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Just before dawn, Kashif Sameer joins dozens of couriers zipping across Mumbai to deliver items stocked in a basement of a shopping mall run by Reliance Industries.

“I make between 20 and 30 deliveries in a day,” said the 25-year-old, who had just driven a mile across the chaotic roads of the Indian megacity to drop off groceries ordered 15 minutes earlier. “It is very popular with customers.”

The buzzing activity at the so-called dark store, a mini-warehouse operated by Reliance’s ecommerce platform JioMart, is part of a renewed push by the conglomerate’s chair and Asia’s richest man, Mukesh Ambani, to reassert his company’s position in India’s retail market.

It has added hundreds of dark stores and opened nearly 20,000 physical outlets this year — almost double its pre-pandemic size — as it battles for dominance against Blinkit, Swiggy and Zepto in the country’s ballooning quick-commerce market.

“It’s a question of who runs out of money first,” said Arvind Singhal, chair of retail consultancy The Knowledge Company. “We will see some kind of a shakeout.”

Despite its large network of physical stores, Reliance has yet to corner the domestic consumer market like it did with telecoms a decade ago. It faces entrenched competition from established domestic and international rivals, as well as millions of kiranas, family-run convenience stores.

The sprawling Tata Group operates a wide range of consumer businesses, while global multinationals such as Unilever and Nestlé are important players in India’s household goods market.

Reliance Retail, the division that contains all of the conglomerate’s consumer-facing units, had shed tens of thousands of employees and closed underperforming stores following a bloated build-out during the Covid-19 pandemic and slowing middle-class spending.

But India’s most valuable company, which has a market value of more than $225bn and operates across oil refining, telecoms and entertainment, is expanding its retail reach again.

Reliance Retail’s latest results point to a rebound. In the quarter ending September, the unit reported revenue of about $10bn and profit of $390mn, up 18 and 22 per cent respectively from the previous year.

“Reliance’s scale in retail now is unmatched in India,” said Devangshu Dutta, chief executive of consumer advisory company Third Eyesight, in reference to the breadth of the conglomerate’s business. “This scale is unique in India and rare in global retail.”

Ambani’s retail ambitions are being led by his 34-year-old daughter, Isha. In August, she detailed plans for Reliance’s consumer brands subsidiary, which has a portfolio including Lotus Chocolate and the recently revived nostalgic Indian soft drink Campa Cola, to reach $11.7bn in revenue within five years.

Ultimately, the goal was to “become India’s largest FMCG company with a global presence”, said Isha Ambani during Reliance’s annual meeting.

The company told the Financial Times that it continued to “reinforce its position as India’s largest retailer, expanding its nationwide network”.

While Ambani originally indicated that he wanted to list Reliance Jio Infocomm, the telecoms unit, and Reliance Retail by 2024, people familiar with the company said the retail unit was not ready to go public. The billionaire said the Jio listing could happen in the first half of next year.

“Competitive intensity in every category in the discretionary retail side has picked up very sharply,” said Karan Taurani, executive vice-president at Elara Capital, who does not expect Reliance Retail to float for at least two years. “New competitors, new brands have come in and they are challenging the larger incumbents.”

The Ambanis, who operate as gatekeepers for foreign corporations seeking access to India’s massive but challenging business landscape, have sought to cement their position through a spate of partnerships with western retails brands.

Foreign brands including West Elm, Pottery Barn and Superdry have stores in Reliance’s shopping malls in upmarket Mumbai. However, those joint ventures have largely struggled to gain traction with shoppers in India, where the per capita income remains less than $3,000.

The conglomerate’s foreign brands business housing these joint ventures lost Rs2.7bn ($30mn) in the financial year through March 2025, according to the latest available accounts. The Knowledge Company’s Singhal called Reliance’s push to bring international names to India “a vanity project”.

Reliance’s high-profile partnership with fast-fashion retailer Shein has also been underwhelming. The company returned to India earlier this year under Reliance’s wing after being booted out in 2020 when relations between New Delhi and Beijing soured following military clashes along their disputed border.

Shein’s app has been downloaded just 11mn times so far, according to market intelligence firm Sensor Tower. Its discount prices are largely matched, if not undercut, by many Indian ecommerce and fashion retailers, say analysts.

Reliance is investing heavily in quick commerce, where deliveries are promised in 30 minutes or less. Bank of America estimates the market could reach $128bn by 2030.

The field is at present dominated by Blinkit, Swiggy and Zepto, which together control more than 90 per cent of the quick commerce delivery market and compete with Amazon and Walmart-owned Flipkart. None of the companies are profitable.

The Ambanis are eager to catch up. Over the past six months, Reliance has built about 600 dark stores across cities to plug gaps in its vast store network. By contrast, market leader Blinkit operates about 1,800 dark stores.

In quick commerce, “we have to be there because everybody is”, said a person close to the conglomerate. “It is a long-term strategy.”

On a call with analysts last month, Reliance Retail’s finance chief Dinesh Taluja admitted to delays in entering quick commerce. But he insisted that Reliance offered better prices, more variety and wider reach across smaller Indian cities where it is often the only formal retailer.

“The competition today is mainly in the top 10, 20 cities,” Taluja said. “We are present in almost a thousand cities. Competition will take many years to reach where we already have a head start there.”

Still, Reliance was facing an uphill battle, warned Elara’s Taurani. “JioMart is making a late entry,” he said, “it will be very tough to disrupt players here.”

The company, one of Malaysia’s largest property developers, is in talks with advisers and looking to list a Malaysia REIT on Bursa Malaysia in 2026 and a Singapore REIT on SGX in 2027, the sources added.

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The Malaysian REIT is expected to include domestic assets valued at about 7 billion to 8 billion ringgit ($1.7 billion to 1.9 billion), while the Singapore REIT will cover assets worth S$7 billion to S$8 billion ($5.4 billion to $6.1 billion), they said.

The Singapore REIT may include marquee properties such as South Beach Tower, South Beach Avenue, and IOI Central Boulevard Towers, one of the sources said.

The company has yet to decide the amount to be raised or the final asset mix, said the sources, who declined to be identified, as the matter is private.

In a emailed response to Reuters, IOI Properties Group said it was “strategically considering and reviewing various possibilities with regard to monetising our assets and capital management as we look to ensure the Group’s sustained growth ahead, specifically in Malaysia and Singapore”.

The review of potential REITs, particularly for Malaysian assets, was part of its 2026 strategic plans aimed at diversification, boosting earnings and ensuring long-term stability, it added.

The group has grown to have total assets of 46.9 billion ringgit as of June 2025, its annual report shows.

Its Malaysian portfolio includes IOI City Mall in Putrajaya, the country’s largest shopping complex, IOI Mall Damansara and office towers in the Klang Valley.

In Singapore, the group owns IOI Central Boulevard Towers in Marina Bay and recently acquired full ownership of the South Beach mixed-use development for S$835 million ($641.22 million).

(This story has been corrected to change the year of listing to 2014, from 2024, in paragraph 9)

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