A new species of the sauropod dinosaur genus Mamenchisaurus has been discovered in China dating back to the Late Jurassic epoch.
Life reconstruction of another Mamenchisaurus species, Mamenchisaurus sinocanadorum. Image credit: Júlia…

A new species of the sauropod dinosaur genus Mamenchisaurus has been discovered in China dating back to the Late Jurassic epoch.
Life reconstruction of another Mamenchisaurus species, Mamenchisaurus sinocanadorum. Image credit: Júlia…

LONDON, Dec 2 (Reuters) – British store chains last month reported lower inflation in the run up to Black Friday sales but higher costs in 2026 mean retailers might struggle to keep inflation on its downward path, the British Retail Consortium said on Tuesday.
Annual shop price inflation of 0.6% in the 12 months to November followed a 1% rise in the 12 months to October, the BRC said.
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Food inflation fell to 3% in November from 3.7%, with fresh food prices dropping by the most since December 2020, although prices for other items including oils, and meats and fish continued to accelerate as producers passed on higher costs to consumers.
The Bank of England is watching food prices closely as it believes they have a big role in shaping public inflation expectations. Britain’s headline inflation rate fell to 3.6% in October.
Prices of non-food items fell by 0.6%.
“With Budget uncertainty behind us, retailers are hoping that consumer confidence rebounds in this crucial trading period and they will continue doing everything they can to keep prices down and help customer’ money go further this Christmas,” Helen Dickinson, Chief Executive of the BRC, said.
“Headwinds in the new year include rising employment costs which are likely to filter through to prices. This could shake already weak consumer confidence and present further challenges for consumers in the year ahead.”
Britain’s food retailers have said that higher employer taxes and regulatory costs as well as increased staff wages, ordered by Reeves in her first budget in October 2024, are adding to inflationary pressure from higher prices for commodities.
Reporting by Suban Abdulla, editing by Andy Bruce
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

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Countries are giving multinational corporations an average 63% tax discount on profits generated from intellectual property.1 The size of the discount is proportionally the same as allowing workers to not pay income tax for seven months of the year.
Countries offering the tax discount are giving away at least US$29 billion of their own tax revenue each year.2 At the same time, they globally cost other countries US$84 billion in tax losses a year, as multinationals respond to the tax discount with abusive profit shifting out of countries where they have their real operations.3
Alex Cobham, chief executive at the Tax Justice Network said:
“Imagine telling the government it can’t tax your wages because you once studied abroad, or better yet, because you’ve stored your diploma in a drawer in another country. Now imagine the government accepting this and letting you not pay tax for seven months of the year. December would be very different for you and your family if you got to stop paying tax on your wages back in May.
“This isn’t too far off from how multinational corporations exploit the ‘pay-where-you-say’ approach that countries have been using to tax multinationals for over 100 years. We need to replace this with a ‘pay-where-you-play’ approach that taxes multinationals where they employ workers and sell goods and services. Countries at the UN have committed to doing just this with a new UN tax convention.”
The large tax discounts are a result of special tax rules known as “patent box” rules.
Alex Cobham said:
“What these special tax rules do is allow multinational corporations to say that their profits weren’t made by workers selling and customers buying goods and services, but by assets they own. That means the profits must be taxed where the assets have been located, which just happens to be in corporate tax havens.”
The justification for the special deal is that the tax giveaways are supposed to incentivise multinational corporations to encourage innovation locally, such as developing new vaccines in local labs. But multinational corporations typically move their patents out of the places where they develop them and into corporate tax havens to underpay tax.
An example is pharma company GSK, which registered drugs it developed, manufactures and markets largely outside the UK under the UK’s patent box rules. Investigators at TaxWatch found that in 2024 alone, GSK gained a £486 million tax discount in the UK from patent box rules meant to incentivise innovation in the UK applied to drug patents that at least some of which GSK had developed outside the country.4 This tax discount was larger than the entire annual budget that year of the Biotechnology & Biological Sciences Research Council, the UK government’s main funding arm for bio-science innovation .
The tax discount doesn’t just cause the UK to give up huge sums of tax revenue, but also forces the countries where those drugs are being manufactured to forgo the revenues.
Alex Cobham said:
“If you’re buying someone a smartwatch this Christmas, you’ll pay with your taxed income and pay VAT. But the multinational profiting from your purchase likely won’t get taxed properly, if at all, because governments must abide by the make-believe that the profit arises in the tax haven where the smartwatch’s patent is registered, not in the country where you bought the smartwatch nor in the country where it was built or designed.”
The Tax Justice Network’s findings come as countries at the UN negotiate an end to this costly, globally-enforced make-believe.
Exploiting patent box rules is just one instance of how multinational corporations exploit the 100-year-old “pay-where-you-say” approach at the heart of the global tax system, which the Tax Justice Network argues must be replaced with a “pay-where-you-play” approach.5
The “pay-where-you-say” approach – adopted by the League of Nations in the 1920s and dating back to a time when most households didn’t have electricity and most countries were colonies – taxes multinationals corporations based on where they declare their profits. Modern multinational corporations, which are very different to international corporations from the 1920s, exploit this approach by moving their profit out of the countries where they make it and into corporate tax havens before they declare it, resulting in countries losing US$348 billion in corporate tax a year6. Exploiting patent box rules is one of the many levers multinationals use to move their profit out of countries.
In contrast, the “pay-where-you-play” approach taxes multinational corporations based on where they do business. That is, where they employ workers and make and sells goods and services to make their profit – regardless of where they declare the profit in the end.
Countries at the UN have already committed to replacing the “pay-where-you-say” approach with a new approach based on a “fair allocation of taxing rights” as part of the new UN tax convention being negotiated. In last month’s negotiations, countries focused on what alternative approaches might look. Most countries backed the latest draft text of the convention, which sets out a “pay-where-you-play” approach.7
The Tax Justice Network finds that 42 countries have patent box rules, or are fully exempting multinational corporations from paying tax, out of the sample of 70 countries monitored on the Tax Justice Network’s Corporate Tax Haven Index – which is a ranking of countries most complicit in helping multinational corporations underpay tax.8 The findings are part of the latest rolling update to the index, which saw little change in countries’ regulations and standings since 2024.9 The top 10 ranking jurisdictions today are: British Virgin Islands (1st), Cayman Islands (2nd), Switzerland (3rd), Bermuda (4th), Singapore (5th), Hong Kong (6th), Netherlands (7th), Jersey (8th), Ireland (9th) and Luxembourg (10th).
If countries were to eliminate their patent box rules, they would on average drop 1 place on the ranking as a result of the single regulatory change, and reduce their contribution to global corporate tax abuse by 12%.
They would also recover the billions in tax that are given up every year under patent box rules. Those with the most to gain are the US, the UK and the Netherlands. The US would drop 2 places and gain US$15.9 billion in tax; the UK would drop 1 place and gain £2.3 billion; the Netherlands would drop 1 place and gain €2.4 billion.10
Tax experts and campaigners like the Tax Justice Network argue that tax incentives better support innovation and cut out tax abuse when they are applied to costs, rather than to profits the way patent boxes are. Subsidising the costs of research and development more effectively reduces barriers to innovation than the promise of a bigger payout. This directly boosts job creation and local economic activity. When tax incentives are applied to just costs, they provide a benefit only when and where a cost is incurred, leaving no benefit to be gained by shifting profit into tax havens.
-ENDs-
Notes to editor
Second are jurisdictions that allow a 0% or near-0% corporate income tax rate under specific circumstances, which when used in conjunction with patents or intellectual property, enable patents to be used to shift profit and abuse corporate tax. The OECD’s evaluations disregard the presence of these rules in its identification of jurisdictions that provide profit-based incentives on patents. For instance, 6 jurisdictions fully exempting foreign IP income are disregarded from the OECD assessment of IP tax regimes (Aruba, Costa Risa, Hong Kong, Liberia, Singapore, Seychelles), insofar as the 0% tax rate effectively applicable to foreign IP income is not considered by the OECD. The same happens with tax systems that de facto allow for full or nearly full exemption from CIT under specific (yet broadly applicable) circumstances. Indeed, the OECD disregards 0% or near 0% tax rates available for IP income accrued by resident companies for at least 5 countries (Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, United Arab Emirates).
Both the first and second category, into which most unidentified jurisdictions fall, are cases where a jurisdiction’s tax rules are designed in a way that enables profit-based incentives on patents without having a specific tax rule on patents. While these can be said to be a difference in perspective between the OECD and Tax Justice Network, to countries working to tackle cross-border corporate tax abuse costing them billions every year, the OECD’s approach leaves a significant blind spot.

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Drug pricing reform has moved to the centre of political debate. In the US, Medicare is beginning to negotiate prices under the Inflation Reduction Act, while the EU is pursuing sweeping changes to exclusivity periods, antibiotic incentives, and shortage management rules. Voters want medicines to be more affordable. But behind this push lies a complex economic challenge: lower prices today may affect the new treatments available tomorrow (Acemoglu and Linn 2004, Kyle and McGahan 2012, Dubois et al. 2015, Cockburn et al. 2016).
Pharmaceutical innovation behaves like a global public good. Once knowledge is created, its benefits spread well beyond borders. Yet the financing of this knowledge remains national, shaped by each country’s reimbursement, pricing, and regulatory system. Research, including Egan and Philipson (2013) and Frech et al. (2023), shows that this disconnect generates powerful international spillovers. A price cut in one major market alters global expected profits and thus global incentives to innovate. Understanding these spillovers is crucial for designing sustainable policy, especially at a moment when countries are rewriting the rules.
Pharmaceutical innovation has driven large health gains worldwide. In the US, new medicines accounted for 35% of the 3.3 years of life-expectancy gains from 1990 to 2015 (Buxbaum et al. 2020). In Spain, they explained 96% of the rise in age at cancer death between 1999 and 2016 (Lichtenberg 2023). Across more than 50 countries, the health improvements generated by new drug launches far exceeded their costs (Lichtenberg 2005).
Yet diffusion is uneven. High-income countries get earlier access to new medicines, while unsurprisingly, lower-income countries free-ride on innovation financed elsewhere. Even amongst wealthy countries, variation in pricing rules leads to different speeds of access and differing contributions to global R&D.
New drug approvals have risen consistently over the last fifteen years (Figure 1), but sustaining this trajectory requires substantial investment in innovation.
Figure 1 Global trend in new drug approvals
Figure 2 shows that R&D investment is still growing. The geography of these R&D investments shows a growing importance of Asia and a lowering of the concentration of clinical trials in the US, except for Phase II.
Figure 2 Active clinical trials per phase per year
Figure 3 Share of US clinical trials per phase per year
R&D for new medicines is extraordinarily risky. Only 8.6% of drugs entering Phase I ultimately reach approval (Dubois 2025). The average R&D cost now exceeds $2 billion per approved drug (DiMasi et al. 2016). Incentives therefore matter greatly.
Push incentives include research grants, National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding, and tax credits. These early-stage inputs have high social returns; for example, a $10 million increase in NIH funding generates 2.3 additional private patents (Azoulay et al. 2019).
Pull incentives (patents, market exclusivity, advanced market commitments, priority review vouchers) reward successful development. Their effectiveness depends heavily on expected revenues, which are directly shaped by national pricing and reimbursement systems. That is why unilateral pricing reforms in one country influence innovation incentives everywhere.
Recent work identifies several pathways through which national policies spill over internationally.
Free-riding and strategic substitution occur when one country raises prices and others feel less compelled to do so. Egan and Philipson (2013) describe pricing as strategic substitutes: if one country pays more, another can pay less without reducing global innovation.
Spillovers across countries also come from regulations like international reference pricing linking domestic prices to foreign ones. These policies compress price differences but distort launch strategies. Firms delay entry into lower-price countries to avoid pulling down prices in high-price markets. Evidence shows delays of up to one year in parts of the EU (Maini and Pammolli 2023). Moreover, if the US adopted reference pricing, reference countries might have to accept higher prices as firms want to preserve US margins (Dubois et al. 2022).
Parallel trade within the EU allows medicines bought in low-price states to be resold in high-price ones. This reduces price variation but shifts bargaining power toward pharmacy chains and distributors. Dubois and Sæthre (2020) show that parallel trade can cut manufacturers’ profits by up to 50%, and firms sometimes restrict supply to prevent arbitrage – raising prices in source countries.
Drug shortages reveal another dimension of spillovers. According to Dubois et al. (2023), high prices in one large country can pull supply away from others, causing shortages. But higher global prices can also incentivise firms to expand capacity, benefiting everyone. Countries that push prices too low risk inducing supply instability.
Thus, most national reforms reverberate across borders, affecting both present-day access and long-term innovation.
A central parameter in these debates is the elasticity of innovation to market size. Estimates vary widely but consistently show a positive relationship (about 1.0 in Acemoglu and Linn 2004; 2.75 for vaccines in Finkelstein 2004; and 0.23–0.30 globally in Dubois et al. 2015). Even at the lower end of these estimates, significant price cuts in major markets can meaningfully reduce global R&D. This is particularly relevant as Medicare negotiations begin and the EU revises exclusivity rules.
In a new paper (Dubois 2025), I find that pharmaceutical revenues matter for innovation but not identically across regions. Indeed, the US and EU markets have strong positive spillovers across innovations from companies headquartered in each of these regions, while the innovations coming from the rest of the world mostly respond to local expected revenue, reflecting the fact that local positive spillovers create additional incentives to invest when the expected revenue is coming more from the company’s headquarters location.
Surprisingly, the elasticity of innovation from companies headquartered in Europe or the US with respect to the expected revenue in the rest of the world is negative, a possible result of international free-riding, but compensated by the positive elasticity of innovation coming from the rest of the world.
Because innovation spillovers are global, policies built on purely national reasoning will underprovide innovation. Several reforms could help. Coordinated value-based pricing would reduce distortionary reference-pricing dynamics and bring faster, more predictable access across countries. Global innovation funds could support areas with low commercial returns, such as antibiotics or rare paediatric diseases. Transferable exclusivity extensions, if tightly designed, can deliver high-priority innovation at lower fiscal cost than cash subsidies (Dubois et al. 2022). Agreements on launch sequencing could reduce strategic delays in low-price markets and provide more stable global incentives.
Innovation is too important and too globally interconnected to rely on fragmented national decisions. A reimbursement reform in Canada, a reference-pricing rule in Italy, or a shift in Medicare policy affects not only local patients but the worldwide development of future therapies. If we want sustained innovation alongside affordable access, drug-pricing policy must integrate global spillovers into its design. Innovation is a global public good. It requires global-minded policy.
Acemoglu, D, and J Linn (2004), “Market size in innovation: Theory and evidence from the pharmaceutical industry”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(3): 1049–90.
Azoulay, P, J S Graff Zivin, D Li, and B N Sampat (2019), “Public R&D investments and private sector patenting: Evidence from NIH funding rules”, The Review of Economic Studies 86(1): 117–52.
Buxbaum, J D, M E Chernew, A M Fendrick, and D M Cutler (2020), “Contributions of public health, pharmaceuticals, and other medical care to US life expectancy changes, 1990–2015”, Health Affairs 39(9): 1546–56.
Cockburn, I M, J O Lanjouw, and M Schankerman (2016), “Patents and the global diffusion of new drugs”, American Economic Review 106(1): 136–64.
DiMasi, J A, R W Hansen, and H G Grabowski (2016), “Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: New estimates of R&D costs”, Journal of Health Economics 47: 20–33.
Dubois, P (2025), “Pharmaceutical regulation and incentives for innovation in an international perspective”, CEPR Discussion Paper 20728.
Dubois, P, O de Mouzon, F Scott-Morton, and P Seabright (2015), “Market size and pharmaceutical innovation”, The RAND Journal of Economics 46(4): 844–71.
Dubois, P, A Gandhi, and S Vasserman (2022), “Bargaining and international reference pricing in the pharmaceutical industry”, NBER Working Paper 30053.
Dubois, P, G Majewska, and V Reig (2023), “Drug shortages: Empirical evidence from France”, TSE Working Paper 23–1417, Toulouse School of Economics.
Dubois, P, P-H Moisson, and J Tirole (2022), “The economics of transferable patent extensions”, TSE Working Paper 1377.
Dubois, P, and M Sæthre (2020), “On the effect of parallel trade on manufacturers’ and retailers’ profits in the pharmaceutical sector”, Econometrica 88(6): 2503–45.
Egan, M, and T J Philipson (2013), “International health economics”, NBER Working Paper 19280.
Finkelstein, A (2004), “Static and dynamic effects of health policy: Evidence from the vaccine industry”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(2): 527–64.
Frech, H E, M V Pauly, W S Comanor, and J R Martinez (2023), “Pharmaceutical pricing and R&D as a global public good”, NBER Working Paper 31272.
Kyle, M K, and A M McGahan (2012), “Investments in pharmaceuticals before and after TRIPS”, Review of Economics and Statistics 94: 1157–72.
Lichtenberg, F R (2005), “The impact of new drug launches on longevity: Evidence from longitudinal, disease-level data from 52 countries, 1982–2001”, International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics 5(1): 47–73.
Lichtenberg, F R (2023), “The relationship between pharmaceutical innovation and cancer mortality in Spain, from 1999 to 2016”, Value in Health 26(12): 1711–20.
Maini, L, and F Pammolli (2023), “Reference pricing as a deterrent to entry: Evidence from the European pharmaceutical market”, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 15(2): 345–83.

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