Taipei, Jan. 19 (CNA) Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) greeted the government’s trade negotiation team on their arrival at Taoyuan Airport on Monday, commending them for the tariff reduction and investment agreements reached with the United States.
Led by Vice Premier Cheng Li-chiun (鄭麗君) and chief trade negotiator Yang Jen-ni (楊珍妮), the team hashed out a “substantive” and “meaningful” deal with Washington, which was announced in the U.S. last Thursday, Cho told reporters at the airport.
Cheng, meanwhile, said the trade agreement proved that “the hard work of the Taiwanese people, along with Taiwan’s technology and industries, had become a key force in the world,” and showed that the world “needs Taiwan.”
The trade negotiation team returned after reaching a preliminary agreement with the U.S. last week on the reduction of tariffs on Taiwanese goods to 15 percent, in return for Taiwan semiconductor and technology companies investing at least US$250 billion in the U.S.
The US$250 billion figure includes a US$100 billion investment pledged by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC) in March 2025, weeks after U.S. President Donald Trump took office, U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick clarified in an interview on Friday.
That implies that TSMC’s US$65 billion investment to build three advanced wafer fabs in Arizona, prior to Trump’s return to office last year, was not included in the US$250 billion figure.
As part of the new trade agreement, Taiwan’s government has also agreed to provide up to US$250 billion in credit guarantees for financial institutions to support investments in the U.S. market by Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, as well as its information and communication technology sector.
The terms of the agreement will be signed in the coming weeks as part of a formal trade pact, which would require approval by Taiwan’s Legislature.
In Taiwan, reactions to the agreement have been mixed, with some people welcoming the U.S. tariff reduction on Taiwanese goods from 20 percent to 15 percent, the same as the tariff rate on Japan, South Korea, and the European Union.
Other commentators, including some members of the opposition parties, have raised concerns that the deal could force companies like TSMC to move too much of their production to the U.S., effectively “hollowing out” Taiwan.
The agreement does not include a timetable for when Taiwan’s investments must be realized.
In a CNBC interview last week, however, TSMC Chief Financial Officer Wendell Huang (黃仁昭) said his company was accelerating its investments in Arizona because of high customer demand.
Even with its growing presence in the U.S., TSMC’s most cutting-edge technology will remain in Taiwan for “practical reasons,” Huang said, citing the intensive collaboration process between the company’s R&D and operations units.
Delivery agents zipping through rain, fog or hot conditions to deliver orders is a common sight in India [NurPhoto via Getty Images]
Last week, the Indian government asked e-commerce companies to stop 10-minute deliveries – drawing the curtain on a much-trumpeted promise by start-ups to provide groceries, food, grooming and even home repair services at lightning speeds in India.
The diktat follows a New Year’s Eve strike by some 200,000 gig workers that pitted start-up founders and venture capitalists against politicians, trade unions and delivery workers over demands that ranged from minimum wages to a ban on the 10-minute promise.
The striking workers also asked for more transparency in wage calculation and an end to what they allege is arbitrary algorithmic control of things like ratings and even contract termination.
Armies of men and women – but mostly men – speeding through traffic to deliver parcels, come rain or sun, have become a common sight on the roads of Mumbai, Delhi and other Indian cities since the pandemic.
Millions of households are now used to the convenience of quick doorstep deliveries booked through digital apps, with platforms such as Zomato, Swiggy, Blinkit and Instamart becoming integral to urban commerce in Asia’s third largest economy.
While the striking workers – who form the backbone of these apps – are bargaining for better, safer working conditions, platforms argue that over-regulation will kill an industry that is possibly the fastest growing segment of the Indian labour market. India’s gig workforce is 12 million strong and expected to double to 24 million by the end of this decade.
Armies of men speeding through traffic to deliver parcels are a common sight on Indian roads [Bloomberg via Getty Images]
The workers’ strike on the last day of 2025, and the ban on 10-minute deliveries – although not yet fully in place – come even as the government is all set to implement new rules that bring gig work under the ambit of labour laws for the first time. A new code set to come into effect this year has brought in, among other things, insurance coverage and social security protections for workers who clock 90 days on the platforms every year.
All of this puts new burdens on delivery apps that have thrived on light-touch regulation and cheap labour so far. Their stock prices have plunged – Swiggy is down some 15% in the last month, and Eternal, which owns Zomato and quick-commerce company Blinkit, is trading flat – as operating costs and pressures from the unions build up.
With investors spooked and some opposition politicians strongly backing the strikes, gig platform founders such as Eternal boss Deepinder Goyal have been forced to go into firefighting mode.
In a series of posts on X earlier this month, Goyal defended the resilience of his platforms, saying that Zomato and Blinkit delivered 75 million orders to 63 million customers on New Years’ Eve – “a record pace” unaffected by the striking workers who he called “miscreants”.
He also dismissed criticism that the 10-minute delivery model was unsafe, saying riders were able to meet the timeline not because of reckless speeding, but because of the density of dark stores (warehouses) that platforms had invested in.
“If a system were fundamentally unfair, it would not consistently attract and retain so many people who choose to work within it,” Goyal said, providing a stream of data to highlight how millions were benefitting from the app he had founded in a country where jobs were hard to come by.
According to Goyal, platforms like his already offer a range of social security protections, from insurance to period rest days and access to pension schemes. Most delivery workers, he said, work only for a few hours a day, and a few days in a month. The attrition rate is at 65% a year, indicating this is not a permanent job for many, and thus couldn’t come with the benefits of full-time work.
Moreover, if someone committed to working full time, they would earn around 21,000 rupees (£173, $232) plus tips in a month – a far better wage than what those employed in India’s vast informal blue-collar economy or even entry-level formal workers get, Goyal argued.
Zomato’s boss Deepinder Goyal has been in firefighting mode amid falling share prices and the gig worker strike [Mint via Getty Images]
Critics, however, are not convinced. They say these numbers mask hidden social and economic costs imposed on delivery workers – such as onboarding expenses, the money they have to spend on their own uniforms, vehicles and fuel.
They also say the incentive structures adopted by the apps reward speed, penalise delays or refusals of orders, and encourage working conditions that offer hardly any flexibility to workers without compromising on their ability to earn well.
Goyal’s assertion that the system is fair because it attracts so many people is also fundamentally flawed, say experts.
“Such work often represents economic desperation rather than genuine choice,” according to Kasim Saiyyad, a PhD candidate from Cornell University who spent time as a delivery worker with a food delivery app for two months.
The debate has presented a conundrum for Indian policymakers and companies.
Gig work by definition is not permanent, but unlike in the West where it is considered a side hustle until people move to better jobs, in India it has come to become a full-time occupation for many, in the absence of stable employment in areas like manufacturing.
A recent survey by Primus Partners, a consulting firm, showed that around 61% of gig workers described themselves as full-time employees.
“Only about 35% say they are part-time, and a mere 4% are seasonal or occasional,” the report said, adding that many workers in their 20s described these jobs as long-term careers, despite only one out of four having insurance or pension benefits.
“Without structured pathways for advancement, there is a growing risk of creating a ‘missing middle’ – a large segment of the workforce that powers consumption but remains excluded from stability, protections and long-term economic mobility,” the report said, calling for better social protections, minimum wages and creating pathways to higher-skilled roles that pay better.
Swiggy and Zomato have raised billions of dollars from the public markets [Bloomberg via Getty Images]
But gig platforms – many of whom have raised billions of dollars through private equity and public markets – are expectedly reluctant to budge.
They operate on wafer-thin margins as it is (2.5-4.5% on food delivery, and negative returns on groceries), according to estimates from HSBC research.
And profitability is expected to come under more pressure from the rise in welfare costs imposed by the new social security law.
“The uncertainty around strikes and inflationary pressures on costs because of higher incentives will make 2026 challenging for these apps,” Karan Taurani of Elara Capital told the BBC.
One union has already warned of more strikes if platforms don’t come forward for talks over their demands, while an opposition politician has vowed to take up the workers’ cause both inside and outside parliament.
Across the world, gig worker protections have strengthened in the past five years as pressures have mounted on platforms.
In 2021, a court in London ruled that Uber drivers were workers and entitled to minimum wages and holiday pay. Asian countries such as Singapore and Malaysia have also been rapidly enacting legislation to improve pay transparency and worker rights.
In India too, workers are unlikely to give up without a fight. And as this battle heats up, consumers may eventually be forced to shell out more for their daily deliveries.
Follow BBC News India on Instagram, YouTube,X and Facebook.
The activity around the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant is reaching its peak: workers remove earth to expand the width of a main road, while lorries arrive at its heavily guarded entrance. A long perimeter fence is lined with countless coils of razor wire, and in a layby, a police patrol car monitors visitors to the beach – one of the few locations with a clear view of the reactors, framed by a snowy Mount Yoneyama.
When all seven of its reactors are working, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa generates 8.2 gigawatts of electricity, enough to power millions of households. Occupying 4.2 sq km of land in Niigata prefecture on the Japan Sea coast, it is the biggest nuclear power plant in the world.
Since 2012, however, the plant has not generated a single watt of electricity, after being shut down, along with dozens of other reactors, in the wake of the March 2011 triple meltdown at Fukushima Daiichi, the world’s worst nuclear accident since Chornobyl.
Located about 220km (136 miles) north-west of Tokyo, the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant is run by Tokyo Electric Power (Tepco), the same utility in charge of the Fukushima facility when a powerful tsunami crashed through its defences, triggering a power outage that sent three of its reactors into meltdown and forcing 160,000 people to evacuate.
The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant. Photograph: Justin McCurry/The Guardian
Weeks before the 15th anniversary of the accident, and the wider tsunami disaster that killed an estimated 20,000 people along Japan’s north-east coast, Tepco is set to defy local public opinion and restart one of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa’s seven reactors, possibly as soon as Tuesday.
Restarting reactor No 6, which could boost the electricity supply to the Tokyo area by about 2%, will be a milestone in Japan’s slow return to nuclear energy, a strategy its government says will help the country reach its emissions targets and strengthen its energy security.
But for many of the 420,000 people living within a 30km (19-mile) radius of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa who would have to evacuate in the event of a Fukushima-style incident, Tepco’s imminent return to nuclear power generation is fraught with danger.
They include Ryusuke Yoshida, whose home is less than a mile and a half from the plant in the sleepy village of Kariwa. Asked what worries him most about the restart, the 76-year-old has a simple answer. “Everything,” he says, as waves crash on to the shore, the reactors looming in the background.
“The evacuation plans are obviously ineffective,” adds Yoshida, a potter and member of an association of people living closest to the facility. “When it snows in winter the roads are blocked, and a lot of people who live here are old. What about them, and other people who can’t move freely? This is a human rights issue.”
Location map
The utility company says it has learned the lessons of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, and earlier this year pledged to invest 100 bn yen (£470m) into Niigata prefecture over the next 10 years in an attempt to win over residents.
The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant, whose 6,000 staff have remained on duty throughout the long shutdown, has seawalls and watertight doors to provide stronger protection against a tsunami, while mobile diesel-powered generators and a large fleet of fire engines are ready to provide water to cool reactors in an emergency. Upgraded filtering systems have been installed to control the spread of radioactive materials.
“The core of the nuclear power business is ensuring safety above all else, and the understanding of local residents is a prerequisite,” says Tatsuya Matoba, a Tepco spokesperson.
That is the one hurdle residents say Tepco has failed to overcome after local authorities ignored calls for a prefectural referendum to determine the plant’s future. In the absence of a vote, anti-restart campaigners point to surveys showing clear opposition to putting the reactor back online.
A sign urges residents to evacuate to a nearby golf course or temple in the event of a tsunami. Photograph: Justin McCurry/The Guardian
They include a prefectural government poll conducted late last year in which more than 60% of people living within 30km of the plant said they did not believe the conditions for restarting the facility had been met.
“We take the results of the prefectural opinion survey very seriously,” Matoba adds. “Gaining understanding and trust from local residents is an ongoing process with no end point, that requires sincerity and continuous effort.”
Kazuyuki Takemoto, a member of the Kariwa village council, says seismic activity in this region of north-west Japan means it is impossible to guarantee the plant’s safety.
“But there has been no proper discussion of that,” says Takemoto, 76. “They say that safety improvements have been made since the Fukushima disaster, but I don’t think there is any valid reason to restart the reactor. It’s beyond my comprehension.”
Kazuyuki Takemoto, a member of the Kariwa village council, opposes the reactor restart. ‘It used to be said that nuclear power was necessary, safe and cheap … We now know that was an illusion.’ Photograph: Justin McCurry/The Guardian
‘The priority should be to protect people’s lives’
Just weeks before the planned restart, the nuclear industry attracted fresh criticism after it emerged that Chubu Electric Power, a utility in central Japan, had fabricated seismic risk data during a regulatory review, conducted before a possible restart, of two reactors at its idle Hamaoka plant.
“When you look at what’s happened with Hamaoka, do you seriously think it’s possible to trust Japan’s nuclear industry?” Takemoto says. “It used to be said that nuclear power was necessary, safe and cheap … We now know that was an illusion.”
Adding to local concerns are the presence of seismic faults in and around the site, which sustained damage during a 6.8-magnitude offshore earthquake in July 2007, including a fire that broke out in a transformer. Three reactors that were in operation at the time shut down automatically.
The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa restart is a gamble for Japan’s government, which has put an ambitious return to nuclear power generation at the centre of its new energy policy as it struggles to reach its emissions targets and bolster its energy security.
Before the Fukushima disaster, 54 reactors were in operation, supplying about 30% of the country’s power. Now, of 33 operable reactors, just 14 are in service, while attempts to restart others have faced strong local opposition.
Now, 15 years after the Fukushima meltdown, criticism of the country’s “nuclear village” of operators, regulators and politicians has shifted to this snowy coastal town.
Pointing out one of the many security cameras near the plant, Yoshida says the restart has been forced on residents by the nuclear industry and its political allies. “The local authorities have folded in the face of immense pressure from the central government,” he says.
“The priority of any government should be to protect people’s lives, but we feel like we have been deceived. Japan’s nuclear village is alive and well. You only have to look at what’s happening here to know that.”
In the letter, Elliott outlined its opposition to the revised tender offer by Toyota Fudosan Co., Ltd. at ¥18,800 per share (the “Revised TOB”), which Elliott believes very significantly undervalues Toyota Industries. Elliott’s analysis showed the Company’s intrinsic net asset value to be more than ¥26,000 per share as of January 16, 2026 – almost 40% above the Revised TOB price – and that the Standalone Plan for Toyota Industries offers a clear path to a valuation of more than ¥40,000 per share by 2028.
The letter highlighted significant deficiencies in the transaction governance process and noted that if the Revised TOB succeeds, it would represent a setback for Japan’s corporate governance reforms and dampen investor interest in the Japanese market. Elliott does not intend to tender its shares into the Revised TOB and strongly encourages other shareholders not to tender.
The full text of the letter can be read at https://elliottletters.com and is included below:
Dear Fellow Shareholders of Toyota Industries Corporation:
We write on behalf of funds advised by Elliott Investment Management L.P. and Elliott Advisors (UK) Limited (together “Elliott” or “we”) as the largest minority investor in Toyota Industries Corporation (the “Company” or “Toyota Industries”).1 Our investment reflects our strong conviction in the Company, its value and its immense potential as a standalone business.
Based on our conversations with many of you, we know that you share our concerns regarding the attempt by Toyota Fudosan Co., Ltd (“Toyota Fudosan”) to squeeze out minority shareholders of Toyota Industries at a deeply discounted and unfair valuation in a coercive transaction. Although Toyota Fudosan’s revised tender offer bid at ¥18,800 per share (the “Revised TOB”) acknowledges the inadequacy of the original transaction terms, the new price continues to very substantially undervalue Toyota Industries, whose intrinsic net asset value is ¥26,134 per share or almost 40% above the Revised TOB price. If successful, the Revised TOB would represent a major setback for corporate governance, minority shareholder rights and fair M&A in Japan. Elliott opposes the Revised TOB as it is not in the best interests of minority shareholders and because we believe substantially more value can be generated by pursuing the Standalone Plan for the Company (described below) than by tendering into this wholly inadequate offer.
Elliott does not intend to tender its shares into the Revised TOB and we strongly encourage other shareholders not to tender.
Key Takeaways
Elliott has followed Toyota Industries for many years and has invested significant time and resources in underwriting its investment in the Company. We have worked with leading commercial consulting firms, former employees, industry executives, asset valuation experts, tax advisors, law firms and accountants to form our views on the Company’s business and significant financial assets.
Our conclusions are as follows:
Toyota Industries owns world-class, market-leading businesses that are dominant in their respective areas, are exposed to positive secular tailwinds and have tremendous growth potential. These include the Company’s materials handling business, which is a global market leader and well positioned for future growth;
Beyond its best-in-class operating businesses, Toyota Industries holds valuable minority stakes in publicly traded companies that together are worth more than the entire market capitalization at the Revised TOB price and account for two-thirds of the intrinsic net asset value (“NAV”) of Toyota Industries;
The initial tender offer bid pre-announced on June 3, 2025 (the “Original TOB”) significantly undervalued Toyota Industries at ¥16,300 per share;
Since the Original TOB was pre-announced, the value of Toyota Industries’ stakes in publicly traded companies has increased by more than 40% and its closest operating peer has appreciated by over 50% – yet the Revised TOB captures only a fraction of this increase, widening the gap to fair value;
The transaction governance process remains deeply flawed, with deficiencies in the Original TOB only superficially addressed in the Revised TOB, representing a setback for corporate governance reform in Japan; and
The Standalone Plan (described below) offers a clear path to NAV of more than ¥40,000 per share by 2028 – more than double the Revised TOB price.
A Fork in the Road for Toyota Industries Shareholders
The Revised TOB presents Toyota Industries shareholders with a choice that will determine the future of the Company. It is also a test of the effectiveness and credibility of Japanese corporate governance more broadly.
For more than a decade, Japanese policymakers, regulators and market participants have worked to improve the governance standards of the country’s world-class businesses and capital markets. The METI Fair M&A Guidelines2, the Guidelines for Corporate Takeovers3, the Code of Corporate Conduct in the Securities Listing Regulation4, and the broader effort to promote fair M&A practices are meant to protect shareholders in situations precisely like this one. The question now is whether those protections have substance – or whether, when tested, powerful companies like Toyota Industries can forcibly squeeze out their minority shareholders at a fraction of the investment’s fair value.
If a transaction on these terms is permitted to proceed – at a price representing a significant discount to fair value, through a process with structural conflicts, and over the objections of a broad coalition of institutional shareholders – it will send a discouraging signal about the effectiveness of Japan’s vital governance reforms and set a dangerous precedent for shareholders in other Japanese companies. The credibility of the Toyota Group and Japan’s capital markets are at stake. If, on the other hand, shareholders reject an inadequate offer and the Company pursues a path that maximizes value for all stakeholders, it will demonstrate that Japan’s governance modernization is real.
We believe this is a decisive moment. As the largest non-conflicted minority investor in Toyota Industries, we face a clear choice: accept an inadequate price, or decline to tender and retain ownership in a world-class industrial and materials handling business capable of delivering substantially greater value. Elliott is committed to the latter – and we believe it represents the better outcome for long-term shareholder value.
Significant Undervaluation from the Start
When the Original TOB at ¥16,300 per share was pre-announced on June 3, 2025, our valuation analysis showed Toyota Industries’ NAV to be ¥20,696 per share (see Appendix 1). Due to the Company’s opaque disclosures, we were not able to reconcile the significant gap between the Original TOB price and the Company’s true intrinsic value, but we suspect the key factors were some combination of:
A discount applied to Toyota Industries’ stakes in publicly traded companies, which have a visible and known price and therefore cannot plausibly be undervalued in any offer;
An inappropriately low valuation of the Company’s best-in-class operating businesses, including the world’s leading materials handling business; and
No value given to the substantial tax savings available when unwinding cross-shareholdings through issuer buybacks. This structure benefits from a favorable deemed dividend treatment that Toyota Industries can utilize – and which it indeed envisages will be utilized, as part of both the Original and Revised TOB plans.
There was overwhelming consensus among market participants that the Original TOB was, at the time, fundamentally undervaluing Toyota Industries – evidenced by the share price trading 13% above the Original TOB price on the trading day before the pre-announcement. In our assessment, Toyota Industries’ NAV on June 3, 2025 – before any of the subsequent appreciation – was ¥20,696 per share, representing a 27% premium to the Original TOB price and a 10% premium to the Revised TOB price.
The Undervaluation Has Only Widened
Since the Original TOB was pre-announced, Toyota Industries’ intrinsic value has materially increased. Our analysis shows NAV of ¥26,134 per share on January 16, 2026 (see Appendix 2). Toyota Industries’ NAV has risen by ¥5,438 per share since the Original TOB, while the Revised TOB represents an increase of only ¥2,500 per share (see Appendix 3).
The key drivers of the demonstrable increase in NAV from June 3, 2025 to January 16, 2026 include:
An increase in the value of Toyota Industries’ stakes in publicly traded companies. These stakes have increased in value by more than 40%, or ¥5,720 per share before tax. Net of tax, the value of these stakes has increased by ¥4,805 per share since the Original TOB was pre-announced; 5
An increase in the market valuation of Toyota Industries’ core operating businesses. KION Group AG (“Kion”) is the most relevant peer company, given its number-two position in the global materials handling market. Kion’s share price increased by more than 50% between the Original TOB and the Revised TOB; and
Cash generation by Toyota Industries, as well as other changes in assets and liabilities at the Company during this time period as customary in a NAV analysis, net of the settlement of the emissions-related class action lawsuit in the U.S.
In this context, the Revised TOB is wholly inadequate. The significant undervaluation evident at the time of the Original TOB pre-announcement on June 3, 2025 has not been addressed, nor will minority shareholders participate in the indisputable increase in the value of Toyota Industries’ stakes in publicly traded companies or in the market value of the Company’s operating businesses since the Original TOB.
The disconnect is evident from the final negotiations over the Revised TOB:
On January 9, 2026, in response to a proposed offer price of ¥18,600, it was deemed that the price “still significantly deviates from the price level envisioned by the Company’s board of directors and the Special Committee, and must be largely increased also from the perspective of securing minority shareholders…in light of the fact that there is an increasing trend in the share prices of TMC and the Three Toyota Group Companies owned by the Company, the Tender Offer Price must be proposed factoring in the risk of price fluctuations up to the scheduled announcement date of commencement of the Tender Offer…”.6
The Special Committee urged Toyota Fudosan to “substantially increase” the proposed offer price accordingly, acknowledging both the inadequacy of ¥18,600 and the rising value of the Company’s stakes in publicly traded companies.
On January 12, 2026, Toyota Industries received the final Revised TOB price of ¥18,800 per share from Toyota Fudosan. On January 13, 2026, just one day after the proposal was received, Toyota Motor Corporation’s share price rose by 7.5% and the Company’s other stakes in publicly traded companies also increased in value. This rise resulted in a ¥1,005 per share increase in the post-tax intrinsic value of Toyota Industries – an increase which should have been fully accounted for in a further revised TOB price, but which was not.
Despite the foregoing, on January 14, 2026, the Company accepted and recommended the Revised TOB price of ¥18,800 – just a cosmetic ¥200 more than the price which, days before, the Company had said deviated significantly from its expectations and needed to be substantially increased to safeguard minority shareholder interests – even before the increase in value of the Company’s stakes in publicly traded companies on January 13, 2026.
This example demonstrates that intrinsic value growth from Toyota Industries’ stakes in publicly traded companies has not been appropriately captured in the price negotiation process. It is therefore unsurprising that Toyota Industries’ representatives, at the January 14, 2026 press conference, were unable to explain how the significant increase in the value of the Company’s publicly traded stakes since the Original TOB announcement had been reflected in the Revised TOB price.
The deficiencies in the Revised TOB price are also evident from the shockingly low implied valuation under other methodologies:
Less than 1x estimated book value: The Revised TOB price is materially below our estimate of IFRS book value as of December 31, 2025 (see Appendix 4). It is even further below our pro forma estimate of book value as of today, given the subsequent material increase in value of Toyota Industries’ stakes in publicly traded companies and in the overall Japanese stock market.
Less than 1x EBITDA for the core operating business: At the Revised TOB price, Toyota Fudosan would effectively be acquiring the core operating business at a valuation of less than 1x EBITDA (see Appendix 5), resulting in ¥2.2 trillion of value accruing to Toyota Fudosan that instead should accrue to Toyota Industries’ shareholders.
The market appears to share our assessment. Toyota Industries’ shares have traded above the Revised TOB price since the January 14, 2026 announcement, indicating continued investor dissatisfaction with the transaction terms.
A Coercive Transaction
The fundamental conflicts and inherent coercion that arise from the Revised TOB and network of interconnected Toyota Group transactions call for enhanced transparency and adherence to the fundamental protections and fairness measures for minority shareholders. These are enshrined in the Fair M&A Guidelines, the Guidelines for Corporate Takeovers, and the Code of Corporate Conduct in the Securities Listing Regulation. Instead, the Revised TOB disregards many of the core principles underpinning these frameworks, including:
Lack of true majority-of-minority protection: The Company claims the Revised TOB satisfies a majority-of-minority standard because the Toyota Group companies – which are clearly interested parties in the transaction – have not entered into binding agreements to tender their shares. This claim is disingenuous. On the one hand, the Company claims that these Toyota affiliates are independent. On the other, it rejected a legally binding offer from a third party to purchase the Company’s cross-shareholding in one of these Toyota affiliates at a higher price on the basis that selling the stake would jeopardize the Revised TOB.7 Under the currently proposed majority-of-minority condition, only 42% of non-Toyota Group shareholders need to tender into the Revised TOB, which is meaningfully below a true majority-of-minority threshold (see Appendix 6).
Financial advisors that lack independence: Mitsubishi UFJ Morgan Stanley Securities and SMBC Nikko Securities – financial advisors to the Special Committee and the Company, respectively – are affiliated with entities that are key lenders to the offeror group, creating a clear conflict of interest.
Abuse of minority shareholders to benefit Toyota Group companies: Toyota Industries has over-invested in its automobile business for years, as evidenced by exceptionally high capital intensity compared to peers and a bloated nearly ¥1 trillion asset base in this division, combined with an unacceptable low-single-digit return on invested capital. While this business is critical to the operations of Toyota Motor Corporation, it does not serve the best interests of Toyota Industries’ shareholders.
The Standalone Plan for Toyota Industries
We have been discussing a standalone plan for the Company (the “Standalone Plan”) with members of the Company’s Board and Special Committee for several months. The Standalone Plan represents a clear alternative to the Revised TOB that will generate significantly more value for Toyota Industries’ shareholders. The Company holds the number-one global position in forklifts, with 28% market share, and has a world-class automation systems business with attractive growth prospects. Toyota Industries also has substantial financial assets, a strong balance sheet and significant opportunities for operational improvement.
Elliott sees a clear path for Toyota Industries to achieve a valuation of more than ¥40,000 per share by 2028 through the Standalone Plan. Key elements of the Standalone Plan include:
Unwinding cross-shareholdings outside the context of any tender offer;
Capturing the significant margin improvement opportunity in the business, through consolidation initiatives, product revitalisation and increased efficiency;
Improving capital allocation by ceasing overinvestment in the automotive segment, which today predominantly serves the interests of Toyota Motor Corporation rather than Toyota Industries, as well as other initiatives; and
Implementing governance reforms to ensure Toyota Industries operates for the benefit of its own shareholders rather than other Toyota Group stakeholders.
The choice for Toyota Industries’ shareholders is not between accepting ¥18,800 or receiving less. It is between accepting ¥18,800 today or retaining ownership in a strong business capable of delivering more than twice that value over the medium term. Elliott plans to release further details of the Standalone Plan in the near future.
Do Not Tender
Elliott has no intention of tendering its shares into the Revised TOB and we strongly encourage other shareholders not to tender.
Based on our analysis, the Revised TOB significantly undervalues the Company and is not in the best interests of shareholders. Toyota Industries’ recent trading price suggests the broader market agrees. With a clear path to unlocking value as a standalone company through operational improvements and more efficient capital allocation, there is no imperative to proceed with this transaction. As a supportive long-term shareholder, we believe the Company has immense value-creation potential.
Even absent the implementation of the Standalone Plan, we believe that the Toyota Industries share price would, in the near term, significantly increase above its current levels if the Revised TOB fails, because the share price has been materially anchored down by the Original and Revised TOBs ever since the June 3, 2025 pre-announcement.
The outcome of this tender offer depends on the decisions of genuinely independent shareholders. If a sufficient number decide not to tender, the offer will not succeed at this price. Independent shareholders have the opportunity to determine whether they receive fair value for their investment – either through meaningfully improved transaction terms or through the Company pursuing a standalone path.
The implications of this transaction are far-reaching. If the Revised TOB is allowed to succeed, it will result in a substantial and potentially irreversible setback for Japan’s corporate governance reforms and dampen investor interest in the Japanese market. As one of the largest and most important corporate groups in Japan, how the Toyota Group acts will set the tone for how both domestic and foreign investors view the Japanese market. Every shareholder has a voice in this transaction and can affect its outcome. We urge you to advocate for a better outcome for Toyota Industries and its shareholders by declining to tender your shares.
Sincerely,
Aaron Tai Portfolio Manager
Gordon Singer Managing Partner
DISCLAIMER
This document has been issued by Elliott Advisors (UK) Limited (“EAUK”), which is authorized and regulated by the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”), and Elliott Investment Management L.P. (“EIMLP”). Nothing within this document promotes, or is intended to promote, and may not be construed as promoting, any funds advised directly or indirectly by EAUK and EIMLP (the “Elliott Funds”).
This document is for discussion and informational purposes only. The views expressed herein represent the opinions of EAUK, EIMLP and their affiliates (collectively, “Elliott Management”) as of the date hereof. Elliott Management reserves the right to change or modify any of its opinions expressed herein at any time and for any reason and expressly disclaims any obligation to correct, update or revise the information contained herein or to otherwise provide any additional materials.
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About Elliott
Elliott Investment Management L.P. (together with its affiliates, “Elliott”) manages approximately $76.1 billion of assets as of June 30, 2025. Founded in 1977, it is one of the oldest funds under continuous management. The Elliott funds’ investors include pension plans, sovereign wealth funds, endowments, foundations, funds-of-funds, high net worth individuals and families, and employees of the firm. Elliott Advisors (UK) Limited is an affiliate of Elliott Investment Management L.P.
Investor Contacts:
Okapi Partners LLC New York: Pat McHugh T:+1 212 297 0720 Toll Free: (877) 629-6357 London: Christian Jacques T: +44 20 3031 6613 [email protected]
Media Contacts:
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1 Based on Toyota Industries’ semi-annual report for the period ended September 30, 2025 and other public sources of information, we believe Elliott is the largest shareholder of Toyota Industries which is not affiliated with any Toyota Group companies.
2 The “Fair M&A Guidelines ― Enhancing Corporate Value and Securing Shareholders’ Interests” published by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry dated June 28, 2019.
3 The “Guidelines for Corporate Takeovers – Enhancing Corporate Value and Securing Shareholders’Interests” published by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry dated August 31, 2023.
4 The “Revisions to Securities Listing Regulations and Other Rules Pertaining to MBOs and Subsidiary Conversions” published by the Tokyo Stock Exchange dated July 7, 2025.
5 At a tax rate reflecting the benefits to Toyota Industries from its larger cross-shareholdings from the deemed dividend tax treatment under the issuer buyback unwind structure the Company plans to utilize.
6 Appendix 7 (The Process of Negotiations Before the Report) to the Toyota Industries Special Committee report dated January 14, 2026.
7 Page 35 of the Toyota Industries Special Committee report dated January 14, 2026.
(Bloomberg) — Asian markets are facing some pressure early Monday after US President Donald Trump proposed new tariffs on eight European countries, denting risk appetite and boosting demand for haven assets.
The pound and euro led losses among Group-of-10 currencies against the dollar in early trading, while the yen and Swiss franc edged higher. Equity futures point to declines in Japan and Hong Kong and little change in Australia when markets reopen, after US shares inched lower on Friday.
Trump said over the weekend he’d impose a 10% tariff on goods from eight European countries starting Feb. 1, rising to 25% in June unless there’s a deal for a “purchase of Greenland.” The move drew quick rebukes from European leaders, who are now poised to halt the approval of the trade agreement struck last year. Bloomberg reported that French President Emmanuel Macron may request the activation of the EU’s anti-coercion instrument – the bloc’s most powerful retaliation tool.
“The outcome of these new trade tensions is unclear, but what has long been evident is that there is no such thing as trade or tariff certainty anymore,” analysts including Carsten Brzeski, global head of macro at ING Bank, wrote in a note to clients. “What is clear is that a full-blown trade war between the EU and the US would leave only losers.”
Asian assets were already facing pressure after US stocks on Friday gave up an earlier gain to close 0.1% lower, after Trump suggested he’d nominated someone other than Kevin Hassett to succeed Fed Chair Jerome Powell. Treasuries slid across the curve as traders dialed back expectations for rate cuts, with odds lifted that former Fed Governor Kevin Warsh will be nominated to lead the Fed.
Chinese data on Monday may show the economy remained sanguine in the fourth quarter and likely capped 2025 with its weakest quarterly growth in three years. Gross domestic product is expected to gain 4.5% year-on-year in the three months to Dec. 31, slower than the 4.8% in the prior quarter, according to a Bloomberg survey.
Eyes will then shift to the European open, with the region’s equities likely to bare the brunt of any selloff, according to strategists. Deutsche Bank anticipates the fallout on the euro may ultimately be limited given the US relies on Europe for capital, while others see Trump’s salvo purely as a negotiating tactic to gain leverage ahead of the World Economic Forum at Davos this week.
“My working assumption is that an ‘off ramp’ from these threats will soon be found, and that this turns into yet another ‘TACO moment’,” Michael Brown, a strategist at Pepperstone Group in London, wrote in a note to clients. “With the fundamental bull case for risk still a resilient one, and providing that any European retaliation remains largely rhetorical, I would view equity dips as buying opportunities for now and wouldn’t be surprised to see the week’s initial FX moves fade relatively rapidly.”
In commodities, oil edged higher Friday to settle near $60 a barrel as traders weighed tensions in Iran. Gold slipped the most in two weeks.
Some of the main moves in markets:
Currencies
The Japanese yen rose 0.2% to 157.89 per dollar as of 7:00 a.m. Tokyo time The euro fell 0.1% to $1.1584 The Australian dollar fell 0.1% to $0.6674 The offshore yuan was little changed at 6.9662 per dollar Bonds
Australia’s 10-year yield advanced three basis points to 4.73% Cryptocurrencies
We recently compiled a list of the 10 Best Investments During A Recession. Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. is placed ninth among the best investments.
TheFly reported on December 19, 2025, that Truist Securities raised its price target for MPWR to $1,375 from $1,163 while maintaining a Buy rating. The company’s strength, according to analyst William Stein, is a compelling AI infrastructure derivative bet, which is fueled by its expertise in high-density power delivery for next-generation GPU and XPU platforms that support a multibillion-dollar potential in AI data centers.
Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. (MPWR) Emerges as High-Conviction AI Data Center Power Play
Monolithic Power Systems, Inc. (NASDAQ:MPWR) designs, develops, and markets integrated circuits (ICs) for the computing, automotive, industrial, and communications markets. The company specializes in power management solutions that reduce total energy consumption and heat dissipation in high-performance environments.
While we acknowledge the potential of MPWR as an investment, we believe certain AI stocks offer greater upside potential and carry less downside risk. If you’re looking for an extremely undervalued AI stock that also stands to benefit significantly from Trump-era tariffs and the onshoring trend, see our free report on the best short-term AI stock.
READ NEXT: 12 Best Multibagger Stocks to Buy Heading into 2026 and 7 Best Rising Tech Stocks to Buy Now.
Investors are often guided by the idea of discovering ‘the next big thing’, even if that means buying ‘story stocks’ without any revenue, let alone profit. Unfortunately, these high risk investments often have little probability of ever paying off, and many investors pay a price to learn their lesson. Loss-making companies are always racing against time to reach financial sustainability, so investors in these companies may be taking on more risk than they should.
So if this idea of high risk and high reward doesn’t suit, you might be more interested in profitable, growing companies, like Scales (NZSE:SCL). While profit isn’t the sole metric that should be considered when investing, it’s worth recognising businesses that can consistently produce it.
Trump has pledged to “unleash” American oil and gas and these 15 US stocks have developments that are poised to benefit.
The market is a voting machine in the short term, but a weighing machine in the long term, so you’d expect share price to follow earnings per share (EPS) outcomes eventually. So it makes sense that experienced investors pay close attention to company EPS when undertaking investment research. It certainly is nice to see that Scales has managed to grow EPS by 26% per year over three years. If growth like this continues on into the future, then shareholders will have plenty to smile about.
It’s often helpful to take a look at earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) margins, as well as revenue growth, to get another take on the quality of the company’s growth. Scales shareholders can take confidence from the fact that EBIT margins are up from 10% to 13%, and revenue is growing. Both of which are great metrics to check off for potential growth.
You can take a look at the company’s revenue and earnings growth trend, in the chart below. For finer detail, click on the image.
NZSE:SCL Earnings and Revenue History January 18th 2026
See our latest analysis for Scales
The trick, as an investor, is to find companies that are going to perform well in the future, not just in the past. While crystal balls don’t exist, you can check our visualization of consensus analyst forecasts for Scales’ future EPS 100% free.
It’s said that there’s no smoke without fire. For investors, insider buying is often the smoke that indicates which stocks could set the market alight. That’s because insider buying often indicates that those closest to the company have confidence that the share price will perform well. However, insiders are sometimes wrong, and we don’t know the exact thinking behind their acquisitions.
Insider selling of Scales shares was insignificant compared to the one buyer, over the last twelve months. Namely, Non-Executive Independent Director Miranda Burdon out-laid NZ$706k for shares, at about NZ$5.93 per share. That certainly piques our interest.
Along with the insider buying, another encouraging sign for Scales is that insiders, as a group, have a considerable shareholding. Indeed, they hold NZ$29m worth of its stock. That shows significant buy-in, and may indicate conviction in the business strategy. Despite being just 3.4% of the company, the value of that investment is enough to show insiders have plenty riding on the venture.
For growth investors, Scales’ raw rate of earnings growth is a beacon in the night. Moreover, the management and board of the company hold a significant stake in the company, with one party adding to this total. These things considered, this is one stock worth watching. Of course, just because Scales is growing does not mean it is undervalued. If you’re wondering about the valuation, check out this gauge of its price-to-earnings ratio, as compared to its industry.
The good news is that Scales is not the only stock with insider buying. Here’s a list of small cap, undervalued companies in NZ with insider buying in the last three months!
Please note the insider transactions discussed in this article refer to reportable transactions in the relevant jurisdiction.
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This article by Simply Wall St is general in nature. We provide commentary based on historical data and analyst forecasts only using an unbiased methodology and our articles are not intended to be financial advice. It does not constitute a recommendation to buy or sell any stock, and does not take account of your objectives, or your financial situation. We aim to bring you long-term focused analysis driven by fundamental data. Note that our analysis may not factor in the latest price-sensitive company announcements or qualitative material. Simply Wall St has no position in any stocks mentioned.
