Category: 3. Business

In August 2025, a consortium led by Mitsubishi Corporation announced its withdrawal from three offshore wind projects in Japan. The decision raised concerns about the viability of the country’s offshore wind sector, long viewed as a cornerstone of its renewable energy expansion. The stated cause — surging construction costs linked to inflation — is not unique to Mitsubishi; developers across Europe and elsewhere face the same challenge.

Yet it would be premature to conclude that offshore wind development in Japan has reached a dead end. Although developers are grappling with structural barriers, the government has begun reassessing its auction framework and implementing reforms that could make the next bidding round more attractive.

Japan’s wind energy plans

Japan’s 7^th Strategic Energy Plan aims to increase the share of renewable energy in power generation from approximately 20% to 40%–50% by fiscal year (FY) 2040. Within this target, wind power is expected to rise from approximately 1% to between 4% and 8%, with offshore wind positioned as the centerpiece of this expansion. Japan added more offshore wind capacity in 2024 than ever before, albeit from a modest base, reaching 253.4 megawatts (MW) of operational offshore wind capacity. Meanwhile, onshore wind capacity stood at 5,330MW at the end of that year.

In 2020, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) published its “Vision for Offshore Wind Power Industry,” aiming for 10 gigawatts (GW) of total wind capacity by 2030. METI began drafting a second version of the plan in March 2025. Meanwhile, the Japan Wind Power Association has outlined a longer-term vision to build 140GW of wind capacity by 2050, comprising 40GW onshore, 40GW fixed offshore, and 60GW floating offshore capacity.

Recent political developments in Japan are likely to affect the trajectory of its energy policy. The newly elected prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, has been a strong advocate for nuclear energy and has highlighted the risks of relying on foreign suppliers for conventional solar panels. While she has shown less resistance to offshore wind, she has emphasized a goal of achieving 100% energy self-sufficiency. Under her administration, Japan’s decarbonization strategy is expected to place greater emphasis on energy security and industrial competitiveness. 

Mitsubishi’s winning bids and subsequent withdrawal

Mitsubishi’s withdrawal from three offshore wind projects reflects both company-specific missteps and broader structural issues in Japan’s offshore wind market. In 2021, Japan held its first offshore wind auction for three projects with a combined capacity of 1.7GW. Under the feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme, companies would compete for projects by submitting low-cost bids but would ultimately win contracts set at higher, predetermined fixed rates. The process enabled price discovery while also enhancing financial security for project backers.

In the first round, a Mitsubishi-led consortium won all three projects with a bidding price between JPY11.99 and JPY16.49 per kilowatt-hour (kWh), or USD10.85 cents per kilowatt-hour (¢/kWh) and USD14.8¢/kWh. This was far lower than the JPY29/kWh (USD26.1¢/kWh) ceiling price set by the government and the JPY17–JPY24.5/kWh (USD15.3¢/kWh to USD22.0¢/kWh) range from other bidders. Mitsubishi’s bid range was closer to that seen in more mature, established European markets than in an inaugural auction. These bids appeared competitive but left little buffer for cost inflation.

In the years following the auction, Mitsubishi’s project costs more than doubled, with total investment ballooning above JPY1 trillion (USD6.4 billion). The company announced a JPY52.2 billion (USD0.3 billion) impairment on the three offshore wind projects, exacerbated by inflation, global supply chain disruptions, yen depreciation, and rising turbine costs. In Japan, average construction costs for offshore wind projects were 20% higher in FY2024 than in FY2020, compared to an 8.5% increase in the cost of consumer goods. This is broadly consistent with trends in Europe, where capital costs increased by 18% between 2019 and 2024.

Factors constraining Japan’s offshore wind sector

Across the wind energy industry, all major segments — turbines, cables, foundations, and substations — have been affected by inflation, driven by rising raw material and energy prices, as well as persistently high shipping rates. Global equipment and materials prices have surged since 2022, particularly for turbines, subsea cables, monopiles, and substations, driving engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) costs higher. For example, wind turbines have typically accounted for 30% of the capital expenditure (capex) required for Japanese fixed offshore wind projects in FY2025. However, turbine costs reportedly increased by 10%–15% between 2021 and 2023.

Monopile foundation costs, which typically account for approximately 8% of capex for Japanese wind projects, have been almost entirely sourced from Europe. European steel prices, the main cost driver for turbines and monopiles, surged by around 200% between late 2020 and mid-2022. Although global steel prices have since fallen to near-2019 levels, the decline in turbine costs has been slow. Shipping and installation expenses have also increased due to post-COVID supply chain bottlenecks. Transporting monopiles from Europe can cost around JPY300 million (USD1.9 million), underscoring Japan’s reliance on imports — a challenge that extends across its offshore wind supply chain.

By 2040, Japan aims to achieve over 65% local content across its entire offshore wind supply chain. Currently, however, the country lacks a domestic supplier for offshore wind turbines. Toshiba plans to establish a nacelle assembly line at its Yokohama plant in partnership with General Electric (GE), but production has not started yet. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Hitachi also previously pursued wind turbine manufacturing, but were unable to establish a sustained, large-scale domestic supply foundation. As a result, Japan’s offshore wind projects continue to rely heavily on imported turbines. Nevertheless, there are opportunities to substantially increase the proportion of wind farm costs sourced domestically, even in the absence of a full turbine manufacturing base.

Importantly, turbines now account for less than 30% of total offshore wind capex in Japan. The remaining 70% consists of balance-of-plant components — foundations, towers, cables, transmission systems, installation vessels, port upgrades, and operations — many of which align closely with Japan’s existing industrial strengths. The country already hosts globally competitive firms in specialty steel production, heavy fabrication, electrical equipment, shipbuilding, and marine logistics.

Therefore, what is lacking is not industrial capability but the effective mobilization of that capability. Irregular auction schedules and an unpredictable long-term project pipeline have prevented domestic industries from scaling or repositioning to meet offshore wind demand, reinforcing reliance on imported equipment, even when domestic alternatives exist.

Japan already forges the specialty steels used in offshore wind foundations and turbine towers. Despite this, developers continue to import these components from Europe. Hitachi, Toshiba, and Mitsubishi manufacture a large proportion of the transmission system components needed for both offshore and onshore portions of wind farm interconnections. The country also has a world-class shipbuilding industry, capable of fabricating vessels of all sizes and specialties, which is a critical requirement for offshore wind farms. These ships need crews, port facilities, and maintenance services, reinforcing the potential for domestic economic spillovers if offshore wind supply chains are localized.

Along with higher component costs, the weak yen and rising interest rates have increased import and capital financing costs. Since 2021, the yen has significantly weakened. On an annual-average basis, the exchange rate increased from 109.78 JPY/USD in 2021 to 151.50 in 2024 — a 38% depreciation. These currency fluctuations have inflated dollar-denominated equipment prices and amplified project financing costs. Moreover, Japanese short-term policy rates are at their highest level since 2008, with future hikes anticipated in 2026. Although lower financing costs, compared to those in the United States (US) and Europe, have been cited as an advantage for Japanese wind projects, recent increases in debt costs have eroded that benefit.

Additionally, regulatory and permitting barriers further increase overall project expenses. In Japan, it takes 6–8 years from the start of permitting to the commercial operation date for fixed-bottom offshore wind projects. By contrast, the European Union (EU) caps the permit-granting process at two years for offshore projects. Japan’s lengthy baseline lead time increases exposure to component price volatility, rising financing costs, and delays, making projects more costly and risk-prone by global standards.

Like Mitsubishi, other bidders in the third offshore wind auction would likely have faced the same inflationary challenges. However, this case highlights more than just the risks of aggressive bidding. To realize its offshore wind ambitions, Japan should address its high domestic costs and unfavorable auction rules that incentivize low bids.

Auction price comparisons: Japan vs. international benchmarks

Japan’s first offshore wind auction in 2021 highlighted the stark disparity between domestic and international prices. Bidding prices in Japan’s first round were between JPY11.99/kWh and JPY24.5/kWh. This was two or three times higher than international benchmarks, such as the United Kingdom’s (UK) 2021 Round 4 bid at GBP37.35 per megawatt-hour (MWhGBP37.35 per megawatt-hour (MWh) (around JPY7–8/kWh) or Germany and Taiwan’s Round 3.2 with zero-premium bids. A zero-premium bid refers to an auction scheme in which developers bid with a premium — defined in the support scheme as a subsidy — set at zero, and proceed with the project solely based on revenues linked to wholesale electricity market prices.

At first glance, Japan’s results appear uncompetitive. However, the higher ceiling prices set by the government reflected the country’s unique conditions rather than an intentional distortion. Japanese developers must pay for grid connections and seabed reinforcement, which are often covered by governments in Europe. Long permitting timelines and coordination with fisheries extend project risks, raising financing costs. The absence of inflation indexation forces bidders to price in uncertainty, while dependence on imported turbines exposes them to exchange-rate and shipping risks.

Japan’s high auction prices are the product of systemic design and cost burdens, not technological inefficiency. Recognizing these differences is essential to understanding why the country’s offshore wind auctions are more expensive compared to its global peers. It also underscores why recent government reforms aimed at correcting low-price competition and easing structural burdens will be critical for unlocking Japan’s true offshore wind potential.

Evolution of Japan’s offshore wind policy framework

The Japanese government has started amending its offshore wind policy framework in response to the issues revealed in Round 1 bidding. In January 2025, it revised core auction guidelines to address excessively low-price bidding and project delays. The new rules allow developers to reflect up to 40% of cost inflation in the electricity price between the auction and the start of construction. For projects allocated from Round 4 onwards, bid bonds for operational delays increase from JPY13,000 per kilowatt (kW) to JPY24,000/kW — double that of projects assigned from Rounds 1 to 3 — and are structured as phased penalties to discourage speculative bidding and ensure project completion. Scoring criteria have also shifted from a price-only evaluation to factor in feasibility and local contributions.

Moreover, in November 2025, the government announced seven measures to enhance the bankability and completion prospects of offshore wind projects. These include a provision that zero-premium projects in Rounds 2 and 3 will be allowed to participate in the Long-Term Decarbonization Power Source Auction, securing 20 years of capacity revenue. The price-adjustment mechanism will continue to reflect only future inflation. Developers may also revise key equipment, including turbines, in cases of supplier withdrawal or significant cost escalation. Additional measures include more flexible base port rules, “renewal in principle” for occupation permit extensions, improved valuation of renewable attributes, and integrated grid, port, and financial support for low-carbon investments.

Strengthening domestic supply chains

METI also aims to reinforce domestic supply chains through initiatives, such as the July 2025 memorandum of understanding with Vestas and Nippon Steel, to localize turbine component production. The government has also pledged to reauction the sites abandoned by Mitsubishi under these new rules.

The initial bidding rounds highlighted the cost risks associated with weak domestic supply chains. Japan could address both exchange rate impacts on wind farm costs and the need to localize the offshore wind supply chain by domestically sourcing steel, foundation and tower fabrication, and other key components in the balance of systems and services. Beyond the turbines themselves, these inputs and services account for 60% to 70% of total project expenses. Japan’s advanced steel production, fabrication, integration, project management, and logistics systems are well-suited to meet offshore wind demands. The country’s shipbuilding sector could also benefit from producing specialized vessels needed for offshore wind farm installation and maintenance. Additionally, Japan is home to leading global suppliers of key components for cabling and transmission system elements, especially high-voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission components. As the offshore wind auction market matures and scales, the advantages of onshoring or localizing a greater share of wind turbine manufacturing and assembly become increasingly clear.

Expanding the scope for offshore wind projects

In June 2025, the Japanese parliament passed a law allowing the installation of offshore wind farms in the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). This is a significant development as it effectively expands the geographical scope for future auctions beyond Japan’s territorial waters, opening vast new areas for large-scale offshore wind development. With one of the world’s sixth-largest EEZs, Japan could now access deeper and windier sites with higher capacity factors and lower seasonal variability, giving new momentum to its long-term offshore wind ambitions.

The government is considering reauctioning the three sites in Akita and Chiba that were awarded in Round 1, following Mitsubishi’s withdrawal from the projects.

Simultaneously, attention is turning to the upcoming Round 4 auction. Two new offshore areas near Matsumae and Hiyama in Hokkaido have been designated as promotion zones, and a public tender is expected for these sites. However, the government postponed the launch of Round 4, initially scheduled for 14 October 2025. The delay is intended to provide time to assess the reasons behind developers’ withdrawal from the three Round 1 sites and to establish conditions to ensure offshore wind investments can reach completion. Therefore, the postponement is not a setback, but a constructive step toward refining the auction framework and fostering a more sustainable market environment.

Optimistic outlook for the sector

Despite these headwinds, other renewable energy developers remain optimistic about the long-term outlook for the sector. At a recent industry event, Masato Yamada, Senior Vice President at JERA Nex bp Japan Ltd., remarked, “There’s a perception that offshore wind power is dead, but the initiative hasn’t even truly begun.” Regarding the company’s Round 2 project off the coast of Akita, he further noted that withdrawing would result in greater losses, making continued development the rational choice. His comments underscore that, despite recent setbacks, developers still have strong incentives to move projects forward.

In fact, not all projects are stalled. Round 2 developments are progressing despite cost headwinds: Mitsui & Co. has selected its EPC contractor and plans to begin onshore construction in October 2025, Tohoku Electric is moving ahead with its 615MW Aomori project, and the Oga–Katagami–Akita consortium led by JERA Nex bp Japan has established a local headquarters with operations targeted for June 2028.

Round 3 developments are also progressing in line with planned construction and operation timelines. The consortium led by JERA is preparing fisheries impact assessments for its project off the southern coast of Aomori in the Sea of Japan, while Marubeni’s project off Yuza, Yamagata Prefecture, is moving forward on a similar schedule. Both projects target commercial operation in June 2030 and plan to use Siemens turbines. In June 2025, METI and Siemens Gamesa established a cooperation framework to discuss and promote the development of a wind turbine supply chain for the Japanese market and overseas expansion. Together, these efforts signal growing momentum toward strengthening Japan’s offshore wind industry through international collaboration and supply chain development.

These examples demonstrate that, alongside policy reform, tangible progress continues, highlighting that Japan’s offshore wind sector may be down — but is far from out.

Yet limitations remain

Despite the visible progress in Round 2 and the reforms introduced, Japan’s offshore wind developers still face structural headwinds. The latest measures — including the provision of 20 years of capacity revenues for zero-premium projects in Rounds 2 and 3, the allowance of turbine substitutions in the event of supplier withdrawal, and the shift toward “renewal in principle” for occupation permit extensions — are crucial mechanisms to reduce cancellation risks and improve financial visibility. However, these relief measures apply only to Rounds 2 and 3; from Round 4 onward, developers will return to a highly competitive environment.

At the same time, many of the fundamental bottlenecks identified by industry and in the Global Wind Energy Council’s (GWEC) recent white paper remain unresolved. These include:

(1) Insufficient inflation protection that does not compensate for past cost escalation, in stark contrast to the UK’s fully Consumer Price Index (CPI)-adjusted Contract for Difference (CfD)

(2) An underdeveloped corporate power purchase agreement (PPA) market and the absence of credit-guarantee schemes that constrain access to higher-priced offtake

(3) A lack of compensation mechanisms for curtailment risk

(4) The absence of a strategic offshore transmission plan and persistently high grid-connection costs

(5) Shortages of domestic ports and installation vessels, which continue to force developers to rely on costly foreign charters

(6) Regulatory inconsistencies — such as the implicit application of building standards — that prolong certification and permitting timelines, delaying revenue generation

Unless these structural issues are resolved, development costs will remain elevated, permitting will remain protracted, offtake options will stay limited, and incentives for meaningful domestic supply chain investment will continue to be weak. Addressing these challenges would establish a solid foundation for the long-term growth and stability of the offshore wind market and send a strong signal to domestic manufacturers to invest in localizing supply chains. Mitsubishi’s withdrawal showed that the difficulty was not only aggressive bidding but also weaknesses in the auction framework. With further institutional improvements, Japan can still realize its offshore wind potential. Accelerating climate policy and innovation in this sector will be essential to sustaining the country’s future competitiveness.

Following the US tariff announcement on the so-called ‘Liberation Day’, Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong warned the nation to “brace ourselves for more shocks to come”. This has proved prescient. Global uncertainty has become the norm, and maintaining resilience while pressing ahead with reforms to promote long-term growth is essential for effective policymaking.

AMRO’s 2025 Annual Consultation Report on Singapore shows that Singapore has weathered external shocks well thus far. It also illustrates how strong policymaking, preparedness, and the ability to leverage structural advantages can reinforce resilience and support future competitiveness and growth potentials. The key takeaways from the report released today are:

1) Growth has been revised up significantly from October.

Singapore’s GDP is projected to grow by 4.1 percent in 2025 and 2.5 percent in 2026 – a sharp upward revision from our October projections of 2.6 and 1.7 respectively. The upgrade reflects solid performance in the first three quarters of 2025, supported by the global electronics upcycle, AI-related demand, and strong activity in financial services. However, the near-term outlook remains vulnerable to external risks, particularly US trade policy shifts and weaker global growth, even as the announced 100-percent tariff on pharmaceuticals has been delayed,

2) An adept mix of fiscal, monetary and trade policies will be needed to cushion near-term impacts from trade disruptions.

Fiscal support should be targeted to vulnerable businesses and households, while broad-based transfers should be phased out gradually. An easier monetary policy stance remains appropriate given the uncertain outlook and low inflation—projected at 0.9 in 2025 and 0.8 percent in 2026. However, sustained capital inflows, while contributing to lower domestic interest rates, could impose an upward pressure on the exchange rate and present challenges to monetary policy implementation. Meanwhile, strengthening international trade agreements and ensuring businesses fully utilize them will help unlock new export opportunities and diversify markets.

3) A whole-of-government approach is helping safeguard a stable and sustainable property market.

Close coordination across agencies has enabled the effective implementation of both demand- and supply- side measures to moderate property price increases. These include macroprudential and property market measures as well as efforts to increase housing supply. Maintaining tight macroprudential measures will help contain risks of property market overheating and rapid household debt accumulation amid lower interest rates induced by capital inflows.

4) Singapore must preserve its competitive edge amid aging and rising trade fragmentation.

Boosting workforce adaptability, fostering a dynamic business environment, accelerating the adoption of automation, and maintaining an agile regulatory framework will be key to maintain competitiveness. A multipronged approach, including fiscal and healthcare reforms, can help address structural challenges, particularly from demographic change.

5) Singapore is well placed to advance regional integration, lifting growth potential domestically and across ASEAN.

The Johor-Singapore Special Economic Zone could serve as a blueprint for deeper intra-ASEAN integration, while ongoing regional initiatives on digital payments and financial market infrastructure connectivity are strengthening financial linkages. Singapore’s notable progress on climate adaptation and mitigation also positions it to play a leading role in regional climate governance and collaboration.

Conclusion

Singapore’s experience shows that resilience is not accidental. It is built through prudent policies, strategic foresight, and the agility to respond to emerging risks. As global uncertainties persist, the country’s continued commitment to sound macroeconomic management and structural reform will be vital to sustaining growth, enhancing competitiveness, and contributing to a more integrated and resilient ASEAN region.

By David Weidner

An always-on crypto hype machine lives to goose prices and then blame ‘macro’ when the selloff hits

As bitcoin cracked, liquidations mounted and short-term holders capitulated.

It’s the oldest game on Wall Street – the pump and dump. Only the tools have changed.

They came in by the tens of thousands: young, internet-native, mostly male, lured by the promise of lightning gains and financial freedom. For many, crypto wasn’t just an asset class – it was a storyline; a chance to get rich quickly and grab outsized returns before the mainstream figured out what was happening. That story was sold to them constantly through late-night livestreams, hyped Twitter threads, “moon or bust” Discord raids.

Now, after the crash, the crypto bros are showing signs of burnout – drained from margin calls, bag-holding and fading hope that the next “rocket tweet” will ever get them back to the high they were chasing.

The November wreck in bitcoin (BTCUSD) – from north of $120,000 to the low $80,000s – didn’t come out of nowhere. It was manufactured in plain sight by an always-on hype machine that lives to goose prices and then blame “macro” when gravity returns. Sure, crypto, including bitcoin, has rallied since falling below $85,000, but its “November to remember” crash wiped out dumb money. The subsequent rally only shows there’s dumber money out there.

We watched the script unfold in real time: chest-thumping year-end calls, retail pile-ins and leverage, a sharp downdraft, and then the postmortems telling the faithful to HODL [hold on for dear life] because the next big rally is imminent. Meanwhile, investors who bought the story are walking away. U.S. spot bitcoin ETFs bled roughly $3.5-$4 billion in November – their worst month since launch – as bitcoin erased its 2025 gains and slid into December still falling.

With crypto, you rarely need a smoking gun; leverage and narrative do the job.

This is how a walled-garden market works. Crypto’s most influential voices sell a future where bitcoin hedges U.S. dollar DXY debasement and soon sits beside gold (GC00) on central-bank balance sheets. Then they flood social media with price targets timed for maximum virality.

Arthur Hayes, the BitMEX co-founder, held the line on a $200,000 to $250,000 year-end bitcoin target even after November’s plunge – echoed by reposts and crypto media. Michael Saylor’s camp predicted $150,000 “by end of this year,” while VanEck reiterated an $180,000 “year-end” bitcoin target as late as August. This cheerleading sets sentiment, drives flows and helps build the runway for the next “sell the news.”

Then comes the unwind. With crypto, you rarely need a smoking gun – leverage and narrative do the job. As bitcoin cracked, liquidations mounted and short-term holders capitulated, while ETFs registered heavy outflows. The result was a trillion-dollar drawdown across digital assets and a price air-pocket down to the $80,000s. Even sympathetic analysts called it a classic “reset.” That’s a polite word for a market built on promotion, margin and the hope that the next post goes viral.

“Finfluencers” and coordinated campaigns can spark short-lived pops that fade once the insiders are out.

If this sounds like the oldest game on Wall Street – the pump and dump – that’s because it is. Only the tools have changed. “Finfluencers” and coordinated campaigns can spark short-lived pops that fade once the insiders are out. Crypto markets have billions in wash trading – fake volume that flatters momentum and dupes newcomers. Influencer calls deliver initial bumps that quickly evaporate.

Unsuspecting investors are told bitcoin isn’t just a trade – it’s insurance against the dollar – and, any day now, central banks will buy it. The facts say otherwise. The BIS, IMF and major central bankers keep drawing the same bright line: crypto is speculative, volatile and unsuitable as reserves; banks’ crypto exposure is tightly capped under global rules. Switzerland’s central bank publicly rebuffed bitcoin for reserves this year. Yes, you’ll find a headline-grabbing outlier – the Czech governor floated a small reserve allocation – but that remains a lonely view.

Read: For these big players, bitcoin investing is all about power

Crypto fatigue is setting in

If your due diligence begins and ends on social-media and chats, you’re playing a game where the other side writes the rules and the storyline.

Meanwhile, retail is exhausted. November brought multibillion-dollar redemptions, three straight weeks of ETF outflows and headlines about “crypto winter” all over again. Trading desks talk about “seller fatigue,” but that’s after the selling.

There’s a less glamorous explanation for bitcoin’s November plunge: It was due to content – a deliberate online campaign cycle. Early in the fall, the most widely followed social-media accounts planted calls for a bitcoin moonshot by December.

The memes did their work. Leverage piled in, and, when macro jitters and ETF outflows hit, the same voices reframed it as “healthy” before re-upping the end-of-year targets. Hayes’s bitcoin $250,000 post ricocheted across X; Saylor-adjacent channels packaged “this-year” price decks. In an unregulated attention economy, those posts are order flow. And when the tide turns, the exit is narrow.

The market structure amplifies it. Crypto still trades on venues where leverage is cheap, surveillance is lighter than with equities and market-making and marketing are indistinguishable. Crypto isn’t price risk; it’s narrative risk.

The crypto-hedge story – inflation, deficits, dollar debasement – sounds reasonable until investors find the correlations aren’t stable enough in the moments we need them most. November’s drop arrived alongside broader risk-off and funding stress – exactly when a “hedge” should help. Instead, bitcoin traded like a high-beta risk asset. Even crypto-friendly explainers acknowledged the slide reflected investors “ditching risk” and short-term capitulation.

Investors aren’t dumb. They’re human. Many of them are young and inexperienced. They listen to confident voices. But if your due diligence begins and ends on social media and chats, you’re playing a game where the other side writes the rules and the storyline. November was the reminder that, when an “asset” depends on engagement to work, the product is you.

Ultimately, investors should treat crypto’s influencer economy like any other funnel. When the call is for a year-end moonshot, ask who benefits if you buy that exposure today – and who’s already positioned to sell it back to you tomorrow. Recognize that the adoption stories (dollar hedge, central banks) remain mostly marketing copy, not monetary policy. If you still want exposure, size it like a lottery ticket, not a Treasury bill.

And when the next “healthy reset” arrives? Remember November.

David Weidner writes about markets, money and the stories behind them. His work has appeared in MarketWatch, The Wall Street Journal, McKinsey Quarterly, The Deal and American Banker.

Plus: This ‘safe’ cryptocurrency promises stability – but its claim is shaky

More: If you’re this type of investor, get out of the stock market now

-David Weidner

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Speaking at the Fortune Brainstorm AI event in San Francisco on Monday, he pointed out that the company—a key enabler in the AI infrastructure landscape—has been working on AI since well before large language models came along and took the long view.

“We also knew that the the most problematic thing that was going to happen was going to be energy, because energy and data centers were going to become a bottleneck alongside chips,” Kurian told Fortune’sAndrew Nusca. “So we designed our machines to be super efficient.”

The International Energy Agency has estimated that some AI-focused data centers consume as much electricity as 100,000 homes, and some of the largest facilities under construction could even use 20 times that amount.

At the same time, worldwide data center capacity will increase by 46% over the next two years, equivalent to a jump of almost 21,000 megawatts, according to real estate consultancy Knight Frank.  

At the Brainstorm event, Kurian laid out Google Cloud’s three-pronged approach to ensuring that there will be enough energy to meet all that demand.

First, the company seeks to be as diversified as possible in the kinds of energy that power AI computation. While many people say any form of energy can be used, that’s actually not true, he said.

“If you’re running a cluster for training and you bring it up and you start running a training job, the spike that you have with that computation draws so much energy that you can’t handle that from some forms of energy production,” Kurian explained.

The second part of Google Cloud’s strategy is being as efficient as possible, including how it reuses energy within data centers, he added.

In fact, the company uses AI in its control systems to monitor thermodynamic exchanges necessary in harnessing the energy that has already been brought into data centers.

And third, Google Cloud is working on “some new fundamental technologies to actually create energy in new forms,” Kurian said without elaborating further.

Earlier on Monday, utility company NextEra Energy and Google Cloud said they are expanding their partnership and will develop new U.S. data center campuses that will include with new power plants as well.

Tech leaders have warned that energy supply is critical to AI development alongside innovations in chips and improved language models.

The ability to build data centers is another potential chokepoint as well. Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang recently pointed out China’s advantage on that front compared to the U.S.

“If you want to build a data center here in the United States, from breaking ground to standing up an AI supercomputer is probably about three years,” he said at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in late November. “They can build a hospital in a weekend.”

A new clinical trial suggests that pairing bispecific antibodies and antibody-drug conjugates with CAR T-cell therapy may sharply boost one-year progression-free survival for people with aggressive lymphoma.

In just a few years, treatment options for aggressive lymphoma have rapidly advanced. However, many patients show a consistent pattern: powerful new therapies act quickly but often fail to keep the lymphoma at bay permanently, says Jay Spiegel, M.D., a transplant and cellular therapy physician at Sylvester Comprehensive Cancer Center, part of the University of Miami Miller School of Medicine.

Spiegel will present the early findings Dec. 8 at the 2025 American Society of Hematology (ASH) annual meeting in Orlando.

We have made huge improvements in lymphoma care. But there are still many patients where the current approaches are not curative.”

Jay Spiegel, M.D., a transplant and cellular therapy physician, Sylvester Comprehensive Cancer Center

That challenge inspired a new clinical trial – the researchers, led by senior author Lazaros Lekakis, M.D., professor of clinical medicine at the Miller School, combined three of the most promising lymphoma treatments, aiming to improve outcomes.

The clinical trial data indicate that combining these treatments may significantly enhance progression-free survival at one year.

Layered therapies extend responses

Large B-cell lymphoma is the most common aggressive lymphoma in adults. Its most frequent subtype, diffuse LBCL, affects about 25,000 people in the U.S. each year. First-round treatments work for approximately 70% of patients. 

For the 30% whose lymphoma comes back or never fully disappears, the next step is often CAR T-cell therapy, such as axicabtagene ciloleucel, approved in 2017. It trains a patient’s immune cells to target lymphoma.

“CAR T works incredibly well upfront,” Spiegel said, “but we’ve learned that it often falls short in the long-term – only about 40% of patients remain in remission after five years.”

So, researchers have designed other new therapies. Mosunetuzumab is a two-headed bispecific antibody that links a T-cell to a lymphoma cell, activating the immune system to attack. Polatuzumab is an antibody–drug conjugate, meaning it delivers a small dose of chemotherapy directly into lymphoma cells. Both are effective initially but don’t reliably keep the disease away when used alone.

To boost the durability of these new treatments, the Sylvester team integrated all three approaches. “Attacking three different antigens at once could help overcome several of the reasons CAR T fails,” Spiegel said. “The hope was that combining them could really jump the efficacy, and so far, it has been quite something.”

The phase 2 study enrolled 25 adults with relapsed or refractory LBCL. They received mosunetuzumab and polatuzumab before and after the CAR T treatment. Of the 24 patients who reached day 90, 90% were in complete remission. At one year, about 80% were still in remission, a significant increase from an estimated 50% at one year with CAR T alone.

“I did not think it would work this well,” Spiegel said. “To take patients with this type of aggressive disease and have so many still in remission at one year, that really surprised me.”

The Sylvester trial might provide a way to achieve longer remissions. “We have an exciting result,” Spiegel said, “but now we need to show it can be done on a larger scale. That is the goal of the next study, to prove the juice is worth the squeeze.”

As encouraging as the findings are, they arrive in a field moving at an extraordinary pace as researchers are continually testing new immunotherapies, improving CAR T treatments, and exploring fresh drug targets. “Everything in lymphoma is happening all at once,” Spiegel said. “It makes the field exciting but also complicated.”

That pace presents both opportunity and complexity as clinicians work to understand how each advancement fits into the broader treatment landscape – and how they can work together. The current challenge is figuring out the best sequences and combinations for these new treatments – and how to use each without exhausting the immune system, Spiegel said.

In this surge of treatment options, the message for patients is increasingly hopeful. “If you have relapsed disease, even aggressive disease, there are multiple approaches now that can still cure your lymphoma,” Spiegel said. “That was not true seven years ago.”

By Scott Murdoch

SYDNEY, Dec 9 (Reuters) – The chief investment officer of Australian pension fund Aware Super says there are flashing “orange” lights in some funding ​arrangements in the global artificial intelligence industry but earnings growth is backing up ‌the sector’s current valuations.

Simon Warner, who became CIO of the A$210 billion ($135.75 billion) fund last week, said ‌the future trajectory of the AI industry’s economic model was the most prominent financial market risk in 2026.

Soaring AI stock valuations have started to weigh on global markets as investors question when huge capital investments will translate into profits.

“We’ve taken great comfort in most of ⁠the last few years that ‌the capital investment into both large language models, but also into the data centers and all the infrastructure to support AI, has ‍been from very stable sources of funding, largely from retained earnings,” Warner told Reuters in an interview.

“There’s been some instances in the last six months or so where that’s softened a bit, ​there’s more circular financing, a bit more conduit financing. Nothing that flashes red, but ‌things that certainly flash orange.”

Warner said there was an interdependence between capital expenditure valuations in the so called “Magnificent Seven” stocks and broader wealth effects and domestic demand in the U.S.

“I do think there is a dynamic there, but if one of those pillars was to stumble, then we could have a correction,” he said.

“That is something we ⁠are watching very closely.”

Meta said in late October ​it had struck a $27 billion financing deal with ​Blue Owl Capital to fund its biggest data center project globally, as large technology companies race to build out the infrastructure needed to power ‍their artificial intelligence ambitions.

Microsoft ⁠was Aware’s second-largest listed stock investment in its balanced fund at the end of June, according to filings. It also owns Nvidia, Apple, Alphabet and Meta among ⁠others.

Warner said while some investors remained wary of AI and tech-related stocks valuations, there were risks to ‌those valuations if capital expenditure levels started to decline.

($1 = 1.5101 Australian dollars)

(Reporting ‌by Scott Murdoch; Editing by Sonali Desai)