Category: 3. Business

Keynote speech by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the 15th workshop on exchange rates, co-organised by Banka Slovenije with the Banca d’Italia, the Bank for International Settlements, the European Central Bank and the Nationale Bank van België/Banque Nationale de Belgique

Ljubljana, 3 December 2025

It is an honour to participate in this excellent workshop on exchange rates and to visit Bank of Slovenia.

This speech has two parts.^[1] In the first part, I will discuss the appropriate monetary policy response to deviations of inflation from the ECB’s symmetric two per cent medium-term target. In the second part, I will turn to the topic of this conference and outline some analytical perspectives on the interplay between the exchange rate and monetary policy.^[2]

Inflation deviations and monetary policy

The ECB has a clear orientation for the conduct of monetary policy: a symmetric two per cent inflation target over the medium term. This is articulated in our monetary policy strategy statement as follows:

“The Governing Council considers that price stability is best maintained by aiming for two per cent inflation over the medium term. The Governing Council’s commitment to this target is symmetric. Symmetry means that the Governing Council considers negative and positive deviations from this target as equally undesirable. The two per cent inflation target provides a clear anchor for inflation expectations, which is essential for maintaining price stability.”

In pursuing the symmetric two per cent target, a working definition of the medium term is required. Our monetary policy strategy statement provides a nuanced description:

“The flexibility of the medium-term orientation takes into account that the appropriate monetary policy response to a deviation of inflation from the target is context-specific and depends on the origin, magnitude and persistence of the deviation. Subject to maintaining anchored inflation expectations, it also allows the Governing Council in its monetary policy decisions to cater for other considerations relevant to the pursuit of price stability.”

How should such high-level strategic guidelines be implemented in practice? Let me make a few comments.

It is straightforward that small inflation deviations that are not expected to persist do not call for a monetary policy response. Most obviously, lags in the transmission of monetary policy mean that it would be counterproductive to seek to respond to near-term deviations that are solidly expected to be transitory. Moreover, a small and transitory deviation is unlikely to trigger the adjustment dynamics that can turn temporary deviations into longer-lasting deviations.

At the other extreme, it should also be clear that a sufficiently large and persistent deviation from the target requires a monetary policy response, regardless of its origin.

First, through the cost-of-living channel, the current inflation rate may influence subsequent price and wage-setting, as firms and workers respond to lower cost pressures in relation to negative deviations and higher cost pressures in relation to positive deviations.

Second, the real interest rate channel can reinforce an inflation shock that is expected to display some persistence: if a drop in inflation today is associated with ongoing low inflation for, say, the next year or two, this translates into a higher real interest rate (nominal rate minus expected inflation) over the relevant horizon. In turn, this puts downward pressure on consumption and investment, adding to the disinflationary impulse. Symmetrically, above-target inflation that is expected to persist for some time maps into a lower real interest rate and amplifies inflationary pressures.

Third, a persistent shift in the inflation rate can influence the formation of inflation expectations if people put some weight on simple extrapolation in forming expectations. Under such extrapolative behaviour, if inflation runs below target for a year or two, there is some risk that people might revise down their beliefs about the de facto medium-term inflation target. Symmetrically, if inflation runs above target for a year or two, there is some risk that people might revise up their beliefs about the de facto medium-term inflation target.

Fourth, a material inflation deviation that does not trigger a monetary policy response poses a communication risk, since markets, firms and households may find it difficult to understand the reaction function if there is no reaction.^[3] In turn, greater uncertainty about the reaction function can give rise to higher volatility in expectations about inflation and the policy rate path.

Given these mechanisms, a material deviation of inflation from the target calls for a monetary policy response. Since the cost-of-living, real interest rate, expectations-deanchoring and communication channels operate in a plausibly non-linear manner (individually and collectively), the appropriate monetary policy is also non-linear, with an incremental adjustment to mid-sized deviations but a more forceful or persistent adjustment to large deviations. 

This non-linearity is recognised in our monetary policy strategy statement, which highlights that:

“To maintain the symmetry of its inflation target, the Governing Council recognises the importance of appropriately forceful or persistent monetary policy action in response to large, sustained deviations of inflation from the target in either direction, to avoid deviations becoming entrenched through de-anchored inflation expectations.”

How should monetary policy respond to material deviations that fit neither the “small, transitory” category that can clearly be ignored, nor the “large, sustained” category that clearly triggers a non-linear response that is appropriately forceful or persistent? For this intermediate category of “mid-sized, somewhat persistent” deviations, the origin of the inflation deviation should play an important role in determining the appropriate monetary policy reaction.^[4]

In particular, an intermediate-category broad-based inflation deviation likely calls for an incremental adjustment in the monetary stance. In essence, this is the standard prescription of monetary policy feedback rules (such as the “family” of Taylor rules). However, if the origin of the inflation deviation is a supply-driven relative price level shock, the case for an active monetary policy response is more nuanced.^[5]

In particular, a supply shock to the relative price level of energy does not pose the same risk to medium-term inflation as a shock to domestic demand.

While an intermediate-category shock to the relative price level of energy may visibly alter headline inflation for a substantial fraction of the projection horizon (energy comprises about 10 per cent of the overall Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)), it might not materially alter the broader underlying inflation dynamics that are most important in determining the medium-term inflation trend. In particular, an intermediate-category supply-driven relative energy price level shock might not be sufficiently large or persistent to generate a broader wave of price changes, with energy-using sectors choosing to absorb the cost shock in margins rather than passing it through to the consumer.

The impact of a supply-driven relative price level shock on overall inflation also tends to have an inbuilt, self-correcting element. For instance, a decrease in the relative price level of energy will boost activity levels in energy-using sectors, with less slack in the economy putting upward pressure on inflation over the medium term. More broadly, since energy has a high import content, a decrease in the relative price level of energy typically constitutes an improvement in the terms of trade, boosting the real incomes and consumption levels of euro area households and thereby further adding to medium-term inflation pressures. In the opposite direction, symmetric mechanisms apply in relation to a positive shock to the relative price of energy.

These considerations mean that, within the intermediate category, a supply-driven inflation deviation that is primarily sectoral in origin does not pose the same risk to the medium-term inflation target as a broad-based inflation deviation. This means that it is essential in determining the appropriate monetary policy stance to carefully analyse the realised and projected dynamics of supplementary inflation measures, such as non-energy inflation (the sum of all categories excluding energy) and core inflation (further excluding the food category).^[6]

Clearly, it is a judgement call to determine how to respond to intermediate-category inflation deviations. Such judgement calls are best made on a meeting-by-meeting, data-dependent basis that draws on a comprehensive and rigorous analytical framework to take account of the unfolding evidence in relation to the shocks driving inflation deviations, and whether there are incipient signs that relative price shocks are transforming into broader inflation dynamics. This meeting-by-meeting, data-dependent approach is especially helpful under conditions of elevated uncertainty.

This analytical framework necessarily involves inspecting and modelling the current and projected behaviour of wages, profit margins, the suites of underlying inflation indicators and indicators of inflation expectations to assess whether a moderate inflation deviation might turn into a larger or longer deviation. It also involves a wide-ranging risk assessment. Amongst other dimensions, an important set of risk scenarios relates to possible amplification shocks, by which an inflation deviation might grow larger or become more persistent. This means that upside inflation shocks are especially salient if the baseline exhibits a positive inflation deviation. Symmetrically, downside inflation shocks are especially salient if the baseline exhibits a negative inflation deviation.

In summary, this discussion has emphasised that the appropriate monetary policy response to an inflation deviation from the target is context specific and requires a careful analysis of a broad set of considerations. Of course, the capacity to consider “looking through” some types of inflation deviations depends on a strong institutional commitment to delivering the symmetric inflation target over the medium term, underpinning firmly-anchored medium-term inflation expectations.^[7]

The interplay between the exchange rate and monetary policy

Let me now switch gears and turn to the interplay between the exchange rate and monetary policy. Chart 1 shows the nominal and the real effective exchange rates of the euro against 18 major trading partners, indexed against their values in 1999. While there have been prolonged and substantial currency swings over the lifetime of the euro, there has been no clear overall trend with currency shifts tending to reverse over time.

Chart 2 zooms in on the last decade and shows the euro exchange rate against the US dollar, the Chinese renminbi and a basket of selected Asian currencies since 2014. Since the start of the hiking cycle in Summer 2022, there has been marked appreciation of the euro against these major trading partners. For the renminbi in particular, this appreciation has been even stronger in real terms than in nominal terms, reflecting the much larger cumulative inflation in the euro area relative to China during this period.

Chart 3 zooms in further by examining the evolution of the dollar-euro exchange rate over the last year (Q4 2024 through Q3 2025) in the context of a BVAR model maintained by ECB staff. A striking feature of this analysis is the contribution of risk sentiment to euro appreciation in Q2 2025, reflecting some mix of a decline in risk sentiment towards the dollar and an improvement in risk sentiment towards the euro.

Transmission of the exchange-rate: model-based impact

Model-based analysis allows for a broader analysis of the transmission of exchange rate changes on the key macroeconomic variable. Simulations based on the ECB’s semi-structural multi-country model indicate that a 10 per cent appreciation in the euro plays out over several years, with inflation markedly lower for about three years and a peak disinflation impulse of 0.6 percentage points after about a year.^[8] The level of GDP declines throughout this adjustment period, with a cumulative loss of about one per cent of GDP after three years. In relation to trade dynamics, the euro appreciation reduces export volumes by about 3 per cent over this horizon and import volumes by about 1.5 per cent.

In the model, the transmission of the exchange rate shock operates primarily through the effects on trade deflators, which in turn influence export and import volumes. The appreciation makes euro area exports more expensive on international markets, reducing export volumes. At the same time, the appreciation also lowers the price of imports, dampening domestic inflationary pressures. Overall, imports decline despite the reduction in import prices as the demand drag dominates, with both private consumption and investment decreasing: consumption falls as economic activity contracts and labour demand slows. Investment declines as higher real interest rates and the appreciation’s disinflationary effects take hold. The resulting drop in the relative price of investment goods further suppresses investment, especially in externally exposed sectors.

Transmission of the exchange-rate: financial conditions

It is important to analyse the impact of currency movements using a range of different approaches. In addition to standard macroeconomic models, it is also helpful to study the impact of the exchange rate on financial conditions. In particular, currency movements operate via financial channels in addition to trade channels by altering the relative wealth of domestic investors versus foreign investors and affecting home and foreign asset prices.

Chart 5 shows the contribution of the exchange rate to the “Macro-Finance” financial conditions index (MF-FCI) that has been developed by ECB staff. ^[9] While the exchange rate only accounts for a relatively minor proportion of the total variation in the MF-FCI, it still adds significant explanatory power on top of the contributions of nominal and real interest rates and risk asset prices.^[10]

In the run-up to the global financial crisis, euro appreciation added to the tightening of financial conditions in the euro area. During the European debt crisis and in its aftermath, the weaker euro reinforced the generally accommodative monetary policy by contributing to the loosening of financial conditions. Since 2017, the regained strength of the euro has tightened financial conditions to varying degrees. Most recently in 2025, the euro has recorded its strongest tightening impulse on the MF-FCI , partly explained by the relative weakening of the US dollar.

In the baseline version of the MF-FCI, the coefficient of the euro NEER is positive, in line with the notion that an appreciation in the euro tends to tighten financial conditions in the euro area (Chart 5, hollow bar). A benefit of the methodology underlying the new index is its flexibility in estimating other specifications. The coefficients in the baseline do not only resemble average effects over the estimation sample from 2007 until 2025, but possibly also across underlying variables. In the case of the NEER, a meaningful model extension substitutes the NEER with euro exchange rates (Chart 5, filled bars). The positive average coefficient of the NEER is primarily driven by the EUR/USD, pointing to the importance of the US dollar for global financial markets and the relevance of a stronger euro relative to the US dollar as a dampener of the euro area economy. By contrast, a stronger euro relative to the Chinese renminbi indicates a loosening of financial conditions. Finally, a stronger euro relative to the Swiss Franc is also associated with a loosening of financial conditions, which is consistent with the special status of the Swiss France as a safe haven currency that weakens during “risk on” phases.

Model-based impulse responses to a surprise monetary policy expansion

Finally, it is also important to understand how the exchange rate responds to monetary policy decisions. In what follows, I show model-based simulations of a surprise monetary policy easing carried out by ECB staff. The simulations use the ECB-BASE and New Area-Wide Model (NAWM) models, which treat the euro area as a small, open economy, as well as a two-region model calibrated on the euro area and the rest of the world (GMGS henceforth).^[11] All three models account for changes in trade and asset flows across regions following changes in euro area monetary policy.

The impulse responses show the effect of a surprise 100-basis point monetary policy easing (in annualised terms; see Chart 6, panel a). The shock lowers domestic interest rates relative to foreign interest rates, triggering asset outflows that result in a nominal and real exchange rate depreciation (Chart 6, panels b and d). In the ECB-BASE model, the reaction is less frontloaded, as it is linked to long-term yields, which react more sluggishly. In the GMGS model, the real depreciation is less pronounced than in the NAWM, as in the latter inflation responds more sluggishly due to partial backward indexation and stickiness also affecting importers.

The depreciation makes domestic goods cheaper relative to foreign goods, improving price competitiveness in international markets. As the domestic currency depreciates, foreign demand for domestically produced goods increases, leading to an increase in real exports (Chart 6, panel e). The increase is more sluggish in the ECB-BASE model, reflecting the slower adjustment of the real exchange rate and a shock transmission mechanism with backward-looking expectations.

On the import side, two opposing forces come into operation following the monetary policy easing, as both import prices and domestic demand increase. On the one hand, the weaker exchange rate raises the domestic currency price of foreign goods, which tends to reduce imports. On the other hand, monetary easing stimulates overall domestic demand, including for imported goods. In the GMGS and the NAWM models, the demand effect slightly outweighs the price effect, leading to an increase in real imports, which is more limited than the increase in exports (Chart 6, panel f). Therefore, there is an improvement in the trade balance (Chart 6, panel g). By contrast, the domestic demand effect is stronger in the ECB-BASE model, as – which has a high import content – increases in response to the shock, leading to a deterioration in the trade balance. In the longer term, the trade balance also deteriorates in the GMGS and NAWM models: as higher prices feed through to export prices, the initial boost to exports fades. By contrast, domestic demand remains stronger more persistently, keeping imports higher for longer.

Overall, the results align with the empirical evidence shown in the context of my keynote speech at the CEPR International Macroeconomics and Finance Programme Meeting in 2019.^[12] Empirically, a monetary policy easing shock weakens the euro and stimulates both euro area exports and imports. In net terms, the trade balance improves as the response of exports is stronger than the increase in imports.

In order to obtain a better understanding of the importance of the role of the exchange rate in the transmission of monetary policy, it is helpful to “switch off” this channel in an alternative simulation exercise. The model simulations in Chart 7 examine the same policy trajectory as those in Chart 6, but with the nominal exchange rate held constant.^[13] Under this counterfactual scenario, exports would remain largely stable as they would no longer benefit from improved terms of trade (Chart 7, panel e), while imports would grow more significantly due to the absence of currency depreciation, which would prevent foreign goods from becoming more expensive (Chart 7, panel f).

As a result, the trade balance would worsen (Chart 7, panel g), leading to a somewhat smaller increase in GDP (Chart 7, panel h). In addition, the rise in inflation would be smaller (Chart 7, panel c), as the absence of currency depreciation would prevent imports from becoming more expensive. In summary, in response to an easing impulse, the depreciation in the exchange rate strengthens the impact of monetary policy on output and inflation.

Wrapping up, the aim of this part of the speech has been to explain some of the analytical approaches used by the ECB staff to understand the macroeconomic role of the exchange rate. Of course, the exchange rate is just one variable among many in determining euro area macroeconomic dynamics and our overall evaluation of economic and financial developments is based on an integrated assessment of all relevant factors.

PARIS — Aerospace manufacturer Airbus expects to deliver fewer planes than planned this year following an issue with fuselage panels used on some A320 planes.

The European company said Wednesday it is targeting around 790 commercial aircraft deliveries in 2025 “in light of recent supplier quality issue on fuselage panels impacting its A320 family delivery flow.”

The previous target was around 820 aircraft, the company said, explaining the projection was revised downward because the problem occurred at the end of the year, which is traditionally a very busy period.

The issue affecting a “limited number” of metal panels on the single-aisle A320 aircraft was contained and new panels meet all requirements, the company said.

Airbus sources parts and components from thousands of outside suppliers.

The quality issue with panels surfaced earlier this week, just days after the firm reported it was rushing to fix a separate software problem impacting about 6,000 of the popular planes.

The demand for battery raw materials is expected to increase significantly over the next decade, driven by the growth of electric vehicles (EVs) and energy storage systems. Europe is entering an exciting phase as it expands its production base for battery materials, including lithium, with the aim of strengthening its global position. However, the region faces persistent vulnerabilities such as heavy reliance on imports, supply chain complexities, rising energy and labor costs, slower-than-expected market developments, and the challenge of securing capital-intensive investments — all of which could undermine the sector’s competitiveness.

In October 2025, Marsh, Rystad Energy, and Commodity Trading Club hosted an event in London to discuss how Europe can develop secure, resilient, and sustainable battery supply chains. The key takeaways from this discussion are summarized below.

Financing the battery revolution: Overcoming capital challenges

Securing funding for capital-intensive battery projects remains crucial to scaling the value chain. In Europe, raising capital for land, construction, machinery, technology, and operations can be challenging. Supply chain disruptions and permitting delays further threaten the steady revenue streams that investors seek.

Equity risk is primarily addressed through non-recourse and project finance structures, where project success can depend on strong offtake agreements and the ability to secure favorable pricing for products. One participant from a multinational energy company highlighted the importance of engaging potential buyers (offtake partners) early to align project schedules and expectations.

Government support emerged as a key theme. Panelists highlighted the US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) as a benchmark for accelerating investment through subsidies and tax credits.

Experience from companies operating in the US and Europe indicates that measures in the US, such as Executive Order 14265, have served to streamline acquisitions and reduce uncertainty, boosting investor confidence. For example, a US$225 million Department of Energy grant accelerated a US lithium project, illustrating the impact of government backing. While the US lithium battery market is growing faster than the EU’s, due in part to such support, the EU market is maturing and leveraging lessons learned abroad to build its capabilities. As one participant noted, it has “been great for us to be able to develop our capabilities in the US and then bring that across into the projects in Europe.”

Indeed, the EU is fast-tracking battery projects through initiatives such as the FASTEST project, which accelerates battery R&D, and regulations like the Net Zero Industry Act and the Critical Raw Materials Act, which prioritize strategic projects and streamline permitting. The EU Commission has identified 47 key projects to expedite the raw material value chain, aiming to reduce historically lengthy permitting timelines.

Innovative financing models, such as venture tech approaches, are gaining traction for critical mineral production in Europe and North America. These models tend to prioritize investors’ vision and commitment over traditional cash flow metrics, helping earlier-stage developers to secure funding.

Mapping the hidden layers of battery supply chains

The global battery supply chain is complex and geographically concentrated, with China holding 80% of battery cell manufacturing capacity. Chinese restrictions on exports of certain technologies and critical minerals, including lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries, have limited European producers’ ability to develop LFP chemistry without reliance on China.

To enhance growth, Europe should focus on manufacturing optimization, access to capital, cost reduction, and technological innovation. Currently, European lithium-ion (li-ion) battery pack prices average 163€/kWh, about 40% higher than China’s 116€/kWh.

Despite strong R&D support and new policies, Europe remains dependent on imports for the supply and extraction of raw materials. Emerging geothermal lithium projects show promise, but short-term gaps mean imports will remain necessary for some time.

Bruno Livi of Marsh emphasized the importance of examining supply chain interdependencies and bottlenecks beyond direct suppliers, “where dependencies can increase up to 150-fold.” He added that many companies lack visibility into these extended networks.

AI-powered platforms like Marsh McLennan’s Sentrisk, together with specialist insights, can enhance supply chain visibility. For example, Sentrisk analyzed a battery supply chain by mapping its extensive supplier networks and incorporating geopolitical, natural hazard and concentration risks, enabling rapid, data-driven insights to inform risk management and strategic planning. Strategies to strengthen supply chains include supplier development programs, diversification, and nearshoring or friendshoring.

Sustainability as a strategic imperative

From a financing perspective, one speaker said environmental, social, and governance (ESG) alignment is “a license to finance. It’s not a nice-to-have. It’s a must-have, a non-negotiable requirement.”

Financing and risk management in the battery supply chain requires integrating environmental and sustainability concerns into risk assessments, supplier due diligence, and embedding sustainability factors into business strategies. As Aaron Bailey of Marsh said, sustainable business practices can attract investment and align with the insurance industry’s growing focus on responsible practices.

Navigating political minefields

The geographical concentration of lithium makes the battery supply chain susceptible to disruptions stemming from political instability, trade disputes, or natural disasters in key producing regions.

Investors and project owners often have to balance value creation with short- and long-term risks. While perceptions of political risk can deter investment, such risks can be managed through country-specific assessments, market intelligence, regulatory support, and insurance solutions.

Companies are adopting several risk mitigation strategies, including:

• Assessing the impact of country risks using resources such as Marsh’s World Risk Review, which provides up-to-date country risk insights.
• Integrating political risk into risk management decisions at an early stage.
• Adopting risk mitigation solutions, such as political risk insurance or trade credit insurance.

These measures help manage country risk, reduce financial exposure, and can assist in unlocking new investment opportunities.

Balancing innovation, risk, and opportunity

Europe’s battery supply chain faces a dynamic interplay of global economic forces, industry trends, political motivations, and business strategies. As the sector evolves, companies can increasingly benefit from a nuanced understanding of their risk exposures and solutions in their operating regions.

As one panelist said, Europe’s battery market is interesting because it has first-of-a-kind projects, many of which are trying to break new ground. One panelist cautioned that the success of Europe’s battery supply chain “depends on keeping the promises that we make.” Insurance coverage has an important role in the growth and strengthening of Europe’s battery supply chain by protecting investments, enabling growth, and promoting compliance with regulatory requirements and consumer expectations.

For more information on mitigating risks in your battery supply chain operations, please contact your local Marsh representative.

Want to learn more? Fill out the form and let’s connect.

3 December 2025

Bank interest rates for corporations

Data for cost of borrowing and deposit interest rates for corporations (Chart 1)

The composite cost-of-borrowing indicator, which combines interest rates on all loans to corporations, remained broadly unchanged in October 2025. The interest rate on new loans of over €1 million with a floating rate and an initial rate fixation period of up to three months increased by 6 basis points to 3.19%. The rate on new loans of the same size with an initial rate fixation period of over three months and up to one year fell by 13 basis points to 3.26%. The interest rate on new loans of over €1 million with an initial rate fixation period of over ten years decreased by 15 basis points to 3.43%. In the case of new loans of up to €250,000 with a floating rate and an initial rate fixation period of up to three months, the average rate charged stayed constant at 3.59%.
As regards new deposit agreements, the interest rate on deposits from corporations with an agreed maturity of up to one year stayed almost constant at 1.91% in October 2025. The interest rate on overnight deposits from corporations stayed constant at 0.52%.
The interest rate on new loans to sole proprietors and unincorporated partnerships with a floating rate and an initial rate fixation period of up to one year increased by 6 basis points to 3.97%.

Data for bank interest rates for corporations (Table 1)

Bank interest rates for households

Data for cost of borrowing and deposit interest rate for households (Chart 2)

The composite cost-of-borrowing indicator, which combines interest rates on all loans to households for house purchase, showed no change in October 2025. The interest rate on loans for house purchase with a floating rate and an initial rate fixation period of up to one year remained broadly unchanged at 3.52%. The rate on housing loans with an initial rate fixation period of over one and up to five years stayed almost constant at 3.37%. The interest rate on loans for house purchase with an initial rate fixation period of over five and up to ten years remained broadly unchanged at 3.48%. The rate on housing loans with an initial rate fixation period of over ten years stayed almost constant at 3.16%. In the same period the interest rate on new loans to households for consumption decreased by 7 basis points to 7.33%.
As regards new deposits from households, the interest rate on deposits with an agreed maturity of up to one year remained broadly unchanged at 1.77%. The rate on deposits redeemable at three months’ notice stayed constant at 1.21%. The interest rate on overnight deposits from households showed no change at 0.25%.

Data for bank interest rates for households (Table 2)

Further information

The data in Tables 1 and 2 can be visualised for individual euro area countries on the bank interest rate statistics dashboard. Additionally, tables containing further breakdowns of bank interest rate statistics, including the composite cost-of-borrowing indicators for all euro area countries, are available from the ECB Data Portal. The full set of bank interest rate statistics for both the euro area and individual countries can be downloaded from ECB Data Portal. More information, including the release calendar, is available under “Bank interest rates” in the statistics section of the ECB’s website.

For media queries, please contact Benoit Deeg, tel.: +49 69 1344 95686

Notes:

• In this press release “corporations” refers to non-financial corporations (sector S.11 in the European System of Accounts 2010, or ESA 2010), “households” refers to households and non-profit institutions serving households (ESA 2010 sectors S.14 and S.15) and “banks” refers to monetary financial institutions except central banks and money market funds (ESA 2010 sector S.122).
• The composite cost-of-borrowing indicators are described in the article entitled “Assessing the retail bank interest rate pass-through in the euro area at times of financial fragmentation” in the August 2013 issue of the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin (see Box 1). For these indicators, a weighting scheme based on the 24-month moving averages of new business volumes has been applied, in order to filter out excessive monthly volatility. For this reason the developments in the composite cost-of-borrowing indicators in both tables cannot be explained by the month-on-month changes in the displayed subcomponents. Furthermore, the table on bank interest rates for corporations presents a subset of the series used in the calculation of the cost-of-borrowing indicator.
• Interest rates on new business are weighted by the size of the individual agreements. This is done both by the reporting agents and when the national and euro area averages are computed. Thus changes in average euro area interest rates for new business reflect, in addition to changes in interest rates, changes in the weights of individual countries’ new business for the instrument categories concerned. The “interest rate effect” and the “weight effect” presented in this press release are derived from the Bennet index, which allows month-on-month developments in euro area aggregate rates resulting from changes in individual country rates (the “interest rate effect”) to be disentangled from those caused by changes in the weights of individual countries’ contributions (the “weight effect”). Owing to rounding, the combined “interest rate effect” and the “weight effect” may not add up to the month-on-month developments in euro area aggregate rates.
• In addition to monthly euro area bank interest rate statistics for October 2025, this press release incorporates revisions to data for previous periods. Hyperlinks in the main body of the press release lead to data that may change with subsequent releases as a result of revisions. Unless otherwise indicated, these euro area statistics cover the EU Member States that had adopted the euro at the time to which the data relate.
• As of reference period December 2014, the sector classification applied to bank interest rates statistics is based on the European System of Accounts 2010 (ESA 2010). In accordance with the ESA 2010 classification and as opposed to ESA 95, the non-financial corporations sector (S.11) now excludes holding companies not engaged in management and similar captive financial institutions.

Airbus has confirmed an unspecified number of its aircraft will undergo inspections after a “supplier quality issue” with metal panels used on some A320 planes was identified.

The problem, which the firm said impacts a “limited number” of planes, comes days after thousands of the same model were grounded for an urgent software update.

On Tuesday, the European manufacturer said it was taking a “conservative approach” by checking all planes that could be affected, even though not all are expected to need repairs.

As many as 600 A320s – a model widely used by airlines – will need to be checked, though not all are expected to have faulty panels, Airbus’ spokesperson told the BBC.

“The source of the issue has been identified, contained and all newly produced panels conform to all requirements,” he said.

The “supplier quality issue” is located at the front of the aircraft, where in some cases, the panels were found to be overly thick or too thin, the spokesperson said.

“This quality issue does not affect the flight safety of the aircraft in question,” said the Airbus spokesperson.

A statement continued: “Only inspections will determine where an aircraft may have panels with quality issues and the appropriate action to be taken.”

The number of jets that needed inspections for quality problem include 168 planes that are already in service, Reuters reported on Wednesday.

It is not known how long repairs could take.

The BBC has contacted major airlines that use the A320, including British Airways, American Airlines and Lufthansa Airlines for comment.

Korean Air told BBC in a statement that it is awaiting more information from Airbus to determine if any of its aircraft are affected.

Delta said that its teams have completed the required work and that there has been no effect on operations.

“This applies to a small portion of our Airbus A320 family fleet. Specifically, less than 50 A321neo aircraft,” the airline said in a statement.

Earlier this week, thousands of Airbus planes were grounded for a software update after it was discovered that intense solar radiation could interfere with onboard flight control computers.

That issue was discovered after a plane travelling between the US and Mexico suddenly lost altitude as a result of the vulnerability, injuring 15.

More than 6,000 Airbus aircraft needed emergency computer updates in one of the largest ever aviation industry recalls.

It resulted in global disruption and flight cancellations over the final weekend of November, a busy time of the year for travel – particularly in the US, where it coincided with Thanksgiving.

Airbus shares have fallen by more than 6.5% in the past five days.