The PAA’s pivot to the Z-10ME was not a choice made in a vacuum. It was the final, logical step on a long and frustrating path paved with broken promises and geopolitical maneuvering. The original modernization plan, a carefully balanced two-tiered approach to acquire 12 Bell AH-1Z Vipers and 30 Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) T129B ATAK helicopters, collapsed under the weight of a fundamental US miscalculation.
Washington’s error was twofold.
First, it underestimated the velocity at which the Chinese defence industry was advancing and scaling, operating under the assumption that Beijing was at least another decade away from producing a truly competitive equivalent to top-tier US platforms. The belief was that Pakistan, facing a capability gap, had no viable alternative and would eventually be forced to accept US terms regarding the withholding of financing support.
Second, it overestimated Pakistan’s patience while also underestimating the PAA’s operational urgency. The aging Cobra fleet was not just obsolete; it was an airworthiness and major safety liability. The need for a replacement was an urgent, non-negotiable requirement.
The historical context of mistrust is deep. The Pressler Amendment of the early 1990s, which blocked the delivery of 28 F-16A/B Block 15 aircraft that Pakistan had already paid for, had left a scar on the relationship. Not only were F-16s withheld, but the US ‘repaid’ Pakistan with soybean stocks, rather than the cash the PAF had needed (for a downpayment for alternate French Mirage 2000/-5 fighters sought in lieu of the F-16s at the time).
This event, where US law unilaterally abrogated an existing contract and withheld Pakistan’s payment for years, created a policy-level reluctance within Rawalpindi to commit its own national funds for major US procurements without the security of co-funding using aid mechanisms like Foreign Military Financing (FMF) or Coalition Support Funds (CSF). These mechanisms were not just for financial relief; rather, they were a litmus test of American commitment.
When the Trump Administration froze the FMF/CSF designated for the AH-1Z deal in 2017 and asked Islamabad to self-fund the acquisition, it triggered this deep-seated institutional memory of the Pressler-era betrayal. Islamabad walked away, just as it had from a self-funded F-16C/D Block 52 deal earlier in 2016. Subsequently, the T129 deal fell victim to Washington’s refusal to issue re-export licenses for its American-made LHTEC T800 engines – a decision tied to broader US geopolitical friction with Turkey.
This was the final straw. It demonstrated to Pakistani defense planners that even sourcing from a non-US, NATO-aligned partner offered no immunity from a US political veto. Supply chain security could only be guaranteed from a source outside the Western orbit.