The increasing use of TikTok trends and social media terms in everyday conversation has led Cambridge Dictionary to include “skibidi,” “delulu” and “tradwife” in the 6,000 new words it has added to its online edition over the past year.
To those of us who spend less time online, some of the phrases the UK-based dictionary uses to show how these new words fit into sentences may look like gibberish. How exactly do you describe the precise meaning of “that wasn’t very skibidi rizz of you” or “As Gen Z say, I’ve entered my ‘delulu era?’”
Well, the Cambridge Dictionary defines skibidi as “a word that can have different meanings such as ‘cool’ or ‘bad,’ or can be used with no real meaning as a joke” and delulu as a “play on the word delusional, means ‘believingthings that are not real or true, usually because you choose to.’”
Skibidi was first coined by the creator of “Skibidi Toilet,” a viral, nonsensical, animated YouTube series that depicts human heads emerging from toilets.
Delulu, meanwhile, emerged about a decade ago as a way to rebuke particularly obsessive K-pop fans, but it has since become a more general way of saying “delusional” online.
It was brought into the offline mainstream in March when Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese dropped the phrase “they are delulu with no solulu” during a speech in Parliament, after two podcast hosts dared him to use it.
“It’s not every day you get to see words like skibidi and delulu make their way into the Cambridge Dictionary,” said Colin McIntosh, the dictionary’s lexical program manager.
“We only add words where we think they’ll have staying power. Internet culture is changing the English language and the effect is fascinating to observe and capture in the Dictionary.”
Other words added by the dictionary include “tradwife” – an abbreviated form of “traditional wife” used to describe influencers who glorify that role – and “broligarchy,” a mashup of bro and oligarchy, which referenced the tech leaders who attended US President Donald Trump’s inauguration in January.
Language changes in more ways than simply developing new words. Pre-existing phrases or words have also picked up new meanings, which are now reflected in the dictionary. The word “snackable,” originally referring to addictive food, can now also describe online content that you can read or watch in small bursts.
Meanwhile, the phrases “red flag” and “green flag” are increasingly used to express undesirable or desirable qualities in a partner, rather than their more literal meaning.
“Skibidi”, “tradwife” and oda slang terms wey dey popular for social media dey among new words wey Cambridge Dictionary add dis year.
Skibidi mean nonsense, word wey one di creator of one viral animated video series for YouTube coin, while tradwife na short form for “traditional wife” – a married mother wey dey cook, clean and post on social media.
More dan 6,000 new words na im dem add, di words include those wey relate to tech giants and remote working.
“Internet culture dey change English language and di effect dey interesting to observe and capture am for dictionary,” na so lexical programme manager Colin McIntosh tok.
Di dictionary define Skibidi as “a word wey get different meaning like ‘cool’ or ‘bad’, or e fit use am as joke wey no get meaning”. Example of how you fit use na like dis “Which kain skibidi you dey do?”
Reality TV star Kim Kardashian show how she dey use di phrase wen she post one video on Instagram to show one necklace wey dem write “skibidi toilet” – di name of di YouTube series.
As well as new phrases, some short versions of existing terms dem add dem na “delulu” – dem play wit di word “delusional”, e get di same definition: wey mean to “believe tins wey no dey real or true, usually becos you choose to”.
Sake of di increase in remote working since di pandemic words like “mouse jiggler” – wey be device or piece of software wey pipo dey used to make am seem like say dem dey work when you no dey work – also gain dia place for di dictionary.
Some ogbonge terms like “broligarchy” dem add am too. Dem Merg”bro” and “oligarchy”, e mean “a small group of men, especially men wey own or dey involved in a technology business, wey dey extremely rich and powerful, and wey get or want political influence”.
Dem use am to describe tech leaders Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg wey dem bin attend Donald Trump inauguration for January.
Starvation deaths are climbing daily in Gaza, as Israel’s 22-month blockade and relentless attacks drive a man-made famine into homes and tents.
As of August 19, the known number of people who have starved to death in Gaza, according to the Palestinian Health Ministry there, reached at least 266 people, including 122 children.
(Al Jazeera)
Why is there not enough food in Gaza?
Between March and mid-May, Israel fully sealed Gaza’s crossings, preventing food, water, and humanitarian aid from entering. The blockade created extreme shortages, pushing Gaza’s already fragile population into severe hunger and dehydration.
On August 14, more than 100 aid organisations, including prominent groups such as Oxfam, Doctors Without Borders (MSF), Amnesty International, and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), condemned Israel’s weaponisation of aid, saying it was obstructing life-saving assistance from entering Gaza.
Vast quantities of relief supplies are stranded in warehouses across Jordan and Egypt while Palestinians continue to starve.
On Monday, rights group Amnesty International accused Israel of enacting a “deliberate policy” of starvation in Gaza and of “systematically destroying the health, wellbeing and social fabric of Palestinian life”.
“It is the intended outcome of plans and policies that Israel has designed and implemented, over the past 22 months, to deliberately inflict on Palestinians in Gaza conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical destruction – which is part and parcel of Israel’s ongoing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza,” Amnesty said.
Gaza has always been dependent on aid, given an Israeli blockade that has been imposed since 2007.
Before October 7, 2023, about 500 aid trucks entered daily, nearly 15,000 a month. Since then, deliveries have fluctuated drastically, rarely reaching pre-war levels needed to sustain the territory’s 2.3 million residents.
When does malnutrition become deadly?
The human body relies on glucose from food to survive. When food is scarce, it first burns fat to keep the heart beating, but prolonged hunger eventually causes organ failure, which can lead to death.
Prolonged malnutrition also causes brain fog and difficulty thinking or speaking, affecting daily functioning.
Children are most at risk because starvation quickly damages their growing bodies and organs.
The first 1,000 days of a child’s life, which include during pregnancy up to two years of age, are critical for a child’s development.
Malnutrition, especially during this time, can have devastating long-lasting effects that hinder cognitive development, physical development and, in some cases where nutrition treatments and therapies are not administered, can prove fatal.
(Al Jazeera)
In Gaza, where food shortages have been severe for months, more and more images are emerging of children in the “red” zone on MUAC tapes, which measure the circumference of the upper arm to assess malnutrition.
A measurement below 11.5 cm signals severe acute malnutrition. These children require emergency treatment, and without it, they face a high risk of death.
Other than the visible signs of extreme thinness, children suffering from severe malnutrition may show physical traits such as sunken, pale eyes, flaky skin, loss of hair, and a swollen belly caused by oedema – fluid buildup in the body due to severe protein deficiency.
(Al Jazeera)
How is famine measured?
Famine is the worst level of hunger, where people face severe food shortages, widespread malnutrition and high levels of death due to starvation.
Assessing the situation in Gaza is difficult because access to the ground is severely restricted, and Israel has destroyed nearly all the health facilities. According to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), famine is when:
At least 20 percent of households face extreme food shortages.
Acute malnutrition affects more than 30 percent of the population.
Death rate exceeds 2 deaths per 10,000 people per day.
LONDON: Eight months after the fall of the Bashar Assad regime, the world is watching and hoping that Syria, despite its fragility, can avoid partition along sectarian lines.
The latest crisis erupted in mid-July in the southern province of Suweida. On July 12, clashes broke out between militias aligned with Druze leader Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hijri and pro-government Bedouin fighters, according to Human Rights Watch.
Within days, the fighting had escalated, with interim government forces deploying to the area. On July 14, Israel launched airstrikes on government buildings in Damascus and Syrian troops in Suweida with the stated aim of protecting the Druze community.
Although they constitute just three to five percent of Syria’s overall population, the Druze — a religious minority — make up the majority in Suweida, with further concentrations in Israel and the Israeli-occupied Golan.
Syria’s Druze heartland in Soweida has seen a shaky calm since violence between the Druze and Bedouins in July killed thousands. (AFP)
Diplomatic maneuvers quickly followed. On July 26, Israeli and Syrian officials met in Paris for US-mediated talks about the security situation in southern Syria. Syria’s state-run Ekhbariya TV, citing a diplomatic source, said both sides agreed to continue discussions to maintain stability.
The human cost has been severe. Fighting in Suweida has displaced roughly 192,000 people and killed at least 1,120, including hundreds of civilians, according to the UN refugee agency, citing a UK-based monitoring group.
The bloodshed in Suweida has cast a long shadow over Syria’s post-Assad transition. “Syria is already fractured,” Joshua Landis, director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, told Arab News. “The Druze region is under Druze control and the much more important northeast is ruled by the Kurdish-led SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces).
“The real question is whether (President Ahmad) Al-Sharaa’s new government can bring them back under government control.”
FASTFACTS
• Syria is home to eight major religious sects, including Sunni, Alawite, Twelver Shiite, Ismaili, Druze and several Christian denominations.
• Its ethnic and cultural mosaic includes Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, Armenians, Yazidis and others with distinct identities.
Analysts say the surge in violence reflects the fragility of Syria’s political and social landscapes.
“This violence is not only disturbing; it’s also revealing a lot about the internal dynamics inside Syria,” Ibrahim Al-Assil, who leads the Syria Project for the Atlantic Council’s Middle East programs, told CNN last month.
“It also shows how fragile not only the ceasefires are but also the whole transition inside Syria.”
Al-Assil said the turmoil also tests the ability of Syria’s government, its society, and regional powers — including Israel — to guide the country toward stability.
Despite a US-mediated ceasefire declared on July 16, sporadic clashes persist. Residents report severe shortages of food, fuel and medicine, blaming a government blockade — an allegation Syria’s interim authorities deny.
Syrian security forces deploy in Walga town amid clashes between tribal and bedouin fighters on one side, and Druze gunmen on the other, near the predominantly Druze city of Sweida in southern Syria on July 19, 2025. (AFP)
Camille Otrakji, a Syrian-Canadian analyst, describes Syria as “deeply fragile” and so vulnerable to shocks that further stress could lead to breakdown.
He told Arab News that although “officials and their foreign allies scramble to bolster public trust,” it remains “brittle,” eroded by “daily missteps” and by abuses factions within the security forces.
From a rights perspective, institutional credibility will hinge on behavior. Adam Coogle, deputy Middle East director at Human Rights Watch, stresses the need for “professional, accountable security forces that represent and protect all communities without discrimination.”
Coogle said in a July 22 statement that de-escalation must go hand in hand with civilian protection, safe returns, restored services and rebuilding trust.
The battlefield map complicates the political storyline. Tensions between the SDF and government troops threaten an agreement reached in March to integrate the Kurdish-led coalition into the national military.
Mazloum Abdi, commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), speaks during the pan-Kurdish “Unity and Consensus” conference in Qamishli in northeastern Syria on April 26, 2025. (AFP)
Talks were set back earlier this month when the two sides clashed, with both accusing the other of striking first. The interim government announced it was backing out of talks planned in Paris in objection to a recent conference calling for a decentralized, democratic constitution.
The August 8 meeting in the northeastern city of Hasakah brought together Kurds, Druze and Alawite figures and called for a new democratic constitution and a decentralized system that respects Syria’s cultural and religious diversity.
State-run news agency SANA quoted an official accusing the SDF-hosted event of having a separatist agenda and of inviting foreign intervention.
Meanwhile, religion and identity remain combustible. The coalition of rebel groups that ousted Assad in December was led by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, which was led by Al-Sharaa.
Members of the former rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham stand guard on a street in Damascus, Syria, on December 31, 2024,. to monitor security and prevent crime in their districts after the ouster of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. (REUTERS)
The insurgent pedigree of parts of the new administration fuels mistrust among communities already raw from years of war.
Meanwhile, fear continues to grip Alawite communities in coastal areas amid reports of ongoing revenge attacks. Assad belonged to the sect and promoted many in his government, making them a target since his downfall, even though most had nothing to do with his repression.
A UN-backed commission that investigated violence in coastal areas in March found that killings, torture, looting and burning of homes and tents primarily targeted Alawites and culminated in massacres.
Families of Syria’s Alawite minority cross the Nahr al-Kabir river, forming the border between Syria’s western coastal province and northern Lebanon in the Hekr al-Daher area on March 11, 2025, to enter Lebanon while fleeing from sectarian violence in their heartland along Syria’s Mediterranean coast. (AFP/File)
These developments across the war-weary country have heightened fears of sectarian partition, though experts say the reality is more complex.
“The risk is real, but it is more complex than a straightforward territorial split,” Haian Dukhan, a lecturer in politics and international relations at the UK’s Teesside University, told Arab News.
“While Syria’s post-2024 landscape is marked by renewed sectarian and ethnic tensions, these divisions are not neatly mapped onto clear-cut borders.”
He noted that fragmentation is emerging not as formal borders but as “pockets of influence” — Druze autonomy in Suweida, Kurdish self-administration in the northeast, and unease among some Alawite communities.
“If violence persists,” Dukhan says, “these local power structures could harden into semi-permanent zones of authority, undermining the idea of a cohesive national state without producing formal secession.”
In Suweida, communal confidence is buoyed by a sense of agency — and by outside deterrence. Al-Hijri, the most prominent of Syria’s three Druze leaders, has resisted handing control of Suweida to Damascus.
“There is no consensus between us and the Damascus government,” he told American broadcaster NPR in April. Landis, for his part, argues that Israel’s military posture has been decisive in Suweida’s recent calculus.
Taken together, these incidents underscore the paradox of Syria’s “local” conflicts: even the most provincial skirmishes are shaped by regional red lines and international leverage.
Against this backdrop, Damascus has drawn closer to Turkiye. On August 14, Reuters reported the two had signed an agreement for Ankara to train and advise Syria’s new army and supply weapons and logistics.
“Damascus needs military assistance if it is to subdue the SDF and to find a way to thwart Israel,” Landis said. “Only Turkiye seems willing to provide such assistance.”
Although Landis believes it “unlikely that Turkiye can help Damascus against Israel, it is eager to help in taking on the Kurds.”
While the SDF has around 60,000 well-armed and trained fighters, it is still reliant on foreign backers. “If the US and Europeans are unwilling to defend them, Turkiye and Al-Sharaa’s growing forces will eventually subdue them,” said Landis.
US forces patrol in Syria’s northeastern city Qamishli, in the Hasakeh province, mostly controlled by Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), on January 9, 2025. (AFP)
For Ankara, the endgame is unchanged. Turkiye’s strategic aim is to prevent any form of Kurdish self-rule, which it views as a security threat, said Dukhan.
“By helping the government bring the Kurdish-led SDF into the national army and reopening trade routes, Turkiye is shaping relations between communities and Syria’s place in the region.”
Could there be more to Syria’s flareups than meets the eye? Ghassan Ibrahim, founder of the UK-based Global Arab Network, thinks so. “It looks like a sectarian conflict, but at the same time, it has a strong element of political ambition,” he told Arab News.
He pointed to the unrest in Suweida as one example. “On the surface, what happened there looks sectarian, but at its core, it’s more about political autonomy.”
Elaborating on the issue, he noted that Al-Hijri had long supported Assad and believed Suweida should have a degree of independent self-rule.
“When that ambition was crushed — by the (interim) government — things spiraled out of control, taking on a stronger sectarian appearance,” he said. “But I still see it mainly as a struggle for power — each side is trying to bring areas under its control by force.”
Syrian government security forces set up a checkpoint in the town of Busra al-Hariri, east of the city of Sweida, on July 20, 2025, to prevent armed tribal fighters from advancing towards the city.
This perspective dovetails with Dukhan’s view that “sectarian identity in Syria is fluid and often intersects with economic interests, tribal loyalties and local security concerns.”
He noted that “even in areas dominated by one community, there are competing visions about the future.” That fluidity complicates any blueprint for stabilization. Even if front lines quiet, the political map could still splinter into de facto zones where different rules and loyalties prevail.
To Landis, the government’s current instinct is consolidation. He believes the leadership “has chosen to use force to unify Syria,” which he adds “has proven successful” in the coastal region “because the Alawites are not united and had largely given up their weapons.”
Success by force in one region, however, does not guarantee the model will travel. In Suweida, Israel’s tripwire and Druze cohesion have raised the price of any government offensive. In the northeast, the SDF’s numbers, organization, and foreign ties complicate any quick military integration.
If raw power cannot produce a durable settlement, what could? For Dukhan, the transitional government’s challenge is “to prevent local self-rule from drifting into de facto partition by offering credible political inclusion and security guarantees.”
That formula implies a real negotiation over autonomy, representation, and local policing — sensitive subjects that arouse deep suspicion in Damascus and among nationalists fearful of a slippery slope to breakup.
Landis agrees that compromise is possible, but unlikely. “Al-Sharaa has the option of compromising with Syria’s minorities, who want to retain a large degree of autonomy and to be able to ensure their own safety from abuse and massacres,” he said. “It is unlikely that he will concede such powers.”
Syria’s President Ahmed al-Sharaa (R) and SDF chief Mazloum Abdi seal their agreement with a handshake in Damascus on March 10, 2025, to integrate the institutions of the semi-autonomous Kurdish administration in the northeast into the national government. (AFP)
Still, experts say Syria can avoid permanent fracture if all sides — domestic and foreign — work toward reconciliation.
As Syria’s conflict involves multiple domestic factions and foreign powers, Ibrahim said international actors could foster peace by pressuring their allies on the ground. Responsibility, he stressed, lies with all sides.
“The way forward is cooperation from all,” he said. “For example, Israel could pressure Sheikh Al-Hijri and make it clear that it’s not here to create a ‘Hijristan’.”
Ibrahim was referring to the Druze leader’s purported ambition to carve out a sovereign state in Suweida.
Otrakji said that “after 14 years of conflict, Syria is now wide open — a hub not just for diplomats and business envoys, but also for military, intelligence and public relations operatives.”
Representatives and dignitaries of Syrian communities attend a two-day national dialogue conference called for by the country’s new authorities in Damascus on February 24, 2025.
The previous regime was rigid and combative, he said, but the new leadership “seems intent on pleasing everyone.”
That balancing act carries dangers — overpromising at home, underdelivering on reforms, and alienating multiple constituencies at once.
Otrakji stressed that without full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, Syria will remain trapped “on a dizzying political rollercoaster” and in uncertainty.
The UNSC reaffirmed on August 10 its call for an inclusive, Syrian-led political process to safeguard rights and enable Syrians to determine their future.
Global Arab Network’s Ibrahim concluded that Syria does not need regime change, but rather reconciliation, education and a leadership capable of dispelling the idea that this is a sectarian war.
Sectarian and religious leaders, he said, “must understand that Syria will remain one unified, central state with some flexibility — but nothing beyond that.”
Authorities in Bagh, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, have ordered the temporary closure of all schools and educational institutions following a high flood alert issued by the Meteorological Department.
A notification stated that both public and private schools in the district will remain closed on August 18 and 19, as a precautionary measure to protect students and staff.
The Met Office has predicted heavy rain and thunderstorms across several districts, including Muzzafarabad, Rawalakot, Bagh, Haveli, Kotli, Mirpur and Bhimber over the coming days.
These weather conditions can lead to flash flooding and landslides, particularly in hilly areas.
Additionally, heavy rainfall is expected in Islamabad within the next 24hours. Officials emphasised that the closure of schools in Bagh is a necessary step to mitigate risks as the region prepares for the ongoing monsoon season.
Temperatures in major cities recorded this morning include: Islamabad at 26°C, Lahore and Peshawar at 28°C, Karachi at 29°C, Quetta and Gilgit at 21°C, Murree at 17°C, and Muzaffarabad at 23°C.
In Indian occupied Kashmir, the weather forecast indicates cloudy conditions with the chances of rain and thunderstorms in Srinagar, Jammu, Leh, Pulwama, Anantnag, Shopian and Baramula.
Temperatures recorded this morning were Srinagar, Pulwama, and Baramula at 18°C, Jammu at 26°C, Leh at 10°C, and Anantnag and Shopian at 19°C.
Baghaei told reporters that Tehran remained ready to take steps to reassure the world about the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, but only if sanctions were lifted.
“We are prepared to adopt a series of measures to provide assurances about the peaceful nature of our nuclear program, conditional upon the removal of oppressive sanctions,” he said at his weekly press briefing.
Baghaei dismissed speculation about third-party mediation in its relations with the UN nuclear watchdog, saying, “Our relationship with the Agency is direct. Last week, one of its deputies visited Tehran. We also had discussions on drafting a cooperation framework,” he said. “Our representative in Vienna is in constant contact with the Agency.”
‘European have no right for snapback’
The spokesperson also criticized Britain, France, and Germany over threats to use the so-called snapback mechanism that could restore UN sanctions.
“The very act of Europe using this tool as a means of pressure against Iran is an illegal move,” Baghaei said.
“The three European countries failed to fulfill their obligations under the 2015 nuclear deal, and after the US and Israel attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities, they neither condemned it nor even tried to provide a logical explanation of their positions. We believe the three European countries have no right to use this mechanism.”
He added: “We never cut off negotiations with these three countries. They must decide whether they want to play a constructive role or a negative role aligned with the interests of the Zionist regime.”
Responding to a question on whether Iran might consider extending the deadline set by Britain, France and Germany in their recent letter to the United Nations, Baghaei said Tehran had no such plans. “The Islamic Republic has no program to extend the snapback mechanism,” he said.
His comments followed a letter sent last week by the foreign ministers of the three European powers — known as the E3 — to UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the Security Council, warning that they were prepared to reimpose international sanctions unless Tehran resumed nuclear negotiations with Washington and restored cooperation with the IAEA before the end of August, or accepted an extension.
Caucasus concerns
On regional issues, Baghaei said Iran closely monitored developments in the South Caucasus.
“We have been very clear that we are sensitive to the presence of extra-regional actors,” he said.
“We conveyed this explicitly to our friends in Armenia and listened to their explanations. For us, the unblocking of routes must not harm internationally recognized borders or contradict Armenia’s national sovereignty. We are monitoring the situation carefully and will raise concerns whenever necessary.”
Last week, US President Donald Trump brokered a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which gives Washington leasing rights to develop the Zangezur transit route connecting Azerbaijan with its exclave, Nakhchivan. It will be renamed the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).
Epstein case not linked to talks
Asked about reports linking the Jeffrey Epstein case to negotiations with Washington, Baghaei said Iran would not speculate.
“The so-called Epstein case is an issue that is not limited to the United States; many officials from different countries were implicated. We do not engage in speculation about the motives of US officials. What matters to us are their actions and Iran’s interests,” he said.
