Trump said Vladimir Putin “agreed that Russia would accept security guarantees for Ukraine”. He added: “I think that the European nations are going to take a lot of the burden. We’re going to help them, and we’re going to make it very secure.”

Follow the latest: Trump vows to stop war

The US president said one point on the agenda for the leaders to discuss in Washington tonight was “who would do what”.

The mention of US involvement in security guarantees was welcomed by the European leaders, with Ms Von der Leyen saying it was “good to hear” the nations were working on “Article Five-like security guarantees”.

NATO’s Article Five is the principle that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all of them.

“When we speak about security guarantees, we speak about the whole security of the European continent,” French President Emmanuel Macron said.

He added that one guarantee he would want to come out of any deals is that Ukraine should be able to have a “credible” army for “the years and decades to come”

Mr Zelensky and Mr Trump previously met in the Oval Office, where Mr Trump already said that there would be some form of security guarantees for Ukraine, which would include the US being involved in providing them.

But the US president did not say whether any security guarantees would involve US troops. He later added that the US will provide “very good protection” for Ukraine.

Trilateral meeting possible

The US president said that “if everything works out well today”, there will be a trilateral meeting between himself, Mr Putin and Mr Zelenskyy. The latter said he was ready for such a meeting.

At the end of the news conference in the Oval Office, Mr Trump said he would have a call with Mr Putin “right after” the White House meetings.

The talks with Mr Zelenskyy and European leaders come just days after Mr Trump’s Alaska summit with Mr Putin.

At the summit, Mr Putin has reportedly made demands to take control of the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine as a condition for ending the war.

In exchange, Russia would give up other Ukrainian territories held by its troops, according to several news reports citing sources close to the matter.

Russian troops currently occupy large parts of the two regions and, in September 2022, Moscow announced it was officially annexing them, alongside the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions, in a move rejected and condemned as illegal by the West.

Read more: Putin’s demands would be bitter blow to Ukraine

Mr Trump is said to be planning to urge Mr Zelenskyy to agree to the conditions as part of a peace deal to end the war – despite the Ukrainian president previously ruling out handing any territory to Moscow.

“We also need to discuss the possible exchanges of territory,” the US president said ahead of the multi-lateral talks with Mr Zelenskyy and European leaders.

He said such exchanges would need to take “into consideration the current line of contact”.

He added: “That means the war zone, the war lines that are now, pretty obvious, very sad, actually, to look at them and negotiating positions.”

Infamous Oval Office clash

Mr Zelenskyy and Mr Trump shook hands upon the Ukrainian president’s arrival at the White House.

The greeting was friendly, with Mr Trump putting his arm around Mr Zelenskyy’s shoulder for a brief moment as both smiled.

Later in the Oval Office, both leaders were all smiles – a clear contrast to Mr Zelenskyy’s previous White House visit, which descended into chaos when vice-president JD Vance berated Ukraine’s leader for being insufficiently grateful for US help – in front of the media.

He completed his ambush of Mr Zelenskyy by mocking him for not wearing a suit, with Mr Trump adding that the Ukrainian did not “have the cards right now with us”.

Read more:
Why is Zelenskyy bringing a posse of European leaders to talks?
Analysis: Meeting will be no repeat of Oval Office meltdown

The disastrous meeting ended with Mr Zelenskyy prematurely leaving the White House. He later said the bust-up was “not good for both sides”.

This time, Mr Zelenskyy appeared to set the tone by arriving at the White House dressed in a smart black collared shirt and black jacket with lapels.

Sky News’ US correspondent Mark Stone said he believes this “will be seen as a really important moment. We have learnt with Donald Trump that the trivial matters as much as the detail”.

A pivot point

Sky News’ deputy political editor Sam Coates said that there would have been an “almighty sigh of relief” among the European leaders who watched the Oval Office news conference.

“I actually think what we have just witnessed was a pivot point, potentially, in this war. Not only did you have Volodymyr Zelenskyy turning up with a different tone and a different approach […] but there was important substance in the room,” he said.

He added that the language around security would be why “this will be remembered as a significant day”.

On July 31, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a 25 percent “reciprocal” tariff on Indian imports, effective August 7, aimed at forcing New Delhi to lower its barriers to trade for American goods. Trump subsequently signed an executive order imposing an additional 25 percent tariff on imports from India, beginning August 27, for its continued purchases of Russian oil. However, after the last week’s summit meeting between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, it is unclear whether this second tariff will still go into effect in late August. If it does, the total tariff on India would be the steepest rate applied to a U.S. trading partner, thus locking the United States and India in their most serious trade dispute in decades.

The Indian government has decried the tariffs, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has pledged to protect his domestic producers no matter the cost. Nevertheless, both sides have kept diplomatic channels open for discussion of a possible deal. CFR turned to Distinguished Fellow Kenneth I. Juster—who served as ambassador to India during the first Trump administration—to better understand the nuances behind the trade dispute, the response in India, and the pathways that remain to a resolution.

The Trump administration recently raised tariffs on Indian imports to 25 percent and, possibly, to 50 percent. What is the strategy behind the levy, and why has the White House placed its highest tariff level on a strategic partner?

Trump tends to approach issues with other countries primarily with a bilateral focus and largely in the context of a particular set of concerns. He also believes deeply in the concept of reciprocity. From the president’s perspective, the economic relationship between the United States and India has been out of balance for many years. He is concerned about India’s high barriers to trade and the significant U.S. trade deficit with India. The administration’s 25 percent reciprocal tariff on Indian imports is designed to put pressure on India to open the market further opening measures and agree to a trade deal.  

The White House has also threatened to impose an additional 25 percent tariff beginning August 27 if India does not eliminate its sizable imports of Russian oil. In this case, the president’s concern is that payments for the large volume of Indian oil imports provide critical financial support for Russia’s war against Ukraine and the killing of many innocent civilians. Trump’s objective, if he moves forward with this second tariff, is to indirectly pressure Putin to agree to a plan to end the war by cutting off some of Russia’s financial resources. Trump could also be trying to incentivize Modi to appeal directly to Putin in this regard. However, following Trump’s meeting with Putin, there are reports that he could suspend the implementation of this additional tariff. Of course, this situation could change depending on Trump’s assessment of progress in the Russia-Ukraine talks.

Ultimately, the high tariff rates on India appear to me to be part of a negotiation. This is a similar tactic to what the president has used in other deals, including the trade agreements with Japan and the European Union. Nonetheless, Trump’s rhetoric and public threats could well make it more difficult domestically for Modi to take the desired measures.

I do not believe that Trump approaches these trade issues as part of a broader Indo-Pacific strategy, or as inconsistent with U.S. and Indian joint strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. It would therefore be a mistake—and certainly premature—for the government of India to view these tariffs as fundamentally undercutting the strategic partnership that the two countries have developed over the last twenty-five years. I believe the president still has a strong interest in the U.S.-India partnership and enjoys his good relationship with Modi. But he also favors the use of tariffs to try to rebalance the economic relationship and, if he imposes the additional tariff, to help close another deal—one between Russia and Ukraine—for an end to hostilities.

What has the reaction been from the Indian side? What position does this put Modi in at home politically and economically?

The reaction in India has been multifaceted. Initially, because the government of India felt the parties were close to announcing a trade deal, the reaction was one of surprise that there were additional issues to address. When the level of the rhetoric from the White House increased by labeling India’s tariffs “obnoxious” and calling the Indian economy “dead,” there was a sense of indignation among Indian commentators. This was exacerbated by the president’s repeated statement that he had brokered a ceasefire between India and Pakistan, which the Indians have publicly disputed (thereby irritating Trump in the process).

More recently, when the president announced the threatened imposition of a 25 percent additional tariff on August 27, India’s Ministry of External Affairs called this action “unfair, unjustified, and unreasonable,” and asserted that India “will take all necessary steps to protect its national interests.” Modi also vowed not to compromise the welfare of India’s farmers, dairy sector, or fishermen, and stated that he is personally ready “to pay a heavy price for it.” Regrettably, respected voices in India are now questioning the value of their strategic partnership with the United States.

The United States, however, is India’s largest and most important trading partner. Almost 20 percent of India’s total merchandise exports go to the United States. Even though the reciprocal tariff exempts some key sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, electronics, and energy—which account for approximately 40 percent of India’s total merchandise exports to the United States—the detrimental impact of the tariff will still be significant, especially in sectors such as textiles, gems and jewelry, and auto parts.

Given the vibrant political discourse in India, Modi needed to respond publicly and firmly to the new tariffs. But he should also be careful not to paint himself into a corner and to remain open to discussing ways to resolve the current trade dispute. I understand that the two leaders are trying to arrange a meeting in the United States in late September, when both plan to attend the UN General Assembly.

U.S.-India relations have progressed a long way over the past two-and-a-half decades. How do these tariffs affect the U.S.-India relationship and their respective relationships with China?

The steady progress in U.S.-India relations over the past twenty-five years, through changes in government on both sides and across political parties, has been extraordinary. This includes Trump’s first term, when he and Modi developed a warm friendship. However, the economic component of the bilateral relationship has always underperformed relative to its potential.

While there have been trade disputes in the past between the United States and India, this one is more acute though still solvable. Despite the initial rhetorical flourish by both sides, Washington and New Delhi are keeping open lines of communication and, hopefully, beginning to discuss constructive ways to close a trade deal. Ultimately, the planned meeting in September between Trump and Modi is probably needed to resolve outstanding issues and get the relationship back on track.

Continuation of this trade dispute would inevitably have a negative impact on certain sectors of India’s economy, as the tariffs affect over 55 percent of Indian shipments to the United States. For example, in the textile and apparel sector, India competes with Vietnam and Bangladesh, which each have a lower reciprocal tariff rate. If American companies shift their sourcing away from India and toward these other countries, the damage to India in terms of lost business and jobs would be significant. In the estimation of some experts, the loss of export trade could lower India’s domestic growth by approximately 0.5 percent or more, depending on how long the high tariffs last. 

The tariffs will also impose costs on U.S. companies and consumers. To the degree that U.S. companies incorporate Indian parts or components into their products, the cost of these inputs will increase (or substitute inputs will need to be found where possible). And U.S. consumers of Indian products will have higher costs and less choice in sectors such as textiles, gems and jewelry, auto parts, and certain foodstuffs. The impact in both countries will depend on a combination of factors, including product differentiation, demand, quality, and contractual arrangements. 

Beyond these economic issues, the failure to conclude a deal could cause spillover collateral damage to other aspects of the bilateral relationship, including in defense and technology cooperation. The weakening of the U.S.-India relationship would inevitably be of strategic benefit to China—and that is not in the interest of either the United States or India. Both Washington and New Delhi should recognize that their bilateral relationship is more significant and impactful than any arrangement either of them can work out with China, which remains a strategic challenge for both countries.

Both sides have emphasized their desire to make a deal in the past. What is their best path to progress from this moment of trade tension?

The United States and India need to address two issues: The 25 percent reciprocal tariff related to a trade agreement and the possible additional 25 percent tariff related to India’s oil imports from Russia. 

Regarding the potential tariff relating to Russian oil imports, India’s initial position seems to be to wait and see what the impact will be of the talks between Trump and Putin. While an early resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict would eliminate any tariff on Russian oil imports, this protracted conflict is unlikely to be settled soon. Accordingly, while it would probably be impractical for the Indians to terminate all oil imports from Russia, they could wish to quietly lower their level of Russian oil imports and substitute them with more energy imports from the United States. Some reports indicate that this process could already be starting. If so, that could enable New Delhi to request Washington to delay any implementation of the threatened tariff. And if Trump and Modi can resolve outstanding trade issues when they meet in late September, perhaps the United States will agree to drop the extra 25 percent tariff altogether, even if the Russia-Ukraine conflict has not been resolved.

Regarding the 25 percent reciprocal tariff, Trump’s imposition of this is, in my mind, a negotiating tactic rather than a desire to jettison the U.S.-India strategic partnership. Under these circumstances, New Delhi should avoid the temptation to impose retaliatory tariffs on U.S. imports, which would likely be counterproductive. Fortunately, I see no evidence that India is planning to take such action. However exasperated the Indian government could be by recent events, it should try to be as creative as possible in presenting further ideas for discussion with its U.S. counterparts. 

Perhaps the Indians can carefully review other U.S. trade deals to see if there are elements that they could borrow to enhance what they have already put on table. This could include pledges of further investment by Indian companies in the United States, the allowance of duty-free access for certain agricultural items such as cotton and blueberries, and the acceptance of some other items under limited quotas. I also recall during Trump’s first term that the two countries had outlined a proposal for limited U.S. dairy imports. Perhaps that could be resurrected. 

Based on my experience, Modi is an extremely skillful interlocutor and is well suited to a high-stakes meeting with Trump. The prime minister would likely want to emphasize the strategic importance of the bilateral relationship and his appreciation for the good rapport between the two leaders over time. While Modi should be prepared to provide ideas on how to sweeten India’s offers on trade, procurements, and investments, he could also reference his own constraints as the head of a democratic government and the areas where he will need some U.S. understanding and flexibility. 

Hopefully, the two leaders can then reach an agreement, with a final reciprocal tariff rate conceivably at 15 percent but in no event greater than 20 percent. Such a resolution would also pave the way for a visit by Trump to New Delhi later in the year for the Quad summit.

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Attorney Advertising. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

If there was a sign that Volodymyr Zelenskyy wasn’t going to be immediately voted off the island of the Donald Trump diplomacy show, it came early on when a familiar voice commended his choice of attire.

“President Zelensky, you look fabulous in that suit,” said Brian Glenn, a pro-Trump pundit and member of the White House press corps, who had attacked him for wearing military fatigues during the infamous Oval Office meeting in February. “I said the same thing,” Trump added.

“You are in the same suit,” Zelenskyy shot back, earning smiles and laughter from the room including the US president. “I changed, you did not.”

Thus did Zelenskyy survive his first media appearance at the White House with Trump on Monday as the US president focused less on belittling the leader of a wartime ally than boasting – and in many cases exaggerating – his exploits as a peacemaker in world conflicts.

Zelenskyy, dressed reluctantly in a black military-style suit to appease sticklers for protocol in the White House, largely sat by quietly as Trump claimed to have hammered out peace deals in six wars including one the veteran real estate developer said had taken place in the “Republic of the Condo”.

From Trump there was hyperbole about his ability to broker peace deals, digressions to internal US political battles over mail-in ballots, nebulous declarations about how he would end the conflict and evasions over how he would do that without negotiating a ceasefire.

But there were no explosions – which meant for Zelenskyy it probably went as well as it could have.

Luckily, Zelenskyy had some help, as he was joined by the UK’s Keir Starmer and the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Finland and the European Union in order to keep the discussion on track and to prevent a similar meltdown as took place in February.

It was billed as a European summit at the White House on Monday, but it might as well have been an intervention.

The European leaders were all smiles as they arrived at the White House on Monday afternoon, but they were there to steer Trump away from being sweet-talked by Vladimir Putin into a bad deal on Ukraine and Europe.

Before Trump rolled out the red carpet (literally) for Vladimir Putin in Alaska last week, he said that he would know within two minutes of meeting the Kremlin leader whether it would be possible or not to negotiate with him.

But within two minutes of meeting Zelenskyy, Trump sent a message when he was asked early in a press conference whether Russia or Ukraine “had the better cards”.

“I don’t want to say that,” said Trump, who in February directly told Zelenskyy that he “didn’t have the cards to negotiate”.

Then, he went back and played the classics: “Look, this isn’t my war. This is Joe Biden’s war.”

The Ukrainian leader’s arrival at the White House on Monday had potentially threatened the kind of political fireworks – or some could say depth charges – that scuttled the Ukrainian leader’s last visit to Washington in February.

Then Trump and vice-president JD Vance teamed up for a brutal takedown of Zelenskyy during which Trump told him that he was “playing with world war III”.

But on Monday, Zelenskyy found a far more hospitable welcome from both Trump and Vance, and he kicked off the meeting with some high-level flattery, thanking Trump profusely for his efforts to end the conflict and praising Melania Trump for sending a letter to Putin about abducted Ukrainian children.

There was little detail about the peace deal that Trump wanted to hammer out, except for the fact that he wanted to skip past a ceasefire – too difficult to actually negotiate – and go straight for a peace deal.

And yet it appeared that all – or at least most – sides were keen to smooth over their differences in order to prevent Ukraine as being seen as the main obstruction to peace and of throwing the ball back to Putin.

The EU’s most substantive pushback (in public at least) came as the leaders all sat around a table and Germany’s Friedrich Merz and France’s Emmanuel Macron both called for a ceasefire before talks over territory or a peace deal moved forward.

Trump didn’t appear to take umbrage although he had ruled out a ceasefire earlier – and doubled down after Merz again called for a halt in the fighting.

But the most white-knuckle moment of the introductory remarks came as Zelenskyy began to delve into detail on Ukraine’s priorities for ending the war, all good points that Trump appeared to have little interest in discussing in depth.

As the minutes ticked by, Macron’s face grew dour. Trump tried to break in but Zelenskyy continued to speak.

Then suddenly, as though coming to, the Ukrainian leader straightened up in his seat and quickly wrapped up his remarks. Mark Rutte, the secretary general of Nato, quickly jumped in and, as soon as possible, said the main words that Trump wanted to hear: “Thank you.”

It’s now a week since Prime Minister Christopher Luxon announced his government had begun to formally consider New Zealand’s position on the recognition of a Palestinian state.

That leaves three weeks until the United Nations General Assembly convenes on September 9, where it is expected several key allies will change position and recognise Palestinian statehood.

Already in a minority of UN member states which don’t recognise a Palestinian state, New Zealand risks becoming more of an outlier if and when Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom make good on their recent pledges.

Luxon has said the decision is “complex”, but opposition parties certainly don’t see it that way. Labour leader Chris Hipkins says it’s “the right thing to do”, and Greens co-leader Chloë Swarbrick has called on government MPs to “grow a spine” (for which she was controversially ejected from the debating chamber).

Former Labour prime minister Helen Clark has also criticised the government for trailing behind its allies, and for appearing to put trade relations with the United States ahead of taking a moral stand over Israel’s actions in Gaza.

Certainly, those critics – including the many around the country who marched during the weekend – are correct in implying New Zealand has missed several opportunities to show independent leadership on the issue.

The distraction factor

While it has been open to New Zealand to recognise it as a state since Palestine declared its independence in 1988, there was an opportunity available in May last year when the Irish, Spanish and Norwegian governments took the step.

That month, New Zealand also joined 142 other states calling on the Security Council to admit Palestine as a full member of the UN. But in a subsequent statement, New Zealand said its vote should not be implied as recognising Palestinian statehood, a position I called “a kind of muddled, awkward fence-sitting”.

It is still not too late, however, for New Zealand to take a lead. In particular, the government could make a more straightforward statement on Palestinian statehood than its close allies.

The statements from Australia, Canada and the UK are filled with caveats, conditions and contingencies. None are straightforward expressions of solidarity with the Palestinian right of self-determination under international law.

As such, they present political and legal problems New Zealand could avoid.

Politically, this late wave of recognition by other countries risks becoming a distraction from the immediate starvation crisis in Gaza. As the Israeli journalist Gideon Levy and UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese have noted, these considered and careful diplomatic responses distract from the brutal truth on the ground.

This was also Chloë Swarbrick’s point during the snap debate in parliament last week. Her private members bill, she noted, offers a more concrete alternative, by imposing sanctions and a trade embargo on Israel. (At present, it seems unlikely the government would support this.)

Beyond traditional allies

Legally, the proposed recognitions of statehood are far from ideal because they place conditions on that recognition, including how a Palestinian state should be governed.

The UK has made recognition conditional on Israel not agreeing to a ceasefire and continuing to block humanitarian aid into Gaza. That is extremely problematic, given recognition could presumably be withdrawn if Israel agreed to those demands.

Such statements are not exercises in genuine solidarity with Palestinian self-determination, which is defined in UN Resolution 1514 (1960) as the right of peoples “to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”.

Having taken more time to consider its position, New Zealand could now articulate a more genuine statement of recognition that fulfils the legal obligation to respect and promote self-determination under international law.

A starting point would be to look beyond the small group of “traditional allies” to countries such as Ireland that have already formally recognised the State of Palestine. Importantly, Ireland acknowledged Palestinian “peaceful self-determination” (along with Israel’s), but did not express any other conditions or caveats.

New Zealand could also show leadership by joining with that wider group of allies to shape the coming General Assembly debate. The aim would be to shift the language from conditional recognition of Palestine toward a politically and legally more tenable position.

That would also sit comfortably with the country’s track record in other areas of international diplomacy – most notably the campaign to abolish nuclear weapons, where New Zealand has also taken a different approach to its traditional allies.

The State Department has revoked more than 6,000 international student visas because of violations of US law and overstays, the department told the BBC.

The agency said the “vast majority” of the violations were assault, driving under the influence (DUI), burglary and “support for terrorism”.

The move comes as the Trump administration continues its crackdown on immigration and international students.

While the State Department did not specify what they meant by “support for terrorism”, the Trump administration has targeted some students who have protested in support of Palestine, arguing they had expressed antisemitic behaviour.

Of the 6,000 student visas that were revoked, the State Department said about 4,000 of those were revoked because visitors broke the law.

Another 200-300 visas were also revoked for “terrorism done under INA 3B”, the State Department said, referring to code that defines “terrorist activity” broadly as acts that endanger human life or violate US law.

Earlier this year, the Trump administration paused scheduling visa appointments for international students. In June, when they restarted appointments, they announced they would ask all applicants to make their social media accounts public for enhanced screening.

They said they would search for “any indications of hostility toward the citizens, culture, government, institutions, or founding principles of the United States”.

State Department officers were also instructed to screen for those “who advocate for, aid, or support designated foreign terrorists and other threats to national security; or who perpetrate unlawful anti-Semitic harassment or violence”.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio told lawmakers in May that he estimated “thousands” of student visas had been rescinded since January.

“I don’t know the latest count, but we probably have more to do,” Rubio told US lawmakers on 20 May. “We’re going to continue to revoke the visas of people who are here as guests and are disrupting our higher education facilities.”

Democrats have pushed back against the Trump administration’s effort to revoke student visas, describing it is an attack on due process.

More than 1.1 million international students from over 210 countries were enrolled in US colleges in the 2023-24 school year, according to Open Doors, an organisation that collects data on foreign students.