IT appears to be a cruel irony that the very force that was once blamed for triggering an apocalypse now seeks atonement. Whether or not the Afghan-Soviet war reshaped the world order, it undoubtedly transformed this region, particularly Pakistan and Afghanistan. Politics, after all, follows its own calculus: understanding when a former foe becomes a strategic partner requires a dispassionate reading of interests and imperatives.
In that context, Russia’s formal recognition of the Afghan Taliban regime should not come as a surprise. But is this development not replete with contradictions? After all, these Taliban are the ideological descendants of the very mujahideen who took credit for defeating the Soviet Union. Pakistan, too, claimed that legacy — and has been bearing its consequences ever since, with compounding interest. The militant groups that now threaten Pakistan’s security are the heirs of that jihadist lineage, and the Taliban’s policies suggest they aim to reimagine Pakistan through the prism of Afghanistan’s turbulent past.
As for the US, the global exemplar of pragmatic diplomacy, it hardly warrants much elaboration. For Washington, victory and defeat are tactical manoeuvres, not moral absolutes. It negotiated with the Taliban before its military withdrawal, offering tacit recognition even before its final soldier had departed from Kabul.
Moscow’s signals of a shift in policy had become increasingly visible in recent years. However, the timing of Russia’s formal recognition, coming amid the fallout of the Israel-Iran conflict, reveals a more profound anxiety: Russia is increasingly becoming a marginal player in Southwest Asian geopolitics. In Syria, the Assad regime has been ousted. In Gaza, the humanitarian catastrophe is growing. Iran, Russia’s principal regional ally, remains under siege. Meanwhile, Moscow’s responses are limited to rhetorical posturing.
How much leverage does Russia truly have over the Taliban that it has formally recognised?
Even in Ukraine, Russia appears trapped. US President Donald Trump, who sees geopolitics as a transactional theatre and war as a branding exercise, has relegated Moscow to a footnote. His public desire for a Nobel Peace Prize, juxtaposed against global unrest, adds a tragicomic element to the situation. For the Palestinians in Gaza, it is yet another chapter in a long history of betrayal, as they continue to suffer while the world’s conscience remains dormant.
But back to the central question: what does Russia hope to achieve by recognising the Taliban regime?
The move is particularly puzzling when viewed through Iran’s lens. Tehran’s frustration with the Taliban has been growing. Some speculate that the Taliban’s muted response to Israel’s aggression, or perhaps their perceived alignment with the new Syrian leadership, especially interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, who stunned observers by engaging with Trump and hinting at normalisation with Israel, has unsettled Tehran. The Taliban and Syria’s new rulers share certain traits: pragmatic diplomacy, ideological ambiguity, and a desire to reposition themselves within a shifting geopolitical landscape.
This alignment has ramifications. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which shares operational and ideological ties with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, has dismantled Tehran’s ally, the Assad regime, in Syria. Iran may also perceive these changes as weakening Hezbollah in Lebanon, hardening Israel’s aggressive posturing towards Tehran. Compounding Iran’s concerns is the presence of anti-Iran groups operating from Afghan soil, particularly the Jaish al-Adl, which maintains a presence along the Pak-Iran border.
For their part, the Taliban are becoming increasingly pragmatic, much like Syria’s new political elite. They are engaged with all major regional and global powers: China, Russia, the US and India. Of these, China has the deepest stakes. As Afghanistan’s immediate neighbour, Beijing is acutely aware that instability in Afghanistan could spill over into its own territory.
That is why China has intensified its efforts to establish confidence-building channels between Kabul and Islamabad, aiming to pre-empt conflict and contain terrorism. Yet, terrorism has been far from contained. The Afghan soil continues to serve as a launching pad for attacks that bleed Pakistan. Ironically, those once branded as ‘good Taliban’ or Pakistani proxies have now turned their guns on the state.
The recent suicide attack in Mir Ali, claimed by Aswad al-Harb, a group linked to the Hafiz Gul Bahadur network, is emblematic of this shift. An alliance of groups, including Lashkar-i-Islam, Tehreek-i-Inqilab-i-Islami, and Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan, has escalated attacks across North and South Waziristan, as well as urban areas like Lakki Marwat, Tank and Kulachi. Meanwhile, the TTP has adopted a strategy focused on the systematic targeting of police and government officials.
Despite the fact that both the HTS and the Afghan Taliban share characteristics in their diplomatic overtures and political pragmatism, they also diverge sharply. Unlike the HTS, the Taliban have not distanced themselves from the militant groups that once fought alongside them against the Nato forces. Instead, they appear to be managing these groups, using them selectively against Pakistan. Perhaps the Taliban leadership recognises the enduring utility of proxy tools that can pressure adversaries while maintaining plausible deniability.
Pakistan and Iran, more than any other actors, understand the perils of such arrangements. Proxies can only serve strategic objectives up to a point; beyond that, they develop their own agendas.
Some Afghan analysts argue that Pakistan’s growing assertiveness in regional politics and its increasing interest in Central Asia have made the Taliban uneasy. They want to shed the image of being anyone’s proxy, even while relying on proxies themselves to assert leverage.
Russia’s motivations for recognising the Taliban regime are clearer: a blend of realpolitik and strategic opportunism. The goal is to counter Western influence, secure its periphery and expand diplomatic engagement. Moscow also frames the recognition as a step towards economic cooperation in energy, transport and infrastructure.
But a critical question remains: how much leverage does Russia truly have over the Taliban on issues such as terrorism and the use of proxies against neighbours? This is a challenge that even China and Pakistan have been unable to resolve. The Taliban leadership, meanwhile, continues to play a careful game, balancing global expectations with local ambitions.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, July 6th, 2025
