Category: 2. World

SYNOPSIS

China and India are easing tensions, but the sensitive terrain of territorial disagreements and overlapping regional ambitions remains in the way.

COMMENTARY

“It should be the right choice for China and India to be good-neighbourly friends and partners that help each other succeed, and have the dragon and the elephant dance together,” said Chinese President Xi Jinping at his meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Tianjin on Sunday (Aug 31).

The dragon and elephant metaphor is often used to describe the geopolitical and economic ties between China and India. At times, they fight. At times, they co-exist. And at times, they dance.

Xi invoked the imagery at his meeting with Mr Modi on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, at a time when both countries are trying to stabilise a historically uneasy relationship. The visit marked the first trip to China by Modi in seven years.

The two Asian giants have great potential for collaboration. They are among the ten biggest economies of the world, and together boast a market of 2.8 billion people. As emerging powers, they have shared interests in global economic stability, common development and multilateralism.

These shared interests prompted recent advances in the Sino-Indian relationship. After a five-year hiatus incited by security tensions on their disputed border, they recently agreed to continue the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra pilgrimage, resume direct flights, recommence the issuing of Indian tourist visas to Chinese nationals, and are planning to reinstate border trade. At a recent meeting between their foreign ministers, the two economies committed to facilitating trade and investment ties via concrete measures.

Actions by third actors have catalysed the recent thaw between China and India. In its quest to weaken Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, the European Union sanctioned multiple Chinese and Indian entities for their purported support of Moscow. At the same time, the United States imposed hefty import tariffs on Chinese and Indian products and unleashed further levies for Indian oil purchases from Russia.

New Delhi and Beijing found common ground on this issue, pushing back against Brussels and Washington, charging them with discrimination and double standards against Chinese and Indian companies.

Against this backdrop, the leaders struck a positive tone at their meeting. They expressed appreciation for the constructive momentum and consistent advancement in bilateral ties. They reiterated that the two nations view each other as development partners rather than competitors and doubled down on their commitment to growth and multipolarity.

While current geopolitical trends facilitate the thaw in China-India relations, there are deep-rooted issues between them that can set back or even derail the process.

Sticky Issues Related to the Border and River Flows

China and India share a disputed border spanning thousands of kilometres. In 2020, after decades of bloodless militarised interaction in the contested regions, a deadly conflict erupted, claiming the lives of at least 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers.

While the 2024 border patrol agreement brought back stability on the border, a long list of sensitive issues between China and India remains.

According to recent reports, China plans to construct a rail link between Xinjiang and Tibet, which will reportedly run close to disputed areas. On the other side of the Himalayas, India has been upgrading its infrastructure in the disputed region.

Furthermore, China recently started the construction of the largest hydropower project in the world, the Motuo Hydropower Station. The dam’s location on the transboundary Yarlung Tsangpo river may enable China to divert or control the river’s water flows and potentially harm the interests of downstream states, such as India. New Delhi formally articulated concerns over the dam’s potential impact on regional stability and water flows.

While these developments have not derailed the Sino-Indian rapprochement, they can spur protracted discontent between the two sides and become flashpoints in the future. The example of the 2020 Galwan conflict shows that border-related issues can escalate and freeze ties for years.

Overlapping Regional Ambitions

The boundary problem and river flows are far from being the only friction points between China and India. The two countries are both key regional players in each other’s backyards, and their overlapping regional activities tend to frustrate one another.

China’s close ties with Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh and Pakistan have long been viewed as a threat to India’s strategic interests. These ties, based on Chinese investments, loans and arms supplies, have triggered concerns of encirclement in New Delhi.

On the other side of the equation, some of India’s strategic activities in Southeast Asia draw concern from China. In early August, India and the Philippines conducted their first joint maritime exercise in the South China Sea. Beijing is wary of non-regional states’ strategic presence in the area, and after the joint maritime drill, warned third parties not to interfere in the South China Sea dispute.

Southeast Asia and China-India Ties

In sum, the China-India thaw is underway, but New Delhi and Beijing have to navigate the sensitive terrain of territorial disagreements and overlapping regional ambitions.

This nuanced geopolitical setting brings opportunities and challenges to Southeast Asian states.

The positive direction of ties between China and India enhances stability in the Asia-Pacific. The lower likelihood of a military conflict benefits Southeast Asian states as they can focus on deepening ties with China and India. Closer interaction with Beijing and New Delhi can mitigate the fallout of US tariff policies and strategic retrenchment.

With the opportunity comes challenges. First, as long as the border dispute is not resolved, the ties between China and India can turn volatile at any moment. This requires agile policymaking that is prepared for worst-case scenarios, such as a spike in tensions on the Sino-Indian border followed by a downturn in their bilateral ties.

Second, as China and India vie for influence in Southeast Asia, regional states have to balance their strategic engagements carefully to maintain equidistance between them for the sake of preserving strategic flexibility.

Third, US tariffs already triggered a flow of cheap Chinese goods to Southeast Asia. The situation could turn for the worse if the US and China fail to reach an agreement and Washington maintains hefty tariffs on Beijing.

Now that India is also among the states heavily hit by US tariffs, Indian firms might follow the Chinese playbook and double down on sales to Southeast Asian markets. Therefore, regional states must monitor trade rerouting patterns to protect local businesses from being undercut by cheap imports from China and India.

Ultimately, the trajectory of China-India relations will play a key role in shaping Southeast Asia’s security landscape, geoeconomic outlook, and its capacity to manoeuvre within an increasingly complex, multipolar order.

About the Author

Daniel Balazs is a Research Fellow in the China Programme of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. The views expressed are his own and do not represent the views of his affiliated institutions. This commentary was published on CNA on 3 September 2025. It is republished here with permission.

A SCHOOL administrator recently remarked in a tone of resignation that these days many parents would rather have their children remain occupied with academic work than risk letting them venture outside. “The world beyond the gate,” she said, “is no longer safe.” Streets feel more chaotic, parks feel less secure, and neighbourhoods, once considered havens of community life, now come with their own anxieties.

One can understand the sentiment. There is a certain reassurance in watching a child hunched over homework or attending an after-school tutoring session. Academic involvement at least on the surface, offers structure, purpose and a shield from the unpredictability of the outside world. A child inside the home focused on schoolwork ap­­pears safe. But this comforting illusion carries its own paradox, perhaps even its own quiet danger.

Much of this academic engagement now takes place online. Children are expected to complete assignments, do school projects or join tutoring sessions online. Parents, seeing them glued to their screens in the name of learning, may feel reassured. But the screen is porous. The very device meant for education is the same portal through which children slide into the vast and largely unregulated arena of the internet.

Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and TikTok do not immediately strike one as threatening in the way city traffic or unlit parks might. Yet they ca­r­ry their own insidious risks such as cyberbullying, exposure to inappropriate content, compulsive scrolling and the constant pressure to seek online validation. The shift from educational eng­agem­ent to digital distraction can happen in seconds. And while a bruised knee from playing outdoors may be noticed and addressed, the effects of on­­line harms including low self-esteem, anxiety or withdrawal, often remain hidden for a long time.

Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and TikTok carry their own insidious risks.

This reality challenges traditional notions of safety. The digital world is not inherently dangerous, but it is complex, sophisticated and designed to be addictive. Children still learning to regulate emotions and behaviour are particularly vulnerable to its design.

The issue, therefore, is not only the amount of screen time, but also the nature of that engagement. Are children using digital tools to explore, learn and create, or are they passively consuming content that erodes attention, self-worth and authentic connection?

There is also a broader social dynamic at play. In many households, the increase in academic pressure mirrors a growing anxiety among parents about the future. In competitive education systems, academic achievement is often seen as the most reliable path to opportunity. Add to this the heightened fears around safety in public spaces and the result is a generation of children who are over-scheduled, over-supervised and inc­reasingly disconnected from unstructured play, face-to-face friendships and outdoor exploration.

However, research consistently highlights the importance of real-world experiences, such as outdoor exploration, social interaction, and immersive play, for children’s cognitive, linguistic, emotional and physical development. Increasingly, these experiences are being displaced by screen-based activities, with growing evidence of their adverse effects. US data shows that children spending four or more hours daily on screens face a 45 per cent increase in anxiety, a 65pc rise in depression, and higher risks of conduct problems and ADHD, largely due to reduced physical activity and poor sleep.

Preschoolers with daily screen exposure are significantly more likely to develop speech disorders and nearly twice as likely to experience learning difficulties, with brain scans revealing reduced white-matter development. In India, children exceeding three hours of daily screen time reported greater anxiety, depression and weaker academic outcomes, while outdoor play was shown to buffer these effects. Excessive use of screens also raises obesity risk through sedentary behaviour and unhealthy eating. Echoing these findings, Haidt’s The Anxious Generation documents a doubling of adolescent anxiety and depression since the rise of smartphones, alongside declining face-to-face interaction and chronic sleep loss.

There is a troubling irony here. In shielding children from the messiness and unpredictability of the outside world we risk denying them the very experiences that build judgement, independence and strength. A digitally mediated, academically intensive childhood may feel safe, but it can also be narrow, lonely and emotionally stifling.

What then might a more balanced approach look like?

First, we need to broaden the conversation abo­ut what constitutes safety. It must go beyond the physical to include emotional well-being, digital literacy and mental health. Creating safe environments also means fostering open communication at home, where children can talk about what they see online, what they feel and what they need.

Second, schools and communities can play a pivotal role by reclaiming public spaces for children. Well-designed parks, community centres and walkable neighbourhoods do more than provide recreation, they signal a shared commitment to collective care and trust. When children are seen playing outside, when adults are present and engaged, a community feels safer not just in perception but also in reality.

Third, we must revisit our assumptions about academic success. Learning does not only happen behind desks or on digital platforms. It unfolds through curiosity, movement, conversation and trial and error. Valuing holistic development means making space for play, creativity and rest, recognising that these are not luxuries but essentials for a healthy childhood.

Finally, digital literacy needs to be taught early, not merely in terms of technical skills but as a critical life skill. Children should be equipped to question what they see online, understand the inf­luence of algorithms and develop the confidence to disengage when digital spaces become toxic.

In seeking to protect children we must not build cages, digital or otherwise. Instead, we must create ecosystems that offer both challenge and care, structure and spontaneity, solitude and connection.

Between books and screens, between school and the street, lies a space of balance, conversation and thoughtful design. It is in that space that a new understanding of childhood safety can begin to take root, one that prepares children not just to stay safe but to live fully and wisely.

The writer is a research specialist at the Aga Khan University Institute for Educational Development, Karachi.

Published in Dawn, September 5th, 2025

While Donald Trump is hard to beat when it comes to stealing the global spotlight, Xi Jinping proved this week he can also put on a good show.

In memorable scenes reminiscent of a family reunion, the Chinese leader embraced and riffed with some of the world’s preeminent strongmen — including an impromptu conversation with Russia’s Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un about organ transplants and immortality.

• Muddy water pours into many homes in low-lying areas
• People wade through floodwaters in areas surrounding historic Red Fort
• Crops across tens of thousands of acres destroyed in Punjab
• Torrential rain in hilly areas has swollen several rivers

NEW DELHI: Parts of Delhi and India-held Kashmir were flooded on Thursday after two rivers breached the danger mark following heavy rain in several northern areas, but weather officials forecast some respite from downpours.

A fierce monsoon season has brought immense destruction in the region this year, killing at least 130 people in August.

Torrential rain in the hilly areas of occupied Jammu and Kashmir, the Himlayan enclave of Ladakh and Himachal Pradesh has swollen many rivers, which have crossed danger levels.

Residential areas were flooded in the key city of Srinagar after a breach of the Jhelum river embankment, and authorities urged people to evacuate homes.

“The Jhelum is climbing, but at a much slower rate than was feared,” Omar Abdullah, the chief minister of held Kashmir, said in a post on X. “The administration is not going to lower its guard. We continue to monitor the situation very closely.”

Rescuers searched for any people trapped under debris after the rain triggered a landslide at the Ratle hydroelectric power project on the Chenab river in Drabshalla, officials said.

Indian weather officials have forecast showers to ease off on Thursday, with moderate rain expected in held Kashmir and the state of Uttarkhand.

In Delhi, the capital, the Yamuna river passed the danger mark on Tuesday, in a flow the Central Water Commission described as a ‘severe’ situation.

On Thursday, muddy water poured into many homes in low-lying areas, from which thousands had already been evacuated to safer places as a precaution.

Authorities shut the historic Loha Pul, or Iron Bridge, spanning the Yamuna in the older part of the city.

People waded through floodwaters in areas surrounding the historic Red Fort, many carrying an idol of Lord Ganesha, the Hindu god who vanquishes obstacles, for immersion in the river waters in an annual ritual.

Crops across tens of thousands of hectares have been destroyed by the rains in the breadbasket state of Punjab where 37 have died since August began.

The deluge spurred authorities to release water pent up in dams, further flooding areas in both India and Pakistan.

Published in Dawn, September 5th, 2025

• Pope raises ‘tragic situation in Gaza’ with Israeli president
• Top European official slams bloc’s inaction over ‘genocide’ of Palestinians

JERUSALEM: Israel controls 40pc of Gaza City, a military spokesperson claimed, as its bombardment forced more Palestinians from their homes and claimed the lives of at least 53 more people on Thursday.

Most of the casualties were in Gaza City, where Israeli forces have advanced through the outer suburbs and are now only a few kilometres from the city centre.

Residents said Israel bombarded Gaza City’s Zeitoun, Sabra, Tuffah, and Shejaia districts from ground and air. Tanks pushed into the eastern part of the Sheikh Radwan district northwest of the city centre, destroying houses and causing fires in tent encampments.

In the Tel al-Hawa nei­ghbourhood in Gaza City’s west, where the strike took place, AFP footage sho­wed Palestinians outside damaged tents, clearing up scattered belongings.

Further south, in the Nuseirat re­­fugee camp, Gaza civil defence said an Israeli air strike killed sev­en people including three children. At Gaza City’s Al-Shifa Hosp­ital, where the dead and wounded were being received, bodies wrapped in white shrouds lay on the floor of the hospital’s morgue.

‘40pc of Gaza City’

Israeli military spokesperson Brigadier General Effie Defrin told a news conference that the Zeito­­un and Sheikh Radwan neighborhoods were in their control. “The operation will continue to expand and intensify in the coming days.”

Defrin confirmed that army Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir told cabinet ministers that without a day-after plan, they would have to impose military rule in Gaza.

Pope raises Gaza situation

Pope Leo discussed the “tragic situation in Gaza” with Israeli President Isaac Herzog during a meeting on Thursday, calling for a permanent ceasefire in the Pales­tinian enclave, the Vatican said.

The pontiff also called for the release of remaining prisoners held by Hamas, the statement said, and reiterated the Vatican’s support for a two-state solution to the decades-long Israel-Palestinian conflict.

“A prompt resumption of negotiations was hoped for … to secure the release of all hostages, urgently achieve a permanent ceasefire, facilitate the safe entry of humanitarian aid into the most affected areas, and ensure full respect for humanitarian law,” said the statement.

‘Genocide’

Meanwhile, One of the Euro­pean Union’s most senior officials called the war in Gaza a “genocide”, ramping up criticism of Israel and slamming the 27-nation bloc for failing to act to stop it.

“The genocide in Gaza exposes Europe’s failure to act and speak with one voice,” European Com­m­i­ssion vice president Teresa Rib­era said during a speech in Paris.

Top EU officials have so far shied away from calling Israel’s actions in the territory a “genocide”.

One spokesman said it was for the courts to make a legal judgement on whether genocide was happening. The splits are also present insi­de the EU’s executive, where Spanish commissio­ner Rib­era has expre­ssed frustration over the failure to push on the issue.

Published in Dawn, September 5th, 2025

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan’s exports of services rose by 18.27 per cent year-on-year in July — the first month of FY26 — mainly on the back of a strong performance in telecommunication, computer, and information services, official data showed on Thursday.

According to figures released by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, services exports increased to $745.52 million in July, up from $630.38m in the corresponding month of the previous fiscal year. On a month-on-month basis, exports rose by 4.47pc.

In rupee terms, services exports grew 20.74pc to Rs211.89bn in July compared to Rs175.49bn in the same month last year, indicating continued strength in foreign currency inflows from the sector.

The data highlights that the double-digit growth was primarily driven by a 23.77pc surge in telecommunication, computer, and information services, which reached $354m in July compared to $286m in the same period last year, according to the State Bank of Pakistan.

IT-related services lead a 23.8pc rise in telecom, computer, and information exports

Other business services also posted robust growth, rising 17.96pc to $151m from $128m a year earlier. Transport services exports increased by 21.54pc to $79m from $65m.

However, the export of travel services declined sharply by 20.33pc, falling to $47m from $59m in the same month of FY25, reflecting subdued demand or reduced outbound activity in the travel segment.

Despite the overall rise in services exports, imports of services marginally declined by 0.61pc to $871.44m in July compared to $876.83m in the corresponding month last year. On a monthly basis, however, imports rose by 3.41pc.

The slight decline in imports was largely due to reduced spending on transport and business-related services. Transport services imports dropped 2.97pc to $391m in July FY26 from $403m a year earlier. In contrast, travel services imports rose 16pc to $210m from $181m in the same period.

As a result of rising exports and easing imports, Pakistan’s trade deficit in services narrowed significantly by 48.91pc in July FY26, falling to $125.92m from $246.45m in the same month last year.

In FY25, the country’s services exports grew 9.23pc to $8.39bn, compared to $7.68bn in FY24. The momentum has largely been fuelled by consistent growth in IT-related exports since February 2024, though the sector did witness a 6.5pc dip in August 2024.

Analysts believe the performance of the services sector — especially IT and digital services — will remain a key driver of foreign exchange earnings in the current fiscal year, particularly amid volatility in goods exports.

Published in Dawn, September 5th, 2025

History often reserves its cruellest surprises for nations that mistake momentum for permanence. In May 2025, during Operation Sindoor, India’s confrontation with Pakistan was brief, but the aftershocks were immense. What might once have looked like proof of strength instead revealed fragility, exposing Delhi’s overconfidence and its diminishing global weight. India, long celebrated as an emerging pole of power, suddenly appeared adrift, isolated diplomatically and battered economically. The starkest symbol of this shift came at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Tianjin, where Prime Minister Narendra Modi returned to Chinese soil after seven years. His presence no longer suggested bold outreach but reluctant necessity, a recognition that India could not afford absence when other doors were closing. In Tianjin, under the gaze of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, India looked less like a shaper of events than a humbled participant, forced to acknowledge that the SCO, once dismissed as peripheral, had become a stage 

it could not ignore.

The rupture with Washington pushed India further into this corner. After Sindoor, Donald Trump scorned Delhi’s escalation as “a shame” and imposed punishing 50 per cent tariffs on Indian exports, one of the harshest measures ever applied to a supposed ally. For a country that had built its foreign policy around an “all-weather” partnership with the United States, the blow was devastating. At home, the opposition branded Modi’s failed gamble “Narendra Surrender,” mocking his spectacle-filled friendship with Trump as naïve theatrics that collapsed under real pressure. For Delhi, the message was clear: the West could no longer be counted on to rescue its missteps. With G20 and Quad channels less reliable, the SCO emerged as one of the few viable forums to reassert a place on the world stage. Modi’s appearance in Tianjin, then, was not triumph but survival, an acknowledgement that multilateralism on Beijing’s terms was better than isolation altogether.

The symbolism of Tianjin cut deep. Since the Galwan clash of 2020, Delhi had prided itself on refusing Chinese platforms, framing absence as defiance. Now, silence replaced protest. The SCO under Xi is no longer a loose forum; it has become a pillar of Eurasian integration, binding Central Asia, Russia, Pakistan, Iran, and increasingly the wider Global South. At its heart lies the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, long denounced by India for slicing through contested territory. Yet in Tianjin, there was no confrontation. India, once positioning itself as a counterweight to China, appeared instead as a participant in a framework designed by Beijing. The elephant, once imagined as defiant, now moved cautiously, aware it needed the SCO more than the SCO needed it. That reversal was visible not only to China and Pakistan, but also to smaller members like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, who read India’s presence as proof that even proud powers must eventually align with the region’s gravitational centre.

For Beijing, the shift validated years of patience. The SCO has always been more than a talking shop; it is China’s instrument to entrench primacy without overt conflict. Unlike NATO or the Quad, which showcase military postures, the SCO emphasises infrastructure, security coordination, and development arenas where China steadily consolidates influence. At Tianjin, Xi spoke of the “dragon and elephant” destined to cooperate, but the framing was deliberate: India’s participation was portrayed as a mutual necessity, not a concession wrung from Delhi. The message to the wider Global South was unmistakable: Asia’s future would be shaped not by Western-led institutions, but by platforms built around Beijing’s vision. For India, the choice was stark: embrace a forum it once mistrusted or risk being left outside the region’s new architecture. The SCO became both refuge and reminder, underscoring that India’s autonomy now required engagement on terms it did not dictate.

While India grappled with this external humility, domestic turbulence deepened the picture of contradiction. On Independence Day, Modi hailed the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh as the “world’s biggest NGO,” provoking outrage from opponents who accused the RSS of opposing the freedom struggle, rejecting the Constitution, and fueling communal division. Congress mocked the organisation as a “Rashtriya Sandighda Sangathan,” questioning its legality and role in weakening democracy. Kerala’s Chief Minister denounced the Prime Minister for equating Savarkar with Gandhi, calling it a betrayal of history. These controversies reinforced the sense of a government projecting ideological triumphalism at home even as it bent abroad. The juxtaposition was striking: a humbled India in Tianjin, where it deferred to Beijing’s stage, and a triumphant India in Delhi, glorifying an outfit accused of undermining its pluralist ethos. Together, they projected not strength, but incoherence a country at once subdued internationally and combative domestically.

In sum, the story of 2025 is not of resurgence but reckoning. Operation Sindoor revealed the limits of bravado, U.S. tariffs exposed the fragility of economic reliance, and Tianjin showed the compulsion of seeking shelter within Chinese-led institutions. The SCO, once peripheral, became central to India’s survival, even as domestic choices inflamed division. For decades, India styled itself as the democratic counterweight to China and the pluralist model for Asia. Now it risks being seen instead as a chastened participant in Beijing’s architecture and a divided polity at home. Power lies not only in action but in narrative; at Tianjin, the narrative belonged to Xi, not Modi. Unless India rebalances with humility, the year 2025 may be remembered not as a stumble but as the moment when the elephant, once proud and independent, found itself tethered to someone else’s stage.

Omay Aimen
The writer frequently contributes to issues concerning national and regional security, focusing on matters having a critical impact on these milieus. She can be reached at omayaimen333@gmail.com