Category: 3. Business

Tokyo, October 9, 2025 – Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Co., Ltd., a part of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) Group, held a christening and launch ceremony on October 9 for the second of two large car ferries ordered by Shinnihonkai Ferry Co., Ltd. and Japan Railway Construction, Transport and Technology Agency (JRTT). The ceremony took place at the Enoura Plant of MHI’s Shimonoseki Shipyard & Machinery Works in Yamaguchi Prefecture. The new ferry will serve on a shipping route between the cities of Otaru in Hokkaido and Maizuru in Kyoto Prefecture.

At the ceremony, Shinnihonkai Ferry President Yasuo Iritani christened the new ferry “HAMANASU,” the Japanese word for a species of native shrub rose. The ceremonial rope cut was performed by Nozomi Kobayashi, ship travel ambassador for the Japan Passengerboat Association. The ship’s handover is scheduled for June 2026 following completion of outfitting work and sea trials. The HAMANASU is the tenth ferry built by Mitsubishi Shipbuilding for Shinnihonkai Ferry.

The HAMANASU utilizes the latest energy-saving vessel design, including being one of the second ferries in Japan to incorporate a buttock-flow stern hull(Note1) and a ducktail,(Note2) along with a KATANA BOW. Propulsion resistance is suppressed by an energy-saving roll-damping system combining an anti-rolling tank(Note3) and fin stabilizers,(Note4) providing energy savings of 5% compared to conventional ships.

The christening and launch ceremony for the first ship ordered by Shinnihonkai Ferry and JRTT, named KEYAKI, was held in April 2025, with handover scheduled for November.

Japan is currently undergoing a modal shift to sea transport to mitigate environmental impacts by reducing CO₂ emissions, and to compensate for truck driver shortages arising from workstyle reforms. This shift has brought utilization of ferry transport into sharp relief. Going forward, Mitsubishi Shipbuilding will continue to contribute to the active use of sea transport and environmental protection, resolving diverse issues together with its business partners through construction of ferries that provide stable sea transport together with outstanding energy and environmental performance.

• 1A hull design that reduces water resistance by optimizing the shape of the stern.
• 2A hull form with the stern protruding like a duck’s tail.
• 3An anti-rolling tank contains water that shifts laterally within a ship’s beam. When a vessel rolls, the tank water moves in the direction opposite to the rolling, countering the rolling effect.
• 4Fin stabilizers are another device that reduces ship rolling. Attached to both sides of the hull, these movable fins generate lifting power in the water in the direction opposite to the rolling.

■ Main Specifications of the HAMANASU

Ship type	Passenger-carrying car ferry
LOA	Approx. 199m
Beam	Approx. 25.5m
Gross tonnage	Approx. 14,300t
Service speed	Approx. 28.3 knots
Passenger capacity	286
Loading capacity	Approx. 150 trucks and 30 passenger cars

Interview with Piero Cipollone, conducted by Žanete Hāka-Rikarde and Priit Pokk on 29 September 2025

9 October 2025

What benefits would consumers and end users get from the introduction of the digital euro?

The core issue is that the world is changing, and people are increasingly paying digitally. But because cash cannot be used for digital payments, this reduces their freedom of choice. We want to preserve this freedom by complementing physical cash with a digital equivalent – a digital euro. This would ensure that people enjoy the benefits of cash in the digital era.

Cash has key advantages. It is Europeans’ money, issued by their central bank. It is the most widely accepted and inclusive payment solution; and the one that best preserves our privacy. But its role is declining because we cannot use it for digital payments.

In today’s world, if we do not provide people with a digital equivalent to cash, we constrain their freedom. Let me give you an example. You cannot use cash for e-commerce, which already accounts for one-third of our day-to-day transactions in the euro area. Now, imagine that e-commerce continues to expand – without a digital public means of payment, people are left with no choice but to use private payment solutions. This is a fundamental problem for a central bank, because we have a mandate to provide people with a public means of payment for their day-to-day purchases.

This has very concrete implications for Europeans.

Consumers are eager to shop, not to deal with the hassle of paying – they need a payment solution that is simple, fast, secure and easy. Do we have a solution today that provides for this? I don’t think so. In Italy, if I want to go and buy something in a shop, I can use a piece of plastic: a debit card issued by my local bank. But that piece of plastic may not work in all shops, and it may not work when I shop online or when I’m in Germany. And it doesn’t allow me to make peer-to-peer payments. To cater for all of these use cases, I need several different solutions. This is inefficient and inconvenient for users.

We do not currently have one single, simple, digital means of payment that we can use to pay across Europe, be it in shops, online or from person to person. And the question that follows from this is: if we provide such a means of payment, have we improved the lives of people in Europe? It seems to me that the answer is yes.

The main reason for the digital euro is to allow people to make digital payments anywhere in Europe. We want to ensure that we Europeans can use our money, the euro, whenever we need it.

Another key reason is to reduce our over-reliance on non-European solutions, which currently limits competition and results in higher fees for merchants – and ultimately, higher prices for consumers. It also makes us vulnerable: we depend on others for our money and this can be weaponised against us. Ten years ago we weren’t facing this problem, because cash was king. We did depend on foreign companies for digital payments, but it was not critical. Today, two-thirds of euro area countries lack a domestic card payment solution, and all of them rely on international card schemes for payments to other euro area countries. Non-European solutions also dominate online payments, and with e‑commerce rapidly expanding, this dependency is only increasing.

At the same time, in some places, the infrastructure supporting cash payments is shrinking. I’ll give you an example. I was in Amsterdam a couple of weeks ago and I went to the supermarket. There were ten card-only self-service checkouts and just one cashier for cash payments. To pay with cash, there was a long queue. This creates a disincentive to use cash.

Europe’s lack of a unified digital payment solution is working against us, in the sense that the expansion of the e-commerce space is pushing us to be more and more dependent on solutions that we don’t have any control over.

As citizens, we should care that at any moment, our means of payment can be interrupted at the will of somebody outside Europe. And as consumers, we should also care that merchants face higher fees owing to the lack of sufficient alternatives, as we too pay for it in the end in the form of higher prices.

A digital euro would complement cash as its digital counterpart. It would offer a European solution built on European infrastructure, increasing the options available to Europeans and preserving their freedom when it comes to payments.

What are the use cases that the digital euro is supposed to cover that banks and other services are not covering today?

This very much depends from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, Estonia doesn’t have a domestic card payment solution or digital wallet. For most use cases, you have to use a non‑European solution, except when using cash.

So where are we strong? European domestic solutions excel in certain areas, particularly at the point of sale through traditional cards. And this holds true in countries like France or Italy. However, even in those cases, domestic cards cannot be used in other countries, leading to a reliance on international card schemes for cross-border transactions.

There is also very little coverage for e-commerce. Only two euro area countries – Spain and the Netherlands – offer domestic online payment solutions, namely Bizum and iDEAL. By contrast, in Germany, most online transactions are done through PayPal rather than a domestic solution. Wero still needs to enter that space.

The digital euro would cover all key use cases: point of sale, e-commerce, peer-to-peer and even payments to or from the Government. Users would have a universal means of payment that satisfies all legal obligations and is guaranteed to be accepted wherever digital payments are possible. In this sense, the digital euro serves as a digital counterpart to cash.

Can you tell us a little bit more about how it will work, how people will get it and how they can use it?

It will work like any other means of payment. People will access the digital euro through their bank or a payment service provider of their choice. The bank or payment service provider will act as the intermediary, onboarding clients and handling processes such as anti-money laundering checks, and so forth. Users will receive either an electronic wallet or a card that allows them to access and use the digital euro. From there, the system will function much like any other payment method.

However, there’s more to it. Banks could also embed the digital euro app directly in their existing wallets. For you as a consumer, it will be no different if the transaction is going through commercial bank money or the digital euro wallet. What is important is that – with one simple, single app on your phone, in that case your bank app – you can pay everywhere in Europe. That’s the fundamental advantage.

There will be two ways to pay with the digital euro.

First, you can transfer money from your bank account into the wallet and then pay.

Alternatively, you can link your digital euro wallet to your bank account. In that case, you don’t even need to have funds in your digital euro wallet before you pay. Let’s say I’m out shopping and find a pair of shoes that cost €150. Even if I don’t have €150 in my digital euro wallet, I can still make the purchase. The digital euro app will automatically connect with my bank account, transfer the required amount into my digital euro wallet, and complete the payment seemlessly and instantaneously.

The digital euro will also offer an important functionality: offline payments. Imagine I’m going to a pharmacy and I don’t want anybody to know that I’m going to buy something there – I could decide to pay with the offline solution. To do so, I simply need to prefund my offline wallet, go to the pharmacy, buy whatever I want, and nobody will know about this transaction except me and the pharmacy. The offline solution will be very convenient not just in terms of privacy, but also resilience: it will ensure we can still pay even when there is an outage, or simply when there is no network connection.

The promise is that the digital euro will offer a high level of privacy, like you mention. But on the other hand, people are fearing that it’ll be the opposite – that Big Brother will be looking at your transaction data, etc. So, who exactly will have access to the transaction data? Could there be cases where the ECB, the Government or police have access to this data?

The offline solution will be completely anonymous. Only the payer and the payee will know about their payments because there will be no record of the transaction. So this is as private as cash. Money moves from one wallet to another but the details of the transactions will not be known to anyone else. To address anti-money laundering concerns, offline transactions may be subject to a maximum amount. This will be for the legislators to decide.

Let me now explain how privacy will work for online payments. There are three pillars to protecting privacy for online payments.

The first pillar is technology. When you initiate a payment, the bank will send three pieces of information to the ECB: the amount, a code representing the payer and a code representing the payee. The codes for the payer and payee are encrypted. The ECB does not know who they are. Only the payer’s bank can link the code with the the payer’s identity. This is the same for the payee; only the payee’s bank knows the payee’s identity. Checks for possible illicit activities such as money laundering or terrorist financing will take place at the level of the commercial bank, as is currently the case for online transactions.

The second pillar is regulation. We are working on very strict rules on who will be able to access those three pieces of information for the purpose of running the system. And we’ll make sure this can be audited. We will be supervised by independent data protection authorities to ensure that we comply with EU data protection law. We want them to see what we are doing and we want to make sure that everybody knows that we walk the talk. There will be complete transparency.

The third pillar is openness to future privacy-enhancing technologies. Privacy technology is constantly evolving, and we are in touch with innovators around the world, especially the BIS Innovation Hub, to explore these new, more sophisticated technologies and potentially implement them in the future.

So, in summary, we will ensure privacy through technology, regulation and being open to future privacy-enhancing techniques so that we can bring an additional layer of privacy as soon as more advanced technologies are ready to be implemented in a system that has to run a billion transactions every day.

What is the current status of the digital euro project? And are there major obstacles that you are now facing, such as resistance from banks or other market players?

Internally, we are completely on schedule with the technical work. We have a timeline and we are fully respecting it. But as we have previously said, we will not issue the digital euro until we have the legislation in place. So we are waiting for this legislation to be adopted.

The European Commission presented its legislative proposal for the digital euro on 28 June 2023. That was over two years ago. The proposal is now being examined by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU – which brings together national finance ministers – so that they can suggest any amendments they may wish to make. Once both institutions have agreed on their position, they will meet with the European Commission and decide on the final legislation. The discussion in the EU Council is proceeding very well. The current Danish Presidency of the EU Council is committed to reaching an agreement by the end of the year. In September an important agreement was reached on how to set the holding limit. Member States are now discussing the compensation model, i.e. how all parties involved will be compensated for their respective roles. They are paying close attention to the issue of privacy, which is a very important matter. To me, the compensation model is more of a political matter than a technical one, and the EU Council is working on this. The Council Presidency is very confident that the EU Council will finalise its position – what they call the “general approach” – by the end of the year.

At the European Parliament, the rapporteur has publicly said that he will publish his proposal by 24 October. Members of the European Parliament then have five to six weeks to present amendments and almost five months to discuss them. The European Parliament will possibly finalise their position at the beginning of May, which means that they will start discussions with the EU Council afterwards to agree on a common text. It might take three months or six months, but we should have the legislation in place in the second half of 2026.

From what I understand, there are differences of opinion within the European Parliament. But Members of Parliament are no longer discussing if the digital euro should be introduced; they are discussing how. It’s important for the success of the digital euro that they exercise their democratic role in full.

Banks have two concerns. One is cost and the other is the risk of disintermediation. We have explained many times that both are a little overstated and that safeguards have been foreseen that can be further discussed.

What are the incentives for banks to play their part in implementing the digital euro so that people will start using it?

Banks can make money out of this. Simply put, banks will be remunerated for the services that they provide to people.

Who will pay? The ECB?

The compensation model will be similar to the one that currently applies to private digital payment solutions, but both banks and merchants stand to benefit.

Today, there are four parties involved in a card payment: the issuing bank (the bank that issues the card); the acquiring bank (the merchant’s bank); the merchant; and the infrastructure provider. When a payment takes place, the merchant pays what is called a “merchant service charge” to the acquiring bank for processing the payment, and part of this charge is passed on to the issuing bank as an “interchange fee”. Both the acquiring and issuing banks also have to pay “scheme fees” and other charges to the payment scheme and infrastructure providers, which typically are international card schemes.

How will this work with the digital euro? We will not charge scheme fees, nor will we charge for the use of our infrastructure. So money will be saved in the process. The idea is that the money that is saved will be transferred in part to the merchants (who will pay lower fees) and in part to the acquiring and issuing banks on top of their current remuneration.

So Visa and MasterCard will be cut out of the process?

Visa and MasterCard will be remunerated according to their fee structure whenever people chose to use these payment solutions. If people decide to pay with the digital euro, the scheme that I have just described will be applied. We are not forcing people to pay with the digital euro, but they can if they choose to.

Has there been a lot of intensive lobbying from Visa and Mastercard?

Understandably – they are business people. But they can reduce costs and compete. They also offer insurance and other quality services. The bottom line is: people should decide. We are not here to exclude anybody. We are here to make the system more resilient.

And in your opinion, is that a key reason why the digital euro could be widely adopted or is there another reason?

Merchants will encourage clients to pay with the digital euro. Why?

First, merchants will pay less.

Second, they will gain negotiation power as there’ll be an alternative to international card schemes. Merchants will be able to say: “if you don’t want to reduce merchant fees, I’m going to use the digital euro”.

There is one additional reason: standards. If you are a merchant that operates in many markets in Europe, you have to accept many different payment solutions. For example, imagine you are a large supermarket chain operating in Estonia, France, Spain, etc. You must be able to accept all the domestic payment solutions in those countries. And each of these solutions has its own standards. So you have a huge technical complexity to deal with. A digital euro standard that the various solutions could use across Europe would be a huge simplification and would result in lower costs.

To recap, there are three key benefits for merchants: reduced fees, more negotiating power with regard to card schemes and simplification on the back-end side and on the operational side.

You mentioned inclusion. Many people, particularly older people, prefer to use cash. So people are also wondering: is the digital euro the next step towards eliminating cash?

This is completely against our philosophy.

Physical cash is central bank money. We certainly do not want to eliminate a key form of the money that we issue, one that many people remain attached to.

And we are not just saying this. There are facts that prove this.

First, we are investing in a new series of banknotes. We just launched a design contest for this purpose.

Second, a discussion is taking place on a proposed EU legislation to strengthen the legal tender of cash. We are pushing to strengthen it even further: we are the strongest voice in asking to reduce exceptions to the obligation to accept cash. The ECB has been very vocal on this topic.

Our job is to provide people with means of payment – that is in our mandate. People want to use cash and we will continue to provide cash. But they also want to be able to pay digitally. So to fulfill that same mandate, we are working on the digital euro. The digital euro will complement physical cash by offering a digital form of cash.

We are not here to tell people how they should pay. It’s their money and their choice. We are a technical implementing agency, tasked with fulfilling the needs of Europeans. I want to make that clear. We have neither the power nor the mandate to decide how people should pay. But we have a responsibility to continue offering the option of paying with sovereign money.

We do not want to replace cash. We want cash to exist in a physical form and digital form so that cash can continue to thrive in the digital era.

The rollout of kerbside glass collection will start in two months after it was delayed by a fire at a waste storage site, a local authority said.

Bedford Borough Council said glass bottles, jars and containers will be collected from orange recycling bins from 1 December.

The fire at Elstow Waste Transfer Station near Bedford broke out at about 21:00 BST on 4 July and was put out seven days later.

The building, which temporarily stored the borough’s non-hazardous waste, was demolished so the blaze could be extinguished.

The authority said it had worked closely with contractors to “ensure that the necessary infrastructure is fully in place to manage the expected increase in recycled glass tonnage effectively”.

A glass collection pilot scheme, which began in May 2024 and expanded to other parts of the borough that December, led “to increased recycling rates”, the council said.

Nicola Gribble, an independent councillor at the authority and portfolio holder for environment, said: “The strong response to our trial proves that residents want to recycle more glass, and making this part of regular collections is a straightforward way to help our environment and reduce waste.”

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HSBC has made a HK$106bn ($13.6bn) offer to buy out minority investors in Hong Kong lender Hang Seng Bank as it presses ahead with a restructuring plan.

Europe’s largest bank has offered HK$155 a share, a 30 per cent premium over Hang Seng’s closing price on Wednesday, to take the unit fully private and delist its Hong Kong-listed shares. The all-cash deal values Hang Seng at HK$290bn.

HSBC’s share price was down as much as 7.3 per cent by mid-morning in Hong Kong after it said it would not make share buybacks for the next three financial quarters in order to generate the cash needed for the deal.

The bank returned $11bn to shareholders in 2024 through share buybacks alone.

HSBC took control of Hang Seng during a banking crisis in 1965 and owns about 63 per cent. It ranks among the global bank’s most significant acquisitions alongside the UK’s Midland Bank in 1992.

Hang Seng has been hard hit by Hong Kong’s recent property slump, with its non-performing loan ratio at 6.7 per cent at the end of June — an all-time high.

HSBC had already kicked off a restructuring at Hang Seng, bringing in a new chief executive in October.

“This investment is primarily to enhance the capabilities of Hang Seng in terms of additional products and additional scale and technology investments, as well as obviously giving customers the same access to our international network,” said group chief executive Georges Elhedery. 

Elhedery took on the role of chief executive last year and kicked off a worldwide restructuring that included shutting HSBC’s investment bank in the US and Europe and pulling out of some markets.

He denied that the move to tighten HSBC’s grip on Hang Seng was sparked by concerns over its commercial real estate exposure.

“We remain constructive on the outlook for the [Hong Kong real estate] sector in the medium to long term. So we see this as a short-term credit cycle,” he said.

HSBC considers Hong Kong a “home” market along with the UK. The global bank has been under pressure amid greater tension between China and the west, with its largest shareholder Ping An launching a campaign in 2022 for it to split up its Asian and western businesses.

In an internal email to staff Elhedery added that he expected “an opportunity to create greater alignment across HSBC and Hang Seng Bank that may result in better operational leverage and efficiencies”.

Some analysts greeted the move positively as a simplification measure for HSBC. “Either Hang Seng Bank should be separate and a competitor or it should be fully owned, so this move makes sense,” said Michael Makdad of Morningstar.

Hang Seng has traditionally operated as a more retail, mass market franchise while HSBC targeted wealthier clients and businesses.

Hang Seng recorded net income of HK$6.9bn in the first half of 2025, compared with HK$10bn in the same period the previous year.

In a call with journalists Elhedery added that there might be “opportunities for alignment between the two entities”, including offering Hang Seng customers more access to HSBC’s international network.

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Europeans are at risk of cold showers after materials critical to hot water tanks were not included on an EU list of authorised substances, which was revised as part of the bloc’s sprawling environmental legislation.

Applia, the home appliance lobby group, has estimated that more than 90 per cent of hot water storage tanks would no longer be marketable in the EU if hafnium, a highly heat resistant metal, and its sister element zirconium are not recognised as safe for household use.

The two elements were not listed in the bloc’s rules for drinking water, which enter into force in 2027 and aim to protect consumers and improve water quality standards. The European Commission appears to have overlooked the fact that hot water tanks also hold potable water, with manufacturers warning they risk fines if they do not comply with the list of authorised substances.

“[Hafnium] is absolutely safe to use,” said Paolo Falcioni, director-general of Applia, stressing that the element had been used for more than 100 years in enamelled hot water tanks. If hafnium or zirconium are not mixed with the enamel, he explained, the glazing “cracks and the hot water is not hot”.

The two elements are also used in enamelling heat pumps, which have become more popular in recent years as households move away from gas boilers.

Falcioni said alternatives to hafnium, such as steel or copper, cost four to five times as much, which would be transferred to consumers at a time when household finances are tight.

“The impact would be huge,” said Jérôme Martel, regulatory affairs manager at the French heating and ventilation company Groupe Atlantic. Italy’s Ariston, another major manufacturer of hot water tanks, raised similar concerns.

European companies have pushed the commission to simplify the bloc’s regulatory burden, arguing it only adds to their woes ranging from high energy prices to US tariffs and cheap Chinese competition. Falcioni warned, however, that the complexity of the existing rule book also meant that more oversights, such as the exclusion of hafnium, were likely unless the commission paid greater attention to industry concerns.

The commission said it was up to member states to notify it of the need to authorise hafnium and so far none had done so. Brussels previously told companies they can apply for toxicological assessments to get them approved.

But industry argues this process would take too long and they would be forced to make costly changes to their production lines in the interim.

“This would place European manufacturers at a severe disadvantage compared to non-EU competitors,” said an industry executive, who asked not to be named.

Member states can approve hafnium’s use on a national level but this option is also costlier and more time-consuming than EU authorisation.

Falcioni warned the lack of regulatory clarity in this area risked deterring foreign investors, too.

“There are companies that are willing to reshore the manufacturing to Europe but without this certainty they may not,” he said.

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The writer is an external member of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee

Generations of economists — myself included — were taught to think about changes in economic activity primarily in terms of demand. But supply can prove every bit as consequential for output and inflation, as we recently experienced in the face of a pandemic and a war in Europe. We’ve learnt a number of lessons about how negative supply shocks propagate through the economy and how central banks might respond to them.

The conventional wisdom is that monetary policymakers should look through adverse supply shocks. First, they are often transitory and there is a lag before monetary policy has an impact on the economy, so any response would probably come to bear too late. Second, adverse supply shocks tend to push output down and inflation up. Monetary policymakers generally respond more cautiously to these shocks as they weigh the benefits of stabilising prices with the costs of weakening output. Third, if inflation expectations are well anchored, second-round effects should be avoided. Finally, interest rates are a demand-management tool, with little direct impact on supply.

In the face of recent supply shocks, inflation peaked at 9.1 per cent in the US, 11.1 per cent in the UK and 10.6 per cent in the Eurozone. More than five years after the onset of the pandemic, it remains above target in the US and UK.

The past few years have taught us a lot about the nature and transmission of supply shocks. First, different supply shocks can propagate through the economy in different ways. Recent research by Bank of England staff suggests a fall in productivity growth and a wage mark-up both result in a sharp initial jump in core inflation, but a negative labour supply shock results in a much more persistent rise.

The extent to which supply shocks have a lasting impact depends in part on whether second-round effects take hold, which act mainly through inflation expectations. The level of inflation influences how expectations form. Bank research shows households’ and companies’ attentiveness to inflation is greater when it reaches 3-4 per cent in the UK.

In projecting their own price growth over the next year, companies are more influenced by inflation changes when inflation is high than when it is lower, as it was before the pandemic. Household and company expectations are more sensitive to rising than falling inflation as well. Finally, expectations are particularly responsive to price changes in items such as food and energy.

The state of the economy matters when gauging whether elevated inflation expectations will feed into higher wages and prices. We saw this after the pandemic, when the inflationary impact of energy price and supply chain shocks was perpetuated by a tight labour market, boosting wage growth and services inflation. According to the bank’s Decision Makers Panel, many companies also set prices according to the state of the economy rather than on a schedule, and they changed their prices more frequently when inflation was high in 2022.

These lessons can help central banks respond to supply shocks both now and in the future. Last August, the Monetary Policy Committee considered a hypothetical scenario in which inflation expectations were more backward-looking and productivity growth was weaker than in our baseline forecast. This results in higher and more persistent inflation, barring a monetary policy response.

Bank staff then applied a policy rule that minimises deviations of inflation from target and output from potential, and prescribes a policy path to achieve this. The rule’s path is more restrictive than both the market curve underpinning our baseline forecast and the more recent, higher market curve — in fact it suggests a near-term rate rise.

This prescribed path is not gospel. Policy reversals undermine central bank credibility, and restrictiveness could also be achieved by skipping rate cuts.

Uncertainty around the structural features of an economy may affect the appropriate policy response as well. Bank research finds that if policymakers are uncertain about the persistence of inflation — as they are likely to be in the case of a supply shock — policy should respond more forcefully to inflation than under conditions of certainty.

Learning the lessons from recent supply shocks is not just an academic exercise. Transformational issues such as climate change, economic fragmentation and economic statecraft mean supply shocks are likely to become more frequent and successive.

Central banks need to understand how these shocks might impact the economy and how our policy stance might best evolve accordingly.

A number of economies in sub-Saharan Africa have seen
inflationary pressures wane in recent months amid currency
appreciation versus the US dollar. In turn, this is allowing
central banks to lower interest rates, helping business activity in
the region to expand solidly. PMI® data and the anecdotal evidence
provided by our survey respondents can help to illustrate the
impact of currency movements.

Range of currencies gain versus the US dollar in 2025

Of the seven economies in sub-Saharan Africa for which S&P
Global compile PMI surveys, five have seen currency appreciation
against the US dollar over the course of 2025 so far. While this to
some extent reflects the weakness of the dollar itself this year,
there have also been positive factors supporting local currencies,
including support from IMF programmes, fiscal consolidation and
tight monetary policy.

In particular, the Ghanaian cedi and Zambian kwacha have each
appreciated by 15% against the US dollar in 2025 so far, while the
South African rand and Nigerian naira have also seen gains.

Currency appreciation has contributed to a sustained easing of
inflationary pressures in the sub-Saharan Africa business sector.
PMI data showed that overall input costs increased at the slowest
pace since the COVID-19 pandemic in September. While selling prices
rose at a slightly faster pace than in August, here too the pace of
inflation was among the weakest in the past five years.

Country level PMI data show that most of the economies we cover
in sub-Saharan Africa have seen either a slowdown in inflation of
purchase costs or outright falls in prices over the course of 2025.
Those countries seeing the strongest currency appreciations against
the US dollar – Ghana and Zambia – have recorded periods of
decreasing purchase prices. Such price falls are rarely seen among
the sub-Saharan Africa PMIs, which normally suffer from marked
inflationary pressures. Even Nigeria, where purchase costs
continued to rise sharply during the third quarter, posted the
weakest pace of inflation since March 2020.

Survey comments highlight impact of currency gains

Anecdotal evidence from our PMI surveys can help us to see what
is driving the drop in price pressures in the region, with comments
from panellists highlighting the impact of currency appreciation on
purchase costs.

Normally we see any references to exchange rates or the dollar
being linked to rises in purchase prices as downward pressure on
local currencies feeds through to higher costs for imported items
and those priced in dollars. But between June and August this year
we recorded more mentions of these factors pushing down
prices rather than lifting them; the only time this has been the
case since we have had the full complement of seven sub-Saharan
Africa PMI surveys.

Similarly, recent months have seen above-average mentions of
either exchange rates or the dollar causing a drop in purchase
prices, to a degree second only to that seen in April 2024, when
firms in Kenya were responding to a substantial appreciation of the
shilling against the US dollar.

Central banks lower interest rates amid waning inflation

Easing inflationary pressures have enabled central banks across
much of the region to lower their interest rates over the course of
2025. Of the seven economies we cover, five have lower levels of
interest rates now than at the start of the year. Most notably is
Ghana, where the central bank has cut rates by 650 basis points in
the past two meetings. Interest rates in Uganda are at the same
level as they were at the start of 2025, while only Zambia has
posted an increase. Here though, S&P Global Market Intelligence
expects a cut of 50-100 basis points at the upcoming November
monetary policy committee meeting.

Output rises solidly at end of third quarter

The softening inflation environment has coincided with a period
of solid growth in the sub-Saharan Africa private sector. September
saw output increase at the fastest pace in five months in response
to higher inflows of new orders. Employment rose for the twelfth
month running, while firms increased their purchasing activity and
inventory holdings.

Most notably, the Stanbic Bank Zambia PMI signalled the fastest
rise in business activity since June 2023, while Stanbic Bank PMI
data for Kenya signalled a return to growth following mid-year
disruptions caused by protests. The only economy covered by PMI
data to see a drop in output during September was Ghana, but even
here new orders expanded and business confidence remained elevated,
meaning that we could potentially see renewed growth in the months
ahead.

Overall, the sub-Saharan Africa private sector enters the final
quarter of the year on a solid footing, in part at least due to the
currency gains seen over the course of 2025 so far.

Access the global PMI press releases.

Andrew Harker, Economics Director, S&P Global Market
Intelligence

Tel: +44 134 432 8196

andrew.harker@spglobal.com

© 2025, S&P Global. All rights reserved. Reproduction in
whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

Purchasing Managers’ Index™ (PMI^®) data are compiled by S&P Global for more than 40 economies worldwide. The monthly data are derived from surveys of senior executives at private sector companies, and are available only via subscription. The PMI dataset features a headline number, which indicates the overall health of an economy, and sub-indices, which provide insights into other key economic drivers such as GDP, inflation, exports, capacity utilization, employment and inventories. The PMI data are used by financial and corporate professionals to better understand where economies and markets are headed, and to uncover opportunities.

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China has tightened its rules on the export of rare earths – the elements that are crucial to the manufacture of many high-tech products.

New regulations announced by the country’s Ministry of Commerce formalise existing rules on processing technology and unauthorised overseas cooperation.

China is also likely to block exports to foreign arms manufacturers and some semiconductor firms.

Rare earth exports are a key sticking point in the months-long negotiations between Beijing and Washington over trade and tariffs. The announcement comes as China’s President Xi Jinping and his US counterpart Donald Trump are expected to meet later this month.

Technology used to mine and process rare earths, or to make magnets from rare earths, can only be exported with permission from the government, the Ministry of Commerce said.

Many of these technologies are already restricted. China had added several rare earths and related material to its export control list in April, which caused a major shortage back then.

But the new announcement makes clear that licenses are unlikely to be issued to arms manufacturers and certain companies in the chip industry.

Chinese firms are also banned from working with foreign companies on rare earths without government permission.

China has been accused by the US and other Western countries of aiding Russia’s war on Ukraine by allowing dual technology exports – materials that can be used for either civilian or military purposes – to be sent to Moscow. Beijing has repeatedly denied this.

The latest announcement also clarifies the specific technologies and processes that are restricted.

These include mining, smelting and separation, magnetic material manufacturing, and recycling rare earths from other resources.

The assembly, debugging, maintenance, repair, and upgrading of production equipment are also prohibited from export without permission, the announcement added.

This could have an impact on the US, which has a significant rare earths mining industry but lacks processing facilities.

Rare earths are a group of 17 chemically similar elements that are crucial to the manufacture of many high-tech products.

Most are abundant in nature, but they are known as “rare” because it is very unusual to find them in a pure form, and they are very hazardous to extract.

Although you may not be familiar with the names of these rare earths – like neodymium, yttrium and europium – you will be very familiar with the products that they are used in.

For instance, neodymium is used to make the powerful magnets used in loudspeakers, computer hard drives, electric car motors and jet engines that enable them to be smaller and more efficient.

China has a near monopoly on extracting rare earths as well as on refining them – which is the process of separating them from other minerals.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that China accounts for about 61% of rare earth production and 92% of their processing.

Additional reporting by Ian Tang of BBC Monitoring.

ASEAN+3 Remains Resilient Amid Heightened Global Uncertainties

In the October 2025 update of the AREO, AMRO forecasts the ASEAN+3 region to grow at 4.1 percent in 2025 and 3.8 percent in 2026, an upward revision from July’s forecast, supported by robust first-half performance and stronger-than-expected export momentum. Market pressures have gradually eased since peaking in April following the announcement of the “Liberation Day” tariffs.

SINGAPORE, October 9, 2025 – The ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) today released its ASEAN+3 Financial Stability Report (AFSR) 2025 and the ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook (AREO) October Update, highlighting the region’s broad resilience in the face of heightened uncertainties driven by US trade policy shifts and geopolitical tensions.

Growth in the ASEAN+3 region is projected at 4.1 percent in 2025 and 3.8 percent in 2026, an upward revision from July’s forecast, supported by robust first-half performance and stronger-than-expected export momentum. Market pressures have gradually eased since peaking in April following the announcement of the “Liberation Day” tariffs.

“While intra-regional trade and domestic demand have become increasingly important growth drivers across ASEAN+3, the region remains deeply connected to the global financial system and is therefore not insulated from global shocks,” said AMRO Chief Economist Dong He. “Overall, the region’s financial system remains resilient, although pockets of vulnerabilities persist.”

Export-oriented corporate sectors—particularly smaller firms with high exposure to US demand—may face pressures on profit margins amid shifting trade dynamics. Inflation pressures in the US could persist amid higher import tariffs, complicating the Fed’s monetary policy stance and potentially triggering spillovers to other parts of the world. Additionally, growing uncertainty around the US dollar’s safe-haven status could further fragment the global financial landscape.

Despite these challenges, ASEAN+3 economies remain well-positioned to navigate global headwinds. Well-calibrated policy mixes and strong fundamentals—including robust banking systems, deepening financial markets, ample foreign reserves, and available policy space—have provided critical buffers. With inflation largely subdued and expectations well-anchored in most economies, central banks can maintain accommodative monetary policy to support growth.

At the same time, macroprudential tools, along with foreign exchange and capital flow management measures, offer additional safeguards to maintain financial stability and mitigate external spillovers. However, AMRO underscores that support should be carefully targeted to vulnerable sectors and deployed prudently to preserve policy space amid elevated external uncertainty.

Beyond near-term risks, the region is undergoing deeper structural transitions. Most notably, the rapid digitalization of financial services presents opportunities for greater financial inclusion and efficiency, while also introducing new challenges to financial stability.

“Digitalization of the banking sector is reshaping the market structure, offering new pathways for inclusion and efficiency,” said Runchana Pongsaparn, AMRO Group Head for Financial Surveillance. “But it also alters the nature and distribution of financial stability risks. Policymakers must adopt a multi-pronged strategy that promotes innovation while managing risks, calibrated to the maturity of each market segment.”

As ASEAN+3 manages near-term uncertainties, AMRO emphasizes the importance of reinforcing policy frameworks, improving transparency, and deepening domestic markets and buffers to mitigate spillover risks from external shocks.

Dr. He concluded: “With coordinated actions and deeper financial cooperation and integration, ASEAN+3 can turn today’s challenges into tomorrow’s opportunities, and emerge stronger, more connected, and more resilient.”

For more insights, refer to AMRO’s latest flagship publications: the ASEAN+3 Financial Stability Report 2025, and the ASEAN+3 Regional Economic Outlook October Update.

Also available in Chinese | Japanese | Korean

 

About AMRO

The ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) is an international organization established to contribute toward securing macroeconomic and financial resilience and stability of the ASEAN+3 region, comprising 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China; Hong Kong, China; Japan; and Korea. AMRO’s mandate is to conduct macroeconomic surveillance, support regional financial arrangements, and provide technical assistance to the members. In addition, AMRO also serves as a regional knowledge hub and provides support to ASEAN+3 financial cooperation.