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Foreign ownership in Indonesia is rarely a binary yes-or-no determination. Most sectors are open to foreign capital in principle, but access is shaped by ownership limits, scale requirements, licensing conditions, or mandatory local participation.

For foreign investors, the central question is not whether Indonesia allows foreign investment, but whether a specific business model can operate legally, sustainably, and at the intended scale within the country’s regulatory framework.

How Indonesia determines foreign access

Indonesia regulates foreign participation at the level of business activities, not at the level of the investor or the company’s name. Whether a foreign investor may own a company outright, hold a minority position, or must partner with a local entity depends on how the proposed activities are defined and how those activities are treated under national investment policy.

Ownership rules are set centrally but applied through a licensing framework influenced by sector ministries. As a result, access outcomes are structured rather than arbitrary, but they are also not automatic. Participation reflects policy priorities, sector sensitivity, and economic impact rather than purely commercial intent.

Reading the Positive Investment List in practical terms

The Positive Investment List functions as a policy filter rather than a definitive permission table.

It categorizes activities as open, conditionally open, capped, or reserved based on national priorities.

In practice, the list provides orientation rather than certainty. While it establishes broad eligibility, it does not operate independently from licensing interpretation or sector regulation. Actual access depends on how activities are applied within the licensing system and whether accompanying conditions are met. A sector may appear open on paper while remaining constrained in execution due to ownership caps, investment scale requirements, or sector-specific licensing conditions.

How foreign participation is structurally restricted

Foreign participation is shaped through overlapping regulatory mechanisms rather than a single rule. In some activities, foreign ownership is capped at defined levels such as 49 percent or 67 percent, requiring Indonesian participation regardless of investment scale. These caps affect not only equity participation but also control, governance, and the ability to make unilateral decisions.

In other activities, access is conditioned primarily on scale rather than ownership percentage. Indonesia applies investment plan value thresholds to determine whether certain activities are open to foreign investors. In many sectors, foreign participation is permitted only where the planned total investment value meets or exceeds IDR 10 billion (US$590,000). This threshold is assessed at the project level and is distinct from paid-up capital requirements. As a result, an investment can be legally incorporable but practically inaccessible if its planned scale does not meet policy expectations.

These mechanisms operate together. Compliance with an ownership cap does not negate scale requirements, and meeting an investment threshold does not override sector-specific licensing conditions. Feasibility must therefore be assessed holistically rather than rule by rule.

Why business activity definition determines outcomes

The way a business defines its activities is a structural decision with long-term consequences. Similar commercial models can face materially different ownership outcomes depending on how activities are classified within Indonesia’s regulatory framework.

Two investors pursuing the same revenue model may receive different ownership treatment if one defines its activities narrowly while the other adopts a broader or differently framed scope. These differences may not prevent incorporation, but they often surface later when additional licenses are required, when activities expand beyond the original scope, or when records are reviewed during audits or regulatory checks.

Activity definition determines not only initial access but also the durability of that access over time.

Capital structure and practical market access

Capital requirements operate on two distinct levels. At incorporation, foreign-owned companies are required to issue and pay up a minimum of IDR 2.5 billion in capital (US$145,000) under statutory company law requirements. This threshold enables legal establishment, but it does not determine whether an activity is accessible in practice.

Separately, many sectors assess feasibility based on investment plan value rather than equity contributions. Where foreign participation is conditioned on a minimum planned investment of IDR 10 billion (US$590,000), capital may be deployed progressively rather than paid up in full at entry. However, the approved investment plan anchors regulatory expectations. Significant deviations between approved plans and actual deployment can trigger licensing issues or additional scrutiny, affecting both cost and flexibility.

Capital planning shapes not only entry feasibility but also execution risk and long-term regulatory stability.

When local partnerships become mandatory

Local partnerships arise when ownership caps restrict foreign participation beyond defined thresholds. In these cases, joint ventures are regulatory outcomes rather than strategic preferences.

Mandatory partnerships affect feasibility in several ways. Capped ownership limits influence control over decision-making, pace of execution, and governance structure. They also complicate exit options, as transfers of shares are constrained by ownership rules and regulatory approvals. For investors, the key question is whether the required partnership structure aligns with commercial objectives and long-term risk tolerance, not merely whether a local partner can be identified.

Areas of interpretation and regulatory exposure

Not all sector access rules are explicit or uniformly applied. Regulatory interpretation, precedent, and administrative practice influence outcomes, particularly in activities involving hybrid business models or evolving sectors.

Interpretive exposure is often not visible at entry. It tends to emerge as the business scales adds activities, seeks financing, undergoes restructuring, or prepares for M&A or exit transactions. Where ownership caps or investment thresholds apply, alignment between activity definition, investment classification, and licensing commonly extends approval timelines from several weeks to several months, increasing both cost and execution risk.

Long-term strategic implications

Foreign ownership conditions extend beyond initial market entry. They shape scalability, restructuring risk, acquisition options, exit flexibility, and valuation.

Once ownership structures, activity definitions, and investment classifications are embedded in licensing approvals, later changes are assessed against the original configuration. 

Assumptions that create structural risk

Foreign investors often assume that ownership limits can be bypassed through structuring shortcuts, adjusted easily after incorporation, or offset through flexible capital declarations. In practice, ownership and investment rules are enforced structurally rather than informally.

These assumptions rarely fail at entry. They tend to fail when transaction size increases, when external financing is introduced, or when exit and M&A activity is contemplated, at which point earlier design decisions are reassessed under heightened scrutiny.

Ownership assessment as a feasibility decision

Foreign ownership analysis belongs at the feasibility stage, before incorporation and capital commitment. Ownership rules and investment thresholds determine whether an investment is structurally viable and whether Indonesia is the right market for a given business model, not merely how to enter it.

Bottles of children’s play sand have been withdrawn from shelves by the craft retailer Hobbycraft after a parent discovered they were contaminated with asbestos.

The parent, who did not wish to be named, raised the alarm after her children played with the sand at a party.

She sent samples off to a testing lab, which found traces of asbestos fibres in the bottles of yellow, green and pink sand sold in Hobbycraft’s Giant Box of Craft arts kit.

Asbestos can cause cancer in later life if inhaled, although the risk to children who played with the sand is thought to be low.

The discovery came two months after asbestos traces found in similar play sand products in Australia prompted a government recall and the closure of schools and nurseries across the country and in New Zealand.

All the affected products are manufactured in China, where items containing less than 5% of asbestos can be labelled asbestos-free. UK law says that there is no safe limit for exposure to the mineral.

The parent said: “The bottles of coloured sand looked extremely similar to ones I had seen on a news report of play sand recalled in Australia.

“I was concerned enough to buy a set at Hobbycraft and send it to an accredited lab for testing. Three of the five colours came back positive for fibrous tremolite asbestos.”

She alerted Hobbycraft, which withdrew the product from sale but declined to issue a recall notice. “I am getting increasingly upset thinking that kids are being exposed unnecessarily,” she said.

Hobbycraft said that no UK authority had warned of a risk and that there was no evidence of harm to customers.

However, a spokesperson said: “As a precaution, we have voluntarily removed the product from sale while we carry out independent testing … We will update customers as soon as we are in a position to do so.”

A government source criticised Hobbycraft’s response. “Parents are right to be concerned by this,” the source said. “Officials are investigating, but there’s no good reason why Hobbycraft shouldn’t recall this themselves, given the evidence.”

The issue highlights post-Brexit gaps in health and safety law, which leave authorities unable to issue recalls without hard evidence of harm to health.

The so-called “precautionary principle”, abolished when product safety legislation was redrafted after Brexit, allowed the government to restrict products thought to pose a serious threat to health, without having to acquire scientific evidence.

Campaigners, including the British Occupational Hygiene Society, have criticised the government for refusing to reinstate powers to withdraw potentially hazardous goods when product safety laws were redrafted last year. Current rules rely on exporting countries to alert authorities to problem products.

“We know that there is no way that every product landing on British doorsteps can be tested individually for safety and the labels can’t be made to tell the truth, so, it was a missed opportunity for the government,” said Prof Kevin Bampton, CEO of the British Occupational Hygiene Society.

“We do have the precautionary principle for the environment, which means that bats and newts in some ways have better protection than people working in Britain and, potentially, our children.”

The Department for Business and Trade rejected the claims.

“We have some of the most robust product safety laws in the world and any product being put on the UK market by businesses must meet our strict criteria,” said a spokesperson.

According to the British Occupational Hygiene Society, the health risk to children who played with the contaminated sand is likely to be low, as there were only small quantities in the bottles.

However, Bampton warned that the long-term risks of exposure to asbestos remain little understood. He said: “This issue should be a wake-up call for regulatory change, so governments can be proactive, act fast and protect human health from risks before they protect profit.”