Category: 3. Business

Carolyn Kissane, academic director and clinical professor at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University, leads the conversation on the geopolitics of oil.

 

FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to the final session of the Winter/Spring 2023 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I’m Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR.

Today’s discussion is on the record. And the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/Academic, if you would like to share these materials with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.

We are delighted to have Carolyn Kissane with us to discuss the geopolitics of oil. Dr. Kissane is the academic director of both the graduate program in global affairs and the graduate program in global security conflict and cybercrime at NYU’s Center for Global Affairs, where she is also a clinical professor. She also serves as director of the energy, climate justice, and sustainability lab in the School of Professional Studies at NYU. She was named in 2013 by Breaking Energy as one of the top ten New York women in energy, and top ten energy communicator. She’s a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, and serves on several boards.

So, Carolyn, thanks very much for doing this. We really appreciate it.

I thought we could begin by talking about how has the geopolitics of oil changed, especially vis-à-vis Russia’s war in Ukraine and OPEC’s recent announcement to cut oil production?

KISSANE: Well, first of all, I’d just like to say, thank you so very much for having me. I’m really delighted. I am a big fan of CFR’s Academic Webinars. So, to have the opportunity to participate in this—in this way is very meaningful to me. So, thank you.

So, wow. There is so much happening in this space, the geopolitics of oil. This has been a tremendous fourteen months. Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine very much upended the geopolitics of oil because Russia is a significant producer, one of the top three in the world.

And it’s—you know, it’s caused a kind of a reshaping, a kind of a remapping of the—of oil geopolitics. And we’ve seen some, you know, shifts in how countries think about oil security, in light of larger questions about broader energy security questions. And also, on top of that, is the ongoing energy transition, coupled with, you know, climate change, and the need to decarbonize.

So, there’s just—it’s been quite a—you know, a year and a half, that has really sort of put energy security, and oil security, very much at the forefront of people’s minds.

FASKIANOS: Fantastic.

I thought maybe you had some really interesting data to show us. And if you could walk us through those—the trends you are seeing and really bring it to life, that would be fantastic.

KISSANE: Sure.

So, before I do—I have a couple of slides. And before I share my slides, I think it’s really important that, sort of, we understand how interconnected, sort of, the global energy system is, and how interconnected we are, when it comes to the flows of oil.

You know, some countries are very well resourced-endowed, so they have oil. And other countries do not, so they need to import oil. There’s really no country in the world that doesn’t need oil for larger national security issues. And I think one of things that many people sort of are not necessarily aware of or think about, is the amount of oil that gets produced every day.

So, every day, the world consumes over 100 million barrels a day. And every day, that 100 million barrels has to be—has to be moved. It has to be—you know, as part of getting it into the system, getting it to its respective destinations. And what we’re not seeing—which, maybe some people may have thought that we would see at this point—is we’re not seeing a reduction in demand, but we’re seeing an expansion in demand. And much of that global demand is coming out of Asia. And we’re also, of course, seeing the—with the reopening of China, lots of really interesting questions as to what oil demand will be in China for the 2023-2024 years, whether or not they will—they will, sort of, put extra pressure on global demand.

And you know, Irina, just also, you know, it’s—I’m going to share this in my slides. But you know, last week’s decision from OPEC+ to reduce production, of course, had an impact on the price of oil. So when the decision was announced on Sunday, by Monday morning, we saw an uptick in the price. It’s stabilized, but we are sort of looking at $80-plus-a-barrel oil. And again, lots of uncertainty as to what that’s going to mean across economies that are in recessions, experiencing sort of the beginnings of a recession, and sort of what does it mean for the global economy, where we may see sort of more energy inflation.

So, one of the things that I really like to do when I teach the geopolitics of oil is sort of show some visuals. Because I think, again, sort of, really reinforcing the interconnected nature of our global energy system, but also sort of seeing where in the world is oil produced, and where in the world are the—are the importers. And also, just a couple of sort of fun pieces on what we have seen, just this—you know, in the last week, of course, some of this—you’ll be familiar with, those in the audience—but this decision on the part of OPEC to reduce production by 1.2 million barrels a day—again, happening at a time, not when we have an excess supply, but when we’re seeing a tight supply across the oil market. So, it came as a bit of a surprise to—you know—to even the most, you know, longstanding analysts and OPEC observers.

And again, part of this is directed probably toward self-interests on the part of Saudi Arabia and the oil producers that are really going to make the cuts. But of course, it also has an impact here for those of you that are sitting in the United States. What does it mean then for prices that Americans pay at the gas pump? So, the Biden administration sort of came out after this decision was made in sort of being disappointed, surprised that OPEC would make this decision.

Now, it’s also important to sort of recognize that this is not just a singular OPEC decision. This is part of, now, a larger OPEC+. And OPEC+ does also include Russia, as well as other countries like Kazakhstan and Mexico. So, the OPEC that we have historically known is now different, because you have other countries that are not official members but nonetheless are part of what we now refer to as OPEC+.

And these are the countries that are part of OPEC, and really the country that’s considered to be sort of in the driver’s seat of OPEC is that of Saudi Arabia, because Saudi Arabia is the largest producer within the OPEC organization, producing anywhere from 10 to 11 million barrels a day. Venezuela has the largest reserves, but it is far from being at capacity, in terms of what it can—what it can produce. So, just to kind of put that into perspective, these are OPEC countries and their respective reserves.

And then non-OPEC—the United States being a non-OPEC country, but again, this sort of—this chart to the right shows, you know, again, the world is consuming a little over 100 million barrels a day, expected to increase over 2023 and into 2024, question marks as to when we may see peak oil demand.

But again, to sort of link this to energy security—energy security, especially when it’s in the context of oil security—is making sure that we have adequate supply at affordable prices. So, when we see a reduction in supply at a time of tight markets, that suggests that we’re also going to see higher prices that’s going to directly hit vulnerable economies.

And so, again, just to sort of point out sort of where in the world sort of are the top three oil producers: the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. Russia remains in the top three. Canada as well, our, you know, neighbor to the north. And China is also a producer of oil. The United States figure here also includes gas liquefied, so liquid petroleum, which the United States is endowed with a lot of both oil and natural gas.

And then the top oil consuming countries, you have U.S., China, and India. Now, the United States is not the largest importer. That position is now held by China. But as far as consumption goes, we consume over 20 million barrels a day. Again, big question mark about China, in terms of whether or not we will see higher demand coming out of China over the next year, two years, with China’s reopening and what is being, you know, discussed as revenge tourism. And more Chinese who have accumulated a lot of savings, 2.1 trillion, how are they going to use that savings and whether or not, after three years of being under lockdown restrictions, whether or not we’ll see impacts to demand.

And I think Russia is—there’s lots of questions about Russia. And this is now—we’re fourteen months into, you know, Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine—and I emphasize reinvasion, because oftentimes, we forget that, you know, Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014. But Russia is still moving its oil. And up until, you know, a few months ago, its overall production and exports were as high—at some points, even higher—than pre-invasion. Now, you have new countries that are takers of Russian oil, and they’re buying it at discounted prices. We see Turkey, Singapore, China has been a big buyer, as well as India, that they have been buying discounted Russian oil. Lots of interesting questions that we could discuss about the oil price cap and seaborne embargo to Europe. But I think the takeaway from this slide is that Russia continues to produce oil, continues to sell it, selling at a discounted price, but there are still many countries in the world that are eager to take Russian oil.

And again, I’m not going to go into this, but I just love this slide, to just emphasize the—you know, the world’s pipelines. These are the pipelines that help sort of the transit of oil. Something also that’s really unique and interesting to look at is just tanker traffic, so, the tankers that carry oil around the world. But again, you know, there are a lot of pipelines, so twenty-three—two thousand, three hundred, and eighty-one operational oil and gas pipelines. Again, these are—it’s moving a lot of the oil that is consumed every day.

And then finally, is this—is—you know, one of the things that we oftentimes—we think about the hundred million barrels a day that the world is consuming, over 75 percent of the world’s oil is controlled, managed by state-owned oil companies. So, Saudi Aramco being one, PDVSA of Venezuela being another. But it’s really important to sort of recognize the position that state-owned companies have. The rest is controlled or managed by international oil companies—ExxonMobil, Chevron, ENI, Total, and a host of other—host of other companies.

But again, I think the—you know, to understand that NOCs, as they’re referred to, are very, very important for understanding their role in the larger context of the geopolitics of oil.

And again, what we saw last week coming out of OPEC, this decision, this is also being driven by state budget concerns. This is—again, it’s about the production of oil, but it’s also about, you know, governments and their budgets. And oftentimes, you know, there is a desire to add more, rather than—you know, more revenues rather than less.

So, those are the slides that I have. And I hope that they sort of provide some sort of context, and a little bit of, you know, that we can discuss in the questions that I really look forward to answering from the audience.

FASKIANOS: Thank you, Carolyn. That was great.

So now, we’re going to go to all of you for your questions and comments.

(Gives queuing instructions.)

All right, so I’m going to go to the first raised hand in the thing. Amadine Hom, go to you first, and please accept the—unmute yourself.

(Pause.)

You are still muted.

(Pause.)

OK, I don’t know—are you there? Oh, I think—OK.

Let’s go to Morton Holbrook.

Q: Yes, good afternoon.

Dr. Kissane, what a shocking presentation—(laughs)—a hundred million barrels a day and it’s going up, notwithstanding the Paris Climate Agreement of 2015. Is that agreement simply a dead letter, or is it having any effect on oil—on fossil fuel production, particularly oil production? Or what’s the best scenario, in terms of reducing dependence on fossil fuels, considering the oil market?

Thank you.

KISSANE: Well—hi, Morton, thank you so much for that excellent question.

Yeah, that’s kind of why I emphasize that number, is because a lot of people sort of just aren’t aware of how much oil we continue to consume, and again, what the demand expectations are moving forward. And these demand expectations are, you know, coming out of forecasts from the International Energy Agency.

So, I think there’s a big question as to when we see peak demand. And, you know, if you look at BP scenarios, they expect peak demand to happen, you know, before 2030, where, as, you know, others kind of contest that they—that they think that peak demand won’t happen until after 2030. I mean, again, a lot depends on, you know, what we are now experiencing in the energy transition, and how, sort of quickly are we—can we transition away from oil.

I think what’s really critical, when we’re looking at oil, is oftentimes we think only about the transportation sector. So we’re thinking about cars, we’re thinking about planes, you know, we’re thinking about trucks, and tankers, and all these things. But it’s petrochemicals, you know? There’s just a lot of oil that also goes into fertilizer. So, it really is across our economy, and across economies, across the global system.

One of the things that I always tell my students is even during COVID, where you had many countries, right, much of the world was experiencing some level of lockdown, we did have a reduction in oil demand, but it wasn’t—it wasn’t like 20 million barrels. It was under ten.

So, the fact that now it’s 2023, the world has reopened, it’s really hard to sort of see, or to know with certainty, is when we’re going to see that—see that reduction in demand.

Now, I think with the Paris Agreement, what’s also important is—to note is, you know, if you’re—if you’re in the oil and gas space—and I was just at a conference earlier this morning where this was a point of conversation—was, you know, what are the companies doing to reduce the emissions from production? So, how are they integrating carbon capture, sequestration, you know, how are they managing the emissions that come from the production of fossil energy—in this case that we’re talking about, oil.

And I think one of the things that—I think if you sort of follow oil markets, or a country like Saudi Arabia, they are marketing low-emission oil. Now, we could—you know, we could sort of challenge, well, what does that—you know, what does that really mean? But you are having, you know, countries that are now sort of competing to state that they have lower emitting carbon in the production—in the production of oil. And that’s a whole other interesting sort of thing to look at, in the context of the geopolitics of oil, is to kind of understand the variation across emissions, across different countries, in the production of oil.

So, we are—you know, again, we are going to be going into COP-28 this fall. Again, we are not seeing—you know, and we haven’t seen a, you know, reduction in fossil energy demand. Again, lots of people are sort of, you know, hoping that we’ll start to see it sooner rather than later. But for the time being—and again, you know, to Irina’s first question, that, you know, the last fourteen months, and with, you know, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it has both shown us that, you know, Europe is sort of seeking to hasten the energy transition, by building out more renewable energy, and creating more opportunities to buy electric vehicles.

But there’s still big swaths of the world that, you know, are still, and have yet to move towards, you know, really reducing—and that are actually going to see higher demand moving forward, as their economies grow.

FASKIANOS: Thank you.

I’m going to take the next question from Jovana Vujanic, who is a graduate student at Lewis University: How big of an—of an impact will the decision of the Saudi energy minister to cut oil production have on the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia?

KISSANE: Love the question, thank you so much. Yeah, no, it’s a great one.

So, my take is that, of course, this decision came as a bit of a surprise, and it wasn’t something that the United States, you know, wanted. But I would say that the U.S.-Saudi relationship has been very tense for the last ten years. And as part of that—there are lots of different reasons for that, but this is yet—kind of another thing that Saudi has done.

And again, I think it’s also—Saudi has taken a non-alignment policy with relation to its position on Russia and Ukraine. So, it continues to—you know, it continues to have a relationship with Russia. It also has the relationship with Ukraine. As we saw, you know, China just brokered a very significant deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran. You know, again, Saudi Arabia and Iran are two—are two important producers for China. So, China is a large importer of oil.

So, if you go back to World War—the end of World War II, that’s when the United States established the oil-for-security relationship with Saudi Arabia. And as we have grown, sort of, more—I wouldn’t say independent, but our—as our own oil production has increased, especially through the shale revolution, our dependence on the Middle East and Saudi Arabia, more specifically, has shifted.

So, I think we’re seeing a very different Saudi Arabia today, which I think is going to be a challenge for the United States. I think it’s going to be very interesting to see what the summer holds. Last summer, the Biden administration did tap into the U.S. strategic petroleum reserves, the largest—the largest take in the history of the reserves, which started in 1975, you know, taking 180 million barrels out, you know, not because there was massive supply disruptions. But because, you know, as the administration said, it was—you know, it was—it was—it was a war—it was a war-specific decision, because the—you know, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was causing energy prices to skyrocket. And to cushion the American consumer, and to better cushion the, sort of, the global economy, the United States withdrew from the SPR. So I think the summer is going to be very interesting.

But I think we’re going to see, definitely, much more attention in the years to come, between the United States and Saudi Arabia. It’s not the relationship of the past. This is a kind of a very new relationship.

That’s a great question.

FASKIANOS: Thank you. Thank you, let’s go Curran Flynn, who has a raised hand.

Q: Hello?

FASKIANOS: We can hear you, but we’re getting feedback. So you might have two devices open.

Q: Can you hear me now?

FASKIANOS: Yes.

Q: That’s better. OK.

FASKIANOS: That’s better. Thank you. Thank you so much.

Q: So, I’m here at King Fahd University in Saudi Arabia, right next to Aramco, here with my class from international relations. And one of my students has a question, Nasser al-Nasir (ph). Here he is.

Q: So, thank you, Mrs. Carolyn.

My question is: How could Russia’s use of alternative transportation methods, such as the East Siberian Pipeline to China, impact the U.S. market, the domestic market, and the role of the SPR, given potential insurance workarounds from Russia’s side such as ensuring Russian tankers through their RDIF fund?

And thank you to Mrs. Irina.

KISSANE: Thank you. And, Dr. Flynn, thank you so much for having your students join this webinar.

So, I’m a little—so, the question is about the East Siberian Pipeline? Just could you—would you mind repeating it? I just want to make sure I have it—I’m clear on the question.

Q: So, how could Russia’s use of alternative transportation methods, such as the East Siberian Pipeline to China, impact the U.S. energy markets, I mean domestically, and the SPR, given potential insurance workarounds from Russia’s side such as ensuring Russian tankers to the RDIF fund?

KISSANE: Yeah, and that’s a great question.

You know, I think that, you know, begs a lot of things that we could be looking at, right, in terms of, you know, Russia’s kind of ability or capacity to sort of work around, or find workarounds, to the sanctions that were imposed. And I think we’ve seen sort of new markets—so, this kind of reshaping of the energy map with oil, we see that as—kind of in technicolor, right, whereas, you know, a lot of Russian oil would go west, is now going east, you know, China, India, being takers, and of course, you know, other countries as well.

You know, what will be its impact on the—on the U.S. market? I think that’s—you know, again, I do think the sanctions were sort of carefully put into place, so that there wouldn’t be massive disruptions, so we—again, you know, Russia produces over 10 million barrels a day, and about 7 million of those barrels are exported. So, you know, if we lost all of that, that would be a—you know, that would cause some very significant economic disruption globally. We already saw, you know, impacts to sort of grains, grain exports, and food security in many different parts of the world.

So, you know, Russia is finding different ways. You have shadow tankers that Russia is using to move—to move its oil—as you pointed out, the East Siberian pipeline. You know, I think there’s only so much the United States can do, or—and European countries that are part of the sanctions regime, can do to curtail Russian exports of oil.

But I think that—you know, I think Russia, again, has a—has a desire, and also, you know, revenue needs—they’re funding a very expensive war—that they’re finding ways to get their—to get their oil out. I think an interesting question is, you know, what does this mean in the years ahead, the lack of investment, for example, that’s going into Russian energy infrastructure, a lack of, sort of, any kind of Western investment that is—that is going in, and what that is going to mean.

But again, you know, I think, to your question, I think we will see some—you know, we are seeing some impacts, right? There’s a big question as to what—you know, what the next six months to a year will look like, with regards to the reduction from OPEC, and if we were to see a deeper curtailment on Russian oil.

And you know, would the United States then tap more into the SPR? We’re now at—you know, we’re down to seven hundred thousand barrels, which, of course, is not insignificant. But we also sort of have to be, you know, judicious about how we use the SPR.

But thank you for the question.

FASKIANOS: Thank you.

I’m going to take the next question from Michael—let’s see— Trevett, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Southern Mississippi: China and other countries claim there are petroleum reserves under the South China Sea. What are your estimates of the potential amount there, and has China begun to extract any of this oil?

KISSANE: Michael, thank you so much. That’s a great question.

So, China already is an oil producing country, so you do have oil production in China. In the South China Sea, I can’t—I can’t say exactly. I know that there have been geological tests that have shown the reserves. Again, you do have—you know, you do have territorial concerns about sort of where—is this—you know, can China—can China tap those—or seek to explore and tap those reserves, again, if there are—if there is contention over the territory in which these reserves are located?

So you know, China, again—one of the things that’s very interesting about China is that China is an oil producer, but China has seen, over the last, you know, the last decade, they have seen that they have experienced peak demand. So—I mean, sorry. Peak supply. So, they are not producing as much as they used to. And so you’re seeing a year-on-year reduction in the producing capacity.

You know, if you go back maybe five or six years ago, there was lots of questions about if China could kind of replicate what happened in the United States around the shale oil revolution. I think one of the big challenges for China is that, of the—you know, where the shale reserves are located, it’s not near water, lots of questions as to—and some of it—basically, some of the tests have shown that it’s—it definitely is proving harder that, you know, they cannot sort of model the same level of development that we have seen in the United States.

So, yeah, no, I think in the South China Sea, again, I think we—it’s potentially possible that we might see it. I wouldn’t—I wouldn’t—I wouldn’t say it’s soon.

FASKIANOS: Thank you.

I’m taking the next question from Rob Warren at the Anglo-American University of Prague. This question also got an upvote: How do you foresee Venezuela’s role in the global oil market changing moving forward? And can it be reintegrated into the global economy?

KISSANE: Oh, these are all fantastic questions. Thank you all so much.

Yeah, Venezuela is—again, you know, Venezuela has—they have the largest reserves in the world. As part of this webinar, right, you—CFR had a—kind of a primer on Venezuelan, and kind of—you know, you look at sort of where Venezuela is. And one of the biggest challenges confronting Venezuela is both its politics, but it’s also—it basically—you know, you don’t have—you don’t have international oil service providers in the country. I think the only—the only one now that the U.S.—the U.S. has sort of given a sanctions exemption to, is that of Chevron.

But I think—yeah, I mean, if you were to see, you know, kind of shifts in the political regime, and you were to see more openness, then I think you could imagine, you know, Venezuela having an opportunity, or a pathway forward, to be more integrated into the global energy system, and the global oil system. You know, I think one of the big problems that Venezuela faces is that most of its infrastructure is really old at this point. And it would need a significant amount of reinvestment to get it up to a place that it could sort of meet its potential.

So, you know, Venezuela is one of these countries that’s not producing as much as it could, right? It has the potential to be producing 2 million-plus more barrels per day. But you know, we’ve seen that they really have just—they went into freefall. So, I think that’s a big issue.

And another big issue, which—God, it goes back to an earlier question—is that of emissions. So, the oil that comes out of Venezuela is a very, very heavy oil. So, it’s—it has very large carbon emissions associated with the production of that oil. So, that, I think, is—again, as we—you know, think about the emissions from oil production in countries that are sort of seeking to kind of market themselves as low-emission producers, you know, Venezuela definitely will have a very hard time recouping its—where its oil sector was. Again, it has the capacity, it has the reserves. But getting that—getting that oil out of the ground right now, you have a lot of significant above-ground risks.

FASKIANOS: Thank you.

I’m going to go next to Clemente Abrokwaa. Raised hand, so please unmute yourself.

Q: Can you hear me, please?

FASKIANOS: Yes, we can.

Q: Thank you. Thank you so much for your—for your talk. I was also very shocked about the amount of barrels that we consume every day. (Laughs.) I didn’t know that. But anyway, I’m from Penn State University.

And my question is: You just mentioned about the above-ground, you know, effects. And—so the movement towards, like, electric vehicles and so on, how do you think it is going to affect the African continent?

KISSANE: Thank you.

Q: I am—I’m thinking, you know, the economies, and then infrastructure. It will be very difficult for them to—(laughs)—move with the rest of the world in terms of electric vehicles, and so on. I just wanted your take on that.

KISSANE: Thank you, Clemente. It’s an excellent question.

Yeah, I mean, you have countries across the African continent that not only have oil reserves, but are already producing, right? Nigeria is a—is an oil-producing country, also has more capacity, but again, you have some above-ground risks. You also have the need for investment of new infrastructure.

I think one of the things that has been very interesting—and I think it’s getting—it’s getting more attention, as it deserves, is how Western governments are—some of—I think a challenge across Africa is that a lot of Western governments have sort of said, listen, we’re not going to invest in fossil fuels—or also, financial institutions, Western financial institutions—we’re not going to invest in fossil fuels, or new projects that are fossil-based.

And that—you know, that’s problematic when you look across the African continent, where you still don’t have, you know, 100 percent energy access. You know, the idea of the transition to electric vehicles, which is taking a very, very long time, even here across the—across developed economies—so the need for the infusion of more capital to go into, you know, across the continent of Africa for oil and gas, that’s for their economies and for their own economic growth, I think, is really, really pivotal.

And I think this is something that, you know, is being discussed across multilateral financial institutions. And also, you know, is it hypocrisy, right, for Western banks that have, you know, kind of funded the oil and gas industry, or helped to fund the oil and gas industry in the United States and many different parts of the world, and that are now sort of not allowing those funds to flow to Africa. And they have the—again, they have the—they have the resources. So you know, is it—you know, the equity of some of these decisions that are being made, I think, is one that’s—is one that’s really important.

And again, I—you know, I said earlier in this talk, is that, you know, all—most of the demand for oil is not coming from North America and from Europe. All of the demand that we’re seeing and new demand that we’re going to see, is coming from Asia, and is going to come from Africa.

So again, you know, how are we going to make sure that that demand is met, again, going back to that idea of energy security, so there is—there is accessibility, so there is reliable sources of energy at affordable prices, you know, without sort of thinking about kind of a whole-of-energy approach.

So, I think it’s very—it’s a very complex issue. And I think, you know, Western banks who have sort of taken very sharp positions on what they will and will not fund, when it comes to new oil and gas projects, are getting sort of challenged as to, you know, what does that mean, then, for, you know, countries across Africa that are still very much in need of more energy, not less. And again, recognizing that, you know, EVs that, again, are still—are—you know, we’re seeing adoption here in the United States and across Europe, but it’s a big, big, big adoption in China. But it’s very uneven. So how do we ensure greater energy security for the continent of Africa, I think, is a really critical question.

FASKIANOS: Thank you.

I’ll take the next question from Kyle Bales, who is a senior at Lewis University in Romeoville, Illinois: How is the war between Russia and Ukraine having an effect on the progress of the European Green Deal? Maybe you can tell us what the European—define the European Green Deal for us, Carolyn, give us the context for that.

KISSANE: Yes, so, again, this is another fantastic question.

Yeah, the European Green Deal, it’s—this is—this is great. Yeah, I mean, a lot of people would say that the European Green Deal now is—that the—Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has sort of said, hey, this is why the Green Deal is so important. This is why we really need to more quickly transition to renewable energy, because look what—look what happened when we were dependent on Russia for over 30 percent of our natural gas. And look, when Russia, you know, illegally invades Ukraine and suddenly weaponizes gas, we are left very energy-insecure. It affects—it affects consumers. It affects industry across the continent.

So, I think we’re seeing, not just through the Green Deal, but we’re also seeing through, sort of European green industrial policy—so in some ways, akin to what, you know, we put into effect in—this past summer, is the Inflation Reduction Act. And we’re seeing almost, kind of, this industrial competition around clean energy technologies.

And so, Europe is investing—you know, I think it’s about $250 billion, the United States, it’s about 370 billion—towards the—kind of the energy transition, and helping to support domestic industries and companies to—you know, to be able to, you know, develop the technologies, and to have the, you know, the opportunity to contribute to the energy transition.

So, I think one thing, though—whenever I talk about Europe, it’s really important, is to sort of recognize that, you know, when you look across Europe, you have very different policies and kind of approaches, to sort of thinking about energy, and how quickly some countries want to transition and can transition, whereas others, you know, are probably going to experience a slower transition.

So, just really interesting example, as you talked about the Green Deal, is the EU taxonomy, the green taxonomy, that went into effect in the—January of 2022. And there, you had, like, really a lot of contention between France and Germany, because France wanted to make sure that nuclear was part of the green taxonomy. Germany was opposed, right, but Germany wanted to make sure natural gas was part of the green taxonomy. So ultimately, in the end, both natural gas and nuclear—and again, this was—this predated Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But in the EU green taxonomy, you have—you know, you have both nuclear and natural gas, in addition to other renewable energies that can make up this taxonomy, that includes specific measures towards adaptation and mitigation for climate change.

So you know, I think you’re seeing this kind of—some people call it a race, a competition. You know, ideally, it’s—you know, we’re kind of working together to—because we’re all sort of going in the same direction—to, you know, support the transition, and to reduce—to reduce carbon emissions, and to bring in more, sort of, cleaner energy technologies into our system.

FASKIANOS: Thank you.

I’m going to take the next question from Dr. Laeed Zaghlami.

Q: Yes, good afternoon. This is Laeed—good afternoon, Irina. Good afternoon, Carolyn. I’m very pleased to be part of your program.

Just to—want to be back to Africa and particularly to Nigeria, how practical the two projects that Nigeria is advocating for pipelines, one from—through Algeria, and the other one to Morocco through western African countries? How practical are these pipelines to supply gas to Europe and parts of some African countries?

FASKIANOS: And Dr. Zaghlami, you are at Algiers University, correct?

Q: Indeed, Irina, yes. I am professor at University of Algiers, faculty of information and communication.

FASKIANOS: Thank you.

KISSANE: Dr. Laeed, can I—can I keep you on for just one second?

Can I ask you, what is the—what is the status right now? Is it—it’s planned, under construction? Where is—what is the status of those two pipelines? My understanding is that it’s—they’re proposed, but—

Q: Yes, well, actually in—practically, the pipeline between Algeria and Abuja, which means through Niger and so forth, is already in progress, whereas the other project, through thirteen western African countries, they are supposed to be implemented by 2047. But is it—is there any political game or something of strategic—(inaudible)—how practical, how logical, how efficiently will be for Nigeria to have two similar project(s)?

KISSANE: Yeah, no, it’s—again, thank you for the question. You know, pipelines, again, that’s why I wanted to show the—(laughs)—kind of the map of pipelines, is because, you know, a lot of pipelines transverse, you know, multiple countries, right? And this is—this requires not just, you know, a lot of cooperation, but it requires technically. It also can be very complex to build—to build pipelines. And when you’re talking about something like, as you—as you point out, these are, you know, crossing many countries.

You know, I think one of the—again, one of the issues is whether or not—since, you know, what already is under construction, I think you can, you know, with confidence, that one will be completed. Anything that’s not yet under construction—and again, the timeline, 2047, is way out there—a lot of—a lot of uncertainty as to what the status of those projects will be moving forward, for various reasons, in terms of making sure that the investments are there.

Someone I know that studies pipelines, he says, you know, until the steel is in the ground, you don’t have the pipeline, and so until you know that you’ve got that, you know, you’ve got all the OKs, and you feel that kind of security of being able to build it, and being able to provide the resources to supply it and to move it.

I think Algeria has been a really interesting case that hasn’t gotten enough attention, in terms of Algerian gas, that has—that has helped support Europe. Over the last years, we’ve seen an increase in Algerian gas going into Europe. Again, a lot of attention on U.S. LNG and the increase of liquefied natural gas exports into Europe, but also Algeria has been, you know, very important for helping to support European energy security, and make up for some of the losses of the—of the Russian gas. And I think we’ll see more attention on Algeria, and Algeria’s role as a—you know, as an important source of energy, especially, you know, gas, going into—going into Europe, moving forward.

FASKIANOS: So, I’ll take the next written question from Vincent Brooks, who is at Harvard and Diamondback Energy board of directors: How do you view the purchasing of discounted Russian oil by India, in particular relative to the purchasing by China? How are they using the oil purchased? And are you seeing more internal usage or external profit-making sales in places like Africa? And what are the implications of all of this?

KISSANE: Right, great. Great question. So, all of the above—(laughs)—in some ways, right? There is definitely sort of profits that are being made.

You know, I was—I was talking about this last week with someone, and you know, if you sort of put your shoe—put yourself in the shoes of India, right, so, India is a—is a rapidly growing economy, 1.4 billion. You know, if you had—if you have very high energy inflation and high oil prices, that’s going to have ripples effects across the Indian economy. And so, you know, when you have a kind of opportunity to buy, you know, pretty steep discounted oil, which, you know, they had been able to buy from Russia, you know, for purposes of national security, they’ve been buying the oil.

And one of the things that’s very interesting about India is that, actually, India has been building out its refining capacity. So, a lot of that oil is both for domestic, and some of it is being sort of re-exported. But I think what we’ve seen is that they’re using that oil to also sort of enhance their capacity and capabilities as a rapidly emerging, refining power in Asia.

And we see that in some ways in China, too. So, China, even though oil demand was down in 2022, much of the oil that they were buying from Russia went into its strategic supplies, which, you know, they now have access to.

And again, I think, you know, a big question is what we’re going to see moving forward around oil demand in China. Wood Mackenzie just published a really interesting piece, kind of very bullish, on the expectations for oil demand in China, so whether or not they’re going to continue to buy, you know, Russian oil—and again, sort of taking advantage of these lower prices, you know. And I think—I think one of the things that—it’s kind of an inconvenient truth, whereas a lot of this oil trading used to happen in Europe, so European trading houses were kind of the main—the main points of Russian oil trade. A lot of that has been moved out, so, you know, Russia has found ways to kind of bypass some of the sanctions, and have set up—in some cases, they’ve set up trading houses. And some of those trading houses have been sort of set up in places that, you know, that they can sort of, again, bypass the compliance to the sanctions.

And you have some—you have some Russian oil traders that are making a lot of money—(laughs)—selling discounted oil, and then reselling it.

A really interesting case, a couple of months ago, was out of Malaysia. Malaysia announced—or, in the, you know—that they were—that 1.5 million barrels were produced and sold, but only—Malaysia doesn’t produce that much. So, those were Russian barrels that were sort of being sold under, sort of, the Malaysian—under the Malaysian barrel.

So, again, I think China and India have, you know, have taken advantage. Some of this has, again—as I said, has been re-exported. And some of it, you know, has been re-exported through petroleum products, because China and India, you know, both are building and have refining capacity.

FASKIANOS: Thank you.

I’m going to take the next question from Bhakti Mirchandani at Columbia University: What global trajectory do you see for nuclear? The Russia-Ukraine crisis has taken some of the refining capacity offline, and nuclear has the potential to change the geopolitics of energy. And so what steps can be taken to foster nuclear energy?

KISSANE: Bhakti, thank you. And I was just at Columbia earlier today for the Center for Global Energy Policy’s conference.

Yeah, nuclear is very interesting, right? So when we’re thinking about, you know, decarbonizing our energy systems, you know, nuclear plays a very important role, because it’s zero-emitting. So in certain parts of the world—China being one, Saudi Arabia—you know, you have a lot of new nuclear build. You know, in other parts of the world, you have a lot of contention about nuclear. We saw that even in Germany, which have, you know, three remaining nuclear power plants. And even in the midst of massive energy crisis over the last year, there was still sort of pushback about, no, those nuclear power plants need to be shut down, whereas you would think, OK, in light of energy insecurity, let’s keep them open.

So, you know, France is an interesting country. France had planned to reduce its nuclear capacity by 50 percent. But this past year, they pivoted and they’ve said, no, we’re actually going to build out more nuclear, and we’re sort of—we’re totally scrapping that idea of reducing nuclear energy. And nuclear is very important for France’s electricity system.

Sweden has also announced that they are going to build new nuclear, and they’re going to increase by, I think, almost 50 percent. Again, part of this is their—to meet their targets of net zero.

We also see Japan. Japan, you know, the Fukushima disaster really turned Japanese—the Japanese public off of nuclear. Very, very deep opposition to restarting the nuclear power plants. But this past year, even though there’s still safety concerns on the part of the public, the public is also very concerned about energy insecurity and higher prices. So, nuclear being a domestic source of energy.

So, I think when you look at, you know, net-zero pathways, I have not seen a net-zero pathway that does not include nuclear. So, here in the United States, the net-zero America project out of Princeton, very important place for nuclear. We just have a really hard time—(laughs)—building nuclear at cost, so it’s very expensive. Usually, it’s significant cost overruns. And of course, there is the—I think they have a really significant PR problem. People—there’s still a lot of concern about the safety of nuclear.

So, I think to your point, it’s very, very important for decarbonizing energy systems, but you’re going to see, I think, very disjointed approaches. Some countries are going—are embracing nuclear, and other countries are sort of doubling down on their opposition, and are not going to allow nuclear to be part of the energy system.

FASKIANOS: We have so many questions, and we are just not going to get to them all.

So, I’m going to take the next question from Christian Bonfili, who’s at Torcuato di Tella University in Argentina.

So, do you think, Carolyn, that the landscape resulting from the Ukraine invasion by Russia, vis-à-vis securitization of gas and energy between Europe and Russia, could accelerate energy transition toward greener energy?

KISSANE: Great question.

I think in Europe, it is. And I think, you know, many analysts would agree that—the IEA, for example—you know, you had the, you know—how does Europe continue—you know, to enhance and achieve energy security without the dependence on Russia gas? And a lot of that is through renewable energy. You also have a lot of new attention on hydrogen, and the role that hydrogen will play.

I think—I think Europe is being cautious, and so they are not saying that they are going to completely move away from gas, so as earlier questions, are they getting gas from Algeria, or are they getting gas from Norway? Are they getting more gas from the United States in the form of liquefied natural gas? And then also an uncomfortable truth is they continue to get liquefied natural gas from Russia. So, we’ve seen an increase in LNG from Russia going into Europe.

That said, I think all in, you are seeing that, you know, countries across Europe are saying, OK, you know, how can we enhance our energy security? How do we build more sort of domestic energy sources? Solar, wind, we’re seeing, you know, more rapid deployment. You’ve got a lot of questions about supply chains and things like that, but I think—overall, I think the answer would be that it’s quickening the energy transition.

FASKIANOS: So, I will take the moderator prerogative to just ask the final question for you to close on. And just to give us your top three—what are the major challenges for the geopolitics of oil, as you look out over the next five- to ten-year horizon, that you would leave us with, to be looking for?

KISSANE: OK. You know, so I think what we saw, right, tensions between Saudi Arabia and the United States. We also have a, you know, a hot war, cold war, depending on, you know, the term you want to use, between the United States and China, and lots of sort of questions as to what that’s going to look like.

I think there’s—you know, I think there’s concern that, you know, we’re not reducing demands, but we’re seeing tightening supply. And so that’s going to have, you know, very significant impacts for economies, especially economies that are already very fragile, economically fragile, politically fragile. So that concerns me a lot, in terms of, you know, what happens when, you know, economies don’t have adequate access to energy to make sure that their industries, that their—that consumers, you know, are able—that the lights can stay on, and you can get—you know, if you’re dependent on cars, you’re depending on trucks, like, all these kinds of things are really, really critical.

So, I think we have to be very cautious moving forward, that we don’t take more out of the system before we have adequately set up the system to be resilient, and to be able to sort of meet the energy security demands that are not—are not—they’re not decreasing. I think they are increasing and becoming even more complex.

So, I think there’s a lot of concerns and a lot of uncertainty. And you know, this definitely is going to be an area to watch in the years ahead.

FASKIANOS: Carolyn Kissane—Kissane, excuse me—thank you very much for shaping and sharing this discussion, for sharing your terrific insights with us, and to all of you for your questions and comments. I’m really sorry that we could not get to them all. But we only have an hour. (Laughs.)

KISSANE: Thank you.

FASKIANOS: You can follow Carolyn on Twitter at @carolynkissane, and we will be announcing the fall Academic Webinar lineup in the CFR Academic Bulletin. If you’ve not already subscribed, you can email us to subscribe. Send us an email, [email protected].

Again, I encourage you to share with your students our CFR paid internships announcement. We also have fellowships for professors. You and they can go to CFR.org/careers, follow us at @CFR_Academic, and visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues.

Thank you all again. Good luck with your finals. Carolyn Kissane, thank you so much.

KISSANE: Thank you. It was a pleasure. Great.

FASKIANOS: And we look forward to your continued participation in this series.

KISSANE: Thank you very much. Appreciate everyone’s questions. Bye.

(END)

HOUSTON (Reuters) -Brent and U.S. crude futures fell more than $2 a barrel, or over 3%, on Friday as confidence grew the Gaza peace agreement between Israel and Hamas was taking hold.

Brent crude futures were down $2.16, or 3.31%, at $63.06 a barrel at 10:37 a.m. CDT (1537 GMT), the lowest since early June.

U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude was down $2.15, or 3.45%, to $59.40, the lowest since early May.

“President Trump’s ceasefire announcement immediately took the premium out of the price of oil, not only because of Israel and Hamas but also the reduction of a risk that Iranian proxies would continue to attack oil vessels in the Red Sea and other places,” said Phil Flynn, senior analyst with the Price Futures Group.

CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT

Israel and the Palestinian militant group Hamas signed a ceasefire agreement on Thursday in the first phase of U.S. President Donald Trump’s initiative to end the war in Gaza.

Under the deal, which Israel’s government ratified on Friday, fighting will cease, Israel will partially withdraw from Gaza, and Hamas will free all remaining hostages it captured in the attack that precipitated the war, in exchange for hundreds of prisoners held by Israel.

Numerous vessels have been attacked by the Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen since 2023, targeting ships they deem linked to Israel in what they described as solidarity with Palestinians over the war in Gaza.

The Gaza ceasefire deal means the focus can move back to the impending oil surplus, as OPEC proceeds with the unwinding of production cuts, said Daniel Hynes, an analyst at ANZ.

A smaller-than-expected November hike in output agreed by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and allies (OPEC+) on Sunday eased some of those oversupply concerns.

“Markets’ expectations for a sharp ramp-up in crude supply have not manifested themselves in substantially lower prices,” BMI analysts said in a note on Friday.

Investors are also worried that a prolonged U.S. government shutdown could dampen the American economy and hurt oil demand in the world’s largest crude consumer.

(Reporting by Erwin Seba in Houston, Anna Hirtenstein in London; Additional reporting by Stephanie Kelly and Sudarshan Varadhan; Editing by Christian Schmollinger, Mark Potter, Nia Williams and Andrea Ricci)

The Sean M. Healey & AMG Center for ALS is pleased to announce that the ALS Residence Initiative (ALSRI) was awarded the 2025 Gupta Family Endowed Prize for Innovation in ALS Care. Merit Cudkowicz, MD, MSC, Director of the Healey & AMG Center for ALS, presented the prize to Steve Saling, CEO of ALSRI, and Barry Berman, CEO of Chelsea Jewish Lifecare, at the 24th Annual NEALS Consortium Meeting.

The Gupta Family Endowed Prize is a global prize awarded to a nominated team who has developed promising new approaches to improving care for people with ALS. The goal of this prize is to encourage idea sharing, innovation, and forward thinking on scalable ongoing projects that have directly improved ALS patient care.

The selection committee awarded the 2025 Gupta Family Endowed Prize to the ALSRI because of their work in creating the first fully accessible, tech-enabled ALS residence model. This innovation demonstrates ALSRI’s commitment to initiating ground-breaking new approaches that lead to exceptional care for individuals living with ALS.

In partnership with Chelsea Jewish Lifecare, ALSRI designed and built the award-winning Leonard Florence Center for Living (LFCL), containing the Steve Saling ALS Residence. Saling envisioned building a place where people with ALS could live safely with autonomy and real quality of life. The residence features private suites, a deli, a café, landscaped outdoor areas, and most critically, cutting-edge environmental control systems. Using eye-tracking and other assistive technology, residents can independently open doors, control lighting, communicate, and even drive their wheelchairs – all without needing physical movement. Steve’s motto is, “Until medicine proves otherwise, technology IS the cure,” and the ALSRI has transformed lives with technology.

“While we honor and respect the incredible research to treat and cure ALS being done across the country and the world, the ALS Residences at the Leonard Florence Center for Living have set out to demonstrate that until medicine proves otherwise, technology and compassionate skilled care are the cure,” says Steve. “Thank you to the Gupta family, the Sean M. Healey & AMG Center for ALS at Mass General, and the Northeast ALS Consortium for recognizing our efforts.”

“The ALSRI has already made a significant impact on the ALS community and will continue to do so by expanding their model to other cities across the country,” says Dr. Cudkowicz. “We are proud to award the ALSRI with this prize and look forward to seeing them continue to pioneer new approaches. I am grateful to the Gupta family for supporting this work.”

To learn more about the Gupta Family Prize and previous winners, please visit this page. For more information about the Sean M. Healey and AMG Center for ALS, please visit our website.

Background on ALS

Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) is the most prevalent adult-onset progressive motor neuron disease, affecting approximately 30,000 people in the U.S. and an estimated 500,000 people worldwide. ALS causes the progressive degeneration of motor neurons, resulting in muscle weakness and atrophy. There is an urgent need to understand the biology of ALS and to develop effective therapies.

About the Sean M. Healey & AMG Center for ALS at Mass General

At the Sean M. Healey & AMG Center for ALS at Mass General, we are committed to bringing together a global network of scientists, physicians, nurses, foundations, federal agencies, and people living with ALS, their loved ones, and caregivers to accelerate the pace of ALS therapy discovery and development.

Launched in November 2018, the Healey & AMG Center, under the leadership of Merit Cudkowicz, MD and a Science Advisory Council of international experts, is reimagining how to develop and test the most promising therapies to treat the disease, identify cures and ultimately prevent it.

With many clinical trials and lab-based research studies in progress right now, we are ushering in a new phase of ALS treatment and care. Together, we will find the cures.

LONDON, Oct 10 (Reuters) – The Gates Foundation and the Pan American Health Organization are both working on ways to make weight-loss drugs like Novo Nordisk’s Wegovy and Eli Lilly’s Mounjaro more accessible in lower-income countries, the global health groups told Reuters.

In separate interviews, Microsoft founder Bill Gates and PAHO director Dr Jarbas Barbosa said for the first time that their organizations were each seeking strategies to remedy the unequal availability of the highly effective but expensive treatments.

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In response to a question about the treatments, Gates said his Foundation would take any drug that was effective in high-income countries “and figure out how to make it super, super cheap so that it can get to everyone in the world”.

LOW-COST COPIES

The brand-name weight-loss drugs are primarily sold in wealthier countries, where prescriptions cost hundreds of dollars per month.

The Gates Foundation could also potentially support clinical trials to test how these medicines affect different populations and provide the data needed to broaden access, Gates said.

Obesity’s role in chronic illness has created a new urgency around addressing rising global rates, although it is still not the biggest problem facing most of the countries where the Foundation operates, Gates said.

The World Health Organization estimates that the economic costs of overweight and obesity will reach $3 trillion by 2030 if nothing is done to contain it.

Its Americas arm, PAHO, manages a fund that helps push down medicine prices by guaranteeing bulk orders on behalf of its 35 member states.

Using the fund, which is financed by the member states, is an option for weight-loss drugs, Barbosa told Reuters. He said it could also help manufacturers clear regulatory requirements rather than applying in each country for approval.

“We are starting the conversation,” he said, adding that PAHO is developing recommendations for how best to use the drugs and plans to speak to Novo, Lilly and generic drugmakers within the next couple of weeks.

“We are deeply committed to serving patients around the world,” the Danish company said.

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Across sub-Saharan Africa, a quiet revolution is underway. Equipped with smartphones and empowered by broadband connectivity, millions of micro-entrepreneurs are transforming how goods and services are produced and sold in local economies. This isn’t only a tech trend, but a paradigm shift in the economic fabric of the region, which boasts the highest rate of entrepreneurship in the world, with over 22% of working-age Africans launching new ventures. These agile businesses, rooted in socioeconomic adaptation and innovation, are increasingly powered by digital tools that enable mobile payments, online marketplaces, and real-time customer engagement. Mobile internet penetration in Africa has tripled over the past decade, now reaching over 527 million subscribers. With smartphone adoption projected to hit 88% by 2030 and more users accessing the web via mobile devices, digital platforms are rapidly becoming the backbone of economic inclusion. But what factors drive this digital adoption by micro-entrepreneurs? And how does it shape productivity, growth, and policy design? Understanding these forces is not just an academic exercise. It is essential for crafting public economic policies and private sector-led growth-enhancing measures that unlock inclusive, robust, and sustainable development across Africa.

Key example: Digital adoption in agrifood systems

Digital technology is reshaping micro-entrepreneurship across Africa’s agrifood systems, particularly in informal markets where traditional infrastructure remains limited. As mobile broadband expands and smartphone access deepens, digital platforms are emerging as critical tools for trade while themselves being accelerated by growing African trade. This mutually reinforcing cycle leads to job creation and financial inclusion, thereby bridging the formal-informal divide and boosting productivity and output growth. This transformation is particularly apparent in agricultural value chains, where small-scale intermediaries, often women, play a vital role in linking producers to consumers.

A recent study we conducted in Benin highlights these dynamics. In a country where grains and legumes account for 90% of food consumption, food intermediation remains predominantly a women-led subsistence activity. Using data from Bohicon and Ouando, two semi-rural markets in the country, our research shows that 80% of food traders are women, 60% manage teams of six or more workers, and 90% have over a decade of trading experience. This underscores the maturity and economic significance of these informal micro-enterprises. Although most of these micro-entrepreneurs (52%) have no formal education, the sector is rapidly adapting to digitalization, with mobile broadband penetration rising from under 2% to 42% in just ten years.

Nearly half (49%) of surveyed micro-entrepreneurs have adopted digital technologies to trade their products, reshaping how these informal businesses operate. These adopters tend to be more educated than their peers, conduct larger and more frequent transactions, and are embedded in digitally active networks, suggesting that proximity to other users reinforces adoption through network effects. Yet the promise of digital technology adoption comes with notable constraints: 54% of surveyed adopters face connection costs at or above 20% of the national minimum monthly wage, while 45% blame poor internet quality as a major barrier to efficient business operations. These frictions highlight the need for tailored infrastructure and affordability solutions to ensure that digital transformation reaches its full potential among Africa’s micro-entrepreneurs. Our analysis suggests that digital adoption translates into greater productivity: Adopters outperform their peers based on a range of productivity measures. They also report a 50% increase in both trading frequency and volume, indicating that digital tools are not just modern conveniences, but powerful catalysts for scaling informal enterprises and unlocking latent economic potential.

This sectoral case, among others, illustrates how digital adoption among micro-entrepreneurs is not only accelerating but also redefining the contours of economic participation, especially for women in informal agrifood systems. It also underscores the catalytic role of digitalization in improving food security.

Inclusive digital adoption goes beyond expanding infrastructure

The adoption of digital technologies among micro-entrepreneurs is not random. It reflects deeper patterns of socioeconomic access and network exposure. Our study reveals that younger, wealthier, and more educated individuals are significantly more likely to integrate digital tools into their business practices. Proximity to other digital users also reinforces adoption, suggesting that peer influence and community-level networks play a crucial role in shaping tech-savviness and digital behavior.

These findings carry important implications for digital inclusion strategies across Africa. First, they underscore the need to address structural inequalities in education and income that stifle digital opportunities. Without well-calibrated and targeted interventions, digital transformation could exacerbate existing divides between more advantaged entrepreneurs and those left behind in low-resource settings.

Second, the power of network effects points to the value of localized digital ecosystems. Policies that support digital hubs, peer learning, and community-based training can amplify adoption by leveraging social proximity and trust. Beyond focusing exclusively on individual capacity-building, policymakers could consider how to productively activate collective digital readiness, especially in a continent historically known for a high degree of communality.

Finally, our finding that the variables of gender, experience, or formal business affiliations do not have a significant effect on level of digital adoption suggests that traditional segmentation may miss key levers of digital transformation in the African context. Digital adoption appears to be less about identity or tenure, and more about access, exposure, and perceived utility. This calls for flexible, tailored, and context-sensitive approaches that prioritize connectivity, affordability, and relevance over rigid gender or social network targeting.

In sum, fostering inclusive digital adoption requires more than expanding digital infrastructure. It calls for a nuanced understanding of who adopts, why, and under what conditions they do. Digital adoption in Benin’s agrifood systems offers valuable insights for designing more effective and equitable digital policies across the continent.

Policy pathways to accelerate digital adoption among micro-entrepreneurs

Unlocking the full potential of digital technologies for micro-entrepreneurs in Africa requires a multi-pronged policy approach that addresses both infrastructure and financial constraints. Evidence from our Benin study underscores the importance of well-thought out and targeted interventions to enhance digital uptake and economic performance among micro-entrepreneurs, especially in informal markets.

First, improving the quality of mobile broadband emerges as a high-impact lever. Our structural model simulations reveal that upgrading internet reliability and speed yields the most significant gains in both adoption rates and productivity. This finding points to the need for sustained and cost-effective investments in digital infrastructure, particularly in semi-rural and underserved areas, where poor connectivity continues to hinder business operations.

Second, while reducing the cost of mobile broadband access has a positive effect, its impact is more modest when broadband connection quality remains low. This suggests that affordability policies must be coupled with service quality improvements to be fully effective. Governments and telecom providers can explore tiered pricing models, public-private partnerships, or intra-platform competition to lower entry barriers without compromising service standards.

Third, easing credit constraints is essential for enabling micro-entrepreneurs to invest in digital tools and scale their operations. Many informal micro-enterprises lack access to formal finance, limiting their ability to purchase smartphones, pay for data plans, or adopt productivity-enhancing digital platforms. Expanding access to microfinance, mobile money, and alternative credit scoring mechanisms, especially those leveraging transactional and utility data, can help bridge this gap.

Together, these findings highlight the need for integrated digital inclusion strategies that combine infrastructure upgrades, affordability measures, and financial empowerment. By aligning these efforts with the lived realities of micro-entrepreneurs, many of whom are women operating in mature but underserved sectors, policymakers can foster a more inclusive and resilient digital economy, and in turn, lift productivity, output, employment, and livelihoods across Africa.

Nexans, a global leader in the design and manufacturing of cable systems and energy solutions, today announced the successful conclusion of its 2025 Innovation Summit in Toronto. The event brought together global leaders from energy, policy, finance, and technology to address one of the defining challenges of our time: how to expand and modernize transmission infrastructure to meet surging electricity demand in the era of AI, electrified transport, and digital growth.

The Summit, themed “A New Era of Electrification,” underscored a powerful message: transmission is no longer a technical afterthought – it is the strategic lever of global electrification.

In brief 

• The UK lacks overarching deepfake legislation, leaving victims facing a complex patchwork of existing laws including intellectual property (IP), data protection, defamation and malicious falsehood.  
• While the Government has recently introduced criminal sanctions for sharing non-consensual intimate deepfakes (via the Online Safety Act 2023), and provisions criminalising their creation (in the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, not yet in force), significant gaps remain. 
• Detection and enforcement present substantial challenges for individuals, with perpetrators often difficult to identify and frequently based overseas, beyond UK regulatory reach, whilst platforms are often slow to remove deepfake content. 
• The Government’s current consultation on AI and copyright may include consideration of whether more controls should be given to performers over the use of their likenesses and performances.  
• The EU AI Act meanwhile includes transparency requirements for deepfakes including machine-readable marking and disclosure obligations, though practical implementation challenges remain. 

The use of AI tools is proliferating and becoming mainstream. Allied to fast-moving developments in the technology, it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish AI-generated content – including deepfakes (i.e. images, video or audio intended to impersonate an individual’s likeness or voice) – from human-generated and authentic content. Deepfake technology isn’t, in itself, particularly new, but the ease and scale with which deepfakes can now be produced and disseminated, without easy detection or challenge, has led to urgent calls for a review of regulation in this area. 

‘Digital replicas’ (a more benign expression for ‘deepfakes’) can, of course, be created for positive uses. The technology has been used to de-age the actor Harrison Ford in the movie Indiana Jones and the Dial of Destiny and to reanimate deceased actors (such as Carrie Fisher) on screen. But, when digital replicas are made without consent, they can be put to more nefarious uses. Ofcom summarised these risks well in a recent study when it noted that deepfakes can be used to “demean, defraud and disinform“. Many famous people have been the subject of deepfakes, from Taylor Swift through to Stephen Fry and the financial journalist Martin Lewis, but the problem also impacts non-celebrities, and sometimes in devastating ways.   

No overarching regulatory framework 

The problem for those impacted is that there is no overarching law regulating deepfakes in the UK. Instead, there is a patchwork of existing laws (for example, IP, data protection, defamation, malicious falsehood) alongside existing laws that meet particular harms (such as the use of deepfakes in fraudulent activity). Importantly, current regulatory focus is on the creation and dissemination of non-consensual intimate images in the form of deepfakes, where the Government has taken a number of steps to introduce criminal sanctions, with more developments to come shortly. These developments have been hard fought for, and greatly welcomed by campaigners, but there are still gaps in the legislation, for example, there is nothing yet to address “nudifying” or “undressing” apps, which remove clothing from images.  

Difficulties in detection and enforcement 

In addition to the overly complex nature of the current regulatory framework, those impacted by deepfakes face the additional difficulty of tracking down those who create or disseminate such images. Even if they can be identified, the perpetrators are often based overseas and out of reach of the UK regulatory authorities. While contractual protections may assist for some individuals (for example, performers, who may wish to contract against having their performance used to train an AI model), there is no one size fits all approach to this enforcement question. Accordingly, in addition to enhanced regulation, many are looking to the role of the AI model developers and the large tech platforms (including social media) in detecting and expeditiously removing such content, enforcing their terms of use, and, where possible, preventing such content being generated in the first place. But our experience has been that the platforms are often slow to react, which can be detrimental where content can go viral rapidly online. 

Potential claims against deepfakes 

There are some potential claims that an individual might make in relation to the use of their likeness (image or voice) in a deepfake, some of which are currently less relevant to non-celebrities, but where we may see calls to broaden out the protection available. 

Intellectual property rights  

In the UK, there are certain forms of IP rights that might be available to provide protection for an individual’s likeness. However, there is no form of personality right or image right in the UK (unlike in some other countries).  Potential IP rights that might arise include: 

• Copyright: while there is no copyright in an individual’s voice or image, there is likely to be copyright in a photograph or video of an individual, or in a sound recording of their voice. If those copyright works are reproduced without the copyright owner’s consent (e.g. during the training of an AI model), arguments of copyright infringement may arise. However, the difficulty here is that often the individual who is the subject of e.g. the photograph is not the copyright owner of that photograph. Individuals may also find that any relevant copyright works have been licensed to AI model developers to train their models. 

  Separately, performers have certain rights in their performances (there is no requirement to be a celebrity to rely upon these rights), as well as certain moral rights (though in practice moral rights are often waived by performers). While these rights may be relied upon to tackle unauthorised uses of a performance, the performers’ union, Equity, has called on the government to strengthen performers’ rights to encourage licensing and prevent unauthorised AI-related uses. In particular, Equity is lobbying for increased transparency measures and additional rights, including in relation to performance synthesisation, image rights and unwaivable moral rights. It is also concerned about the terms of contracts used by production companies for training AI models/generating digital replicas, citing the example of a performer whose likeness was used as a ‘performance avatar’ and who later discovered it being used to promote the Venezuelan government. 

  Copyright may, however, have a greater role to play in relation to deepfakes going forward. The Danish government is considering using copyright law to regulate deepfakes by making unauthorised sharing of AI-generated deepfakes illegal, including in relation to deepfakes of non-celebrities. Individuals would be able to demand removal of the images, as well as compensation, and the right would last for up to 50 years after their death. Meanwhile, the central proposal of the US Copyright Office’s report on Digital Replicas is a new federal law to deal with unauthorised digital replicas (again, which would be available for all individuals, not just celebrities), on the grounds that existing laws in the US do not provide sufficient legal redress. A number of US sates have also proposed such laws. 

  In the UK, the Government is currently conducting a consultation process in relation to AI and copyright. While the consultation does not formally consult on specific proposals on digital replicas and personality rights, the Government has said that it is keen to hear views on the topic. This could include whether the current legal framework provides sufficient control to performers over the use of their likenesses/performances (perhaps involving consideration of whether performers should be able to opt their performances out of being used to train AI models). 
   

• Trade marks and passing off: Celebrities, such as Rihanna and former motor racing driver Eddie Irvine, have had some success in bringing passing off proceedings for the use of their image to advertise a product, on the grounds that this amounts to a false endorsement. While such claims may assist in similar situations involving deepfakes of celebrities, it will be much more difficult for a non-celebrity to get such a claim off the ground. 

Data protection  

Information which “relates to” an identified or identifiable individual is their “personal data”, and will, as a general principle, mean that the data subject has rights arising, and those who process the personal data have obligations imposed on them. “Inaccurate” data is still personal data, and, by extension, there is certainly a strong argument that a deepfake of an identifiable individual will also be their personal data. This means that affected individuals potentially have the right to request erasure, or to bring complaints or claims, under the UK GDPR. 

Defamation 

A deepfake could give rise to a claim in defamation if it contains false and defamatory information and causes the subject serious reputational harm. Consider a politician who becomes the subject of a fake video where they admit to wrongdoing. The merits will depend on multiple factors including the meaning, nature and extent of publication of the deepfake, and the evidence of reputational harm. There may also be problems locating and identifying the source of the deepfake/its author, problems establishing the liability of any platform hosting the deepfake, and jurisdictional hurdles if they/the platform are based outside of the UK.  

Breach of privacy and/or confidence  

Where a deepfake contains true but private and/or confidential information, the subject may be able to bring a claim for misuse of private information and/or breach of confidence if they did not consent to the information being used and shared in this way. What constitutes “private information” is not defined in law, but it is established that it includes information such as: medical information, details of a person’s sexuality and sex life, and details of their home or family life. 

Non-consensual intimate image deepfakes 

The UK Government has recently introduced various pieces of legislation aimed at criminalising conduct around non-consensual intimate deepfakes. As of 31 January 2024, legislation brought in by the Online Safety Act 2023 and inserted into the Sexual Offences Act 2003 criminalises the sharing, or threatening to share, of intimate deepfakes without consent. In addition, the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 which has recently received Royal Assent, contains provisions criminalising the creation, and requesting of the creation, of intimate deepfakes without consent (note that these provisions are not yet in force, although their enactment is eagerly awaited).  

Wider regulatory responses 

The EU’s AI Act is a wide-ranging piece of legislation regulating the development and deployment of AI, including generative AI. One of the bedrocks of ensuring trustworthiness and integrity of AI systems is a robust framework of transparency requirements which enables people to know when they are interacting with or are exposed to AI systems and their outputs (including deepfakes or other manipulated content). In that context, the EU AI Act contains a number of transparency requirements, including in relation to deepfakes, which will start to apply from 2 August 2026. 

The European Commission has recently published a consultation on the AI Act’s transparency requirements. The responses to its consultation will inform the drafting of Commission guidelines and a Code of Practice on the detection and labelling of artificially generated or manipulated content.  

Specifically, in relation to deepfakes and other generated content, Article 50 of the EU AI Act requires: 

• Providers of AI systems that directly interact with individuals to ensure they are informed they are interacting with an AI system and not a human (unless this is obvious to a reasonably well-informed, observant and circumspect individual in the circumstances and context of use). For example, the Archival Producers Alliance has published guidance on best practices for the use of Generative AI in Documentaries which include providing visual vocabulary that alerts the audience to GenAI use, such as a unique frame around the material, change of aspect ratio etc. 
• Providers of AI systems to facilitate detection and identification of AI-generated or manipulated content by marking such content in a machine-readable manner and enabling related detection mechanisms (e.g. metadata identification, cryptographic techniques and watermarking). 
• Deployers of AI systems generating or manipulating deepfake content to provide information about the origin of the content. However, where the content forms part of an evidently artistic, creative, satirical, fictional or analogous work or programme, these obligations are limited to disclosing the existence of the generated or manipulated content in an appropriate manner that does not hamper the display or enjoyment of the work.  

Of course, the position in relation to transparency and labelling of AI content is not straightforward, both legally and practically. Many organisations, for example, have partnered with the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA) to add labels to AI-generated content (e.g. LinkedIn). These tags are automatically added based on embedded code data in the images, as identified by the C2PA process. However, this may easily be circumvented by stripping the metadata from digital files. It must therefore be anticipated that the discussions around the proposed Code of Practice will lead to a range of (potentially conflicting) viewpoints that may require compromises to be reached in certain areas.  

Practical steps 

While a number of legal measures are available for individuals who find that their likeness or voice has been used in a deepfake (as well as preventative measures to protect against creation in the first place), the framework for taking action remains a complex one, and so we would recommend anyone impacted to seek specialist legal advice. Those needing support with non-consensual intimate image deepfakes can contact services such as the Revenge Porn Helpline, who provide free assistance with the removal of intimate imagine including deepfakes shared without consent from the internet. The Police also have published guidance on reporting potential criminal offences involving deepfakes.   

If you would like to discuss issues relating to deepfakes, including how to take action to protect against digital replicas being created and shared, please get in touch with a member of the team.  

A City Transformed into a Drift Arena

The 2025 RoDrift Championship came to a spectacular close with its fifth and final stage in the heart of Ploiești, Romania. For two days, the city center transformed into a motorsport arena, with roaring engines, tire smoke, and the unmistakable energy of country’s top drifting series.

Garrett Rewards the 2025 Champions

Garrett Motion was proud to celebrate the success of this season’s champions, presenting a performance turbocharger to each winner across three classes:

• Roman Zelinskyi – 508 points – Pro
• Mazur Efim – 345 points – Semi-Pro
• Poteica Răzvan Flavian – 489 points – Street Open

Their consistency and skill over five demanding events earned each of them a top podium place — along with a Garrett turbo to boost them to even greater performances in 2026.

Cătălin Trifan Shows His Strength

Garrett’s sponsored driver, Cătălin Trifan from Team 3Fun Performance, also made his mark this season, finishing 6th overall in the PRO category. Behind the wheel of his G45 G-Series turbocharged BMW e46 N62B44, delivering over 1200 HP, Trifan showcased determination and fighting spirit throughout the championship. His runs combined precision and raw power, earning respect from fans and fellow competitors alike.

An Electric Atmosphere in the City Center

Unlike previous rounds in Bucharest drift events—where heavy rains and scorching heat challenged drivers —this time the conditions were perfect for the grand finale. With the streets of Ploiești filled with the smell of burning rubber, clouds of smoke, and engines echoing between buildings, the atmosphere was charged with excitement. Drift fever took hold, celebrating just how far RoDrift has come in raising the profile of motorsport in Romania.

Looking Ahead to 2026

As the 2025 season wraps up, Garrett is proud to have been part of the journey, powering champions, supporting rising talent, and sharing our passion for performance. The countdown to next season has already begun — so stay tuned to our newsletter and to RoDrift to see what’s coming next.