Category: 3. Business

  • How options trading in Palantir, Uber and -2-

    How options trading in Palantir, Uber and -2-

    (c)McMillan Analysis Corporation is registered with the SEC as an investment advisor and with the CFTC as a commodity trading advisor. The information in this newsletter has been carefully compiled from sources believed to be reliable, but accuracy and completeness are not guaranteed. The officers or directors of McMillan Analysis Corporation, or accounts managed by such persons may have positions in the securities recommended in the advisory.

    -Lawrence G. McMillan

    This content was created by MarketWatch, which is operated by Dow Jones & Co. MarketWatch is published independently from Dow Jones Newswires and The Wall Street Journal.

    (END) Dow Jones Newswires

    08-07-25 1458ET

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  • Microsoft Adds New OpenAI Models to Azure and Windows

    Microsoft Adds New OpenAI Models to Azure and Windows

    Microsoft is expanding its AI tools by bringing OpenAI’s open-weight language models, gpt-oss, to Azure AI Foundry and Windows AI Foundry. Two of these models debuted this week: gpt‑oss-120b and gpt‑oss-20b. The larger 120b model is built for high-performance reasoning tasks, while the smaller 20b model works on PCs with GPUs that have at least 16GB of memory.

    Developers have full access to the model weights, which means they can fine-tune the models to suit different needs. That could mean trimming for offline use or modifying them for industry-specific assistants. Open-weight access lets teams review models, retrain parts of them, or export them for use on Microsoft’s AKS or local computers.

    Azure AI Foundry offers support via tools for model evaluation, fine-tuning, and deployment. It includes a growing catalog of more than 11,000 models. Meanwhile, Foundry Local offers on-device support, which can help those who require local inference for security or offline access.

    OpenAI’s gpt‑oss-20b is already available on Windows, with macOS support slated for the near future. Both models will be compatible with the common responses API.

    Microsoft says its approach is meant to give developers and businesses more flexibility, transparency, and options for how they use and manage AI across different environments, whether in the cloud, on-device, or at the edge.

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  • Unprecedented large-scale aquifer recovery through human intervention

    Unprecedented large-scale aquifer recovery through human intervention

    Reversing groundwater depletion across the North China Plain

    To investigate groundwater recovery in the NCP, we compiled an extensive dataset of in-situ groundwater level measurements from both unconfined and confined aquifers in urban and rural areas within the NCP. The establishment of China’s national groundwater monitoring project in 2018 markedly improved the spatiotemporal coverage and quality of in situ measurements. Prior to 2018, there were many temporal discontinuities in the monitoring data, but the advent of an automatic monitoring system thereafter provided continuous data. Post-2018, there was a notable increase in monitoring well density in the NCP, particularly in the southeastern portions and in confined aquifers (Supplementary Fig. 1). For unconfined aquifers, groundwater levels were deepest (≥40 m) in the piedmont plain in the western portion of the NCP and shallowest (≤10 m) in the eastern portion of the NCP (Supplementary Fig. 1a–d). For confined aquifers, groundwater heads were deepest (≥70 m) in the cities of Tianjin, Cangzhou, and Hengshui (Supplementary Fig. 1e–h). Rapid shallowing trends have been observed across the NCP in both unconfined and confined aquifers (Fig. 2). We calculated Theil-Sen slopes for depth to groundwater at monitoring wells during 2020–2024 (Fig. 2m) because 2020 marked the point of reversal in the average groundwater depth in the NCP. In unconfined aquifers, the most pronounced reversal in groundwater levels was found in the piedmont plain in the western portion of the NCP, with trends exceeding 1.5 m year1 during 2020–2024. In confined aquifers, rapid shallowing trends in groundwater heads (≥1.5 m year1) were evident in the piedmont areas, as well as in the cities of Tianjin, Cangzhou, and Hengshui. Additionally, wells with continuous measurements indicated recovery in both urban and rural areas (Fig. 2b–l).

    Fig. 2: Trends in groundwater depths across monitoring wells in the North China Plain and comparisons with previously reported cases of recovery.

    a Overview of the Hai River basin (HRB). The purple line represents the boundary of the HRB. The green line represents the northern and western boundary of the North China Plain (NCP), which is the plain portion of the HRB. Orange lines represent the central route of the South-to-North Water Diversion (SNWD-C). Blue polygons represent reservoirs. Brown lines represent the boundaries of Hebei Province and the provincial-level municipalities of Beijing and Tianjin (Province). Red diamonds represent major cities. Purple circles represent the locations of monitoring wells (bl). bj Instances of continuous depth to groundwater measurements in unconfined aquifers during 2005–2024. Green lines represent the depth to groundwater. Thick blue lines illustrate the long-term trends derived from STL decomposition. k, l Instances of continuous depth to groundwater measurements in confined aquifers during 2005–2024. Purple lines represent the depth to groundwater. Thick red lines illustrate the long-term trends derived from STL decomposition. m Trends in groundwater levels and heads at individual wells during 2020–2024. Circles indicate unconfined aquifers, while Deltas represent confined aquifers. Positive trends (blue) indicate shallowing groundwater, while negative trends (red) indicate deepening groundwater.

    The groundwater level data indicate that the reversal of deepening trends in the average groundwater depth anomalies in both unconfined and confined aquifers occurred around 2020 (Fig. 3a). By the end of 2024, the average groundwater depth was ~11 m and ~27 m in unconfined and confined aquifers, respectively. In general, depths to groundwater in unconfined and confined aquifers are greatest in summer and smallest in winter, driven primarily by the combined effects of groundwater pumping for irrigation (peaking in spring) and recharge from precipitation (summer monsoonal rainfall accounting for ~60% of annual precipitation). Seasonal variability in groundwater depth within a year is ~1.5 m in unconfined aquifers and ~4 m in confined aquifers. To mitigate the impact of seasonal variability, we isolated the long-term trends in the groundwater depth anomaly time series after removing the seasonal variability using STL decomposition. Our analysis shows that the rate of deepening in groundwater depth in unconfined aquifers slowed before the reversal in 2020 compared to the deepening trend in the late 20th century. Historically, groundwater levels in unconfined aquifers in the Piedmont Plain declined at a rate of 1–2 m year1 during 1984–200524. The deepening trend decreased to 0.2 m year1 during 2005–2019, with relatively humid conditions in 2012 and 2016 contributing to mild recoveries. After the reversal in 2020, a rapid recovery rate of 0.7 m year1 occurred during 2020–2024, with the average groundwater depth anomaly in unconfined aquifers in 2024 nearing levels last seen in 2005. For confined aquifers, we found a deepening trend of ~0.5 m year1 during 2005–2019, followed by a recovery of ~4 m during 2020–2024. By 2024, the average groundwater head had returned to levels comparable to those in 2013. Notably, the recovery rates for both unconfined and confined aquifers decreased after 2021. Additionally, numerous sources have indicated a recovery in groundwater levels, as shown by the mitigation of land subsidence and re-emergence of springs in regions such as Beijing and Xingtai (see Methods).

    Fig. 3: Time series and trends in groundwater depths across the North China Plain.
    figure 3

    a Time series of average groundwater level anomalies in unconfined and average groundwater head anomalies in confined aquifers. The green and purple lines represent the average groundwater level and head anomalies in unconfined and confined aquifers, respectively. The thick blue and red lines illustrate long-term trends in unconfined and confined aquifers derived from STL decomposition, respectively. The green and purple shadows represent the uncertainty associated with the spatial distribution of the monitoring network and the application of the Thiessen polygon method in unconfined and confined aquifers, respectively. The dashed brown lines represent the timing of reversals. b Average groundwater level anomalies in unconfined aquifers at the city scale. Same legend as in (a). c Proportion of monitoring wells exhibiting deepening (p < 0.05, red), shallowing (p < 0.05, light blue), reversing (dark blue), and no significant trend (orange) during 2005–2017 and 2018–2024.

    Beijing experienced the first reversal of deepening groundwater levels in unconfined aquifers, followed by other cities in the NCP (Fig. 3b). Monitoring data from Beijing, the city with the highest quality data in the NCP, indicated the earliest reversal in 2016, followed by a recovery rate of 1 m year1 during 2016–2024. Since 2021, Beijing’s groundwater level has been shallower than it was in 2005. In Baoding, the reversal occurred in 2020, with a recovery rate of 1.5 m year1 during 2020–2024. By 2024, the groundwater level in Baoding was shallower than in 2005. The recovery of groundwater levels in Hengshui and Tangshan has been ongoing since 2021, albeit at a slower rate of 0.4 m year1 and 0.3 m year1, respectively. The lower uncertainty in average groundwater depth anomalies for Beijing and the NCP, compared to Baoding, Hengshui, and Tangshan, underscores the importance of dense in-situ monitoring networks and comprehensive regional analysis in improving the reliability of groundwater assessments.

    We identified and analyzed trends in groundwater depth at continuously monitored wells during 2005–2017 and 2018–2024 (Fig. 3c). A well displaying a monotonic deepening trend followed by a monotonic rebound was labelled as having a reversal of the deepening trend. For other wells, we assessed whether there was a significant deepening or shallowing trend (p < 0.05, MK test). Our findings show that significant deepening trends were predominant during 2005–2017, whereas significant shallowing trends became prevalent during 2018–2024. Approximately 62% and 83% of the monitoring wells in unconfined and confined aquifers show significant deepening trends during 2005–2017, respectively. Approximately 6% of the monitoring wells in unconfined aquifers, mainly in Beijing, experienced a reversal of the deepening trend during this period. In contrast, during 2018–2024, over half of the monitoring wells exhibited a significant shallowing trend, and about a quarter showed signs of a deepening trend reversal. These results align with the first reversal observed in Beijing in 2016 and the overall reversal at the NCP scale in 2020.

    Water supply and usage in the Hai River basin

    The total water supply in the HRB has remained relatively stable from 2005 to 2023, averaging ~37 km3 annually, but the contribution of different water sources has shifted significantly (Fig. 4a, b). In 2005, groundwater accounted for about two-thirds of the total water supply, with unconfined aquifers providing 18.7 km3, nearly three times the 6.6 km3 supplied by confined aquifers. Around 2009, groundwater extraction from confined aquifers began to decline, providing 5% less in 2014 relative to the volume provided in 2005, with reclaimed water compensating for most of this reduction. Meanwhile, surface water supply from reservoirs increased (+1.8 km3) during 2005–2023 and now constitutes over a quarter of the total water supply. Water diverted from the Yellow River remained stable at ~4.4 km3 annually, representing 10% of the total water supply, except for a spike in 2019 and 2020. Reclaimed water use grew steadily, reaching 4.4 km3 by 2023 and accounting for 12% of the total water supply in 2023. Reclaimed water is primarily used for river and lake replenishment, as well as for sanitation, landscape irrigation, and industry. Despite initiatives promoting desalination, the use of desalinated seawater in the HRB has remained minimal, with an annual capacity of ~0.25 km3 in 2023, contributing <1% to the total water supply.

    Fig. 4: Annual water supply and usage in the Hai River basin.
    figure 4

    a Annual water supply from various sources (km3), including surface water from reservoirs, groundwater from unconfined and confined aquifers, water diversion from the Yellow River, water diversion from the Yangtze River (South-to-North Water Diversion, SNWD), and reclaimed water. b Proportions of total water supply in 2005, 2014, and 2023. c Annual water use across different sectors (km3), including municipal, agricultural, industrial, and environmental water usage. d Proportions of total water use in 2005, 2014, and 2023.

    The central route of the South-to-North Water Diversion (SNWD-C), which began operations in December 2014, introduced significant diversification into the water supply structure of the HRB. The SNWD-C was designed to divert 9.5 km3 of high-quality water annually from the Danjiangkou Reservoir on the Han River, the largest tributary of the Yangtze River, to northern China. The eastern route of the SNWD (SNWD-E), which diverts water from Jiangdu near the Yangtze River, supplies a small amount of water (~0.2 km3 year1) to the southeastern parts of the NCP, with the majority benefiting areas in Shandong Province outside the NCP. In 2023, the SNWD provided 5.3 km3 of water, accounting for 14% of the total supply, making it the third largest source after unconfined aquifers (11.9 km3, 32%) and surface water from reservoirs (10.4 km3, 28%).

    Groundwater usage in 2023 (~13 km3) was nearly half of what it was in 2005 (~25 km3), with a steeper decline in confined aquifers (~85% reduction) than in unconfined aquifers (~36% reduction) from 2005 to 2023. By 2023, pumping from confined aquifers decreased to <1 km3, accounting for only 3% of the total water supply. This greater reduction in confined aquifer use is largely attributed to its greater substitution by water from the SNWD project. Historically, confined aquifers, valued for their high water quality, have been a primary source for municipal use, particularly because unconfined aquifers are more vulnerable to contamination. With the introduction of water from the SNWD project, groundwater from confined aquifers that had been used for municipal supplies has increasingly been replaced, thereby reducing groundwater pumping. However, the SNWD supply is affected by drought conditions in its source areas. For example, drought conditions upstream of the Danjiangkou Reservoir led to the SNWD supply being decreased by 16% from 2022 to 2023 (from 6.3 km3 to 5.3 km3).

    Despite generally stable total water use, a shift towards increased allocation to environmental flows has led to a reduction in total municipal, agricultural, and industrial use, from 37.6 km3 in 2005 to 29.5 km3 in 2023 (Fig. 4c, d). Agricultural water use, which accounted for 70% of the total in 2005, has steadily declined to 50% by 2023. In addition to a ~ 10% decrease in cropland area (Supplementary Fig. 2), this reduction is attributed to policies aimed at mitigating water shortages and curbing groundwater extraction, including adjustments to cultivation practices, dryland farming, seasonal fallow, and use of plastic mulch to conserve soil moisture30. Municipal water use increased by ~30% during 2005–2023, driven by population growth, while industrial water use decreased by a similar percentage due to conservation efforts31. Environmental water use, which includes watering trees and grasslands as well as replenishing lakes and rivers17, has been over 7 km3 since 2021, becoming the second-largest water use sector (>20% of the total) after agriculture. Reclaimed water, along with water diverted from the Yellow and Yangtze rivers and surface water from reservoirs32, plays a crucial role in supporting these environmental flows17.

    Water diversion and aquifer restoration policies drive groundwater recovery

    The observed groundwater recovery in the NCP is primarily attributable to sustained human intervention, with wet years (e.g., 2021) providing additional but temporary reinforcement (Fig. 5). A pivotal measure was the substitution of groundwater pumping with water from SNWD-C. Initially, in 2015, Beijing received the bulk of diverted water (0.8 km3 out of 1.4 km3 delivered to the NCP), which led to an early recovery of groundwater levels beginning in 2016. This recovery remained resilient even during droughts in 2019 and 2022 (Fig. 5c). After 2020, SNWD-C deliveries expanded to other parts of the NCP, reaching over 4 km3 per year and supporting a broader reversal of regional groundwater declines (Fig. 5a).

    Fig. 5: Groundwater depth response in unconfined aquifers to precipitation variability.
    figure 5

    a Annual precipitation in the Hai River basin (HRB, white bars) and average groundwater depth anomalies in unconfined aquifers across the North China Plain (NCP). Background shading denotes dry (orange), normal (gray), and wet (blue) years. The red line shows the long-term trend in average groundwater depth anomalies, derived via STL decomposition. b Scatter plot relating 12-month average precipitation (Pr) in the HRB to the corresponding change in the STL trend component of groundwater depth anomalies in the NCP. Both axes use logarithmic scales. Point colors indicate months, and labels such as “2014Q2” denote the year and calendar quarter. The red arrow indicates the leftward shifts observed during droughts. The dashed gray line indicates a stable trend. c Same as (a), but for Beijing: annual precipitation and groundwater depth anomalies in unconfined aquifers. d Same as (b), but for Beijing: precipitation-groundwater trend relationships based on STL decomposition.

    The coupling between precipitation and groundwater depth anomalies further highlights the impact of these interventions (Fig. 5b, d). A systematic leftward shift in precipitation-groundwater scatter plots indicates increasingly shallow groundwater conditions, even under similar rainfall conditions. These shifts are particularly pronounced during drought years (the red arrow in Fig. 5b), suggesting that the interventions have altered the groundwater balance and strengthened the system’s resilience. A similar pattern is observed in Beijing (Fig. 5d), where 2024 groundwater depths significantly improved compared to 2005. Although the extreme rainfall in 2021 temporarily accelerated groundwater recovery, its effect was short-lived, as soil moisture returned to baseline levels by early 2022 (Supplementary Fig. 3). In contrast, the continued groundwater rises in Beijing (2016–2020) and the ongoing NCP-wide recovery since 2022 underscore the effectiveness and durability of policy-led groundwater restoration efforts.

    MAR and reduced irrigation-related pumping are critical strategies for restoring depleted aquifers (Fig. 6a–c). For years, rivers in the NCP had dried up due to upstream reservoir interception and declining groundwater levels. Experimental river replenishment began in 2018 in the Fuyang, Hutuo, and Juma rivers. Since then, over 10 km3 of water from the SNWD project has been allocated to restore rivers across the NCP by 2024. Additional contributions came from Yellow River diversions and local reservoirs, benefiting rivers (e.g., the Yongding River) and lakes (e.g., the Baiyangdian Lake). These efforts have rejuvenated drying rivers, restored riparian ecosystems, and enhanced aquifer recharge. Wells near replenished rivers exhibited more rapid groundwater recovery rates (Fig. 6b), confirming the effectiveness of river-based MAR. Other MAR methods, including flood-restoring recharge ponds and injection wells targeting confined aquifers, were employed but at smaller scales. In parallel, changes in irrigation practices also contributed to partial recovery. The NCP’s dominant double cropping system (winter wheat and summer maize rotation) requires intensive spring irrigation, historically sustained by groundwater pumping. Between 2013 and 2018, the area under double cropping declined by ~10,000 km230. In rural areas between Beijing and Langfang, where the reduction was the greatest30, groundwater recovery began as early as 2013–2014 (Fig. 6c). Since 2018, further decline in double-cropped area has slowed, as diverted water has allowed local surface water to be redirected for irrigation30. In contrast, the southeastern NCP retained stable cropping patterns due to reliance on Yellow River diversions. Despite the cropping adjustments, regional food production in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei rose from ~28 million tons in 2005 to ~42 million tons in 2023 (Supplementary Fig. 4)33, aided by increased yield per unit area, helping to ensure local food security.

    Fig. 6: Engineering and policy approaches for reversing groundwater depletion.
    figure 6

    a Water diversion and river replenishment in the North China Plain (NCP). The green line represents the boundary of the NCP. Blue polygons represent lakes and reservoirs. Blue, orange, and dark red lines represent rivers, the central route of the South-to-North Water Diversion (SNWD-C), and the eastern route of the South-to-North Water Diversion (SNWD-E), respectively. b Groundwater depth in unconfined aquifers near replenished rivers. Green, purple, gray, and red lines correspond to four monitoring wells located between the Sha and the Hutuo rivers from 2018 to 2024. c Groundwater depth in unconfined aquifers in areas where double-cropped acreage declined substantially between 2013 and 2017. Green and purple lines represent two representative monitoring wells. d GRACE-derived total water storage anomalies (TWSA) in the NCP. The green line shows the average of the JPL and CSR mascon products; the shaded green area shows their spread. The thick blue line represents the trend (based on STL decomposition). e Annual groundwater balance in the NCP from 2005 to 2023. The x axis shows net groundwater abstraction (abstraction minus recharge) based on Hai River Water Resources Bulletins (km3). The y axis represents the annual change in the trend in groundwater depth (based on STL decomposition) in unconfined aquifers, with the dashed gray line indicating a stable trend. Sy_fit indicates the fitted specific yield derived from the slope of the balance-depth relationship.

    Groundwater depth recovery observed in monitoring wells is consistent with both satellite-based and water balance estimates (Fig. 6d, e). Interannual changes in groundwater depth in unconfined aquifers show a strong linear relationship (R2 = 0.87) with net water balance deficits, calculated as annual groundwater abstraction minus recharge from the Hai River Water Resources Bulletins (Fig. 6e). The fitted specific yield (Sy_fit) of 0.07 generally matches reported values of ~0.12 in the piedmont plains and ~0.04 in other regions of the NCP25, supporting the reliability of the water balance approach34 (see Methods). Satellite observations from GRACE and GRACE-FO show a recovery in total water storage anomalies (TWSA) beginning around 2020 (Fig. 6d), yet this rebound compensates for only about half of the ~49 km3 of total water storage depletion between 2005 and 2019. Based on a 3 m decline in groundwater level and the estimated Sy_fit, unconfined aquifer storage alone decreased by ~27 km3 during this period. Confined aquifers, characterized by much smaller storage coefficients (0.0004–0.004), contributed relatively little to the total depletion, indicating that the majority of groundwater loss occurred in unconfined systems25. Discrepancies between GRACE TWSA data and in-situ groundwater trends likely stem from variations in soil and surface water storage, uncertainties in specific yield and storage coefficients, or inherent limitations in GRACE resolution. A full attribution of these differences is beyond the scope of this study.

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  • Epcoritamab Plus Rituximab and Lenalidomide Hits Both Primary End Points in R/R Follicular Lymphoma

    Epcoritamab Plus Rituximab and Lenalidomide Hits Both Primary End Points in R/R Follicular Lymphoma

    Blood Cells | Image credit:

    © Bipul Kumar – stock.adobe.com

    The combination of epcoritamab-bysp (Epkinly), rituximab (Rituxan), and lenalidomide (Revlimid) demonstrated significant improvements in overall response rate (ORR) and progression-free survival (PFS) compared with rituximab and lenalidomide in patients with relapsed/refractory follicular lymphoma, meeting the coprimary end points of the phase 3 EPCORE FL-1 (NCT05409066).1

    Data from a preplanned interim analysis of EPCORE FL-1 revealed that patients who received the triplet experienced a 79% reduction in the risk of death or disease progression compared with those treated with only rituximab and lenalidomide (HR, 0.21; P < .0001). Moreover, there was a significant benefit in terms of ORR in favor of the investigational arm (P <.0001).

    In July 2025, the FDA accepted the supplemental Biologics License Application (sBLA) of epcoritamab plus rituximab and lenalidomide for the treatment of patients with relapsed/refractory follicular lymphoma following at least 1 prior systemic therapy. The sBLA submission was based on prior findings from EPCORE FL-1. The FDA set a Prescription Drug User Fee Act target action date of November 30, 2025.

    “[Although] therapeutic options exist for patients with relapsed/refractory follicular lymphoma, response rates tend to decline and durability diminishes with each subsequent line of treatment, which can increase the risk of the disease transforming into aggressive large-cell lymphoma,” Jan van de Winkel, PhD, president and chief executive officer of Genmab, stated in a news release. “The results from this trial, and the decision from the FDA to accept the sBLA for priority review, demonstrate the potential of this epcoritamab combination therapy to reshape the treatment landscape and reinforces our shared commitment with AbbVie to advance epcoritamab as a potential core therapy across B-cell malignancies.”

    EPCORE FL-1 was an open-label study that evaluated epcoritamab plus rituximab and lenalidomide in adult patients with relapsed/refractory follicular lymphoma who received at least 1 prior systemic regimen containing an anti-CD20 monoclonal antibody plus chemotherapy.2 Additional inclusion criteria consisted of having an estimated creatine clearance of at least 50 mL/minute, at least 1 measurable lesion per CT scan or MRI, and an ECOG performance status of 0 to 2. Patients were also required to have stage II to IV disease without evidence of histologic transformation to an aggressive lymphoma and CD20-positive disease.

    Eligible patients were randomly assigned 1:1 to receive subcutaneous epcoritamab at 48 mg for up to twelve 28-day cycles in combination with intravenous rituximab and oral lenalidomide or rituximab and lenalidomide alone.2,3 Patients in both arms received rituximab at 375 mg/m2 for up to 5 cycles and lenalidomide at 20 mg for up to 12 cycles.2

    The coprimary end points were best overall response (BOR) rate and PFS. Secondary end points included complete response (CR) rate, overall survival, minimal residual disease negativity rate, change in Functional Assessment of Cancer Therapy–Lymphoma scale, investigator-assessed PFS, investigator-assessed BOR rate, investigator-assessed CR rate, duration of CR, time to disease progression, and event-free survival.

    In terms of safety, findings from the interim analysis showed that the safety profile of epcoritamab plus rituximab and lenalidomide in patients with relapsed/refractory follicular lymphoma was consistent with the known safety profiles of the individual regimens.1 Notably, no new safety signals were reported.

    In June 2024, the FDA approved epcoritamab monotherapy for the treatment of patients with relapsed/refractory follicular lymphoma after at least 2 lines of systemic therapy.4 The approval was supported by findings from the phase 1/2 EPCORE NHL-1 trial (Study GCT3013-01; NCT03625037), which demonstrated that patients who received the agent (n = 127) achieved an ORR of 82% (95% CI, 74.1%-88.2%).

    The FDA has also granted breakthrough therapy designation to the combination of epcoritamab plus rituximab and lenalidomide for the treatment of adult patients with relapsed/refractory lymphoma who received at least 1 prior line of treatment.1

    Additional data from the interim analysis of EPCORE FL-1 will be submitted for presentation at the 2025 ASH Annual Meeting and Exposition, according to Genmab.The findings will also serve as the basis for global regulatory submissions.

    References

    1. Genmab announces phase 3 EPCORE FL-1 clinical trial met dual primary endpoints in patients with relapsed/refractory (R/R) follicular lymphoma (FL). News release. Genmab. August 7, 2025. Accessed August 7, 2025. https://ir.genmab.com/news-releases/news-release-details/genmab-announces-phase-3-epcorer-fl-1-clinical-trial-met-dual
    2. Study of subcutaneous epcoritamab in combination with intravenous rituximab and oral lenalidomide (R2) to assess adverse events and change in disease activity in adult participants with follicular lymphoma (EPCORE FL-1). ClinicalTrials.gov. Updated July 28, 2025. Accessed August 7, 2025. https://clinicaltrials.gov/study/NCT05409066
    3. Falchi L, Morschhauser F, Linton K, et al. EPCORE FL-1: phase 3 trial of subcutaneous epcoritamab with rituximab and lenalidomide (R 2) Vs R 2 alone in patients with relapsed or refractory follicular lymphoma. Blood. 2023;142(suppl 1):3053. doi:10.1182/blood-2023-180092
    4. FDA grants accelerated approval to epcoritamab-bysp for relapsed or refractory follicular lymphoma. FDA. June 26, 2024. Accessed August 7, 2025. https://www.fda.gov/drugs/resources-information-approved-drugs/fda-grants-accelerated-approval-epcoritamab-bysp-relapsed-or-refractory-follicular-lymphoma

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  • Trump calls for Intel boss Lip-Bu Tan to resign over alleged China ties

    Trump calls for Intel boss Lip-Bu Tan to resign over alleged China ties

    President Donald Trump has called on the head of US chipmaker Intel to resign “immediately”, accusing him of having problematic ties to China.

    In a social media post, he said CEO Lip-Bu Tan was “highly conflicted”, apparently referring to Mr Tan’s alleged investments in companies that the US says are tied to the Chinese military. It is unusual for a president to demand the resignation of a corporate executive.

    Intel, which has received billions of dollars from the government to support semiconductor manufacturing in the US, did not respond to a request for comment.

    Mr Tan was appointed in March to turn around the tech giant, as it fell behind China and other competitors in chips development.

    A naturalised US citizen born in Malaysia and raised in Singapore, he is a venture capitalist well-known for his expertise in the semiconductor industry.

    In an update to investors this week, he said the firm would be scaling back its investments in manufacturing, including in the US, to match demand from customers. Intel has already cut thousands of jobs this year as part of an effort to “right-size” the firm.

    Shares in Intel fell more than 3% by midday after the attack from Trump, who has been critical of the firm previously and is preparing to raise tariffs on the chip industry.

    “The CEO of INTEL is highly CONFLICTED and must resign, immediately. There is no other solution to this problem,” Trump wrote.

    It is not illegal for Americans to invest in Chinese firms.

    But Washington has ramped up restrictions since Trump’s first term, as it pushes to break business ties between the US and China when it comes to advanced technology, as both Democrats and Republicans openly worry about national security.

    Trump’s attack took up concerns aired by Republican Senator Tom Cotton this week in a letter to Intel’s board that said Mr Tan’s “associations raise questions about Intel’s ability” to be a “responsible steward of American taxpayer dollars and to comply with applicable security regulations”.

    Cotton pointed to Mr Tan’s role as the longtime chief executive of tech firm Cadence Design Systems, which pleaded guilty in July and agreed to pay $140m over US charges that its subsidiary in China had repeatedly done business with the country’s National University of Defense Technology, violating US export controls.

    Mr Tan himself was not indicted.

    In a statement earlier this week, Intel defended its relatively new chief executive, saying Mr Tan and the company were “deeply committed to the national security of the US and the integrity of our role in the US defense ecosystem”.

    Industry expert Patrick Moorhead, founder of Moor Insights & Strategy, said he thought Trump was using the controversy over Mr Tan’s ties to China to put pressure on Intel over some other issue. He pointed to potential disputes about Intel’s investments in the US and reports of a possible partnership with Taiwanese firm TSMC backed by the White House.

    “It’s apparent to me that there was some negotiation amongst the two that Trump didn’t like,” he said. “Trump probably saw, ‘Ok, I’ve got an opportunity to turn up the heat with Intel on this’.”

    Trump is known for targeting business leaders with public criticism to a degree unheard of with other presidents. But, even by his standards, the demand that the leader of a private company resign is extraordinary.

    Mr Moorhead said other tech executives who had found themselves in Trump’s crosshairs had come up with ways to “kiss the ring”, pointing to promises from firms such as Apple and OpenAI to make large investments in the US.

    “Intel probably misread the room on how important it was to get in and be visible with the White House,” he said.

    Responding to critics who said Trump had gone too far, the White House told the BBC: “President Trump remains fully committed to safeguarding our country’s national and economic security. This includes ensuring that iconic American companies in cutting-edge sectors are led by men and women who Americans can trust.”

    Mr Tan’s ties to China had been spotlighted in a 2024 congressional report examining links between US investment firms and Chinese businesses.

    They were also the subject of a Reuters investigation in April, which found that he had invested at least $200 in hundreds of Chinese companies, some of which are linked to the Chinese military. The investments were made either personally or though his funds between 2012 and December 2024.

    Republican Senator Bernie Moreno, a Trump ally, took up the attack on Mr Tan on Thursday, criticising Intel for delays in its plans for chip manufacturing in the US.

    But the clash with Trump could add to the challenges the firm, along with US chip manufacturing, currently faces.

    “Intel has been a hope for America to build out more chip capacity and has struggled to do so to date,” said Janet Egan, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. “It’s important that we get continuity of leadership to support that ramping up of capacity.”

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  • The Outlook for Global Solar Energy Continues to Be Bright

    The Outlook for Global Solar Energy Continues to Be Bright

    Second, solar energy’s marginal fuel costs are zero, meaning that it costs nothing to produce every additional unit of electricity beyond the original cost of installing the panels and the ongoing cost of maintaining them.

    Third, solar panels are modular: They come in small sizes available at constant fixed prices, making it easier to create a decentralized grid. In contrast, thermal or nuclear power stations are usually large with high fixed costs.

    Bottlenecks in solar panel supply are unlikely, in part because there is plenty of excess capacity in the sector, with China’s production potential alone covering 200% of global demand in 2024. “Any slowing in solar growth is likely to come from reduced policy support and from power supply volatility rather than from solar panel supply bottlenecks,” says Struyven.

     

    This material is provided in conjunction with the associated video/audio content for convenience.  The content of this material may differ from the associated video/audio and Goldman Sachs is not responsible for any errors in the material. The views expressed in this material are not necessarily those of Goldman Sachs or its affiliates. This material should not be copied, distributed, published, or reproduced, in whole or in part, or disclosed by any recipient to any other person. The information contained in this material does not constitute a recommendation from any Goldman Sachs entity to the recipient, and Goldman Sachs is not providing any financial, economic, legal, investment, accounting, or tax advice through this program or to its recipient. Neither Goldman Sachs nor any of its affiliates makes any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the statements or any information contained in this material and any liability therefore (including in respect of direct, indirect, or consequential loss or damage) is expressly disclaimed.

    © 2025 Goldman Sachs. All rights reserved.

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  • Trump calls for resignation of Intel chief a day after 100% chip tariff threat | Trump tariffs

    Trump calls for resignation of Intel chief a day after 100% chip tariff threat | Trump tariffs

    Donald Trump has called on Intel’s chief executive to resign, alleging Lip-Bu Tan had ties to the Chinese Communist party, sending the stock of the US chipmaker falling.

    “The CEO of Intel is highly CONFLICTED and must resign, immediately,” Trump posted on Truth Social about Tan. “There is no other solution to this problem. Thank you for your attention to this problem!”

    Shares in Intel dropped more than 3% in early trading. The company did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Trump’s post.

    Trump’s comments came a day after he threatened a 100% tariff on imported semiconductors and chips, which could favor Intel as a US-based semiconductor firm.

    Trump did exclude Taiwan Semiconductor and Apple, companies that have said they plan to increase their investments in US manufacturing.

    Apple chief Tim Cook announced from the White House that the company would invest $100bn in US chip fabrication.

    Trump’s criticism of Intel, which has lagged chipmakers such as Nvidia in producing graphics-processing chips suitable for AI applications, comes after Arkansas senator Tom Cotton wrote a letter to company chairman Frank Yeary expressing concern over Tan’s investments and ties to semiconductor firms that are reportedly linked to the CCP and the People’s Liberation Army, the party’s military arm.

    Cotton, a Republican, asked Intel’s board if Tan had divested his interests and questioned if Tan’s previous leadership of Cadence Design Systems, a company that last month said it had sold products to China’s National University of Defense Technology, a violation of US export controls.

    Cotton said Tan controlled dozens of Chinese companies, at least eight of which had ties to the People’s Liberation Army.

    In a statement, the company said: “Intel and Mr Tan are deeply committed to the national security of the United States and the integrity of our role in the US defense ecosystem. We appreciate Senator Cotton’s focus on these shared priorities. We look forward to addressing these matters with the senator.”

    Tan, 65, is regarded as an industry veteran in technology and venture capital. He was tapped to lead the once-dominant personal computing and laptop chipmaker in March as part of a turnaround effort. Intel’s market valuation is about $89bn, compared with $4.4tn for rival Nvidia.

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    Tan, 65, has said he wants to sell off Intel assets that are not core to the company’s revitalization, cut jobs and to delay or cancel projects to reduce operating expenses. Intel has received about $8bn from the Chips and Science Act for US investments, the Biden-era legislation framed as a national security imperative to reduce US dependence on foreign chip production.

    A number of foreign-based chipmakers have recently announced they are boosting US chip production , including Taiwan’s TSMC and South Korea’s Samsung.

    Beneficiaries of the Chips Act besides Intel include TSMC, Micron Technology, Samsung, GlobalFoundries and Texas Instruments. But the $1bn grants are dwarfed by more than $400bn in pledged private-sector investments.

    The Trump administration wants Congress to scrap the Chips Act, arguing that tariffs are a more effective incentive for companies to build fabrication plants on US soil, pointing to TSMC’s decision to expand its chipmaking capacity from three to six plants in Arizona.

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  • Children’s Diets Primarily Made Up of Ultra-Processed Foods, Finds CDC

    Children’s Diets Primarily Made Up of Ultra-Processed Foods, Finds CDC

    In the newest edition of a report that the CDC uses to provide estimates on the percentage of ultra-processed food that Americans consume each year, the results were enlightening for both children and adults in the country. About 62% of children’s and teens’ daily calories are coming from ultra-processed foods, closely followed by adults, who have an intake that equals about 53% of their daily calories, according to the report.1,2

    Ultra-processed foods made up 63% of children’s and teens’ daily calorie intake according to a CDC report | Image credit: colorcocktail – stock.adobe.com

    The report is part of HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr’s continued initiative to reduce the amount of ultra-processed food in the United States. The secretary of HHS has previously talked about his goals of reducing the number as much as possible, including asking for food companies to stop using certain food dyes in their products.3 Kennedy has also pointed to ultra-processed foods as the cause of the “chronic disease epidemic” in America, believing that a reduction in the consumption of such foods would lead to a healthier country.

    “Ultra-processed foods” has become a catch-all phrase for foods that require involved methods to produce them or foods that are synthesized with other compounds, which can help them last longer on the grocery store shelf. Ultra-processed foods can include foods like frozen pizza and instant noodles but also store-bought bread.4 Previous reviews have found that there is a link between ultra-processed foods and mortality from any cause, including heart disease and mental health conditions.

    The CDC report aimed to assess how many people in America were consuming these ultra-processed foods, as it could enlighten the government and the people of the US alike on how much work needed to be done to reduce the intake of these foods. The report was based on the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey that was conducted between August 2021 and August 2023.1 The definition of ultra-processed food was based on the NOVA classification developed in Brazil, which classifies ultra-processed foods as those that are industrial creations that are made with little whole food.

    Burgers, hot dogs, and peanut butter and jelly sandwiches were among the top sources of ultra-processed foods in children and adults, according to the report. Salty snacks, sugary drinks, and baked goods were also among the most frequently cited sources of ultra-processed food consumption. Those with higher incomes also tended to eat fewer ultra-processed foods compared with those with lower incomes.

    “Although youth and adults consumed the majority of their calories from ultra-processed foods in the past decade, a decrease was seen in ultra-processed food consumption among youth and adults between 2017–2018 and August 2021–August 2023, and a decrease was seen among adults from 2013–2014 to August 2021–August 2023,” the CDC reported.1

    Marketing, said Marion Nestle, professor emerita of nutrition, food studies, and public health at New York University, is a foundational part of decreasing use of ultra-processed foods, as most foods are marketed toward kids. “They’re seen as cool and are iconic and you’re lucky to eat them, because that’s how they’re marketed,” she said in a statement.2

    The new report emphasizes the need to reduce ultra-processed foods in the diets of Americans but necessitates that experts pick out the actual harmful ultra-processed foods rather than all such foods, as some ultra-processed foods are beneficial. However, as the majority of ultra-processed foods can be harmful, it’s important to define which foods carry health risks as the administration moves toward lowering the number of ultra-processed foods in the diets of all Americans.

    References

    1. Williams AM, Couch CA, Emmerich SD, Ogburn DF. Ultra-processed Food Consumption in Youth and Adults: United States, August 2021–August 2023. NCHS Data Brief. 2025;536:1-11. https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db536.htm

    2. Lovelace B Jr. Ultra-processed foods make up the majority of kids’ diet, CDC report finds. NBC News. August 7, 2025. Accessed August 7, 2025. https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/ultra-processed-foods-make-majority-kids-diet-cdc-report-finds-rcna223481

    3. Nowell C. Inside RFK Jr’s conflicted attempt to rid America of junk food. The Guardian. July 8, 2025. Accessed August 7, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/jul/08/rfk-jr-junk-food

    4. MacMillan C. Ultraprocessed foods: are they bad for you? Yale Medicine. July 10, 2024. Accessed August 7, 2025. https://www.yalemedicine.org/news/ultraprocessed-foods-bad-for-you

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  • Fundraiser, philanthropist, PGA TOUR Golf Course Advisory Board member Jim McGlothlin dies at age 85

    Fundraiser, philanthropist, PGA TOUR Golf Course Advisory Board member Jim McGlothlin dies at age 85

    Born June 18, 1940, in Grundy, Virginia, where the Mountain Mission School is located, McGlothlin received his undergraduate and law degrees from the College of William & Mary. McGlothlin founded the United Company, based in Blountville, Tennessee, in 1970 as a coal production company. It later diversified its four-state operations into oil and gas exploration services, investment management services and real estate development. He sold the company in 1997 but later repurchased it seven years later.

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  • Zimmer Biomet raises annual profit forecast on lower tariff impact – Reuters

    1. Zimmer Biomet raises annual profit forecast on lower tariff impact  Reuters
    2. ZBH Stock Gains On Q2 Earnings and Revenue Beat, ’25 EPS View Up  TradingView
    3. Zimmer Biomet raises annual profit forecast on strong demand for medical devices  Reuters
    4. Zimmer is latest medtech firm to lower expected tariff hit  MedTech Dive
    5. Zimmer Biomet Announces Second Quarter 2025 Financial Results  Morningstar

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