Category: 3. Business

• Scott Dylan and David Antrobus allowed £13.9 million to pass through two companies using unauthorised bank overdrafts, with Dylan himself receiving £1.675 million
• The pair’s actions resulted in Barclays Bank freezing the company accounts and demanding repayment
• Dylan and Antrobus subsequently defied freezing injunctions obtained by Barclays, leading to contempt of court proceedings and jail terms for the pair

Two former business associates have been banned for a combined total of 23 years after allowing more than £13.9 million to pass through company bank accounts funded by unauthorised overdrafts.

Scott Dylan, 41, and David Antrobus, 39, opened bank accounts for the two companies in spring 2021 and made millions of pounds in transfers before the accounts were frozen by Barclays Bank.

The pair, both formerly of Wadlow Close, Salford, were subsequently sentenced to prison last year after breaching freezing injunctions.

Dylan, described by the judge as the “driving force”, was disqualified as a company director for 13 years at a hearing of the High Court in London on Thursday 4 December.

Antrobus was banned for 10 years at the same hearing.

Both disqualifications come into effect on Christmas Day and ban the pair from forming, managing or promoting companies without the permission of the court.

Victoria Edgar, Chief Investigator at the Insolvency Service, said:

Scott Dylan and David Antrobus exploited the banking system to allow £13.9 million to move through their companies using unarranged overdrafts, leaving behind insolvencies worth more than £52 million.

Dylan personally received £1.675 million, while nearly €1.8 million was transferred to a family member for what was claimed to be a hotel purchase in Turkey.

The judge regarded their actions as ‘little short of a scam’ and said there was ‘no legitimate purpose’ for the removal of the funds.

These bans mean Dylan and Antrobus cannot run companies for a significant time, protecting the public from directors who abuse their positions.

Antrobus signed bank application forms naming Dylan as the primary contact in March and April 2021 in his role as the official director of Oldcoft Ltd and Old3 Ltd.

The companies were known as FT (OPS) Limited and Fresh Thinking Group Limited at the time of the misconduct.

Three bank accounts were opened in April and May 2021: current accounts for Oldcoft Ltd and Old3 Ltd and a Euro currency account for Oldcoft Ltd.

Between mid-July and late September 2021, Dylan and Antrobus allowed more than £13.9 million to be transferred to the Oldcoft Ltd current account from 10 connected companies.

The money was funded through unarranged overdrafts with Barclays.

During the same period, payments of more than £11.7 million were made from Oldcoft Ltd’s current account.

Dylan himself received £1.675 million, more than £7.4 million was transferred to Old3 Ltd’s account, and at least £1.545 million was transferred to other connected companies.

In August 2021, an unarranged overdraft on the Euro account was used to fund 37 transfers totalling €1.795 million to a family member.

Oldcoft Ltd’s liquidators were unable to find any evidence to support Dylan’s explanation that the money was used to purchase a hotel in Turkey.

Barclays secured freezing orders for the accounts on 24 September 2021, asking Dylan and Antrobus to explain why the transfers had been made and where the money had gone.

Within a fortnight, Barclays demanded repayment.

However, the 10 connected companies entered provisional liquidation in November 2021, Oldcoft Ltd was wound-up in January 2022 owing an estimated £44 million, including £13.7 million to Barclays, and Old3 Ltd entered administration in April 2022 with an estimated deficiency of £8.2 million.

Both Dylan and Antrobus breached the freezing orders by transferring an entire group of companies to two companies in the British Virgin Islands without informing Barclays.

Dylan was sentenced to 22 months in prison in October 2024 for contempt of court for breaching the court orders.

Antrobus was sentenced to the same period in his absence, with a warrant of committal issued for his arrest and transfer to prison.

Dylan should not have been acting as a company director during this period as he had given an undertaking to the court in September 2019 while disqualification proceedings were ongoing in relation to his conduct at a separate company, SDRW Limited.

The proceedings only concluded in September 2025, with Dylan disqualified for eight years after he acted as a director while bankrupt at SDRW Limited between July 2013 and July 2015.

Antrobus, who also failed to maintain and deliver accounting records for Oldcoft Ltd to the liquidator, was declared bankrupt in August 2025.

Further information

(HARTFORD, CT) – Governor Ned Lamont, chairman of the State Bond Commission, today announced that the commission voted at its meeting this morning to approve an allocation of $18 million in bond funding that will be used to establish the Housing Environmental Improvement Revolving Loan and Grant Fund – a new state loan and grant program that will assist in making energy efficiency upgrades at existing single-family and multi-family homes and helping residents generate savings on energy bills.

Administered by the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (DEEP), this program will be used to help with the retrofitting costs of items such as the installation of more efficient heating and cooling equipment, building envelope upgrades, and other similar items that produce energy savings. The program will build on the success of DEEP’s most recent barrier remediation program, the Residential Energy Preparation Services program, which recently utilized all its available funding, removing hazards in dozens of homes, clearing the path for money saving efficiency upgrades.

The establishment of the program and its related bond funding was authorized by the Connecticut General Assembly through Public Act 25-125, which Governor Lamont signed into law this summer.

“Energy efficiency improvements are a huge part of the way that savings can be generated on energy bills,” Governor Lamont said. “One of the great things about energy efficient upgrades is that they help reduce costs and increase reliability for all ratepayers – not just the person installing an energy efficient upgrade – by reducing wasted energy across the electric grid. With this funding, we’re also removing barriers that prevent people from being able to install energy efficient upgrades. Everyone should be able to realize the savings that can come from installing energy efficient upgrades in the home. Altogether, these funds will help expand affordable housing in Connecticut by rehabilitating existing housing and integrating energy upgrades that lower utility costs, improve resident comfort, and extend building life.”

“The Housing Environmental Improvement Revolving Loan and Grant Fund builds on DEEP’s commitment to addressing high utility costs for low-income residents,” DEEP Commissioner Katie Dykes said. “With housing and utility costs rising, this funding is essential to help residents and developers, who live in or own low income single and multifamily buildings, access weatherization and energy efficiency measures that can lower utility bills, increase comfort and safety, and keep housing costs affordable.”

When the program begins, $12 million from this initial $18 million allocation will be used to provide loans for developers to install energy upgrades and retrofits in existing multifamily affordable housing, including but not limited to more efficient heating and cooling equipment and building envelope upgrades.

The remaining $6 million will go toward removing barriers that prevent people in lower-income, single family homes from making their homes more energy efficient. Barriers include asbestos, knob and tube wiring, mold, and moisture. These barriers disqualify homes from state and federal weatherization and energy upgrade programs, as contractors are unable to move forward with energy audits, window and insulation installation, and other measures if such barriers are present. For example, in 2024, about 30% of Home Energy Solutions – Income Eligible units and 50% of Weatherization Assistance Program units were deferred due to health and safety barriers. Lower-income residents face the highest energy burden, or percentage of gross income spent on energy bills, and without funding for barrier remediation these homes cannot proceed with weatherization work and therefore are not able to improve their energy efficiency, which can save money on utility bills and increase home comfort.

In 2024, DEEP compiled public input related to this funding through a request for information, where respondents highlighted gaps and challenges in the affordable housing energy efficiency space, such as lack of technical assistance, difficultly accessing financing, high costs, health and safety barriers, and market confusion. Additionally, DEEP held three Affordable Multifamily Stakeholder Roundtables in June that produced similar key takeaways and sparked the creation of an interagency working group to discuss coordination among their various affordable multifamily programs.

The next steps in the establishment of the Housing Environmental Improvement Revolving Loan and Grant Fund include determining the process to recruit entities that can implement the program. DEEP hopes to solidify a process for entity selection by early to mid-2026, with the goal of initial program launch for both the grants and loans by end of 2026.

Funding complements other recent efforts to reduce energy costs

The funding and establishment of this program complement other efforts Governor Lamont has enacted recently to help reduce energy costs. These include:

• Governor Lamont signed energy affordability legislation this year that will save ratepayers at least $300 million on their electricity bills over the next two years, and more in future years.
  • Public Act 25-173 was a collaborative, bipartisan effort to provide rate relief immediately and over the longer term to Connecticut residents and businesses facing costly utility bills.
  • Connecticut was recently recognized for its passage of Public Act 25-173 and Public Act 25-125 by the National League of Conservation Voters in its 2025 Clean Energy Report.
  • The $300 million includes savings to ratepayers of $125 million annually in each of fiscal years 2026 and 2027 by shifting hardship protection measure costs off electric bills to state bonds; and $30 million in savings in fiscal year 2026 and $20 million in fiscal year 2027 by shifting electric vehicle charging program costs off electric bills to state bonds.

• Connecticut’s Conservation and Load Management (C&LM) energy efficiency programs, implemented by Connecticut’s utilities with oversight from DEEP and the state’s Energy Efficiency Board, continue to provide significant energy and bill savings benefits to ratepayers.
  • C&LM program investments in 2025 alone are expected to deliver $353 million in bill savings to Connecticut ratepayers over the lifetimes of the installed efficiency measures.
  • In 2025, an individual Connecticut resident participating in the home energy assessment program through EnergizeCT is expected to receive an average incentive of $1,129, which will result in $2,068 average lifetime bill savings.
  • Overall, C&LM programs returned $2.38 in benefits for every $1 invested from 2022 to 2024. Benefits are anticipated to increase to $3.30 for every $1 invested in 2025-2027.

 

I am pleased to update Members on the progress of the Global Centre of Rail Excellence (GCRE), a strategic initiative established by the Welsh Government in 2021 to drive economic development in South West Wales. Located on the former Nant Helen open cast mine, GCRE is being developed as a unique, purpose-built facility for international-standard rail research, testing and innovation. 

GCRE aims to harness the net zero transition for Wales’ economic advantage. By creating vital infrastructure needed by the global rail industry, the project will support the development of a high-quality rail technology cluster that can generate new green jobs, enable innovation-led growth and attract investment in key areas such as energy and research and development. 

Sitting just fifteen miles from Port Talbot, GCRE offers a significant opportunity to bolster the Welsh Government’s efforts to help build a more sustainable and diverse economic base in South West Wales and I am pleased that it was showcased at the Welsh Government investment conference earlier this month.

The commercial momentum behind GCRE continues to grow, with more than 200 companies expressing interest in using the facility once it is built, with strategic partnerships having already been formed with Hitachi, CAF, Thales, Network Rail and Transport for Wales. GCRE’s development is guided by four missions aligned with Welsh Government priorities and the Wellbeing of Future Generations Act. They are to: Rebuild Local Prosperity; Make Transport Better; Develop a Net Zero Railway and Renew an Amazing Place.

GCRE is a 2021 Programme for Government commitment that builds naturally on the wider infrastructure strategy of the Welsh Government. The recently completed £2bn dualling of the A465 Heads of the Valleys Road will provide strategic support for the facility. An independent economic appraisal undertaken by PWC has highlighted that GCRE has the potential to create more than 1,100 jobs in its first decade, with the potential to contribute a £300m GVA uplift to the local and regional economy and £1.2bn over its lifetime. It reported that for every £1 spent developing the GCRE project, £15 is returned in wider community, economic and rail industry benefit. 

While, to date, no investment partner has yet been able to commit the private funding needed, feedback from the market is that the GCRE project is viable and can be progressed. A market review over the summer made it clear that to secure investment the company needs to provide greater certainty about the final construction costs and confidence about investment viability in the early years commercial operation of the business.

Welsh Government support will be needed to put both of these measures in place.

I have discussed these issues in detail with GCRE and want to work with the company to help it secure private investment. As indicated in my letter to the Senedd Economy, Trade and Rural Affairs Committee of 21^st October, as a government we are prepared to explore how the GCRE project can be further de-risked by virtue of additional public funding or the provision of a guarantee in order to secure the private capital funding necessary to take the project forward. Despite the challenges, the Welsh Government still firmly believes in the project and is ready to work with the business to address the barriers identified by private investors to date. 

The Welsh Government has therefore provided funding to cover the capital requirements for design and development work over the next 6 months, preparing for Early Contractor Involvement (ECI) in detailed design, working towards a fixed construction cost.

In parallel to this, GCRE is also seeking an Energy and Data Centre Partner (EDCP).  The appointed EDCP will work with GCRE to harness the site’s significant renewable energy potential and develop a major data centre offering at the site, alongside the railway. 

Combined, all of these strands of work will allow the next Welsh Government to consider a Final Investment Decision on GCRE in 2027. 

GCRE remains a strategic priority for the Welsh Government, offering transformative potential for the coalfield communities of South West Wales that can position Wales as a European and global leader in rail innovation.

GCRE is an example of the type of creative and active government approach that can help to tackle some of the most stubborn productivity and growth challenges in the northern coalfield of South West Wales and this Government’s aim is to put the project into the strongest possible position for the next Welsh Government to consider.

I will continue to keep Members informed as this important work progresses. 

Washington, DC: An IMF team led by Ms. Mercedes Vera Martin, Mission Chief for Zambia, visited Lusaka from October 22 to November 4, 2025, to conduct discussions for the sixth and final review under the ECF arrangement. Follow-up discussions were held virtually from Washington D.C. Given productive discussions with the Zambian authorities, Ms. Vera Martin issued the following statement:

“We are pleased to announce that IMF staff and Zambian authorities have reached a staff-level agreement on policies to complete the Sixth and final Review of Zambia’s 38-month ECF arrangement. Subject to approval by the IMF Executive Board, Zambia will receive a disbursement of SDR 138.9 million (about $190 million), bringing total disbursement to SDR 1,271.66 million (about $1.7 billion) since August 2022.

“Despite external and domestic shocks during the program period, Zambia has significantly reduced macroeconomic imbalances, reached agreement on most of the external debt under the perimeter of the debt restructuring, and undertaken sustained fiscal consolidation while safeguarding social spending. The authorities have restored macroeconomic stability and built buffers that have improved economic resilience to shocks.

“The Zambian economy has continued to expand in the first half of 2025, with real GDP growth projected at 5.2 percent in 2025, reflecting lower-than-expected mining and wholesale and retail trade. Inflationary pressures are easing—although more gradually than envisaged— supported by a stronger kwacha, lower fuel prices, and improved food supply. Despite favorable terms of trade, including higher-than-projected international copper prices, the current account deficit is projected to widen to about 2.1 percent of GDP in 2025 driven by broad-based import growth and lower official grants. Gross international reserves continue to increase and are expected to cover 4 months of prospective imports by end-2025.

“Notwithstanding heightened global uncertainty, the medium-term outlook remains favorable. Growth is projected to average 5.6 percent in 2026-31 underpinned by investment, robust agriculture production, and improved electricity generation. Inflation is projected to converge gradually toward the 6-8 percent target band by 2027. The current account would rebound to an estimated surplus of 1.7 percent of GDP in 2026 and gradually increase to about 3.2 percent of GDP by 2030, amid expanding copper production and elevated copper prices. Risks are tilted to the downside, with heightened uncertainty around the baseline.

“Fiscal performance remains strong supported by non-mining revenues and lower spending mostly reflecting lower external disbursement, while social spending has increased in line with government’s priorities. The 2025 primary surplus is projected at 2.2 percent of GDP, including repayment of fuel arrears. Revenues, excluding grants, are projected to reach 22.6 percent of GDP despite accelerated VAT refunds to clear legacy arrears. Given the high risk of debt distress, maintaining fiscal discipline and containing new borrowing remain critical for debt sustainability. In this vein, IMF staff welcomes the authorities’ commitment to maintain a prudent fiscal stance through 2026, while protecting social spending. Continued efforts to enhance public financial management, including by revamping the fiscal framework, and improve revenue mobilization, through strengthening compliance and expanding the tax base, remain essential to generate fiscal space to support growing spending needs, including infrastructure, in line with the authorities’ objectives. It is also important to ensure cost-recovery electricity pricing and strengthen SOE governance to limit fiscal risks.”

“A carefully calibrated monetary policy is needed to anchor inflation expectations and preserve price stability. The real policy rate is expected to increase in the coming months as inflation decelerates, hinting toward a tighter monetary policy stance. However, if the inflation decline becomes more gradually than initially envisaged, there are merits in maintaining a prudent approach for further monetary policy easing. Efforts to improve the operational monetary framework remain critical to strengthening monetary transmission. While allowing for exchange rate flexibility, the BoZ should scale up efforts to accumulate net international reserves, especially taking advantage of supportive FX liquidity conditions. The team welcomes legislative initiatives to revamp the financial supervision and resolution, including a new deposit insurance framework.”

“Pressing ahead with structural reforms is paramount to boost inclusive and private sector-led growth. Despite some progress on structural reforms, improving governance, including by setting up a merit-based transparent process for the selection of the Board of the Anti-Corruption Commission, will help enhance accountability and facilitate the role of the private sector in the economy. Energy sector reforms continue to advance. As open access to the TAZAMA pipeline is rolled out, consistent and transparent application of the guidelines, anchored in private sector participation, will be key to ensuring the reform delivers its expected gains.”

“The IMF mission team met with Minister of Finance and National Planning Dr. Situmbeko Musokotwane, Governor of the Bank of Zambia, Dr. Denny Kalyalya, Secretary to the Treasury Mr. Felix Nkulukusa, Deputy Governor Dr. Francis Chipimo and other senior Government officials, as well as representatives of the private sector, civil society, and development partners. The team expresses its sincere appreciation to the Zambian authorities for their close cooperation.”

Released on December 18, 2025

Data from the Ministry of Trade and Export Development and the Saskatchewan Trade and Export Partnership (STEP) show global demand for Saskatchewan goods remained high in 2024. The value of shipments from the province to the rest of the world totaled $45.3 billion last year. 

“Saskatchewan’s economy is built on exports, in fact, we export 70 per cent of what we produce,” Trade and Export Development Minister Warren Kaeding said. “These numbers are a sign of a robust economy that is delivering for our citizens, with more capital flowing into the province thanks to our export sectors, we are able to focus on providing the infrastructure and services to Saskatchewan people that they rely on.” 

Through its network of nine international trade and investment offices, Saskatchewan has explored new export markets while strengthening existing ones. In 2024, exports from the province reached more than 160 countries, exemplifying the success of Saskatchewan’s exporters. 

“Saskatchewan exporters continue to demonstrate their resilience and global competitiveness,” Saskatchewan Trade and Export Partnership President and CEO Chris Lane said. “These strong results reflect the coordinated efforts of industry and government to open new markets and STEP is proud to enable and support bringing Saskatchewan products to the world.”

Saskatchewan continues to be a safe and reliable supplier of critical minerals including potash and uranium, crude oil, wheat, canola, pulses, canola oil, agricultural machinery, steel, wood products and more. All of these place the province in an excellent position to withstand current global trade uncertainties. 

The province’s strong export sectors have led to significant growth in the provincial economy. Private capital investment in Saskatchewan increased last year by 17.3 per cent to $14.7 billion, ranking first among provinces. Private capital investment is projected to reach $16.2 billion in 2025, an increase of 10.1 per cent over 2024. This is the second highest anticipated percentage increase among the provinces.  

Last year, the Government of Saskatchewan unveiled its new Securing the Next Decade of Growth – Saskatchewan’s Investment Attraction Strategy. This strategy, combined with Saskatchewan’s trade and investment website, InvestSK.ca, contains helpful information for investors and outlines why Saskatchewan is the best place to do business in Canada. 

For more information visit: InvestSK.ca. 

-30-

For more information, contact:

The euro area economy is proving to be resilient despite the challenging global environment. Real GDP increased by 0.3% in the third quarter of 2025, which was above the September projections. This followed volatile developments in the first half of the year, reflecting the effects of frontloading in response to higher US trade tariffs and related uncertainty, as well as the impact of sharp fluctuations in Irish data. Domestic demand should remain the main driver of euro area growth, bolstered by rising real wages and employment, in the context of resilient labour markets with record low unemployment rates. Additional government spending on infrastructure and defence announced this year, especially in Germany, alongside improved financing conditions stemming from monetary policy rate cuts since June 2024, is also expected to support the domestic economy. On the external side, while competitiveness challenges persist, including some that are of a structural nature, exports are expected to pick up next year. This improvement is attributed to a rebound in foreign demand amid declining trade policy uncertainty, despite a gradually unfolding impact from higher tariffs. Annual average real GDP growth is projected to be 1.4% in 2025, 1.2% in 2026, 1.4% in 2027 and 1.4% in 2028. Compared with the September 2025 projections, GDP growth has been revised up over the whole projection horizon, reflecting better than expected data, reduced trade policy uncertainty, stronger foreign demand and lower energy commodity prices.^[1]

Inflation is projected to decrease from 2.1% in 2025 to 1.9% in 2026 and then to 1.8% in 2027, before rising to the ECB’s medium-term target of 2% in 2028. The expected decline in headline inflation (as measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices – HICP) at the start of 2026 reflects a downward base effect stemming from energy prices, while inflation in non-energy components should continue to ease throughout 2026. The contribution of energy inflation to headline inflation is expected to remain muted up to late 2027, before increasing notably in 2028 driven by the expected implementation of the EU Emissions Trading System 2 (ETS2), with an upward impact of 0.2 percentage points on headline inflation. HICP inflation excluding energy is expected to fall from 2.5% in 2025 to 2.2% in 2026 and to 2.0% in 2027 and 2028. Food inflation is projected to drop noticeably as the effects of prior price increases in global food commodities and adverse weather conditions over the summer subside, and is seen to stabilise at rates somewhat above 2% as of late 2026. HICP inflation excluding energy and food (HICPX) is projected to moderate from 2.4% in 2025 to 2.0% in 2028 as services inflation declines amid easing labour cost pressures, and as the past appreciation of the euro feeds through the pricing chain, curbing goods inflation. Wage growth should continue to moderate through 2026, before stabilising at around 3%, underpinned by a resilient labour market and productivity growth just slightly below 1%. Unit labour cost growth is expected to ease, although the impact on inflation is seen to be partly offset by a gradual recovery in profit margins over the projection horizon. Compared with the September 2025 projections, the outlook for headline HICP inflation has been revised up by 0.2 percentage points for 2026, reflecting recent data surprises for HICP inflation and wage growth, with the latter leading to a notable upward revision to the wage outlook. The projection for HICP inflation has been revised down slightly for 2027 as a result of an assumed lower contribution from energy inflation, since the implementation of ETS2 is now expected to be postponed from 2027 to 2028, although this contribution is seen to be partly offset by stronger services inflation.

The global economy has demonstrated resilience this year, despite the headwinds caused by tariffs.^[3] Lower tariffs between the United States and China and reduced trade policy uncertainty, together with lower oil prices and easier financing conditions than foreseen in the September 2025 projections, are providing some relief to the global economy. These factors, combined with positive data surprises in major economies, have contributed to a slightly stronger growth outlook and lower expected inflation for the global economy this year and in 2026.

While the global growth outlook has been revised up slightly compared with the previous projections, it remains subdued relative to the pre-pandemic average. Global real GDP growth is estimated to be 3.5% in 2025 and is expected to gradually decline to 3.3% in 2026 and then to stay at this level in 2027 and 2028 (Table 2).The upward revision to the outlook for global growth largely reflects a stronger growth outlook for the United States and China. In addition to lower tariffs, the slight upward revision to the growth outlook for the United States is due to more resilient domestic demand than previously expected, which is seen to be supported over the near term by positive wealth effects stemming from recent equity price developments and by overall higher fiscal spending assumptions. For China, real GDP growth projections for this year and 2026 have also been revised up slightly to reflect stronger than previously estimated export dynamics and a larger assumed fiscal stimulus.

Headline consumer price index (CPI) inflation across major advanced and emerging market economies is projected to decline gradually, but at a somewhat faster pace than foreseen in the September projections.^[4] It is expected to stand at 3.1% in 2025 and to decrease to 2.8% in 2026 and 2.5% in 2027, followed by a small uptick to 2.6% in 2028. This implies a slightly faster than previously projected decline in CPI inflation this year and next year, owing to lower inflation outcomes across most advanced economies than previously expected. In addition, the downward revision reflects lower bilateral tariffs between the United States and China, as well as a slightly smaller than previously foreseen impact of tariffs on inflation in the United States. Furthermore, in China, weaker domestic demand explains the more gradual than previously expected increase in consumer price inflation over the projection horizon.

Global import growth is projected to remain resilient this year, but its momentum is expected to slow next year. It is projected to be 4.4% in 2025, largely reflecting strong import growth in the first half of this year, before declining to 2.0% in 2026 owing to the adverse impact of tariffs. Global imports are then projected to recover to stand at 3.1% in both 2027 and 2028. The outlook for global imports has been revised up significantly for this year and next year compared with the September projections, while the projections for 2027 remain unchanged. The upward revision to import growth reflects positive data surprises for the second quarter of 2025, mostly across emerging market economies, and, to a lesser extent, lower tariffs agreed between the United States and China in early November 2025. The data surprises can be attributed to two main factors. First, imports exceeded expectations in countries across South-East Asia as well as in non-euro area EU Member States. Concurrent positive surprises in export performance suggest that several of these countries, especially in South-East Asia, might be benefiting from the ongoing reconfiguration of global trade relationships. This shift has been prompted by higher US tariffs and includes the rerouting of Chinese exports to these countries, alongside robust trade in technology products linked to artificial intelligence-related investment. Second, imports in Egypt, India and Türkiye significantly exceeded expectations, although in these cases there does not appear to be a clear link between their stronger imports and diverted Chinese exports.

The outlook for euro area foreign demand has been revised up compared with the previous projections. Growth in euro area foreign demand is expected to stand at 3.8% in 2025, and then to slow to 1.9% in 2026 in line with weaker global trade growth, before recovering to 3.1% in 2027 and 3.0% in 2028. The upward revision for this year, similarly to global imports, reflects data for the second quarter which indicate that the contraction in euro area foreign demand was smaller than previously expected.

Euro area competitors’ export prices are projected to increase at a pace below the historical average and have been revised down compared with the September projections. Euro area competitors’ export prices (in annual terms and measured in national currencies) are expected to increase by 1.1% in 2025, 1.6% in 2026 and 2.0% in both 2027 and 2028. This is below the historical average of 2.6% recorded over 2000-19, as Chinese export price inflation in annual terms is projected to remain in negative territory until the third quarter of 2026. Compared with the previous projections, competitors’ export prices have been revised down over the whole projection horizon, reflecting a lower path of export price inflation across advanced economies, including the United States and several non-euro area EU Member States, and to a lesser extent in China.

Euro area economic activity rose by 0.3% in the third quarter of 2025, which was much stronger than expected in the September projections (0.0%) but more in line with expectations when adjusting for volatility in Irish data (Chart 1). While a sharp unwinding of frontloading that took place in the first quarter of 2025 had been anticipated in Ireland, Irish GDP declined by much less than expected in the third quarter, which explains most of the upward surprise in euro area GDP growth (Chart 1, panel c). An adjusted measure of euro area GDP that uses so-called “modified domestic demand” instead of GDP for Ireland also suggests that growth was 0.3% in the third quarter of 2025.^[7] By this measure, the outturn was only slightly stronger than the respective September projection (0.2%). Across sectors, services activity continued to expand, driven by robust tourism and a pick-up in digital services. By contrast, industrial activity remained subdued in the third quarter, hampered by higher tariffs, still elevated uncertainty and a stronger euro. Meanwhile, the recovery in consumer demand for goods and services continued, supported by improving real incomes amid resilient labour markets.

Real GDP is expected to increase modestly in the fourth quarter, amid continued divergence across sectors. The composite output Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) stood at 52.8 in November, indicating positive underlying growth momentum.^[8] The PMI for services business activity increased further, confirming services as the primary driver of growth. By contrast, the manufacturing output PMI declined, remaining just above the threshold indicating no change. The European Commission’s Economic Sentiment Indicator rose further in November, reaching its highest level since April 2023. Overall, survey data suggest moderate growth in the final quarter of the year. However, a projected sharp contraction in GDP growth in Ireland in the fourth quarter of 2025 is seen to subtract around 0.1 percentage points from growth in the euro area, suggesting a slight dip in euro area GDP growth to 0.2% in the fourth quarter (Chart 1, panel c). Some of the headwinds related to tariffs and trade policy uncertainty should start to fade, therefore, euro area growth is expected to pick up in the first quarter of 2026, returning to 0.3%. The projected annual growth rate for 2025 of 1.4% is to a significant extent driven by within-year growth dynamics, although carry-over effects from 2024 are also seen to play a role.

Annual real GDP growth is projected to average 1.3% over the projection horizon, supported by real disposable income growth, receding uncertainty, robust foreign demand, and fiscal stimulus related to defence and infrastructure spending. This fiscal stimulus, mostly accounted for by Germany, should provide a boost to euro area GDP growth in the medium term, which is assessed to cumulatively amount to 0.5% by 2028, with the highest impact on growth expected in 2026-27 (Chart 2).^[9] An estimated slight dip in real GDP growth, from 1.4% in 2025 to 1.2% in 2026, is seen to be the consequence of lower carry-over effects in 2026 following the expected somewhat more modest growth in the second half of 2025. Driven by strengthening carry-over effects, annual real GDP growth is projected to increase thereafter and stabilise at 1.4% in 2027-28, reflecting similar carry-over and within-year contributions in these two years. When using modified domestic demand for Ireland instead of Irish GDP, euro area real GDP growth is seen to rise more gradually, increasing from 1.0% in 2025 to 1.1% in 2026 and to 1.3% in both 2027 and 2028.

The impact of monetary policy rate cuts since June 2024 is expected to gradually outweigh the lagged effects of the previous tightening cycle, thereby supporting growth. The negative impact of the previous monetary policy tightening cycle on economic growth is now seen to have largely dissipated. Based on market expectations regarding the future path of interest rates at the time of the cut-off date for the projections, small positive impacts from the subsequent loosening phase are expected in 2027-28. However, there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the quantitative assessment of these impacts.

Real GDP growth should continue to be driven by domestic demand, with the negative contribution of net exports diminishing to zero in 2027-28. From an expenditure perspective (Chart 3, panel a), private consumption is projected to grow robustly throughout the horizon, providing the largest contribution to real GDP growth. The strengthening of households’ spending is expected to be underpinned by their increasing purchasing power, reflecting robust wage and employment growth amid continued labour market resilience. Additionally, investment growth should outpace GDP growth throughout the horizon. Private investment is expected to compensate for the slowdown in public investment in 2027-28 resulting from the expiry of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme funding. Over the projection horizon investment growth should be driven by a reduction in uncertainty, increased defence and infrastructure spending, and strengthening profits and improving demand conditions linked to the cyclical recovery. By contrast, export growth is expected to remain subdued despite improving foreign demand, as persistent euro area competitiveness challenges, US tariffs and the past appreciation of the euro weigh on export performance. This is likely to lead to continued losses in export market shares. As a result, net exports are projected to make negative contributions to real GDP growth in 2025 and 2026, with import growth outpacing export growth. These negative contributions are seen to be partially offset by a positive contribution from changes in inventories in 2025.

Compared with the September 2025 projections, real GDP growth has been revised up by 0.2 percentage points for 2025 and 2026 and by 0.1 percentage points for 2027 (Chart 3, panel b). The upward adjustment for 2025 reflects revisions to past data, including the better than expected outturn for the third quarter of 2025. The somewhat lower trade policy uncertainty, stronger foreign demand and lower energy commodity prices have led to the upward revision to the growth outlook for 2026. Marginally stronger quarterly dynamics and a larger carry-over effect from the stronger growth momentum in 2026 together entail a small upward revision to the outlook for 2027. In terms of expenditure components, the largest upward revisions for 2025-27 relate to investment and, in particular, stronger business investment over the whole horizon and more dynamic government investment in 2027, as well as stronger government consumption in 2025-26. Net trade has also been revised up for 2025, reflecting the better than expected performance of exports in the first three quarters of the year.

Private consumption should expand steadily, supported by increases in labour compensation and non-labour income. Private consumption has continued to grow over recent quarters – albeit at a slower pace than in the second half of 2024, reflecting heightened economic uncertainty. Consumption growth is expected to regain some strength in the coming quarters, with annual rates of around 1.2% projected over 2026-28, which is broadly in line with its historical average (Chart 4, panel a). This outlook is largely due to rising real disposable income, supported mainly by wage income and, to a lesser extent, by non-labour income. Consumer confidence is assumed to recover gradually towards its historical norm over the medium term. This is supported by overall resilient labour market prospects, which should also lead to a small gradual decline in the household saving ratio (Chart 4, panel b). Nevertheless, the saving ratio is likely to remain elevated, reflecting heightened economic uncertainty as well as potential Ricardian effects in countries with announced fiscal stimulus. These effects are supported by evidence from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey. Interest rates remain somewhat above historical average levels and access to credit continues to be tight, which also likely supports an elevated saving ratio. However, it is not clear whether these historical averages are the right benchmarks for the medium term, given that the economy has experienced several large shocks in the post-pandemic period. Additionally, households may need savings to finance higher future housing investment. Despite the more favourable real disposable income dynamics over the projection horizon, real private consumption is broadly unrevised as the stronger income gains are expected to translate into a persistently higher saving ratio.

Housing investment should recover over the projection horizon on the back of favourable financing conditions and rising real incomes. After increasing in the first and second quarters of 2025, housing investment temporarily declined in the third quarter, amid negative outturns in several euro area countries. The decline in housing investment underscores the fragility of the moderate recovery that started at the beginning of the year and reflects still low affordability, high construction costs and persistent macroeconomic uncertainty. Nevertheless, housing investment is projected to strengthen in 2026-28. This recovery reflects improved housing demand – as also evidenced by the continued increase in the number of residential building permits issued and evidence from the Consumer Expectations Survey on households’ perceptions of housing as a good investment – and is attributable to the gradual decline in mortgage rates since the end of 2023. It is also supported by continued growth in real household income and is also evidenced in rising house prices.

Business investment has been more resilient than expected and should gradually gain momentum over the medium term, driven by improving economic activity, receding uncertainty and the impact of fiscal stimuli in some countries. Following positive, albeit slowing, growth rates in the first half of 2025 – driven by frontloading effects in anticipation of higher tariffs – euro area business investment (excluding the volatile Irish intellectual property products) grew robustly in the third quarter, notwithstanding the higher tariffs and still elevated uncertainty. This contrasts with the expectation of a contraction in the September projections. Business investment is projected to continue to rise in 2026-28, amid increasing profit growth, supportive financing conditions, strengthening domestic and foreign demand, declining uncertainty and spillovers from defence and infrastructure spending.

Exports are expected to remain weak in historical terms, despite a short-term pick-up, a positive reassessment owing to a lower effective tariff rate and a more gradual unfolding of the impact of tariffs. Following volatility in the first half of 2025, when exporters frontloaded shipments ahead of the imposition of US tariffs, euro area exports are expected to have grown slightly in the second half of 2025. Some renewed strength in exports in the third quarter of 2025 might have reflected specificities of the pharmaceuticals supply chain, amid uncertainty about the tariff rate for pharmaceuticals before the EU-US trade deal was reached. In addition, export orders for goods and services do not suggest any further significant deterioration in the near term. Export growth is projected to remain weak in historical terms, at 1.9% in 2025 and 1.6% in 2026, but has been revised up by 0.6 percentage points for 2025 and 0.5 percentage points for 2026. These revisions reflect the 1 percentage point reduction in the effective tariff rate applied by the United States to euro area imports (see Box 1) as well as expectations that the fully fledged effects of US tariffs will materialise more gradually, as export volumes and prices have adjusted downwards less than previously expected.

Over the medium term the outlook for exports continues to be clouded by adverse trade policies, competitive pressures – especially from Asian countries – and the past appreciation of the euro. Conditional on unchanged trade policies, export growth is projected to strengthen gradually to stand at 2.6% in 2028, though continuing to fall short of foreign demand. This is due to structural competitiveness challenges, primarily from Asian countries, and to an elevated euro exchange rate which is seen to adversely affect price competitiveness throughout the projection horizon. As a result, compared with the September projection exercise, further losses in export market shares are assumed in addition to those that have already materialised in 2025.

On the import side, growth prospects have improved compared with the September projection exercise. This reflects primarily more robust developments recently, with import volumes now projected to grow by 3.2% in 2025 owing to the appreciation of the euro exchange rate, which has reduced import prices. Imports are expected to expand steadily in the medium term also, supported by low-cost sourcing from China and other Asian economies whose export prices are expected to remain subdued over the medium term. Overall, net trade is expected to make a substantial negative contribution to euro area growth in 2025 (-0.5 percentage points) and 2026 (-0.3 percentage points), but neutral contributions in 2027 and 2028.

The labour market is projected to remain resilient, with the unemployment rate set to decline steadily throughout the horizon. The unemployment rate is expected to decline over the medium term and to reach a historically low level of 5.8% by the end of 2028 (Chart 5), in the context of rather stable projected growth in total employment in 2026-28 and declining labour force growth. Compared with the September projections, the lower unemployment rate from 2025 to 2027 primarily reflects a lower outcome in the third quarter of 2025 than previously expected.

Employment growth is projected to slow in 2026 and to remain broadly unchanged thereafter (Chart 5, panel b). Overall, robust employment growth in 2025 is in line with labour force growth of the same amount in the year. While the growth rate of the labour force is projected to decline thereafter, amid adverse demographics and lower migration inflows, growth in employment is projected to remain above labour force growth, primarily on account of the services sector. Employment growth should, however, remain broadly flat over the projection horizon, but slightly stronger than in the September projections.

Labour productivity growth is expected to be slightly stronger in 2026 and 2027 than previously projected and to continue its cyclical recovery in 2028 (Chart 6). It declined in the third quarter of 2025, having been heavily influenced by volatility in Irish GDP data over the recent period. By contrast, productivity growth in the rest of the euro area picked up in the third quarter of 2025 and is expected to increase slightly over the projection horizon, reflecting an expected recovery from the unusually low growth recorded after the pandemic. Compared with the September projections, labour productivity growth has been revised up somewhat over the projection horizon reflecting the upward revisions to GDP growth.

After tightening slightly in 2025, the euro area fiscal stance is projected to loosen in 2026 and then to tighten again in 2027 and 2028 (Table 4).^[10] The tightening in 2025 was mostly due to discretionary revenue measures, including increases in social security contributions and, to a lesser extent, increases in indirect and direct taxes.^[11] These increases were partly compensated by continued growth in public spending. In 2026 the fiscal stance is projected to loosen, mainly on account of higher public investment. This reflects primarily large defence and infrastructure spending in Germany (over 2026-28) and, to some extent, NGEU-funded investment growth in Spain, among other countries. In 2027 the tightening of the NGEU-adjusted fiscal stance is explained by non-discretionary factors, while in terms of discretionary fiscal policy measures, consolidation in many countries (among other factors, following the expiry of NGEU financing) is seen to be offset by stimulus, mostly in Germany. In addition, NGEU-funded spending that has been deferred to 2027 in some countries is seen to mitigate the tightening of the fiscal stance in that year. In 2028 the euro area fiscal stance is expected to continue tightening. However, the slight tightening of discretionary fiscal policy measures (amounting to just below 0.1 percentage points of GDP) masks cross-country heterogeneity, as a strong loosening of the fiscal stance, particularly in Germany, compensates for a tightening in other countries.

Compared with the September projections, the fiscal stance is seen to be somewhat looser, mainly on account of additional discretionary measures in 2027. The revisions to the fiscal stance over 2025-27 amount to a cumulative loosening of 0.2 percentage points of GDP, primarily driven by higher investment in 2027. At the country level, additional loosening in Germany (mainly related to defence investment over 2026-27) and higher government investment, especially in Italy and to a lesser extent in Spain, are only partly offset by stronger tightening in France (mostly from increases in direct taxes and social security contributions) and other countries.

The budget deficit and debt ratios remain on an upward path (Table 4). After an expected slight decline in 2025, the euro area budget deficit is projected to increase rather sharply in 2026 and 2027, and then to moderate only slightly in 2028 to stand at 3.4% of GDP. This increase reflects rising interest payments (from 1.9% of GDP in 2024 to 2.3% in 2028), which are seen to be only marginally offset by positive macroeconomic effects. The euro area debt-to-GDP ratio is set on an increasing path, as the continuous primary deficits and positive deficit-debt adjustments outweigh the favourable, though diminishing, effects of interest rate-growth differentials. Compared with the September projections, the path of the budget balance has been revised slightly down over 2025-27, mainly on account of the cyclically adjusted primary balance which more than compensates for the slight improvement in the cyclical component. The path of government debt has been revised down, reflecting base effects from statistical revisions to data for 2024 and more favourable interest rate-growth differentials.

Headline inflation is projected to decrease from 2.1% in 2025 to 1.9% in 2026 and 1.8% in 2027, before rising to 2.0% in 2028, mainly owing to energy inflation (Chart 7). Headline inflation is expected to drop from 2.1% in the last quarter of 2025 to 1.9% in the first quarter of 2026, largely owing to energy base effects. The lower average rate for headline inflation for the whole of 2026 reflects a decline in HICPX inflation owing to a moderation in services inflation, alongside weaker food inflation. The further decrease in headline inflation in 2027 mirrors a continued decline in HICPX inflation, which is partly offset by a reversion of energy inflation to zero rates, while food inflation should remain unchanged. The rise in headline inflation to 2.0% in 2028 is mainly attributed to a significant increase in energy inflation, driven by climate transition-related fiscal measures and, in particular, the introduction of the new Emissions Trading System (ETS2), which pushes headline inflation up by 0.2 percentage points (see Box 2). Excluding the impact of ETS2, headline inflation would remain slightly below target (1.9%) in 2028 also, as energy inflation dynamics excluding ETS2 remain very low by historical standards.^[24] HICP inflation excluding energy is expected to decline gradually and to settle at 2.0% in both 2027 and 2028, while HICPX inflation is expected to stabilise at or close to 2.0% in the medium term.

Energy inflation is projected to remain subdued until late 2027, before rising notably in 2028 with the introduction of ETS2 (Chart 9, panel a). The sharp decline in energy inflation during the first quarter of 2026 is largely attributed to a pronounced downward base effect in the transport fuels component. In addition, an expected reduction in electricity prices in Germany, driven by lower network fees, is seen as contributing to the decline in energy prices seen in early 2026. As these effects fade, energy inflation will remain subdued, in line with rather flat energy price assumptions (see Box 1). The noticeable rise in energy inflation to 2.2% in 2028 is seen to be driven mainly by the implementation of the EU Fit for 55 package, particularly the new ETS2 for the heating of buildings and for transport fuels, which is estimated to contribute 1.9 percentage points to energy inflation in 2028 (see Box 2).

Food inflation is projected to continue to decline noticeably in the short term, as commodity prices ease and weather-related factors fade, and to remain at moderate levels throughout 2028 (Chart 9, panel b). Specifically, in 2025 food inflation is expected to fall from 3.2% in the third quarter to 2.5% in the fourth quarter, reflecting the recent easing in certain food commodity prices, such as cocoa and coffee, as well as the fading impact of adverse weather conditions observed over the summer. The continued moderation through late 2026 is attributed to lower euro area food commodity prices and downward base effects from the strong price increases in mid-2025. On average, food inflation is projected to stand at 2.4% in 2026-27, before easing further to 2.2% in 2028. These levels are below the long-term average and in line with benign assumptions for energy and food commodity prices.

HICPX inflation is expected to decline from 2.4% in 2025 to 2.2% in 2026 and then to stabilise at or close to 2% in the later years of the projection horizon (Chart 10), in line with fading labour cost pressures on services inflation. While HICPX inflation is projected to edge up to 2.4% in the final quarter of 2025 and remain there in the first quarter of 2026, it is expected to moderate to 1.9% by the first quarter of 2027. The initial decline in HICPX inflation is seen to be driven primarily by the slowdown in services inflation, mirroring easing labour cost pressures (Chart 11). The disinflation process in the services component is expected to come to a halt in 2027, in line with a stabilisation in labour cost growth. Non-energy industrial goods inflation is expected to remain subdued in the coming months, supported by the appreciation of the euro, before gradually converging towards its historical average of around 1% by late 2027 and remaining there for the rest of the projection horizon, leading to a small uptick in HICPX inflation in 2028.

The ECB’s monetary policy measures since December 2021 are expected to have, on balance, a notable, although declining, dampening impact on inflation over the projection horizon. Given the much longer lags than in the case of growth, the dampening impact of the tightening phase of monetary policy is estimated to still outweigh the subsequent loosening phase over the full projection horizon.

Compared with the September 2025 projections, the outlook for headline HICP inflation remains unchanged for 2025 and has been revised up by 0.2 percentage points for 2026 and down by 0.1 percentage points for 2027 (Chart 12). HICPX inflation is unchanged for 2025 but has been revised up by 0.3 percentage points for 2026 and 0.1 percentage points for 2027. The unchanged headline inflation rate for 2025 reflects largely stable projections for its main components. For 2026, the upward revision to headline inflation is driven primarily by stronger than expected outcomes for energy, services and non-energy industrial goods inflation. Meanwhile, the downward revision for 2027 is largely attributable to the expected postponement of the ETS2 scheme, although this is partially offset by stronger services inflation, in line with upward revisions to labour cost projections.

Nominal wage growth is expected to ease further through 2026 and then move sideways over the remainder of the projection horizon. Growth in compensation per employee increased to just over 4% in the third quarter of 2025, which is above the expectations in the September projections. It is projected to moderate as of the last quarter of 2025, largely owing to a lower contribution from wage drift.^[25] It is expected to average 4.0% in 2025, before slowing to 3.2% in 2026 and 2.9% in 2027 (Chart 13). In 2028 it is projected to tick up to 3.0%, reflecting a slightly higher contribution from wage drift and also higher social security contributions in Germany, while growth in negotiated wages continues to gradually decline. Real wage growth is projected to decline further and gradually converge towards productivity growth in the latter half of the projection horizon. Compared with the September 2025 projections, growth in compensation per employee has been revised up across the entire projection period – by 0.6 percentage points for 2025, 0.5 percentage points for 2026 and 0.2 percentage points for 2027. In part, this is due to the stronger than expected wage growth in the second and third quarters of 2025. However, the revisions also reflect new information on minimum wage increases and a higher expected impact of minimum wages on aggregate wages compared with the September 2025 projections.

Growth in unit labour costs is projected to decline through 2027, driven by lower wage growth and, to some extent, higher productivity, and then to level off at 2.1% in 2028. Unit labour cost growth ticked up slightly in the third quarter of 2025 and is expected to remain over 3% until early 2026. An easing in the growth of compensation per employee is anticipated to lead to a slowdown in unit labour cost growth throughout 2026. On average, unit labour cost growth is expected to moderate from 3.3% in 2025 to 2.6% in 2026 and 2.0% in 2027, before edging up to 2.1% in 2028, slightly above its long-term average. Compared with the September 2025 projections, unit labour cost growth has been revised up for each year of the horizon owing to stronger wage growth, despite slightly higher productivity.

Domestic price pressures, as measured by the growth of the GDP deflator, are expected to decrease in 2026, on the back of lower growth in unit labour costs, and stabilise just above 2.0% (Chart 14). Despite some volatility in the growth rate of the GDP deflator during 2025, owing to fluctuations in the contribution of unit profits, the annual GDP deflator growth rate is projected to decline from an average of 2.4% in 2025 to 2.2% in 2026 and to stabilise at 2.1% in 2027 and 2028, slightly above its long-term average. As growth in unit labour costs moderates, unit profit growth is expected to increase gradually over the projection horizon, supported by the ongoing economic recovery, initially weak import price growth, strengthening productivity growth and a temporary accounting boost – now delayed until 2028 – stemming from the statistical treatment of ETS2.^[26] Compared with the September 2025 projections, GDP deflator growth has been revised up by 0.1 percentage points per year across the projection horizon.

Import price changes should remain slightly negative until early 2026 but return to moderate positive rates thereafter, as the dampening impact of the past appreciation of the euro fades. In annual terms, the growth rate of the import deflator is projected to rise from -0.1% in 2025 to 0.7% in 2026, followed by a stronger increase to 1.7% in 2027 and 1.8% in 2028. In comparison with the September 2025 projections, the downward revision to the profile of import price inflation in 2025 is also due to recent data outcomes and is in line with lower assumptions for energy commodity prices. For 2026, the small upward revision reflects the slightly weaker exchange rate over the projection horizon (see Box 1), while the import price deflator is unrevised for 2027.

6.1 Alternative energy price paths

Alternative paths for energy commodity prices suggest similar risks to inflation on the upside and on the downside. The staff projections are based on the technical assumptions outlined in Box 1. In this sensitivity analysis, alternative downside and upside paths are derived from the 25th and 75th percentiles of the option-implied neutral densities for both oil and gas prices.^[27] According to these densities, risks to oil prices are broadly balanced while for gas prices they indicate some upside risks to the technical assumptions (Chart 15), A constant price sensitivity analysis is also carried out for both oil and gas prices. In each case, a synthetic energy price index (a weighted average of the oil and gas price paths) is computed and the impacts are assessed using ECB and Eurosystem macroeconomic models. The average results across these models are shown in Table 6.

6.2 Alternative exchange rate paths

Market-based distributions for the exchange rate are skewed towards a further appreciation of the euro, indicating some downside risks to growth and inflation. The technical assumptions for exchange rates in the baseline projections are held constant over the projection horizon. Alternative downside and upside paths are derived from the 25th and 75th percentiles of option-implied neutral densities for the USD/EUR exchange rate on 26 November 2025, which was tilted towards a modest appreciation of the euro (Chart 16). The impacts of these alternative paths are assessed using ECB and Eurosystem staff macroeconomic models. Table 7 shows the impacts on output growth and inflation averaged across these models.